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Abstract
This  study  examines  the  transaction  of  the  lived  experience  of  ‘suffering’  in  the 
process of psychotherapy. ‘Suffering’ is conceptualised as having its weight and value 
transacted between a psychotherapist  and his  or  her  client.  As a  psychotherapist 
from a family with a disabled member, my fieldwork in a hospital with the parents of 
disabled  children  was  conducted  in  Taiwan.  The  development  of  our  therapeutic 
relationship was discovered as the process of ‘suffering transaction’: the interaction 
of lived experience of suffering between my clients and myself.
Two clients took part in this study in which eight to ten sessions of counselling or 
psychotherapy were conducted and transcribed as the research data. The data also 
included my lived experience, which was made explicit  in this  field work through 
records of six sessions of therapeutic supervision and my self-reflective therapeutic 
diary and research journal. Inspired by Gee’s (2000) work on data presentation, my 
understanding of client’s stories is represented as poetic form. Reflections from the 
use of reflexivity explore the inter-correlations of ‘suffering’ between us.
The  theoretical  perspective  informing  the  further  analysis  of  this  study  is 
hermeneutic phenomenology and social suffering. The socio-cultural embodiments in 
language  are  explored  as  the  hermeneutic  horizons  of  the  theme  of  suffering 
transaction. Politically, the development of ‘early intervention’ in Taiwan creates as 
‘unjust’  context  for  those  encountering  medical  services,  and  this  shared 
understanding  of  the  medical  bureaucracy  influenced  the  psychotherapeutic 
encounter.  The  analysis  also  explores  the  influence  of  Confucian  approaches  to 
gender difference and family ethics, and Christian religious beliefs, in relation to the 
self-identification of my clients in suffering for other. These three horizons indicate 
that searching for the meaning of suffering is an inter-subjective process that entails 
taking the responsibility for the ‘Other’ as the symbolic socio-cultural body.
The thesis concludes with discussion about the ethics of the therapeutic relationship. 
I argue that in psychotherapy, both therapist and client are engaged in the Levinasian 
idea of the primordial responsibility ‘for’ the other. In the context of wider debates 
about psychotherapy as an ethical practice, I argue that a therapist has the pre-moral 
position of not only witnessing client’s lived experience of suffering but also being 
witnessed by  the  client.  This  study  provides  an  example  in  which  the  context  of 
‘witness’ is inter-subjectively developed in psychotherapy.
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Chapter 1 Encounter Suffering
1.1 Encounter Suffering 
In the autumn of 2001, on my first day of work as a paediatric psychologist, I found 
myself preparing an unfamiliar developmental assessment of a mentally disabled 
six-year-old boy. I felt nervous because I was embarking upon the first practice of 
my clinical  work in the paediatric  department,  which required that,  for  the first 
time, I formally perform this clinical test alone. When the father of my client, Mr. K, 
led him into the assessment room, I was stunned because the six-year-old was tiny 
and appeared to be much younger, as if he was only a two-year-old baby. 
The assessment used for the boy was Bayley Scales for Infant Development (BSID-
II), was particularly designed for infants younger than three-years-old and did not fit 
my client’s age. However, it could translate his general development into developing 
scores, which I could then analogise the scores with a healthy baby’s development. 
The assessment was done quickly. The boy could not sit up by himself; he did not 
have enough muscle tension to crawl and there was no intention in his eyes when 
directed  to  trace  an  object  and  sound.  Based  on  my  client’s  underdeveloped 
responses his diagnosis was so apparent that anyone could foresee the evaluation 
result, even Mr. K: The boy would be labelled as a permanently disabled child with 
‘severe mental and developmental retardation’ in the Taiwanese medical service. 
This diagnosis had confirmed that, combined with neurological and psychological 
assessments, his global development ceased in the second year of his life; as had 
his cognitive and psycho-social functions. As I performed my assessment, I saw how 
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a  formal  procedure  revealed  intimate  details  concerning  a  disabled  child’s 
relationship with his parent figure.
As a beginner practitioner, this process was quiet but astonishing. I was to be the 
one  who  had  to  confirm  the  boy’s  permanent  disability  and  announce  my 
assessment  result  to  the  parent  and  others  like  neurologists,  nurses  and  social 
workers. Since it was the first official psychological evaluation which could affect 
not  only  the  family’s  relationship  to  their  child,  but  also  their  social  welfare 
payments, I was especially careful and aware as I took every step of my evaluating 
work. I was very nervous that my mistakes could cause injury to this child and his 
family.     
During my assessment, I was quite impressed by how this father interacted with his 
son. The evaluation proceeded as two parts: firstly a questionnaire completed by 
the father concerning his own observations of his child and, secondly, my clinical 
interaction with the boy. During the assessment process, I laid the boy on a soft bed 
and let the father finish the questionnaire, and it was nice to see that the father 
seemed to have an intimate relationship with his son. When the boy laughed as I  
worked with him, although the father was busy writing the questionnaire, I saw that 
he was also listening to our interaction, for he smiled along with his son. When the  
boy  cried  because  I  moved  his  body  into  uncomfortable  positions,  the  father’s 
eyebrow twitched and his face appeared apologetic and encouraging, as he looked 
at his little boy. Standing between the father and son, I also observed these silent 
interactions,  which  were  so  natural  they  demonstrated  how  the  connection 
between  them  was  tight  and  close.  I  was  moved  by  the  atmosphere  of  both 
happiness and sorrow in this small medical space.
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Throughout this encounter I  found myself  asking questions about Mr.  K and my 
emotions  regarding this  interaction.  I  wondered why did  only  the father come? 
Where was the mother? What had the family experienced in the four years that had 
passed from when the boy was two until  now? When I watched the interaction 
between a small  boy who was to be diagnosed with mental  retardation and his 
solitary father, I held my sad curiosity and waited to know more about them until I  
officially  finished  the  assessment.  The  reason  for  my  curiosity  about  why  the 
mother was not there was cultural: in the Taiwanese patriarchal society it would 
most often be the mother as the main caregiver who would bring a child to the 
hospital. I later asked Mr. K about my client’s mother and found that the man also 
had four daughters and his wife died during the birth of this boy. I contemplated 
how, in order to have the ‘son’ for this family, the mother gave her life and thus the 
father had to bring up the four daughters and the boy alone. Mr. K shared that he 
knew the boy had stopped growing at the age of two but, before he entered my 
assessment room, could not find any medical explanation of his child’s disease. He 
had contacted famous doctors and different hospitals in Taiwan in order to find a 
pathological reason. However, he still had not received the answer and was getting 
used  to  the  response  ‘no  answer  yet’  when  asking  others  to  explain  his  son’s 
condition.
When I asked him how he could tolerate such long term and intense suffering in 
these four years, he gave me an impressive illustration: 
‘ My wife and I  expected a son for many years,  and finally  he came with his  
mother’s sacrifice. When I saw my son, I was amazed as I thought God handed me 
the brightest star from the sky. Although my wife is not with us, although my boy is  
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now different from other children, I am still grateful that God stopped my boy’s 
development in his most adorable and beautiful moment. God let me keep this  
brightest star forever.’ 
I remember that he made his statement calmly and with a smile. At that time, I  
felt his bliss and agony conveyed in these words. 
1.2 My Family
As a young psychologist,  I  was  overwhelmingly  attracted by Mr.  K's  contexts  of 
suffering because they directly reminded me of my own family experience. I too am 
from a family  with a  member who is  diagnosed as  having a permanent  mental  
disability. My aunt, my father’s youngest sister, is a Down’s syndrome patient with 
also has the diagnosis of moderate mental  retardation. She has lived with us for 
over 30 years. My father, with eight younger sisters and a brother in his generation,  
is the main caregiver of her since my grandfather, who had previously served as her 
caretaker, died three years before my birth. She is 17 years younger than my father 
and so she came to be regarded as my elder sister and one of my father’s children. 
Our family has changed dramatically during these 30 years. My grandmother died 
when I was the age of 9. My other seven aunts and the uncle left home and had 
their families. Then my two younger brothers and myself left to work away from 
home. As a result, our family has eventually become only three members at home: 
my parents and my aunt. 
I  have often wondered why my father chose to have her live with us instead of 
seeking the help of social welfare. Yet, as has never felt confident about the socio-
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political support in Taiwan, he never considered it to be an option. When I once 
asked my father about the situation, when he was affected by alcohol and able to 
share his life stories with me, he responded:  ‘God sent her to my mother, and my  
mother sent her to me’. However, I did not understand what he meant until I started 
working in a hospital. My experiences with parents of disabled children caused me 
to face parents like my father everyday and from these interactions I gradually came 
to understand my father’s words about his relationship with my aunt. In Mr. K’s 
case,  I  came to  realise  that  both  he  and  my father  have  accepted the  difficult 
challenge of having a lifelong dependent child; they have transformed their sadness 
into full support, and lived with it as part of their lives.
As  previously  stated,  my  aunt  has  always  been  like  an  elder  sister  to  me  and 
therefore I never called her ’aunt’ in the Chinese respective form but, rather, by 
name directly. When I was growing up, I started to notice the differences between 
us. I often saw her as being clumsy and awkward, and so I often bullied and teased 
her. As a result, we had less and less conversation. Until I was doing my psychology 
BA degree, with my acquired knowledge of developmental disabilities, I started to 
see her with a different perspective and began to feel close to her. In the year of my 
graduation in 1999, she and I had our first pleasant interaction and conversation. 
She showed me her personal ‘studying space’, which is in her room—a place I had 
never before wanted to enter. I found that she liked studying. Actually, she had once 
attended an institute of learning disability when I was around five to twelve years 
old, but quit it because of the maltreatment she suffered there. After leaving the 
institute, she kept the habit of reading daily newspapers, collecting her favourite 
articles and pasting them to her notebook. I saw that she had a desk and placed her 
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most important things in the right drawer of the desk. When she showed me her 
writings,  drawings  and  the  most  important  things  in  the  drawer,  I  found  two 
yellowing photos with other very old toys and used stationary. One photo was of 
herself  with my grandmother.  The other was herself  with me and my two little 
brothers; in this picture, I was five years old and my youngest brother was still a 
baby. With a sudden and shocking realisation, I then understood her relationship 
with me and my brothers to be one of the most important things in her life.
At this time, I recognised that this was also the first and most important lesson of 
my life:  ‘cherishing a relationship with the other’ is never contingent upon one’s 
intelligence. Even though my aunt’s mental age was only equal to a five-year-old 
child,  she  taught  me that  ‘cherish’  can  be  pure  and simple.  This  lesson  is  also 
important in my psychological practical work, as a medical professional’s support, 
care and trust between a family member and a child with lifelong mental disability 
should not be exclusively defined in relation to the child’s disease and disability. 
Despite her love for learning, in order to protect his little sister from maltreatment,  
my father decided to keep my aunt at home and has isolated her for many years. 
Therefore, when I started to work as a psychological professional, I got an increasing 
sense  of  both  the  reality  of  developmental  pathology  and  my  father’s  unjust 
educational attitude towards my aunt. My father was a teacher and still believes in 
his  old-class Confucian style  that  requires ‘a  teacher  (to be)  strict  otherwise  he 
shows his fall’. I was used to his teaching with physical punishments when I was a 
little child. Similarly, when my aunt made serious mistakes, my father had to correct 
her through physical contact. Being a son, nephew, and psychological professional, I 
always struggled to watch a five-year-old child in a 40-year-old body being punished 
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and crying loudly. All I could do was keep silent or just run away.
My concern for my aunt was an obscure thing in my interaction with my father 
because between them there was no margin into which I could insert my voice. At 
the same time, in my work in a paediatric department, due to my ‘professional’ 
position, I could directly influence another parent’s attitude towards his/her child. I 
feel  that  my  personal  history  enabled  me  to  deeply  understand  a  family’s 
experience of suffering in silence. Because of this, the alliance and trust between 
patients and myself  was always quickly secured. The frequent positive feedback 
from the parents with disabled children made me feel confident in my position and 
medical role. For me, in my field of work, what I could not do for my family could be 
done for the families like mine. I  found that the disappointment of ‘I cannot do 
anything’ was therefore amended in my practical works. Although there is still no 
space between my father and my aunt for me to express my disapproval, as I began 
and continued my practice as a paediatric psychologist, I found that, in this role, I 
was able to have a voice with other parents who interacted with their mentally 
disabled children. 
1.3 The History of Suffering in My Practical Work
As outlined above, my interest in ‘suffering’ was based on the personal struggles of  
my  family,  and  also,  as  discussed  in  this  section,  on  the  personal  growth  I 
experienced through my practical work as a psychotherapist in Taiwan. On the 21 st 
September 1999, a big earthquake with 6.9 scored by the Richter Scale occurred 
and caused the death of nearly 3,000 people in the middle region of Taiwan. At that 
7
time,  I  had just  graduated and was waiting for  my compulsory military  service.  
Because of this natural disaster, my military service was delayed and I was recruited 
as the main assistant to my ex-boss, who was the head of the Student Counselling 
Supporting Centre of the 921 Earthquake by the Taiwanese Ministry of Education 
and also my teacher in the BA course of Counselling and Psychotherapy. Due to the 
lack of therapists, I had to enter the disaster-hit area and do counselling work with 
the children who suffered from the damage caused by the earthquake. Therefore, 
my therapeutic practice, from the very beginning, started with an incredibly harsh 
situation in which I had to develop relationships with children who had lost limbs, 
siblings, friends and parents. As a result, as time went on, I found that the children’s 
painful  memories  and  the  scenes  composed  of  bloody  images  I  had  witnessed 
began to suddenly enter my mind without any preparation. I feared that this would 
affect my psychological practice. For the first time, I experienced ‘burn out’ as I was 
very depressed and disappointed with my difficulty with helping these suffering 
kids. I could not sleep as the violent images and children’s crying appeared when I 
closed my eyes at night. I soon realised that these stories from my work were too 
heavy for me to listen to. My ex-boss noticed my disappointment and depression, 
and  carefully  looked  after  my  feelings  and  how  they  affected/impacted 
relationships in my work. A year passed, and my child clients were much stronger in 
their life and so was I. From this work, I learned how the unbearable weight of life 
could be communicated through the experience of ‘suffering’. Also, I learned how 
this painful learning enabled myself to listen to the voice of suffering, from not only  
my clients but also myself as I struggled to comprehend and connect with the pain 
my clients experienced.
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In 2000, I experienced my first life threatening anxiety when I was engaging in my 
military  service  in  Taiwan.  I  was  23  years  old  and  sent  to  hospital  because  of 
fulminant hepatitis. My liver index was nearly 3,000—60 times higher than normal. 
I was tired, but felt no pain in my body as my liver had no neurons in it to produce  
any pain. I knew I was dying, but I could not feel the closeness of death from my  
awareness  of  my own  body.  The  only  way  to  know  my condition  was  through 
dialogue with medical professionals who shared how the results of the everyday 
blood test and the doses of medications demonstrated how in danger I  actually 
was. I felt a great sense of fear because I could not manage my body and death. I  
was disconnected from the physical suffering and yet tortured with the narrative 
suffering I encountered through the facts of medical tests and the words of medical  
professionals.  It  was  a  fact  I  could  not  feel.  I  was  afraid  of  sleeping  because  I 
doubted I would wake up. I phoned my friends and pretended I was prepared for 
the  possible  final  talk  I  would  have  with  them.  From  this  experience  of  dying 
without pain, I learned that my suffering was not relative to the fatal disease, but 
instead due to the fear of losing connection with my body and with my cherished 
others. 
The  particular  and  personal  suffering  I  experienced  enabled  me  to  better 
understand the complexity and consuming aspect of the suffering of others.  From 
2001 to 2005, I worked as a paediatric psychologist and had to explore the context  
of ‘disease’ and ‘suffering’, for a family like mine. In this work, I could balance with  
what was required of me as a Taiwanese professional in a particular cultural and 
political  context,  as  well  as  what  I  felt  was  necessary  on  a  more  intimate  and 
emotional  level  with  my clients  and their  families.  On the  one  hand,  I  labelled 
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children with diseases because their care was regulated by the Taiwanese public 
insurance and social welfare system and, as a result, medical benefits will only pay 
out if there is a confirmed ‘disease’. Accordingly, I needed to talk to the parents 
about their child’s disease because I had to ensure that psychological intervention 
was  located  in  the  structure  of  parents’  care,  social  support  and  governmental 
funding. On the other hand, I listened to their lived experience of ‘suffering’ as they 
described their everyday struggle with raising a child. The diagnosis of a disease 
confirms and facilitates the clinical actions for the sick child in which both the family 
and psychologist need to work within the medical and political reality in Taiwan. 
The  understanding  of  suffering  confirms  ‘our’  responsibility  for  the  child  in  the 
context of everyday worries, fears and anxiety. After my psychological evaluation, 
confirming a child’s disease not only could start a storyline of engaging in a medical  
process but also had the potential to re-write the storyline of a family’s life itself. I 
was  mindful  that  I  always  worked  with  political-medical  and  every-day-life 
languages in this professional work.
As mentioned earlier, my experience of ‘burn out’ in my first professional work with 
suffering children helped me use my therapeutic supervision as another eye to see 
how I correlated my client’s experience of suffering with my own life. My supervisor 
and I explored my relationship with clients and configured my relationships with my 
important ‘others’ such as my parents. This process inspired me to find the link 
between my ‘self’  and  ‘others’  and how this  link  influences  my own emotional 
balance. In this process, clients’ stories became the key so that my Pandora’s Box of  
memories  with others could be opened and the mutual  experience of  suffering 
could be connected with the psychotherapeutic praxes. As a result, I could see how 
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client’s stories touched me because I could find the similarities between others’ life 
experiences and my own. Clearly, parts of my ‘self’ had been reflected in my client's  
stories. From seeing the ‘Self’ in their stories, I could relate to their suffering as if I  
were a member of their personal lives. For me, the subject of ‘suffering’ reflects not 
only my relationship with clients but also my relationship with others in my own 
life. In therapy, we encounter suffering, as Rogers (1967), Yalom (1980, 2001) and 
Schmid (2004) emphasised. Both client and therapist use their ‘selves’ to relate to 
‘others’  so  that  the  meaning  of  suffering  can  be  constructed  throughout  this 
process.
My  clinical  work  as  a  paediatric  psychologist  was  conducted  under  Taiwanese 
medical  politics in which a patient used the national  insurance for psychological 
treatments  or  interventions.  The  term  ‘psychotherapy’  or  ‘counselling’  had  its 
political background in which the medical context of a child’s ‘disease’ is intervened 
and  expected  to  be  recovered.  Therefore,  my  therapeutic  training  of  being  a 
person-centred or child-centred therapist had to be prioritised after the significance 
of  a  child’s  behavioural  change.  However,  the  context  of  suffering  is  not  the 
recovery  of  a  ‘disease’  or  the  progression  from  a  ‘symptom’;  rather,  from  a 
humanistic perspective (Rogers, 1967; Yalom, 1980, 2001; Schmid, 2004), ‘suffering’ 
is about how it has been encountered between human beings. Engaging in a client’s 
experience of suffering with person-centred or behavioural-change approach is a 
methodological  consideration,  whilst  being  reflexive  to  the  experience  of 
‘encounter  suffering’  is  an  ontological  and  ethical  reflection.  The  context  of 
suffering does  not  matter  with what  a  patient’s  disease is  or  how he has  been 
treated, but matter with how it has been encountered between one and an-other.
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As mentioned earlier, in my clinical work, my clients and I  shared our history of  
common lived experience, in which we all lived with a close family member who 
was disabled and working with parent had always caused me to re-examine my 
relationship with my parents. In this thesis, I aim to further explore my relationship 
with suffering through my life experiences and my interaction with the life stories of 
my clients. I do this so that I can demonstrate how our own historical context of 
everyday suffering interacts with others’ lived experience with suffering. Because of 
the  intrapersonal  responsibility  involved  in  therapeutic  action,  my  clients’  lived 
experience became the stories of suffering and my lived experience with suffering 
was  embedded  in  my  response  to  them.  Interpersonally,  we  used  the  other’s 
language to recall our un-contextualised experience of suffering.  The aim of this 
research is to explore this interaction of psychotherapy, in which I use ‘transaction’ 
to describe the exchange of the history of suffering.
Precisely, before our therapeutic engagement, both clients’ and my own experience 
were  fragment  and  unvoiced;  within  the  therapeutic  encounter,  ‘suffering’  was 
given its meaning in the therapeutic process of listening and mutual understanding, 
in which each client and I ‘encountered’ the other’s experience of suffering. Our 
mutual responsibility awoke each other’s lived experience and ‘transacted’ into the 
language  for  the  other.  Through  this  research,  I  hope  to  introduce  and further 
discover the process of ‘suffering transaction’. 
1.4 Querying ‘Suffering’ and Setting the Structure of this Research
Accordingly,  in this study, I  will  further explore the suffering transaction through 
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literature and the exploration of questions, which would set up a brief structure of 
this research. To elaborate the humanistic concerns in my paediatric clinical work, I  
started from Frank’s  (1995) debate  of  ‘can we research suffering?’  and ‘what  is 
‘suffering’?’ Can  it  be  really  excluded  from  the  medical  context  of  illness  and 
disease? From my empirical learning, an illness or disease is an integral part of the 
experience of suffering but should not be analogised as the cumulative experience 
of suffering. The language of illness and disease are medical, used for conversation 
between  and  with  medical  professionals,  who  form  a  diagnostic  context  of  a 
patient’s body. However, one may not use ‘illness’ or ‘disease’ in his/her everyday 
communication with others. The ‘everydayness’, the context and method through 
which one lives with the difficulty of his or her life, is subjective to oneself as s/he 
interprets their own body and communicates their everyday lived experience with 
others. Exploring ‘suffering’ by its medical contexts alone may simplify the richness 
inside of  it.  For instance,  in the Taiwanese slang,  ‘eating suffering’  is  like eating 
‘tonic’;  the  term  ‘suffering’  can  be  culturally  equalised  as  a  ‘food’  which  can 
strengthen one’s  body and life.  In the Western philosophy of  Existentialism and 
Eastern Buddhism, ‘life’ itself is termed as a collective body of suffering. From a 
political  and sociological  point of  view, the ways a  society functions  through its 
support  and welfare policy  also influence individuals’  usage of  his/her everyday 
‘language’  to  communicate  with  others.  Therefore,  beyond  a  strictly  medical 
perspective, there is a cultural, social and political richness in one’s experience of 
‘suffering’. In my effort to answer the question of what suffering is, I hope I can also 
reveal the complexity of it.
Secondly, I want to understand how the experience of ‘suffering’ can be met as 
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‘suffering’ by interpersonal encounter.  How could the experience of suffering be 
contextualised as a subjective language and understood by others? As reflected, 
suffering is not regarded as the context of recovery from a certain disease or by a 
certain therapeutic perspective, rather, it is considered as an ethical reflection on 
the process of its encounter. To explore this ontological concern, I took a Levinisian 
account that one’s experience of  suffering is interactive;  it  has an ‘Other’ to be 
suffering for while one’s language of suffering is produced by an-other’s encounter 
and understanding. Through the  therapeutic  actions of understanding others, the 
experience of suffering is contextualised and developed by ‘two people’: one speaks 
and the other  understands  and responds for  him.  The ‘transaction’  of  suffering 
means how experience of suffering could become the context of inter-subjective 
mutual understanding.
To  explore  these two research  intentions,  this  thesis  will  be  presented in  three 
parts.  The  first  part  in  Chapter  Two will  be  the ontological  and epistemological 
exploration of suffering and its transaction. In this chapter, literature about illness 
and disease will be reviewed. The socio-cultural perspective of human suffering will  
be elaborated and related to the epistemological terms of suffering transaction. The 
second part in Chapters Three and Four will serve as the methodological discussion 
about how I have considered my research questions and the methodological issues 
of conducting this research. In Chapter Three, the setting of data generation and 
relative ethical  concern will  be discussed and I  will  explain how I  addressed my 
fieldwork of therapeutic practice in Taiwan and coped with the ethical issues that 
manifested  in  the  process  of  it.  In  Chapter  Four,  as  suffering  is  experienced  in 
various ways,  the ways in which language conveys the experience must also be 
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considered. As I utilize a narrative-based exploration in my Taiwanese therapeutic 
practice, I look forms of narrative in order to communicate the intersection of my 
clients’  experience  with  suffering  with  my own through my personal  use  of  re-
presentation.
The  final  part  of  this  research  will  be  about  my  data  representation,  analysis,  
discussion and conclusion. Chapters Five and Six will reveal the representation of 
my fieldwork with two clients in Taiwan, in which the transcripts of the therapeutic 
practices  will  be  collated  and  reflected.  The  Chapters  Seven  and  Eight  will  be 
dedicated to further analyses of the cultural and ethical issues in the therapeutic 
interactions between myself and my clients. In Chapter Nine, as the final chapter, I  
will discuss the findings of this study and the possible contributions to the realm of 
psychotherapy and counselling.
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Chapter 2 The Window of Suffering and its Transaction
2.1 Introduction
Suffering  in  English,  according  to  the  Cambridge  Advance  Learner’s  Dictionary 
(2008), can be defined as one’s experience of physical or mental pain or, as a verb, 
to experience or show the effects of something uncomfortable or bad. One can be 
suffering ‘from’ a difficult event, pain or disease or ‘for’ a specific other who causes 
the situation for  the sufferer.  In Chinese,  suffering is  written as ‘ 苦 (Ku)’,  which 
structures its upper side (艸) as the ‘herb’ and the down side '古' as ‘oldness or the 
past’.  It  is  used both in the description of one’s experience of suffering and the 
bitterness of a food or medicine. According to the Chinese Dictionary (2001) edited 
by the Taiwanese Ministry of Education, as a noun, suffering can be meant as the 
experience of illness and disease; as a verb, it can be used to perplex, as a puzzle, or 
as a painful and strict living experience. In both languages, ‘suffering’ is similarly  
presented  as  a  difficult  living  experience  involving  pain  and/or  illness  but, 
differently,  the sense of  ‘bitterness’   is  embedded in  Chinese and is  not  meant 
dualistically as physical or psychological.
In this chapter, ontology and epistemology regarding to suffering and its transaction 
will  be  discussed.   In  2.2,  I  will  begin  my  discussion  by  reviewing  the  relative 
literature concerning the distinction between pain, illness, disease and suffering in 
which the Cartesian pragmatic interpretation of  pain,  illness and disease will  be 
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reviewed  and  discussed.  Based  on  the  argument  that  suffering  can  be  better 
empirically  approached,  in  2.3,  I  will  review  the  contribution  of  medical 
anthropologists who argue that suffering is socially constructed. ‘Social Suffering’, 
an alternative angle of seeing human experience, will also be addressed, in which 
suffering  can  be  termed  as  the  consequence  of  interpersonal  social  activities, 
political  behaviours  and  cultural  customs.  They  will  support  the  way  in  which 
suffering is in its nature a socio-cultural construction and contextualisation.
Following the anthropological framework, I will provide a perspective of myself in 
my own culture. In 2.4, I will present a non-western perspective of suffering from a 
Buddhist point of view; in doing so, I will contend that suffering is also termed as 
social,  interpersonal  and  ethical.  This  perspective  also  argues  that  suffering  is 
‘unspeakable’  and  unable  to  be  defined.  In  addition,  Buddhist  arguments  that 
suffering is a matter of ethics will be presented. 
In 2.5, the moral perspective of suffering by the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas will 
be reviewed as he approaches suffering as the unavoidable responsibility for the 
‘Other’.  In  a  postmodern  context,  he  constructed  suffering  as  the  ethics  and 
morality based on the relationship between self and others. I will review his articles 
and, due to the similarity to Chinese Daoism, I will inter-correlate the two thoughts 
and ground the debates of suffering as the inevitable ethical burden for the Other.
Suffering transaction, following the above discussions, is based on how suffering is 
experienced and contextualised in the relationship with the Other. In 2.6, the term 
‘transaction’ will be redefined. After reviewing the objectification and development 
of current psychotherapeutic and counselling studies, this research will be defined 
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as an empirically-based study, and the research aim  will be shaped by re-examining 
psychotherapy as a professional practice and reiterate it as an ethical practice. By 
reviewing the relevant literature, how suffering is given meaning in the relationship 
between therapist and client will be illustrated as the main focus of this research. 
Therapy will be redefined as a moral movement to discover the process of suffering 
transaction in psychotherapy. The conclusion of this chapter will connect with the 
next part of this research, the methodological concern.
2.2 Illness, Disease and the Medicalisation of Suffering
In  early  psychological  theory,  influenced  by  the  necessity  of  pragmatism,  the 
concept of suffering was developed through its linguistic attachment to the terms 
‘pain’ and ‘disease’.  In 1664, Jene Descarte defined ‘suffering’ as ‘suffering of mind’ 
and ‘suffering of body’ and also outlined his theory of the mechanism of physical 
pain in his book ‘The Treatise of Man’ (1664, 1972). Since then, the dualistic ideas 
about pain have been widely adopted for approaching the treatment of pain as 
purely  physiological  because  suffering  is  too  subjective  (Bendelow  &  Williams, 
1995;  Cassell,  1982)  and diagnosing pain is  a  clear  way of  diagnosing suffering. 
Therefore,  mind-body  dualism  has  influenced  the  approach  objectifying  human 
‘suffering’. According to Wilkinson (2001), before the 1960s, defining suffering in 
contradistinction to pain for researchers is a ‘well-established tradition’ as ‘pain is 
more objective than suffering’ (Finn, 1986). Wilkinson (2005) argued that, up until 
the mid-1960s, western conceptions of pain were dominated by the understanding 
that this bodily sensation results from a noxious physical stimulus transmitting pain 
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along a path way to the brain (Wilkinson, 2005; Horn & Munafo, 1997). Medical 
practitioners believe that to remove pain is to remove suffering (Cassell, 1982) and 
therefore  the  ‘conquest  of  pain’  (Fairley,  1978)  becomes  the  ultimate  goal  of 
medical praxis. 
By  making  a  clear  distinction  between  the  concepts  of  ‘disease’  and  ‘illness’, 
Toombs (1992) argued that ‘disease’ is more accurate than ‘illness’ in representing 
an  individual's  body  condition,  especially  in  the  medical  practice  field.  ‘Illness’ 
means one’s feeling of being sick with an inability to control his/her body and pain, 
whilst ‘disease’ is termed as the objective description based on a bio-medical model 
in  which  one’s  lived  experience  is  removed  in  order  to  avoid  diagnosing  bias. 
Disease, specialised by medical  practice, is  therefore developed as the ‘practical 
knowledge’ in which individuals’ lived experience can be diagnosed, measured and 
controlled and therefore the experience of suffering is simplified as the rationality 
in which ‘reducing pain is reducing suffering’. 
Cartesian  positivism  separated  pain  and  suffering:  ‘pain’  is  approached  as  a 
technological  quest  to master  an ‘objective’  bodily  sensation while  ‘suffering’  is 
represented  as  a  ‘subjective’  matter  of  moral  conscience,  cultural  outlook  and 
personal psychology (Amato, 1994; Illich, 1976; Wilkinson, 2001). While ‘pain’ can 
be conceptualised as a measurement and a location within one’s body, bodily pain 
and mental suffering cannot be clearly separated. Mental disease is given a space in 
the field of medical practice. From the 1960s, researchers of social science have 
become  increasingly  alert  to  ways  in  which  the  sensation  of  pain  cannot  be 
explained  in  exclusively  physiological  terms,  to  a  point  where  the  conceptual 
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dichotomy between pain and suffering is obscured (Wilkinson, 2001). Since stronger 
correlation  between  human  emotions  and  neurological  responses,  non-
physiological  suffering  is  thereby  conceptualised  as  the  sum  of  measurable 
physiological and psychological responses (Gantt, 2001; Wilkinson 2005) and can be 
‘medicalised’  as  deviant  responses,  like  emotional  disturbance,  anxiety  and 
depression,  and  clinical  symptoms,  such  as  particular  physical  conditions,  daily 
behaviours and irrational cognitions (Conrad & Schneider, 1980; Leisieur & Blume, 
1987; Gantt, 2001;  Summerfield, 2004) . The medical model locates the source of  
deviant behaviours within the individual, postulating a physiological, constitutional 
organic,  or  physiogenetic  agent  or  condition  that  is  assumed  to  cause  the 
behavioural  deviance,  and  mandates  intervention  by  medical  personnel  within 
medical means as treatment for the illness (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). Leisieur 
and  Blume  (1987)  regarded  the  medical  model  of  psychological  practice  as  an 
approach  designed  to  produce  clinical  change.  It  is  a  way  to  conceptualise,  or 
organise and deliver assistance to an individual suffering from an illness, to families 
affected  by  a  sick  member,  and  to  communities  grappling  with  the  destructive 
effects of a disease (Leisieur & Blume, 1987). In this medical model, psychological  
suffering is termed as the part  of mental  illness;  the ‘conquest of suffering’  has 
therefore become the ambition of modern positivistic research. 
The development of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM) 
is  a  clear  example  which  ‘psychologicalises’  human  existence  of  suffering  and 
‘medicalises’ the experience of suffering. In 1952, the first edition of the DSM was 
published  by  the  American  Psychiatric  Association  (APA)  and  is  now  being 
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developed into its fifth edition1. As the most important psychiatric textbook which 
influences worldwide medical practice, social welfare policy and health insurance, 
based on Cartesian statistic and diagnostic rationality, DSM conceptualises ‘Mental 
Disease’ as a diagnostic system with five empirical axes: (1) Clinical symptoms (2) 
Developmental and personality disorders (3) Physical conditions which play a role in 
the development, continuance, or exacerbation of Axis I and II disorders (4) Severity 
of  Psychosocial  stressors  (5)  Highest  Level  of  Functioning  (APA,  2000).  This  bio-
psycho-social medical model of psychopathology defines mental illnesses in terms 
of diseases of mind, nervous system or other physical organs; it also facilitates the 
research  of  neurology,  psychology,  and pharmacology  to ‘prove’  and ‘unify’  the 
aetiology  and  treatment  of  mental  suffering.  The  concept  of  ‘abnormality’  is 
defined  according  to  this  diagnostic  system  and  suffering  becomes  a  range  of 
deviances from the normality of mental health.
However,  the  DSM  system  not  only  medicalises  an  individual’s  living  status 
regarding to suffering but also blocks one’s power to interpret of his/her own body 
and mind (Lee, Yu and Lin, 2008).  For instance, one’s depression and anxiety can be 
diagnosed  as  ‘disordered’  by  the  assessments  and  scales  (ie:  Beck  Depression 
Inventory (BDI),  Hamilton Anxiety  Scale (HAMA).  As Cassell  (2001)  said,  medical 
professions create the situation that one has to surrender to the alien language of 
his/own body and mind. Because of the professionalisation of mental health, one is 
defined using this alien language once s/he is announced as having a ‘disease’ (Lin,  
2006). The rise of the DSM not only means that one loses his/her power to cope 
with the invasiveness of the medical profession, but also means that s/he loses the 
1 DSM-V will be published in 2013 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DSM-V
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power to interpret and identify life events, personal history and self status. 
Among  the  numerous  criticisms  toward  the  DSM  dominance  in  psychological 
professional practice, an important one is that the reliance on the DSM ignores the 
political, historical, social and cultural contexts within one’s diagnosis of having a 
disease.  The  development  of  Post  Traumatic  Stress  Disorder  PTSD2 is  a  salient 
example,  in  which  it  illustrates  ‘how  social  problems  are  transformed  into  the  
problems of individuals, how collective experiences of suffering are made over into  
personal experience of suffering, and how social traumas are refigured, for policy  
and intervention programs,  as psychological  and medical  pathologies (Kleinman, 
1995, p. 177)’. To diagnose a person’s PTSD, the problems of a society and culture  
are disregarded and ignored, and the sufferer, who has lost the power of defining 
his  own  fear,  anxiety  and  the  traumatic  experience,  has  to  repress  his  or  her 
subjectivity, obtain the label which is due to his or her mind and body and take on 
the  trauma  caused  by  the  environment.  In  medical  professions,  the  context  of 
suffering is forbidden to give a voice to individuals. 
Compared to a medicalised perspective, social anthropologists argue that human 
experience of suffering should be discovered in a route different from standardising 
one's  body  or  mind  conditions  (Kleinman,  Das  &  Lock,  1997;  Kleinman,  1999; 
Wilkinson, 2005). From a subjective perspective, a researcher could observe and 
reflect upon how a society, culture and local policies directly produce and influence 
2According to DSM-IV, PTSD is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologicall
y distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience (i.e., outside the range of suc
h common experience as simple bereavement, chronic illness, business losses, and marital conflict).  
The stressor producing the syndrome would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, and is usually 
experienced with intense fear, terror, and helplessness. The characteristic symptoms involve re-exper
iencing the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli associated with the event of numbing of general re
sponsiveness, and increased arousal (American Psychiatric Association, 1987)
22
one's lived experience of illness, disease and suffering with his or her participants. 
As suffering can be argued as a humanistic phenomenon,  it can also be studied 
from an non-medical but socio-cultural and political way.
2.3 Sociological and Anthropological Perspective： Social Suffering
Illness,  disease  and  suffering  may  be  more  clearly  distinguished  from  a 
phenomenological  perspective  by  Sartre.  Between  illness  and  disease,  Sartre 
provided a four-level interpretation of how one’s subjectivity can be dis-attached to 
his/her body when making the confirmation of his ‘disease’. At the first level,  pre-
reflective  sensory experiencing,  an  individual  feels  a  difference in  his/her  body 
based on his/her everyday experience. Pain, on this level, means the whole body. 
Until the second level,  suffered illness, the individual tries to identify where the 
pain is from and from which part of the body (such as headache, the pain of head).  
Pain is therefore given the meaning of a psychological object. Also, the sense of 
suffering  arises  in  this  process.  On  the  third  level,  disease,  an  individual’s 
epistemological understanding of pain and illness is involved, in which, according to 
his/her lived experience, she or he identifies their body as being ill and the pain 
becomes a  suspicion of  a  disease.  Illness  becomes another  psychological  object 
waiting for configuration. In the fourth level, a  disease state, medical service and 
power is involved in the diagnosis of the sick body and gives the body a pathological 
meaning and explanation as a ‘disease’. The right of explaining the message of one’s 
own  body  is  given  from  the  sufferer  to  a  medical  professional,  and  a  medical 
context of the body replaces one’s subjective voice (cited from Lin, 2006). These 
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four levels present how one could lose the power of self in the process of dealing 
with pain and a sick body. In this process, an individual is always suffering not only 
because s/he knows their self as having a disease but also because they are losing 
the ability of understanding and speaking for their own body. Suffering, illness and 
disease  cannot  be  regarded  as  one  concept,  and  cannot  be  easily  or  clearly 
categorised into three concepts. 
Can  we  research  suffering?  Frank  (2001)  argued  that  ‘suffering’  should  not  be 
conceptualised or defined as the process of sensing illness or acquiring a disease. 
One’s subjectivity of suffering should not be excluded out of  hand as a medical 
object,  as the more we seek to understand the body of suffering, the more we 
unsettle  attempts  to explain it  (Frank,  1996).  The experience of  suffering,  Frank 
(1996, 2001, 2005) argues, creates a sense of ‘otherness’ which makes one distant 
from the body which they are used to, and challenges one’s relationship not only 
with his/her body, but also with the others who they are living with. The experience 
of suffering creates the dialogue between one’s self and his body, as s/he has to 
sense and interpret the use of body, and between one’s self and others, as s/he has 
to communicate with others in the context of using the body. To explore suffering, 
one has to go into how it is conceptualised, in which suffering is a subjective sense  
of controlling ‘my’ body and the social context of living with and for others. 
In  order to depict  suffering,  the anthropologist  approaches suffering as  a  social 
experience.  Kleinman  (1995)  conceptualised  the  anthropological  perspective  of 
human suffering as:
Anthropological  accounts  disclose  how  the  idiosyncracies  divide  interests  and 
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cross-purposes of  personal  life  lived under the strenuous constraint  of  disease 
processes are actually culturally patterned into recognizably shared forms. (p. 100)
For anthropologists, suffering can be defined from the historical and cross-cultural 
record as a universal aspect of human experience in which individuals and groups 
undergo  or  bear  certain  burdens,  troubles  and  serious  wounds  to  the  body. 
Furthermore, harms that befall the spirit can be grouped into a variety of forms, 
such as, according to Kleinman (1997), the contingent misfortunes such as serious 
acute  illness,  the  routinized  forms  of  suffering like  chronic  illness,  death, 
deprivation,  exploitation,  degradation  or  oppression,  and the  suffering resulting  
from extreme conditions like survivorship of holocaust or genocide. By means of 
ethnographic  exploration  of  the  lived  experience,  ‘social  suffering’  is  developed 
differently  from a  pragmatic  necessity,  which  sees  humans  experience  suffering 
from the formation of a social, political and cultural context. As this anthropological 
approach has made a profound and lasting contribution to the comprehension of 
the human experience of suffering (Graubard, 1996), researchers of social suffering 
can uncover a social meaning of suffering from the transformation of experience in 
terms  of  cultural  representation,  social  experience  and  embodied  subjectivity 
(Kleinman, 1997). Illness, trauma and wounds are termed as having their nature 
originating from social interaction and construction.
In terms of a sociological perspective of suffering, researchers do not acknowledge 
suffering  from  medical  terms  as  the  attachment  of  diseases  but  rather  they 
reconstruct  the  richness,  uncertainty  and  abstractness  of  suffering  from 
ethnographical  and  reflexive  exploration  (Bourdieu,  1999;  Frank,  2001).  To 
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acknowledge ‘suffering’, they do not choose to answer ‘what is suffering’ but reflect 
upon ‘how an individual lives with suffering’. In this highly subjective and reflexive 
account, firstly, suffering is regarded as a mundane context of everyday life. In the 
book  ‘The  Weight  of  the  World’,  French  sociologist  Bourdieu  (1999)  and  his 
colleagues  showed  how  we  acquire  some  appreciation  for  the  immediate 
‘expressive intensity’ with which people talk about their particular points of view. 
He presented the stories of those who are denied the means of acquiring a socially 
dignified existence, as well as the suffering of those who are poorly adjusted to the 
rapidly  changing  condition  of  their  lives.  The  experience  of  suffering  can  be 
regarded as having ‘weight’, (from the title ‘the weight of the world’). The weight is 
not from how the experience of suffering has influenced one’s life, rather, according 
to Bourdieu (1999), the weight is from how people live the life; it is about how we 
understand  our  lived  experience  and  how  we  encounter  ‘suffering’  in  every 
moment of every day.  
Suffering can be represented in the context of local culture and political systems 
(Kleinman,  Das  & Lock,  1997; Kleinman,  1999; Wilkinson,  2005).  Two important 
publications, ‘Social suffering’ (Kleinman, Das & Lock, 1997) and ‘Remaking a World’ 
(Das, Kleinman, Lock, Ramphele & Reynolds, 1999) showed how individuals live in 
personal grief, social change, political violence and historical holocaust, while the 
stories of their lives are constructed by their local setting of culture and language 
and without medical  evaluation.  Considering the influence from environment to 
individual,  suffering can be a  dramatic  threat  in  which social  force  changes  the 
setting of individuals’ local lived experience and inflicts harm on them (Kleinman, 
1999). Illness, violence and recovery therefore become clearly the developing social  
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context as one is threatened and healed by the change of his/her environment and 
social  relationships.  The approach of 'social  suffering'  shows how an individual's 
experience of suffering can illustrate its own socio-cultural and political context, so 
that  the  voice  of  suffering  could  represent  his  or  her  lived  experience  and life 
history (Das, 1997).
2.3.1 Suffering as socio-cultural embodiments
According to Wilkinson (2001),  the writing of  ‘social  suffering’  can be a specific 
discourse which focuses on the symbolic embodiment of suffering in intrapersonal 
experience and cultural  representation.  Since the experience of  suffering affects 
one’s  life,  this  ‘negative’  force  can  be  comprised  of  an  overwhelming  and 
antagonistic sense of senselessness (Wilkinson, 2001). In light of this, a researcher 
who is interested in human suffering can put effort in invigorating public debate on 
the abuse of  human rights,  and can evoke outpourings of  compassion from the 
public. Since suffering can be deemed as consisting of a compulsive struggle and 
reconstituting a positive meaning for self  and society against the ‘brute force of 
events whereby all matters of human value and dignity are made to appear violated 
and betrayed’, the influence of healing and recovery at the level of social meaning 
can be grasped in the process of  giving meaning to suffering (Wilkinson,  2001). 
From the perspective of social construction, the context of suffering is created in an 
interpretive  framework  for  ‘seeing’  the  world  of  ‘the  hurts  we inflict  upon one  
another’ (Graubard, 1996) and is recognised as the extent to which the trauma of 
suffering takes place as  an embodied experience of  culture,  politics  and society 
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(Kleinman, 1986).
The  concept  of  embodiment  represents  the  idea  of  a  dynamic  and  non-
dichotomous inherence between body and subjectivity. According to McNay (1999), 
in  a  feminist  approach,  embodiment  mediates  the  antinomic  moments  of 
determinism  and  voluntarism  through  the  positing  of  a  mutual  inherence  or 
univocity  of  mind  and  body  in  place  of  a  Cartesian  dualism  (McNay,  1999). 
Embodiment expresses a moment of indeterminacy whereby the embodied subject 
is constituted through dominant norms but not reducible to them while working 
through the dynamic notion of embodiment3 (Butler, 1990, 1993; McNay, 1999). 
Experience,  in  this  context,  is  neither  purely  the  linguistic  object  of  one’s 
engagement  with  the  world,  nor  purely  the  material  residue  against  the 
incorporation to one’s dominant symbolic schema. Lived experience mediates the 
self  in  the context  of  a  body inscribed by cultural  norms and local  moral  value 
(McNay, 1999). 
The lived experience of suffering, therefore, can be approached by how individuals 
experience and cope with social forces and the local setting of the lived experience. 
It  can  be  on  the  one  hand  how  the  social  material  deprivations  and  loss  are 
perceived  and  interpreted,  and  on  the  other  hand  how  political  resources  and 
interpersonal aid are gained and integrated (Wilkinson, 2001, p 84). For example, in 
Ramphele’s  (1996)  autobiographical  research,  she analysed widowhood in Africa 
through relating the experiences of bereavement to how the political widows were 
settled.  She  found  that  the  local  social  life  could  remake  the  heterogeneity  of 
3 For example, Judith Butler’s work on the formation of gender identity through emphasis on the 
fragility of dominant norms.
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private grief into homogenized stereotype of public mourning, and also damage to 
the  experience  of  being  a  woman.  Das  (1999)  emphasised  that  any  form  of 
intervention is a political action creating its own meaning and therefore needs to be 
critically evaluated as a political  tool  that reworks experience conforming to the 
demands  of  power  (Kleinman,  1997).  Conducting  research  about  violence  and 
poverty in India, Das’s ethnographical explorations uncovered the conflicting voices 
of Indian people on legal, medical, welfare, security and religious institutions. In 
Kleinman’s case study of Yeng Chung-Xu( 嚴 仲 叔 ),  a story of a Chinese Cultural 
Revolution survivor was told in which he expected that the Chinese Communists 
could change the rotten capitalised society. However, after the rebirth of the ‘new 
China’, he suffered the complete destruction of social order and traditional ethics 
during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and became disappointed by the trend that 
a re-opened Chinese market was making his adored land capitalised again. Within 
their  stories,  ‘suffering’  is  a  process  of  social  mediation  and  transformation 
(Kleinman,  2001).  Researchers,  participants  and  readers  are  all  engaged  in  the 
nested contexts of embodiment: collective, inter-subjective, individual, by means of 
entangled politics, moral, social and cultural construction (Kleinman, 1997). 
2.3.2  An  Interpretive  Framework  of  Social  Suffering:  Cultural  Representation, 
Transpersonal Experience, and Embodied Subjectivity
In  research  relating  to  human  suffering,  both  researchers  and  participants  are 
engaged in the socio-political activities of making, re-making, and un-making the 
meaning  of  suffering  in  the  local  setting  of  conceptualising  suffering.  Kleinman 
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(1997) argued that suffering includes the individual level but transcends itself as 
cultural  representation,  as  transpersonal  experience  and as  the  embodiment  of 
collective memory. In the discussion of everything that really matters to suffering 
(Kleinman, 1997), he presented an interpretive framework of seeing suffering as the 
transformation of experience, in which suffering and responses to it are depicted as  
reciprocal  influence  of  shifts  in  cultural  representation,  social  experience,  and 
subjectivity  which are shaped and reshaped by epochal  political,  economic,  and 
social structural transformations. 
Kleinman  used  Perkins’s  (1995)  genealogical  review  of  ‘pain  and  narrative 
representation in the early Christian era’ to advance this transcendental framework, 
in which she reviewed second-century Christian discourse, in contrast to the Stoic 
persona, and fashioned a self that was centred around suffering, both as religious 
identification  with  divinity  and  as  a  political  alternative4.  The  'suffering  body' 
became  the  ‘meeting  place’  of  the  human,  and  ‘healing  process’  became  the 
material manifestation of Christian power (Kleinman, 1997). Christianity is therefore 
involved in a transformation of subjectivity and the subjective self as the sufferer 
took institutional form around the organised collection of funds, administration of 
hospitals and poorhouses and experiences of religious transformations, so that the 
entire cluster of representation, self and institutions became a vehicle of political 
power  (Kleinman,  1997).  In  this  example,  suffering,  according  to  Kleinman’s 
discussion on Perkins’s work, is the confirmation of the relationship of changes in 
collective  meanings,  in  transpersonal  experience  and  in  subjectivity  to  those  in 
4 Cited from Kleinman, Judith Perkins, the Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the 
Early Christian Era
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historical, political-economic, and social structures (Kleinman, 1997, p323). 
What  Kleinman  presented was  a  non-Cartesian  way in  which  subjective  human 
experience of suffering can be recorded, traced and acknowledged. He developed 
an  epistemological  understanding  that  suffering  is  embodied  in  a  socio-cultural 
context and transformed between individual, society, politics and culture. In other 
words, one’s experience of suffering can be seen as interacting with unvoiced socio-
cultural  embodiments.  Encountering  suffering,  in  this  sense,  is  giving  these 
embodiments a proper voice to speak for  themselves. As Kleinman emphasised, 
everything  really  does  matter.  He  has  provided  a  view  which  refuses  the 
simplification of human experience of suffering in which not only a sufferer,  the 
participant  of  a  research,  (but  also  the  witness,  the  researcher  and  reader),  is 
positioned in a big socio-cultural map of acknowledging suffering.
2.3.3 Suffering as a co-constructive process and an inter-subjective context
In the perspective of social construction, the meaning of suffering is co-constructed 
by the speaker and listener (Laub, 1992; White, 2005). Although suffering is totally 
subjective, it can be told to a listener. Speaking and listening contextualise the lived 
experience of suffering. Therefore, the context of suffering is never a monologue 
but a dialogue always to an ‘Other’ (Frank, 2006).  As Butler (1997) argues in her 
argument of psychic life of power, the experience of subjugation may itself, when 
owned and worked upon, become the source for claiming a subjective position. The 
movement from the first person singular pronoun, the ‘I’, to the claiming of a plural  
first person, the ‘we’, call upon experience, but this does not provide some kind of 
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unmediated  bedrock  on  which  the  foundations  of  subjectivity  can  be  laid. 
Therefore,  the  ‘we’—participant,  researchers  and  reader—co-construct  the 
development of  the context of suffering and how one’s lived experience can be 
understood by others.  As emphasised,  the anthropological  perspective of  ‘social 
suffering’ is developed on the stance where ‘researchers are unable to prescribe  
any  complete  and  practicable  solutions  the  experiences  they  describe  (Das  & 
Kleinman, 2001, p. 16)’; it is a collaborative work of giving voice to suffering and 
making voices understood by ‘us’.
Through  engaging  in  a  sufferer’s  lived  experience,  a  research  of  suffering  can 
approach the creation of spaces in which sufferers may achieve a shared voice in 
recounting their experience and a social  acknowledgment of the life-threatening 
event they have endured (Das, 1995, 1997). The process of contextualising suffering 
locates  the  relationship  between  participants,  researchers  and  readers  into  a 
relationship of a mutual moral relationship between sufferers and witnesses and 
which actually raises the moral issue of the constructed meaning of suffering. The 
moral perspective will be discussed in the next section but we can consider that the 
context  of  suffering  is  given  an  inter-subjective  property  and  becomes  the 
‘testimony’ which makes the experience of suffering witnessed by this process (Das, 
2001). 
Cited  from  Das  (1998)  in  her  discussion  of  Wittgenstein’s  influence  towards 
anthropology, the context of suffering can be regarded as a language of everyday 
life. Suffering, in terms of language, has its cultural, social and political symbolic  
meaning  embodied  in  the  encounters  and  dialogue  between  sufferers  and 
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witnesses. Researchers’ subjectivity cannot be excluded from a story of suffering 
because his/her lived experience and attitudes decide the intention of attuning the 
other’s  self-disclosure  and  the  direction  of  interpretation.  When  a  participant’s 
story  relates  a  subjective  voice  for  his/her  lived  experience,  a  researcher’s 
subjectivity is also a decisive factor in ‘understanding human suffering; by means of 
his/her  qualification  to  reflect  on  the  research  phenomenon  as  well  as  his/her 
relationship  with  sufferers’  (Das,  1995;  Klenman,  1995;  Frank,  1995,  2001; 
Bourdieu,  1998; Wilkinson,  2001,  2006).  The study of  social  suffering frames an 
inter-subjective perspective from the outer force (e.g. from religious, cultural, moral  
and social conditioning) to an inner state (e.g. sensation, emotions, and body-self 
reactions),  and  provides  other  sorts  of  empirical  material  to  confirm  the 
relationship of changes in collective meanings, in transpersonal experiences and in 
subjectivity  to  sufferers  in  historical,  political-economic  and  social  structures 
(Kleinman, 1997). In this manner, a researcher is viewed as an active participant 
who co-constructs the reality of social and cultural concerns with other research 
participants and readers.
As a researcher from an Eastern culture, with a ‘traditionally’ different paradigm of 
values and ethics, the perspective of social suffering has raised two issues for me to 
explore. The first is about how my own society and culture transform the context of 
suffering to me so as to understand other’s experience of suffering. As Taiwanese 
society inherits Chinese culture and customs, its dominant religious contexts are 
sourced  from  Buddhism  and  Daoism.  In  the  Buddhist  context,  the  core  of  its 
philosophical foundation is that ‘life is suffering’, and is primarily concerned with 
the process  of  coping  with or  transcending suffering.  As  such it  gives  us  a  rich 
33
source to work with. 
Therefore,  in  the  next  section,  I  will  briefly  review  the  Buddhist  context  as  an 
epistemological understanding of ‘suffering’, which can be also regarded as a non-
western  or  non-pragmatic  view  of  constructing  ‘suffering’  (Fromm,  1960).   The 
second is  the moral  relationship between a sufferer and the witness,  about the 
ethics of self and other. The contribution of moral perspective by Levinas will be 
reviewed  and  used  to  support  the  ontological  concern  here  that  suffering  is 
intrinsically social, interpersonal and inter subjective. 
2.4  A Non-Western Epistemology: Buddhist Perspective of Human suffering
Following the discussion above, an oriental society like Taiwan has developed the 
concept  of  ‘suffering’  differently  from the occidental  perspective.  Accordingly,  a 
perspective based on non-western theorisation will be presented and discussed in 
this section. As one of the dominative local beliefs, Buddhism has theorised and 
conceptualised suffering as the main area of concern in its philosophy. Imported 
from  India  to  China  in  the  9th century  AD,  Buddhism  has  pervaded  Chinese 
literature, art, education and social customs. In the following presentation, I will  
review how Buddhism constructs its theory of suffering from the Buddhist literature 
of ‘心經 Shin Jing (Heart Sutra)’5, ‘無量壽經 Wuliangxo Jing (The Amitabha Sutra)’6 
5 The 心經 (Shin Jin) Heart Sutra is a member of the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) class of 
Mahāyāna Buddhist literature, and along with the Diamond Sutra, is considered to be the primary re
presentative of the genre. It consists of just 14 shlokas or verses in Sanskrit and 260 Chinese characte
rs in the most prevalent Chinese version. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heart_sutra, 03/10/07)
6 The 無量壽經 (Wuliangxo Jing) is Buddha's Discourse of the Amitabha Sutra, or Shorter Sukhavativy
uha Sutra, and is a Mahayana Buddhist text associated with Pure Land Buddhism.It was translated fr
om Sanskrit into Chinese by the Tripitaka Master Kumarajiva in the beginning of the 5th century. (htt
p://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amitabha_Sutra, 03/10/07)
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and ‘涅槃經 Neipang Jing (Nirvana Sutra)’7. 
Unlike  the  medical  model  which  relates  ‘suffering’  only  to  diagnosable  bodily 
symptoms,  ‘suffering’  in  Buddhism is  constructed in  a  subjective  manner  which 
depends on one’s individual judgment on how s/he suffers. In ‘無量壽經 Wuliangxo 
Jing’,  suffering  is  defined  as  having  three  aspects:  ‘struggling  with  difficulties’, 
‘feeling the ending of happiness’, and ‘facing the inevitable impasse of life’. In ‘Nei-
Pang Jing’, suffering is termed as the ‘inevitable impasse’ by ‘Eight Ku’(Eight types of 
suffering):  ‘birth’,  ‘elderness’,  ‘sickness’, ‘death’,  ‘love but separate’,  ‘hate but live  
together’,  ‘want  but  cannot  touch’  and  ‘desire  for  satisfaction’.  In  this  context, 
‘suffering’ is not related to the sick body or specific diseases but to the subjective 
experience and interpretation of life.
In addition, different from the Western medical practice which classifies pain and 
psychological responses into the rationality of mental illness, Buddhism rationalises 
suffering into the ‘Four Noble Truths’ which is represented as being how suffering 
originated  from  and  what  it  resulted  to  (Table  2.1).  The  four  noble  truths  are 
represented by four words ‘苦 Ku (Dukkha)’, ‘集 Ji (Samudaya)’, ‘滅 Mei (Nirodha)’, ‘
道 Dao (Magga)’8 in which the human experience of suffering is rationalised into 
four stages of working through suffering (King, 2001). The first two Truths ‘ku’ and 
‘ji’ are  the causes  of  suffering,  which  illustrate  why people  suffer.  The last  two 
7 The 涅盤經 (Neipang Jing), Nirvana Sutra is one of the major texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is a v
oluminous and major scripture which purports to enshrine the Buddha's "final explanation" of his Do
ctrine, an explanation characterised by "exhaustive thoroughness" and allegedly delivered on the las
t day and night before his death (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana_Sutra, 03/10/07).
8 The Four noble Truths in Chinese and Sanskrit are: 苦: ‘Ku’: ‘Dukkha’: Suffering; 集: ‘Ji’: ‘Samudaya’: 
Collection; 滅: ‘Mei’: ‘Nirodha’: Extinction; 道: ‘Dao’: ‘Magga’: Road or path 
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truths ‘Mei’ and ‘Dao’ are the release9 of suffering, which tell people how suffering 
influences human life.
The Four Noble Truths
苦 Ku  Dukkha 集 Ji  Samudaya 滅 Mei  Nirodha 道  Dao  Magga
Reason/ Course of suffering Result/ Effect of suffering
Encounter 
suffering
Collect suffering Cease suffering Find  route  of 
cessation




Table 2.1: The Four Noble Truths and the theory of suffering in Buddhism
From a  Buddhist  context,  'Wuliangxo Jing'  and 'Nei-Pang Jing,  ‘ 苦 Ku (Dukkha)’ 
represent  general suffering. People suffer because they are struggling with their 
desires  or  inevitable  difficulties  as  mentioned  in  the  ‘The  second  Truth’,  ‘ 集 Ji 
(Samudaya)’.  It  refers  to  the  ‘collection’  of  people’s  desires,  psychological 
attachment and delusions known as the 'Three poisons' which generate suffering 
and  keep  individuals  grasping  at  pleasant  experiences  and  the  rejection  of 
unpleasant ones. Suffering is created by desire; desires create and foster loss and 
make one mired in cravings. ‘ 滅 Mei (Nirodha)’  literately means ‘extinction’,  the 
cessation of suffering, and the stage where an individual suffers acutely because 
s/he has known what and how suffering is caused and, subsequently, have to make 
the decision of taking  responsibility for their life. ‘滅 Mei (Nirodha)’ offers another 
9 ‘Release’ is not a good tranlation of ‘Mei’ and ‘Dao’ in Chinese but is a better description in Englis
h. In Chinese, 因果 (Causality in Chinese) is comprised by the reasons (因) and consequences (果). T
herefore, the first two truths illustrate why and how people suffer and the last two tell how people can 
release and learn from suffering.
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facet of liberation. The Buddhist context of freedom is a process of reframing and 
re-contextualising  the  self-experience  of  suffering.  Suffering  in  this  stage  is 
paradoxical  because  the  individual  is  asked  to  accept  both  the  conditions  and 
potential gains of suffering which offer a holistic view to account for suffering itself 
as entailing extinction and liberation, as well as responsibility and freedom. 
After the awareness of the paradoxical reality of suffering, ‘道 Dao (Magga)’ means 
to an individual the ‘road’ or ‘path’ to the cessation of ‘suffering’. In ‘雜阿含經 Tza-
A-Hang Jing’, eight moral ways of living a life are codified as ‘Eightfold Path’: ‘right  
view’, ‘right thinking’, ‘right speech’, ‘right action’, ‘right livelihood’, ‘right diligence’,  
‘right  mindfulness’  and ‘right  concentration’.  The 'Eightfold  Path'  constitutes the 
ethics which provides a supportive framework for individuals to take responsibility 
for  every action in their  daily  life.  Actually,  a number of  researchers regard the 
‘Eightfold path’ as the theory of the Self in Buddhism as it can be deemed as the 
moral context between self and other in terms of social construction. (Das, 1997; 
Myuk, 2003).
The discourse of the ‘Four Noble Truths’ offers three presumptions on the Buddhist 
essential  argument  of  ‘life  is  suffering’,  which  has  influenced  or  echoed  a/the 
Western modern perspective of human experience.  Firstly, suffering is a subjective 
experience and language is used and experienced differently person by person. It is 
‘unspeakable’ (Frank; 1995 also from Neipang Jing (Nirvana Sutra)) as it can only be 
understood by being in it. Secondly, suffering has its paradoxical reality. In Fromm’s 
(1960, p. 102)  Zen, Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, he argued that the ‘paradoxical 
reality’ is not Aristotelian logistic thought in which if A is B, non-B is then non-A; 
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rather, it  has its very nature of two-fold meaning construction. Suffering, in this 
context, is the coming and co-existence of both sides of the coin: the one and not-
one are all  related to the ‘one’. In the Four Noble Truth, the third one, ‘ 滅 Mei 
(Nirodha),  proposes  that  actively  experiencing  extreme  suffering  provides  the 
chance  to  be  released  from  ‘suffering’.  Despite  appearing  paradoxical,  one 
experiences suffering and experiences the release of suffering at the same time. 
Thirdly, suffering is the framework guiding the ethics of self and other, a social and 
interpersonal context of living experience. Although the Buddhist view is developed 
differently from the anthropological perspective which points out the socio-cultural 
and socio-political construction, it re-configures suffering as something that occurs 
to an individual and that the only path to release from suffering is to experience it. 
In the postmodern view, the meaning of suffering is achieved through the everyday 
reinforcement and reflection of others in a social setting (Schon, 1983). The easing 
of  suffering  is  found  in  taking  responsibility  for  the  relationship  with  others. 
Suffering is therefore the language with moral property by one’s exploration of the 
‘real self’, the actions of living a life and the connection with others (Horney, 1950; 
Morvay, 1999).
Although what Buddhism has developed is abstract and paradoxical, it enables a 
person to speak for him/herself about the ways in which suffering reflects ‘my own 
life’, a lifelong task of exploring the relationship with ‘others’. In this presumption of 
individual  subjectivity,  similar  to  the  perspective  of  ‘Social  Suffering’,  individual 
suffering  is  regarded  as  social  and  interpersonal,  and  the  nature  of  this 
interpersonal context is ethics,  the weight of the responsibility for  the other. To 
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echo the arguments so far and to focus on how suffering is ‘intrinsically’ moral, I will  
review French philosopher  Levinas’s  contribution  of  ‘ethics  of  the  other’  in  the 
following section.
2.5  Emmanuel Levinas: The Philosophy of Suffering for the ‘Other’
In the current period of humanistic philosophy and practice, Emmanual Levinas is in 
the spotlight because of his contribution of redeeming ‘ethics’  as the primordial 
practice in human existence (Levinas, 1997; Loewenthal, 2001, Loewenthal & Snell,  
2005). Different from Kantian thought of ethics and morality, Levinas approached 
‘suffering’ empirically from its phenomenology. Similar to the Buddhist context of 
practical  suffering,  Levinas  offered  an  ontological  debate  of  human  suffering  in 
which ‘suffering’ is the ethical practice of taking the responsibility for the ‘Other’  
(Levinas, 1981, 1987). This section of my thesis will review his papers and connect 
his  arguments  with  that  of  the  ethics  associated  with  Eastern  culture  and 
philosophy. 
For Levinas, humans are born with suffering and, simultaneously, the responsibility 
for the other. In his main concept of ‘alterity’ (Levinas, 1999), one’s suffering cannot 
be experienced by another person; it  can only be taken upon together with the 
other. Citing Aristotle, he explained four essential existential oblivions. (1) As we are 
fragile, we need to live with and depend on others ; (2)we are historical and finite; 
(3) since we are historical, we are ‘thrown’ into a particular world which is open and 
closed  to  people;  (4)  living  in  the  world  makes  human  forget  the  existence  of 
sameness,  difference  and  otherness,  and  that  suffering  is  finite.  As  suffering  is 
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finite,  human  have  to  depend  on  others  (Benner,  2001).  Levinas’s  critique  of 
justifications  of  suffering  leads  him to  search  for  a  new ground of  meaning for 
ethics, which he finds in the unmediated, painful exposure and responsibility to the 
vulnerable, suffering Other (Gantt, 2001).
Levinas was born in 1905 to a Jewish family. With his parents he moved to the 
Ukraine, where he lived during the Revolution of 1917, before he settled in France 
as a young man. During 1928 and 1929 he was in Freiburg, where he attended the  
lectures of Husserl and encountered the writings of Husserl’s student, Heidegger. 
His phenomenological approach was massively influenced by them, as well as the 
intertwined ethnographical and historical factors of his Jewish background and the 
world war. He became a naturalised French citizen in 1930 and was ordered to serve 
military  duty  to  France  when it  declared  war  on  Germany.  During  the  German 
invasion of France in 1940, his military unit was forced to surrender and Levinas was 
sent to a camp in Hannover in Germany. As a prisoner, he was assigned to a special  
barrack for Jews in which prisoners were forbidden any forms of religious worship 
and forced to do massive menial work. After surviving prison, he taught at a private 
Jewish High School in Paris and later began teaching at  universities in 1961. He 
retired in 1979, was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy, and died in 1995.
In the 1950s, Levinas started his phenomenological work based on the ethics of the 
responsibility for the ‘Other’,  which he called ‘the first philosophy’. For him, the 
‘Other’ is not knowable and cannot be assimilated to an object of the ‘self’. Also, 
the ‘self’ has been put into an empty position for responding to the emergence of 
the ‘Other’ (Lipari, 2006). Ethics, therefore, was re-considered as the transcendent  
context from how the ‘Other’ calls on the responsibility of an individual, rather than 
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from how the  ‘Self’  takes  action  on  it.  As  Levinas  (1969)  noted in  Totality  and 
Infinity: ‘To recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is  
to give (p. 69)’. Ethics, therefore, becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to 
the  point  where  ethical  responsibility  is  prior  to  any  ‘objective  searching  after 
truth’10.  
'Face’ and ‘Alterity’ were Levinas’s important reflection upon the responsibility for 
the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation of the face-to-face and the epiphany 
from the encounter with another is a privileged phenomenon in which the other 
person’s proximity and distance could be both felt and seen. In this phenomenon, 
the ‘face’ is the medium which calls upon the responsibility for the Other and the 
‘alterity’ (Levinas, 1969) was the approach to reach the responsibility for the Other. 
As  he  noted  in  Totality  and  Infinity,  ‘The  Other  precisely  reveals  himself  in  his  
alterity  not  in  a  shock  negating  the  I,  but  as  the  primordial  phenomenon  of  
gentleness  (Levinas,  1969,  p.  125)’.  The  ‘face-to-face’,  as  he  emphasised,  is  the 
phenomenon  which  enables  one  to  instantly  recognise  the  transcendence  and 
heteronomy of the Other11. Suffering, as if the context of the hunger appeared in 
front of me, is the sign calling on my inescapable moral responses. 
In  terms  of  ‘suffering’,  I  will  now focus  on  two ontological  thoughts  offered by 
Levinas. The first is that suffering is evil, thus unjust and useless. He illustrated how 
suffering is also indefinable. The second developed in his later publication is how 
10Wikipedia: http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmunuel Levinas, 2009/12/21
11 For recent reflections on the ethical-political imports of Levinas' tradition (and biography), along wi
th the examination of the notion of the face-to-face in relation to le visage, while taking into account 
the Levantine/Palestinian standpoint on conflict, see: Nader El-Bizri, "Uneasy Meditations Following 
Levinas," Studia Phaenomelnologica, Vol. 6 (2006), pp. 293–315
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one has the inevitable responsibility ‘for the other’ as the ethics of suffering which 
inter-correlates person with person. Both arguments will be reviewed in 2.5.1 and 
2.5.2. 
2.5.1 Evil suffering and Useless suffering
In Levinas’s early writing, suffering arises from the burden of being and the point of 
‘alterity’, while the ‘Otherness’  calls into question notions of the ‘Same’  (Deuck & 
Parson, 2007). As a survivor of the camps, he presented a different perspective from 
the traditional Enlightenment view wherein the ‘Self’ is the centre of ontology and 
epistemology. He argues that suffering is in nature ‘evil’ as suffering enforces the 
individual involved into the pure passivity of suffering that menaces the ‘freedom of 
will’. 
His analysis started from the analysis of pain and suffering, in which he argued that 
suffering  refuses  to  be  an  object  like  the  sensation  of  pain  (Levinas,  1969).  In 
‘Totality and Infinity’  (1969),  pain can be totalised, as he argues that it creates a 
need to control  our  bodies.  However,  suffering is  passed from and towards  the 
other, and therefore it is infinite. One endures suffering “as a tyranny’, the ‘You’, a 
malicious other who perpetrates violence’. ‘This tyranny’, according to Levinas, ‘is 
more radical than sin, for it threatens the will in its very structure as a will, in the  
dignity in origin and identity (p. 239)’; suffering is ‘an absurdity breaking out on the 
ground of signification (p. 237)’.
Levinas (1969) therefore denounced suffering as evil, not from a Kantian dualistic 
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perspective,  but  from  a  subjective  reference  because  the  individual  state  of 
suffering  directly  contradicts  one’s  trust  to  God  (Deuck,  2007).  Suffering  exists 
against  theodicy  (Levinas,  1969;  Edelglass,  2006).  This  refutation  includes 
justifications of suffering based on social utility, political teleology, and accounts of 
progress (Edelglass, 2006). Here the ‘evil’ does not mean the contrast of good, but 
the  context  of  the  unassumability  and  meaninglessness  of  suffering.  Edelglass 
(2006) compared Levinas’s and Kant’s critique of theodicy, 
Kant’s critique of theodicy is based on the asymmetry between moral evil and 
physical  evil  or  between evil  will  and suffering.  For  Levinas,  however,  the 
literal  absurdity  of  suffering,  its  incommensurability  with  a  coherent 
experience of the world, undermines any attempt to understand suffering in 
the  context  of  a  totality  of  suffering.  Levinas  insists  that,  explanation  of 
suffering justifies the pain of others, authorising actions that cause suffering, 
and  legitimising  the  negligence  of  unresponsive  bystanders.  Justifying  the 
Other’s suffering ‘is certainly the source of all immorality’. Suffering is evil, 
and to legitimize suffering is to justify evil. (p. 49)
Because of this ‘evil nature’, Levinas argues that suffering is unjust and meaningless. 
Evil  is  understood through  suffering:  ’All  evil  relates  back  to  suffering’  (Levinas, 
1986; Edelglass, 2006). ‘Even the very content of suffering is passivity, which is a 
modality’ (Edelglass, 2006) and Levinas had previously signified that this also is a 
quiddity  (Levinas,  1969).  He  argued  that  suffering  cannot  be  meaningfully 
systematised within a coherent whole. Again back to his distinction between pain 
and suffering, ‘pain’ can be controlled by one’s intentions of managing his/her body 
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by themselves or with others. In facing pain, one has the freedom to make a choice 
but, in suffering, one does not, as suffering suffocates the subject and destroys the 
capacity for systematically assimilating the world. In the article ‘Useless suffering’ 
(1982) Levinas argues that in total passivity, one loses his power to control his life, 
therefore suffering is ‘useless’ and ‘meaningless’ and it ‘refuses’ to be defined and 
conceptualised (Levinas, 1982; Frank, 1995, 2001). 
Furthermore, in its meaninglessness, suffering lends itself to its phenomenological 
description, the way in which suffering acts as a consciousness of the refusal of 
order  and  this  refusal  itself  (Levinas,  1982;  Edelglass,  2006).  In  Levinas’s  later 
writings, he developed stronger arguments about the ethical position of the Other. 
The  main  axis  of  his  work  is  also  clearer  as  by  attributing  ethics  as  the  
intersubjective context between a suffering self and the suffering Other. 
2.5.2 The Ethics of Suffering for the Other
The descriptions of suffering in Levinas’s early texts are generally presented from 
the perspective of the suffering itself in which the ‘alterity’ provides an escape from 
the overwhelming burden of suffering; the compassionate gesture arrives for the 
other. In ‘Time and the Other’, Levinas (1987) claimed that ‘I’ have the assess to the 
‘Other’: ‘Only a being whose solitude has reached a crispation through suffering, 
and in relation with death, takes its place on a ground where the relationship with 
the  other  becomes  possible’.  Levinas  describes  suffering,  the  ‘crispation  and 
isolations of subjectivity’, as the ineluctable moment of my dialectic’. In suffering, 
Levinas  argues  that  the  ‘Other’  serves  as  the  context  by  which  we  reach  the 
awareness of the ‘I’, the ethics of suffering for the Other. 
44
2.5.2.1 The Responsibility for the Other
In ‘Totality and Infinity’ he addresses the suffering ‘of’ and ‘for’ the other as ‘the 
eccentric  moral  context  of  a  human being’  (Levinas,  1969;  Edelglass,  2006).  He 
presented  the  primacy  of  ‘alterity’  as  a  language  of  otherness  and  a  new 
development and refinement of subjectivity, identity and self (Edelglass, 2006). As 
mentioned earlier, alterity, for Levinas, means the otherness and that ‘the radical 
heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other is the other with respect to a 
term whose essence is to remain at the point of departure, to serve as entry into 
the relation, to be the same not relative but absolutely’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 136). The 
‘Other’  is  the  connection  with  the  ‘Self’,  a  substitution  of  subjective  and in  its  
nature a morality of binding one to the other. In his writing in later life, Levinas 
distinguishes  his  philosophical  project  from the  dominant  traditions  in  Western 
moral philosophy by highlighting the primacy of the suffering Other, and situating 
the suffering ‘for the Other’ at the heart of his thought (Gantt, 2001).
In ‘Otherwise than Being’,  based on the perspective of alterity,  Levinas analysed 
‘suffering’ as the phenomenon in which the ‘subject bears and suffers the weight of  
the Other as the intrinsic responsibility’ (Levinas, 1998). He argued that one has 
responsibility  ‘for-the-other’,  which  has  been  rooted  within  our  subjective 
constitution, and therefore ‘suffering is the sacrifice of my own nourishment for the 
other’  (p.  74).  Levinas is  not interested in a compassionate suffering that is  the 
result of resemblance with a causal mechanism such as a ‘guilt complex’ or ‘some 
tendency to sacrifice’ (Edelglass, 2006). He argued that suffering is a wounding, a  
sensitivity that is not the affectivity of sympathetic feeling but the affectivity of the 
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moral command of the other. 
As the ‘first philosophy’, he redefined suffering as the context of morality between 
self  and  Other,  as  he  claimed in  the  preface  of  ‘Otherwise  than  Being’  (1999): 
‘everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we 
are not duped by morality.’ He argued that our ‘responsibility-for-the-other’ is not a 
derivative  feature  of  our  subjectivity  but  ‘obligation  founds  our  subjective 
experience  of  ‘being-in-the-world’  by  giving  it  a  meaningful  direction  and 
orientation’ (Levinas, 1998)’. In his phenomenological analysis of ‘neighbours’, he 
adapted  the  question  of  ‘nothing  is  more  burdensome  than  a  neighbour?’  to 
characterise suffering: ‘the augmentation of taking the responsibility for the Other 
and the amplification of taking the weight of being’ (Edelglass, 2006). ‘In proximity, 
in contact, we bear the Other as a painful burden who affect us’ (Edelglass, 2006).
In suffering, Levinas argued that the ‘I’ is offered a position and responsibility for 
the other of ‘me voici’ (Here I am)’. In the condition of ‘face to face’, he mentioned 
that when the sufferer is overwhelmed, a possibility arises for an opening, ‘a half 
opening, and more precisely, the half opening that a moan, a cry, a groan or a sigh  
slips through the original call of aid, for curative help (Levinas, 1982, p. 93)’. For 
him,  suffering  offered  a  firm moral  position  which  makes  it  imperative  and  ‘in 
defiance  of’  for  being  only  for  individuals.  As  Kunz  (2006)  explained,  to  face  a 
sufferer, we can choose our attitudes but cannot escape the moral responsibility for 
him/her  (Kunz,  1998).  The  meaning  of  suffering,  therefore,  is  because  of  the 
engagement  of  an  ‘Other’  who  recalls  the  ethical  context  of  the  intrinsic 
responsibility as a human being. In other words, in a subjective manner, suffering is 
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useless and meaningless, but in the interpersonal dynamic, suffering is creating its 
meaning, because it ‘demands even more from the resources of the ‘I’ in each one 
of us, from its suffering inspired by the suffering of the other, its compassion which 
is a non-useless suffering (or love), no longer ‘for nothing’,  and immediately has 
meaning (Levinas, 1982). From facing the Other, suffering has been given the moral 
weight of responsibility ‘for-the-Other’ that precedes autonomy, a being-for-the-
other constituted by a sufferer for the Other. 
2.5.2.2 Ethics: the Witnessed Suffering
Levinas  (1998)  illustrates  the  ethics  of  suffering  through  another  metaphorical 
discussion in which suffering is given meaning through ‘the hand of giving bread’ (p. 
74). In  ‘Otherwise  than  Being’,  citing  Isaiah  from  Bible,  he  discussed  the  how 
suffering is constituted not only from the sufferer, but also the attitude of the Other, 
the one who witnesses suffering.
It (Suffering) is not a gift of the heart but of the bread from one’s mouth, of one’s 
pocketbook, but of the doors of one’s home, a ‘sharing of your bread with the 
famished’, a ‘welcoming the wretched into your house (Isaiah 58)’. 
The  ethics  of  suffering,  for  Levinas,  is  the  tearing  of  oneself  from  oneself,  the 
tearing of the mouthful of bread from the mouth that one tastes in full enjoyment 
(Levinas, 1974). Ethics are not simply the gift of bread to the hungry, not only the  
nourishment of the Other, but the painful loss of one’s own satisfaction: it is ‘an 
offering  oneself  that  is  a  suffering’  (Levinas,  1997;  Gordon,  1998).  Suffering,  in 
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summary, is witnessing and bearing its own process.
Accordingly, the meaning of suffering, although it is unspeakable, is attached with 
the moral relationship between one sufferer and the Other who is witnessing and 
bearing the process (Levinas,  1998;  Gantt,  2001).  Through the giving hand with 
bread,  one’s  hunger  is  testified;  also,  guided  by  compassion,  one’s  suffering  is 
understood by the other. The nature of compassion, according to Levinas (1998), is 
‘bearing witness’, as one is never able to provide enough support to the other who 
suffers. To face a sufferer, the compassionate witness offers an existential voice of 
‘here  I  am’  as  the  ‘saying’  and  is  exposed  to  the  must-taken  and  never-
accomplished responsibility of ‘here I am’. ‘In saying’, Levinas argued, ’suffering is 
signified in the form of giving’. Furthermore, ‘rather than the said (le Dit), the saying 
(le Dire) exposes an openness to the responsibility’ (Levinas, 1998). In the initial  
contact between sufferer and witness, the ethics begin as a call on a subject’s moral 
responsibility  for  the  Other  (Gordon,  1998;  Levinas,  1998).  When  suffering  is 
witnessed,  the meaningless  suffering is  given the meaning to suffering itself,  in 
which the hand with ‘bread to give’ has given voice to Other’s hunger and the face-
to-face contact has transformed agony to each other. To face Other's suffering, the 
value of morality and the weight of responsibility are given as well.
2.5.3 Suffering, Ethics and 道德 Dao-De 
Levinas’s  arguments  of  Ethics  and  the  responsibility  for  the  Other  can  be  well  
compared and linked with the Chinese Daoist thinking of Dao-De: the Morality and 
Virtue. In Chinese history, Lao-Tzi (600-400BC) developed the Daoist perspective of 
morality which is similar to the Levinasian context of ethics (Nuyen, 2000). As one 
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of  the  most  influential  philosophers  in  far-eastern  culture  and  society,  Lao-Tzi’s 
Daoism was  developed  as  one  of  the  three  mainstream  philosophies  alongside 
Buddhism and Confucianism. Lao-Tzi’s book,  道德 經 Dao-De Jing, literally means 
the book of 道 Dao, routes and rules, as well as 德 De, virtue. In this book he tried 
to present the Chinese Daoist thinking of morality and ethics in the way similar to 
Western paradoxical dialectics and postmodern deconstructionism. 
Ethics and morality in here need to be emphasised that I do not intent to make a 
clear  boundary  between  ethics  and  morality,  as  from  Levinas’s  perspective 
‘suffering’ is a pre-moral and pre-ethical context developed before when one faces 
his  or  her  responsibility  for  the  ‘other’  (Levinas,  1998).  Compared to  Bauman’s 
(1993, 1995) distinctive perspective between ethics and morality, in which ethics is  
the ‘modernist’ project of searching for golden rules of conducts and morality as 
the ‘postmodernist’ acceptance of individual impulse of here and now. I embrace 
Foucault’s (1983, 1984) constructive point of view, in which ethics is the ongoing 
construction  of  self  without  external  authority  and  morality  is  associated  the 
hidden  norm  of  appropriate  conduct.  Ethics  of  suffering,  according  to  Levinas 
(1998), is valued after one takes the responsibility for the ‘other’ and morality of  
suffering is revealed with the socio-cultural context of the values. To face suffering, 
one ‘ethically’ takes the responsibility for the ‘other’ and, ‘morally’, one fulfils the 
social and cultural values of his responsibility.
In the Dao-De Jing, Lao-Tzi illustrated two similar arguments with Levinas. The first 
is  the  de-centering  of  ‘self’  in  which  the  ‘self’  is  put  in  a  nihilistic  position  to 
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accomplish one’s moral responsibility. In its eighth chapter12, he illustrates the best 
righteousness is like water because its shape is decided by its container while it 
always just fits the shape of its container. He implied that morality is shaped by the 
other who works as a container in a relationship, but not oneself who intends to be 
a ‘righteous man’. As the ‘water’ is neither intending nor retreating, it makes the 
container  function  perfectly  by  holding  and  moving  it;  the  ‘righteousness’, 
therefore, is not intending to be a well-known fine man but aims to stay with others  
and allow the relationship with others to function in its way. Chapter 22 13 is another 
example which illustrates how an ‘empty’ self-position could practice the values of 
morality:
The partial becomes complete; the crooked, straight; the empty, full; the worn 
out, new. He whose (desires) are few gets them; he whose (desires) are many 
goes astray. Therefore the sage holds in his embrace the one thing (of humility),  
and manifests it to all over the world. He is free from self- display, and therefore  
he  shines;  from  self-assertion,  and  therefore  he  is  distinguished;  from  self-
boasting, and therefore his merit is acknowledged; from self-complacency, and 
therefore he acquires superiority. It is because he is thus free from striving that 
therefore no one in the world is able to strive with him14. 
The second main argument from the Dao-De Jing is the ‘meaninglessness’ of ethics 





14 The translation is cited from http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/ (2010/01/08)
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definition. In the first chapter15,  he said the Dao cannot be named as it loses its 
meaning.  In  the fifth,  similar  to  Levinas’s  analysis  that  suffering  is  ‘evil’,  Lao-Tzi 
argued that the world is originally unbenevolent to the creatures on it.  In the 23rd 
chapter16,  德 De (virtues) is how the world works itself and all human beings who 
cannot control the standards of morality but only can follow passively. In chapter 
38, he mentioned the highest virtue ’ 上 德 (Shan-De)’ is achieved by the persons 
who do not persist in practicing rigid definition of morality and is not committed to 
pursue the designation of a sage. In Daoist thinking, ethics cannot be defined and 
ranked, as the meaning of it is exists and is lost at the same time by how one acts in 
the self-other relationship.  Conceptualising,  compiling and labelling the levels  of 
morality will lose its own function and meaning of regulation and coordination.  
Reviewing Lao-Tzi and seeing Levinas’ ontological discussion of ‘ethics of suffering’ 
makes  the  above  discussion  a  dialogue  of  ethics  between  an  ancient  oriental 
philosopher and a postmodern thinker. From my own cultural background as the 
starting point, Lao-Tzi’s point of  道 德 (Dao-De) and Levinas’s Ethics both indicate 
that,  firstly, suffering is an interpersonal context of an ethical practice; secondly, 
when the experience of suffering is termed as ethics, it is unspeakable and refuses 
to be given an unified concept and definition; thirdly, suffering is the phenomenon 
of taking responsibility for the other, in which the subject of this phenomenon is  
not the ‘self’ but the ongoing relationship with the ‘other’.  







thinking, arguing that  his arguments of ethics further emphasised the subject of 
the ‘Other’ which is opposite to the Cartesian  subject of the ‘Self’,  developing the 
context of ‘Other’ as another ‘Self’ (Walsh, 2005). In actuality, neither the ‘self’ nor 
the ‘other’ takes precedent; the point of Levinas’s concern is that suffering for the 
Other is ‘between’ them in which both are equally important in constructing the 
meaning  of  the  responsibility  in  suffering.  Suffering  is  the  ethical  practice  of 
situating him/her-self in the relationship for the Other (Loewenthal, 2005). As one 
performs the responsibility for-the-other, 道德 Dao-De is manifested.  
2.6 Between Self and Other: The Transaction of Suffering.
Following the above discussions, to research suffering, one has to locate himself in 
the  phenomenon  of  suffering  in  which  a  researcher  is  always  in  the  ethical 
relationship between the suffering self and suffering other. After reviewing written 
works that provide cultural, sociological and moral perspectives of suffering, I now 
focus on the relationship between self and other to see how the ethics of suffering 
could work and is worked interpersonally.  From an atheistic point of view, I  use 
Dutch artist Rembrandt’s painting ‘the Prodigal Son’ as an example to illustrate my 
research concern of ‘suffering transaction’.
The  prodigal  son  is  taken  from  a  parable  from the Gospel  of  Luke in  the New 
Testament (Luke 15:11-32). According to the note from Wikipedia17,
The parable begins with a young man, the younger of two sons, who asks his father 
to give him his share of the estate. The parable continues by describing how the 
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable_of_the_Prodigal_Son#Narrative (2010/01/08)
52
younger son travels to a distant country and wastes all  his money in wild living.  
When a famine strikes, he becomes desperately poor and is forced to take work as 
a swineherd. ‘So he got up and went to his father. But while he was still a long way 
off, his father saw him and was filled with compassion for him; he ran to his son,  
threw his arms around him and kissed him’. (Luke 15:17-20) … the father calls for his 
servants to dress him in a fine robe, a ring, and sandals, and slaughter the "fattened 
calf" for a celebratory meal. The older son, who was at work in the fields, hears the  
sound of celebration, and is told about the return of his younger brother. He is not  
impressed, and becomes angry (as he feels unfair to himself), but the father told  
him, "But we had to celebrate and be glad, because this brother of yours was dead  
and is alive again; he was lost and is found.” (Luke 15:32). The celebration enables 
the father use himself to teach not only the small son, but also the elder son who 
does not yet know the value of lost and found.
In his life, Rembrandt painted the biblical story three times. The first was drawn in 
his youth when he has become one of the most famous and rich painters in the 
Netherlands. In figure 3.1, Rembrandt illustrated and showed himself  directly as 
being the ‘prodigal son’ in the painting ‘Rembrandt and Saskia inthe scene of the 
Prodigal son’ in 1635, in which he dressed graciously and enjoyed a big feast with 
his  newly  wedded wife.  He turned his  head back  and toasted  with a  delicately 
decorated glass.  
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Figure 3.1
In the same period (1636), Rembrandt drew the whole theme of ‘the return of the 
prodigal son’ from the Bible. As showed in figure 3.2, he directed the audience to 
focus on the prodigal son’s impoverished body and repenting face. Compared to the 
son, the Father’s facial expression was less lively than the returned son. 
Figure 3.2
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However, 30 years later, he presented a totally different interpretation of this story. 
When Rembrandt’s son and wife died, he ran out of his savings, became old, sick,  
alone and no longer the most influential  painter in his country. At this time, he 
created the painting that is shown to the right of this text. As presented in figure 
3.3, the son’s face is not shown to the audience but to the others; only the elder 
son, neighbours and the father each display a different facial expression in response 
to the son’s return. Amongst the three main characters, the father shows a forgiving 
face and holds the little son who kneels down and digs his face into his father’s  
chest.  The elder  son stands aside and stares  at  the reunion of  his  brother  and 
father. His and the two neighbour’s eyes, together with the light in the painting, are  
focused on the forgiving father’s hand. Through this painting, Rembrandt illustrated 
not  only  the  father’s  unconditional  acceptance  of  his  prodigal  son  with  others 
witnessing, but also a prodigal  and regretful  man’s invitation for an audience to 
engage in the theme of a father’s forgiveness (Nouwen, 1992). 
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Figure 3.3
Understanding  Rembrandt’s  work  tempts  us  to  develop  a  phenomenological 
understanding of suffering, as we have been invited to ‘witness’ the suffering and 
have been put in a moral position of ‘suffering for the Other’ as discussed earlier by 
Levinas. Who is the sufferer? The father? The sons? Rembrandt himself? Or part of 
ourselves as we have a similar lived experience with the figures represented in the 
artwork? When viewing this painting, we witness and bear the witness, but how 
does our ‘understanding’ happen in this process? In this research, I try to use the 
term ‘transaction’  to  explore the ‘understanding’  of  the other’s  suffering in the 
moral relationship between a sufferer and the witness. 
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2.6.1 Research Question: The Transaction of Suffering
Following Levinas’s ethical debate of suffering, in facing a sufferer we engage in the 
unavoidable  moral  position  as  the  witness  and  afford  the  inescapable  ethical 
responsibility to the Other. The question I now present asks how we can understand 
the other’s experience of suffering, how we can take on responsibility and witness 
another’s  suffering,  and  how  we  can  use  our  lived  experience  and  history  to 
encounter someone else’s lived experience and history of suffering. 
In the same period of time, Lacan and Levinas similarly discussed the meaning of 
the ‘Other’ in which Lacan regarded the Other as a set of symbolic order (Fryer,  
2004) and Levinas considered it the essential moral context of humanity. Although 
the two philosophers never had a dialogue with each other, in their discourse of 
‘order’ and ‘ethics’, according to Fryer (2004), they constructed the ‘Other’ as two 
sides of a coin. On one side, due to facing the sufferer’s face, one encounters the 
other’s experience of suffering and responsibility for the Other; on the other side, 
because of the encounter, one’s lived experience becomes the language used when 
responding to the other and thus the socio-cultural symbolic system behind one’s 
living  experience  is  transformed  into  a  linguistic  order.  Through  the  encounter, 
suffering transacts the moral weight of responsibility for the other and the socio-
cultural symbolic value of one’s life between a sufferer and the witness (Schmid, 
2004). 
In  terms  of  psychotherapeutic  practice,  ‘For  whom  is  therapy?’  This  question 
precedes  the  issue  of  ‘how’  one  does  therapy  (Sayre,  2004)  and  an  answer  is 
neither  the  therapist  for  his/her  skills  nor  the  client  for  his/her  problems,  but, 
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rather,  their  developing  and  varying  therapeutic  relationship.  In  a  postmodern 
context (Loewenthal, 2001), psychotherapy should not only be regarded as a pre-
settled power relationship but also reflected as a process in which the therapist and 
client intersubjectively contextualise the experience of suffering. A ‘therapist’ is not 
only a professional who leads the client’s story of the ‘I’ developing as the context 
of ‘me becoming, me not-yet; me on the way to me’ (Walsh, 2005), but as Schimid 
(2001) discussed unconditional positive regard, is also the Other who says ‘yes’ and 
commits to listening and understanding ‘together’. A client, whose lived experience 
is  acknowledged  in  therapy,  is  releasing  and  sharing  his/her  burden  with  the 
therapist and is also acknowledging the therapist as the Other who takes on the 
responsibility  of  suffering.  ‘The  therapeutic  relationship  enables  mutual 
acknowledgement as persons instead of knowledge about another’ (Schmid, 2001), 
as suffering is developed from experience to language.
Levinas’s transcendental perspective of alterity, according to Schmid (2006), should 
no longer be described as an escape from the suffocation of suffering, rather it  
should be characterized as the augmentation of suffering, an amplification of the 
weight of being. From Levinas, psychotherapy should be thought of as an ethical 
practice  (Gantt,  2001;  Loewenthal,  2005).  From  a  reflexive  perspective, 
psychotherapeutic practice has to be re-constructed from its moral dimension of 
‘healing’, not from how effective the therapeutic intervention is, but from how the 
responsibility  for  the client is  understood and taken (McLeod,  2005,  2007).  This 
approach, according to Sayre (2005), for both therapist and clients, is the process of 
decentering. In suffering, an approach of Levinas involves a focus on the relational 
understanding which is ‘not governed by the concern to rediscover oneself’, but is 
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acknowledged by acting out of responsibility for the other (Schmid, 2006; Levinas,  
1996).  Clearer methodological  issues  regarding to researcher's  reflexivity  will  be 
discussed in the next chapter.
This study posits an empirical perspective to explore the psychotherapeutic process, 
by means of its 'everyday' context in the dialogue between therapist and client, 
rather than the effectiveness of 'professional' conduct. Psychotherapy, in this study, 
is regarded as the process of ‘more than a set of technical procedures and a just 
warm supportive  relationship (Orlinsky  et  al.,  2003,  p.  363)',  and  is  deemed as 
having  its  ontological  richness  behind  and  beyond  the  psychotherapeutic 
techniques and relationship manifested by this process.  In Lambert and Barley’s 
(2002) review, psychotherapeutic and counselling studies in the past 50 years have 
developed four categories to investigate its process: (1)  extratherapeutic factors, 
the  clients,  ego  strength,  spontaneous  remission,  outside  events  etc.;  (2) 
expectancy,  such as a placebo effect,  belief in treatment;  (3)  techniques, factors 
specific  to  a  particular  modality,  and  (4)  relationship  factors,  like  empathy, 
understanding and alliance. To focus on the ‘transaction’ between a therapist and 
client in a therapeutic process, I explore the issues and context of ‘suffering’ in a 
reflexive perspective on the development of  the psychotherapeutic  relationship. 
However, considering the intrinsic richness of a psychotherapeutic process, I aim to 
represent how the ongoing understanding has been processed, rather than thinking 
about it in terms of finding influential factors. I argue that this study contributes to 
a  dialogue  concerning  the  ontological  exploration  of  how  ‘suffering’  could  be 
developed as having its own meaning between therapist, client and reader. 
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To study the mutual acknowledgment and inter-subjectivity, I use the concept of 
‘transaction’ which is taken from the anthropologist Veena Das (1997) where socio-
cultural  and  political  embodiments  of  suffering  are  transacted  between  lived 
experience  and  subjective  language.  In  her  work  of  ‘Language  and  Body: 
Transaction in the Construction of Pain’, she analysed pain as the object transacted 
between language and body. Following Wittgenstein, Das picked up the scene in 
‘The Blue and Brown Books’ in which he questioned ‘how my pain may reside in 
another body’ (cited from Das, 1997, p. 69). Das had an impressive discussion on  
drawing on Wittgenstein’s pathos of pain:
Wittgenstein creates language as the bodying forth of words. Where is my pain – 
in touching you to point out the location of that pain has my pointing finger – 
there is – found your body, which my pain (our pain) can inhabit, at least for that  
moment when I close my eyes and touch your hand?  (Das, 1997, p. 70)
Das  (1997)  then  moved  the  understanding  to  the  mutual  transforming  point 
between body and language.
Wittgenstein’s example of my pain inhabiting your body seems to me to suggest 
either the institution that representation of shared pain exists in imagination but  
is not experienced, in which case one would say that language is hooked rather 
inadequately to the world of pain. Or, alternately, that the experience of pain cries  
out for this response of the possibility that my pain could reside in your body and 
that the philosophical grammar of pain is an answer to that call. (Das, 1997, p. 70)
Das  understood  ‘pain’  as  being  the  call  for  the  other’s  response  which  echoes 
Levinas’s  notion that ‘suffering’  also calls  for  the other’s  responsibility.  Between 
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embodied experience and expressed language, pain or suffering could therefore be 
regarded as the ‘transaction’ between each other so that, through witnessing, they 
could live in the other’s body. 
Transaction, according to the Oxford English dictionary, is ‘a piece of business that is  
done between people, especially buying and selling’. Literally, this means that two 
things are equally valuable and are exchanged reciprocally between two persons. In 
this  research,  as  explored,  ‘suffering’  necessarily  involves  moral  weight  and 
subjective  values  (Kleinman,  2006;  Bourdieu,  1999)  and  therefore  the 
psychotherapeutic process transacts the weighty and valuable things not only intra-
personally between body and language but also inter-personally between suffering 
and witness. 
In psychotherapy, clients tell the stories of their suffering. In this process, stories 
give both client and therapist different angles to experience the lived experience 
and to examine the self-other relationship again. From session to session, story-
telling and understanding becomes an interpretative circle (McLeod, 2001) in which 
a client’s lived experience is ‘transacted’ into the language/stories ‘for’ the therapist 
and  the  therapist’s  lived  experience  is  ‘transacted’  into  his  understanding  and 
verbal  response  ‘for’  the  client.  The  aim  of  this  research  is  to  see  how  this  
‘transaction’ of suffering can be translated as part of a psychotherapeutic process 
not only from the intrapersonal transaction between socio-cultural embodiments 
and linguistic responses, but also from the interpersonal transaction between the 
therapist and client’s experience of suffering.
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2.6.2 Witnessing Therapist and Witnessed Therapist
We see clients as people who are ethically responsible to the Others in their life 
(Sayre,  2005).  In  psychotherapeutic  practice,  the one side  of  the  transaction  of 
suffering is based on the client's responsibility for the therapist as s/he is assuming 
the  responsibility  of  a  client  who  discloses  him/herself  in  the  therapeutic 
relationship. The client, in this sense, is put in the position as a sufferer whilst the 
therapist, from the very beginning of the first session, is given the responsibility as 
the only witness to the therapeutic condition. 
The  other  side  of  the  transaction  of  suffering  is  based  on  the  therapist’s 
responsibility for the client as a therapist uses his/her own experience of suffering 
to  respond  to  the  client’s  stories.  In  Laub’s  (1992,  1995)  discussion  of  the 
‘testimony’, he clearly presented how the listener shared and owned the experience 
with the suffering storyteller:
When the emergence of the narrative from a client is listened to, the knowing 
of the experience of suffering is giving birth to …. By extension, the listener to 
trauma comes  to  be  a  participant  and  a  co-owner  of  the  traumatic  event: 
through his very listening, he comes to partially experience suffering himself. 
The relation of the victim to the event of the trauma, therefore impacts on the 
relation of the listener to it, and the latter comes to feel the bewilderment, 
confusion, dread and conflicts that trauma victim feels….The listener, therefore, 
by definition partakes of  the struggle of  the victim with the memories and 
residues  of  his  or  her  traumatic  past.  The  listener  has  to  feel  the  victim’s  
victories,  defeats  and  silences,  know  them  form  within,  so  that  they  can 
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assume the form of testimony.
For a therapist, Psychotherapy, as Gantt (2001) mentioned in his reflexive argument, 
is the practice of ‘how “I” am called as the therapist’ in which being the therapist 
suffers. On the one hand, as the therapist, the therapist assumes the role of witness 
as the experience of facing suffering is in its nature an unspeakable heavy burden in 
this relationship (Laub, 1992; Gordon, 1998, 2009; Schimid, 2004). On the other 
hand, the therapist bears his own suffering which is intimately embedded with the 
experience  of  understanding  and  responding  for  the  client.  In  the 
psychotherapeutic relationship, the therapist also offers him/herself as the implicit 
‘sufferer’  who  is  suffering  ‘for’  the  client.  In  this  context,  he  offers  the  moral  
position in which his experience of suffering is witnessed by the client. 
Accordingly, considering the inter-subjectivity of suffering and witnessing, when the 
therapist offers the ethical position of witnessing a client’s experience of suffering, 
he offers the moral position of being witnessed in which the client is at the same 
time  taking  on  their  therapist’s  experience  of  suffering.  Between  sufferer  and 
witness as well as between therapist and client, as Levinas discussed the ‘saying’ 
and  ‘said’,  where  he  stated  that  ‘I  exist  through  the  Other  and  for  the  Other’  
(Levinas,  1981).  In  psychotherapy,  the  suffering  client  is  witnessed  and  the 
development of the stories testifies to the therapist’s unspeakable experience of 
suffering as well.  Through the testimonial  process of  psychotherapy,  suffering is 
transacted between client and therapist.
My own stories presented in the first chapter will serve as an example of the inter-
subjectivity of suffering transaction. In my assessment room, when I  saw how a 
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father looked after his lifelong disabled son, I thought of my father, who made the 
same choice of looking after his younger sister thirty years ago.  I understood my 
client’s suffering because his story awoke my memory of my father’s own process. 
On the  one  hand,  I  witnessed my client’s  suffering  through the  process  of  our 
conversation. As the sub-context of the story is as much part of mine, on the other  
hand,  he  encountered  and  witnessed  my  experience  of  suffering  in  this 
conversation as well. 
To  explore  the suffering  experience of  a  torture  survivor,  Blackwell  (1997)  used 
Winnicott’s concept of holding and Bion’s term of containing to re-contextualise the 
inter-subjective suffering between therapist and client from a psychodynamic point 
of view. When a mother is dealing with a baby’s emotions and behaviours, she is at 
the same time dealing with her own emotions evoked by them whilst the baby is 
receiving and internalising the mother’s  evoked emotions.  The subtle emotional 
changes are implicitly embodied in the maternal interactions so that the baby could 
receive the subtle environmental changes from the mother’s reactions of holding 
and containing. Like the mother in this context, a therapist holds and contains not 
only the client’s suffering but also his/her own lived experience evoked by listening, 
and chooses a subject and an appropriate way to reflect onto the client his/her 
‘therapeutic’  responses.  In  this  margin  between  receiving  and  reflecting,  the 
experience of suffering is transacted between embodiments and language, as well 
as between client and therapist.
Although  there  is  a  significant  amount  of  literature  which  discusses  a  client’s 
influences upon the therapist and vice versa (Bordin, 1979; Corey, 2009; Perlman & 
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Frankela, 2009;  Adams, 2010),  limited research regards the relationship between 
therapist and client as the context of the moral construction of suffering. With the 
argument  that  psychotherapy  is  an  ethical  practice  (Gordon,  1998,  2010; 
Loewenthal, 2005; Laub, 1991; Kunz, 1998), this research of suffering transaction is 
to  recount  this  inter-subjectivity  of  suffering  by  means  of  the  exploration  of 
psychotherapeutic  process.  Since  experience  of  suffering  is  such  a  personal 
phenomenon, known only fully  to the person who experiences how it  is  (Laing, 
1969), it can be told, re-contextualised and thus understood by the one who is fully 
involved  in  the  process  of  speaking  and  sharing  the  suffering.   To  study  how 
experience is transacted in the therapeutic relationship, this research explores the 
moral context of witness suffering: not only from the client’s experience of suffering 
which  is  testified  by  therapeutic  practice  but  also  from  the  therapist’s  own 
experience  which  also  offers  a  necessary  place  of  being  witnessed  in  the 
relationship  with  the  client.   With  an  empirical  and  reflexive  concern,  the 
methodology of this research will be discussed in the coming chapters.
2.7 Summary of Research Area and Literature
In the first chapter, I told the story of my first encounter with a client’s suffering  
which  initiated  my  recollection  about  my  own  family  history  from  a  shared 
therapeutic  environment.  My  therapeutic  practice  made  me  interested  in  the 
transaction of suffering, which although serves as an abstract margin between my 
client and myself, vividly connected my life history with my client’s experience of 
suffering. 
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In this chapter, I have reviewed the literatures of an ontological and epistemological 
discussion of suffering. The main argument from these reviews was that suffering is 
in its nature unable to be conceptualised, defined and rationalised. It is subjective,  
empirical  and thus is paradoxical.  From an anthropological  perspective, suffering 
should be constructed by its  socio-cultural,  historical,  and political  meaning and 
thus  thought  of  as  interpersonal  rather  than  an  independent  experience  of  an 
individual.   From  reviewing  Levinas’s  ontological  discussion,  suffering  should  be 
regarded as the process of moral construction between self and ‘Other’ in which 
through the suffering one has unavoidable responsibility for the Other and one is 
taking  the  responsibility  for  the  Other.  I  connected  Buddhist  and  Daoist 
epistemology of suffering from my culture and echoed the arguments that suffering 
is social and moral, which is in contradiction to the Western Cartesian consideration 
of suffering as the object of pain and disease.
I then defined 'suffering transaction', in which the lived experience of suffering is 
given its value and weight transacted between embodiments and language as well  
as between sufferer and witness. To explore the transaction of suffering, through 
psychotherapy,  I  defined it  as the phenomenon that occurs through the mutual 
acknowledgements and understanding between therapist and client. Therefore, this 
research will explore the context of moral construction in a circulating procedure by 
looking at (1) how experience of suffering is illustrated by the therapeutic process;  
(2) how the context of suffering is understood by an ‘Other’; (3) how a listener’s 
experience  of  suffering  is  called  and  developed;  (4)  how  the  mutual  response 
develops the dialogues and conversations of therapy and (5) how the therapeutic 
process gives testimony to the narrated suffering. The methodology of setting up 
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the  research  field,  collecting  data  and  analysing  data  will  be  presented  in  the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 3  The Setting of Researching Suffering
3.1 Introduction: Discussion of the Data Properties
'Suffering transaction’, based on the discussion of the last chapter, is designed to be 
discovered through actual therapeutic practice, such as that documented through 
my own practice as a psychotherapist.  Since suffering has the property of being 
‘refused  to  be  defined  and  conceptualized  (Frank,  1995)’,  the  objective  of  this 
research  is  not  to  present  pragmatic  evidence  of  suffering.  Rather,  from  an 
empirical  vantage point,  I  aim to represent the development of the language of 
‘suffering’  as  well  as  the ‘transaction of  suffering’  processed by my therapeutic 
work.  In  this  study,  suffering  will  be  acknowledged  by  and  shown  through  the 
deepening dialogic interactions in psychotherapy, as presented through my practice 
and research.
In  Western  philosophical  history,  Aristotle  used  ‘phronesis’  to  illustrate  the 
knowledge formed by one’s  actions or  praxes.  This  term is defined by ‘practical 
wisdom’ (Dunne, 1993; Noel, 1999; Flyvbjerg, 2001) in which one knows things by 
his or her effect on them. A research project investigating ‘phronesis’, according to 
Flybvjerg’s term of phronetic paradigm (2001, 2004), goes beyond both analytical, 
scientific  knowledge (episteme) and technical  knowledge or  know-how (techne), 
and involves judgments and decisions made in the manner of a virtuoso social and 
political  actor  (p.  5).  Frank (2004) used the ‘unfinalised dialogue of  seeking the 
good’ to describe this process of one’s doing, learning and reflecting on what she or 
he has performed or inflicted on his or her own interaction with others. In Chinese 
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philosophy, the Confucian practitioner Yang-Ming Wang (1472–1529) also used the 
term ‘知行合一 (zhi-xing-he-yi)’ to emphasise the ‘knowing as the practice (Wong, 
2004)’. For Wang18, knowledge and practice are two sides of a coin as well as the 
reason for and purpose of the other. 
Apart from the design of action research of exploring my therapeutic practice, this 
research develops my own subjective reflection into an ethical position: an active 
response to  the gathered data  of  this  study.  As  reviewed in  the last  chapter,  a 
psychotherapeutic  process  can  be  proposed  as  the  method  of  ‘acknowledging 
suffering’  in  which  the  meaning  of  suffering  is  developed  through  the  dialogic 
relationship between a therapist and client. In this ethical context between self-
and-other,  the  researcher’s  subjectivity  has  its  decisive  position  of  research 
reduction  (Ellis,  1996;  Etherington,  2004,  2005;  Speedy,  2008).  According  to 
Etherington (2004),  a  researcher’s  reflexivity  offers  a  substantial  space  which  is  
given  to  the  exposition  or  deconstruction  of  the  ‘myth  of  silent  authorship’ 
(Charmaz  &  Mitchell,  1997).  A  reflexive  reflection  also  offers  an  ongoing 
conversation about the experience of simultaneous living, active interpretation and 
questioning of how interpretation could come out (Hertz, 1997). In my therapeutic 
practice,  I  used  my  own  lived  experience  to  engage  myself  in  a  client’s  lived 
experience of suffering (Frank, 2001). A reflexive research position allowed me to 
occupy  a  reflective  space  of  ‘encountering  suffering’  in  which  the  connection 
18  Both Aristotle and Wang developed the knowledge/practice as the ethical matters (Dunne, 1993; Wong,  
2004). Aristotle assigned a central role to the ethical context of knowing and practicing (Dunne, 1993) whilst  
Wang  extended  the  practical  wisdom  from  the  Confucian  tome  ‘ 大 學  (Da-Shue;  Great  Learning)’ that 
achievement of knowledge is ‘在明明德, 在親民, 在止於至善’ (Zai-Min-Min-De, Zai-Chin-Ming, Zai-Zhu-Yu-
Zhi-Shan), to disclose the virtue, to close to people, and to achieve the righteousness. 
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between myself and my client could be clearly contextualised and investigated. 
This chapter will mainly focus on my research design and the ethical issues related 
to my research conduct. The structure is as followed: in 3.2, my research design will 
be introduced in which I will explain how I considered the property of my data and 
its generation. In 3.3, the setting of my fieldwork will be described. Readers will be  
invited to take part in the ethical consideration of a therapeutic practice field that 
took place in a city located in the middle part of Taiwan. They will be asked to think 
about the identities I possess in my work, the people with whom I interact and the 
medical  institute  of  a  Taiwanese  hospital.  Also,  how  and  what  I  think  of  the 
recruitment of research participants in a research field will be illustrated. In 3.4, I  
will  draw upon the research ethics.  Focussing on institutional  ethics,  the ethical 
setting of  this  research and the process of  applying for  ethical  approval  for  my 
fieldwork in Taiwan will be reviewed. Afterward, from a reflexive perspective, I will  
engage in a critical reflection of this setting in 3.5. Focussing upon the concern of 
‘ethics’ I discussed in the last two chapters, I will finish this chapter by reflecting on 
the research ‘ethics’ by assuming different perspectives.  
3.2 Setting up Data Generation  
Counselling and psychotherapy, in this research, will be used as one socio-political 
concept as in Taiwan psychotherapy and counselling have not been developed as 
distinctive  practice  in  medical  field.  For  instance,  as  a  clinical  psychotherapist,  I  
conducted a psychological intervention which was charged as ‘behavioural therapy’ 
and ‘family counselling’. Since the fieldwork was set in the Taiwanese medical field 
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(which  will  be  discussed  later),  assigning  ‘psychotherapy’  and  ‘counselling’  two 
distinct terms would not fit the socio-cultural and political reality of my research 
conduct; I rather make them as ‘one’ concept of encountering clients’ experience as 
‘one’ item of medical service.
To set  a  psychotherapeutic  or  counselling practice as the research material,  the 
qualitative data is traditionally taken from the conversation which occurs within the 
therapeutic  interaction.  Furthermore,  since  this  study  of  ‘suffering  transaction’ 
explores the inter-subjectivity of suffering from the perspective of myself and my 
clients, two sets of data intrinsically existed and each required further exploration. 
Each data set is the result of my fieldwork of direct face-to-face encounters with 
clients in Taiwan, where I was licensed to conduct therapeutic praxis. Therefore, the 
first  data  set  I  introduce  is  my client’s  lived  experience,  which,  because  of  the 
therapeutic encounter with myself as therapist, is contextualised into and becomes 
the narrated stories of his or her life. The second set of generated research data is 
taken from my implicit  lived experience as a practitioner who engaged in active 
listening,  understanding  and  responding  to  the  dialogue  of  my  client.  This 
secondary  set  is  taken from my ‘therapeutic  supervision’  in  which I  myself  was 
supervised by another experienced therapist which then helped my data of lived 
experience to become ‘narrated’ by engaging in another therapeutic relationship 
with my supervisor. This set of data will include the transcript of supervision along 
with  my  research  journals  and  therapeutic  records.  To  research  ‘transaction’,  a 
methodological goal I identified was to overly generalise the two sets of data while 
exploring the inter-correlation between them. 
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3.2.1 The Setting of my Counselling practice in CMUH
In this section, I will further describe my fieldwork as the therapeutic practice in my 
research field, while the ethnographic setting of my fieldwork will be represented 
later. As discussed above, in my research I generated and explored the transcribed 
conversations  of  my therapeutic  practice,  which  contain  client’s  stories  of  lived 
experience, as the first and second sets of my qualitative data. In what follows, I will 
further  describe  the  interaction  between  myself  and  clients  in  a  therapeutic 
research setting. 
The fieldwork was conducted in the Chinese Medical University (CMUH) in Taiwan, 
where I worked from 2001 to 2005 as a paediatric psychologist and psychotherapist. 
My practice, except for neurological and developmental assessments for pre-school 
children, included psychological intervention, family counselling ad psychotherapy. 
As working with the children traumatised by the 921 earthquake, since 1999, I was 
trained as a child centred play therapist.  To work with children, I  used play and 
games as the media for therapeutic works. Combined with cognitive and behaviour 
therapeutic  skills,  in  the paediatric  department,  I  sometimes  designed tasks  for 
children. Sometimes, I let them freely develop their play with me. Most of the time,  
I played with them by reflecting on their feelings, actions and intentions, as well as 
my relationship with them. To work with a family, I presented myself as a medium 
to  connect  children’s  responses  with  parents.  I  facilitated  interactions  between 
parents  and children  in  the  process  of  therapeutic  sessions,  and,  influenced by 
narrative  therapy  developed  by  Michael  White  and  David  Epstein  (1995),  I 
empowered both parents and children’s ambition of securing the relationship with 
each other. 
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In CMUH, the standard time frame of counselling practice with an individual client, 
when  it  is  presented  as  free  service  especially  in  the  institutes  of  volunteer 
counselling  and  universities,  usually  takes  place  in  eight  to  ten  sessions.  As  in 
accordance  with  the  standardised  structure  of  short-term  counselling  in  the 
Taiwanese medical  structure,  I  also set up my research fieldwork of  therapeutic 
practice to take place in eight sessions, an hour per session and a session per week. 
If  a  client  needed  more  sessions,  my  practice  and  our  interaction  could  be 
prolonged, depending on our discussion in the final two sessions. In the period of 
conducting this fieldwork, two clients, a father and a mother, were recruited and 
the process of meeting them will be carefully presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
As  discussed  above,  data  were  taken  from  the  transcription  of  my  therapeutic 
sessions and I did this transcription myself. Before sessions formally began, a one-
hour  session  was  arranged  in  which  I  carefully  explained  to  clients  that  their 
participation  in  my research  would not  influence their  rights  in  counselling  and 
relative  medical  service  in  CMUH.  Furthermore,  I  relayed  that  they  were  not 
responsible for the success or failure of my data collection and they could refuse to 
offer their counselling scripts to my study in and after the period of counselling 
practice in CMUH. 
When all sessions were over, the finished transcripts were handed to both clients in  
order to acquire their validation of my further analysis abroad. Therefore, I finished 
my transcription of all sessions before returning to the UK so that I could acquire 
validation of using the therapeutic works as my research data. After emphasising 
again the careful protection of the data and the anonymity of the relative others 
when  I  left  Taiwan,  they  agreed  to  the  further  analytical  work  of  our  data  in 
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Scotland.
3.2.2 The Setting of Therapeutic Supervision
As stated earlier, the other side of my data concerning ‘transaction’ in counselling 
practice  is  the  data  from  myself,  which  includes  not  only  the  context  of  my 
therapeutic intentions but also the background of my own lived experience which 
causes  my  intentions  and  attitudes  that  are  involved  when  facing  people.  The 
investigation of this therapeutic ‘implicit context’  has a rich history of setting as 
being ‘therapeutic supervision’, in which a therapist builds up a relationship with 
another  experienced  therapist  and  explores  his  or  her  therapeutic  intentions 
towards clients ( Goodyear & Guzzardo, 2000; Knox, Hess & Hill, 2003). 
In this research, I set up ‘therapeutic supervision’ as both the psychological and 
clinical support of my therapeutic practice in Taiwan, and as a way to articulate my 
own  lived  experience  evoked  by  my  encounter  with  the  other’s  experience  of 
suffering. To set up my therapeutic supervision in Taiwan, I successfully sought my 
ex-supervisor, Professor King, who is the ex-dean of the department of counselling 
and guidance in Taipei  Normal University and an existentialist therapist who has 
over 30 years experience of counselling and teaching. After consideration of the 
practical period with clients and discussion with Professor King, in the period of  
data generation, we had a total of six sessions of therapeutic supervision arranged 
in  his  offices  in  Taiwan  Normal  University  in  Taipei  and  Chi-Nan  University  in 
Nantou.  Like  the  counselling  sessions,  these  six  supervisory  sessions  have  been 
audio-recorded and transcribed by myself. The transcription was made in Chinese. 
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Between Chinese and English, the translation and transformation of meaning will be 
discussed in 3.4.
3.3 The setting of Fieldwork
My fieldwork was conducted in the Parenting Consulting Centre in the paediatric 
department of the Chinese Medical University Hospital (CMUH) where I worked as a 
clinical psychologist. Two main benefits of this setting were considered. Firstly, since 
I worked in this institute and was familiar with its clinical service, I could confidently 
use it as a resource to recruit participants who fit this study. With my understanding 
of the diagnosing procedure within this context, I could be more easily engaged in a 
participant’s medical experience and its connection with their everyday life. 
Secondly, a hospital itself is an institute with a bureaucratic body. Understanding 
the bureaucracy enabled me to offer continuing medical help to my participants 
even ‘after’  the  fieldwork  was  over. For  instance,  when this  fieldwork  finished, 
although the research relationship would end, my participants’ needs for medical 
resources  could  still  remain.  Since  counselling/psychotherapeutic  practice  itself 
could enhance or activate the persisting needs of my client’s children, the fieldwork 
in  its  process  could  create  new  ethical  concerns  because  some  children’s 
developmental problems are chronic and life-long. If a client was aware of their  
need for new medical resources because of my counselling and research conduct, 
after leaving the research field, I had the responsibility of coping with their needs 
which could have been facilitated by my research conduct. Considering the further 
issues caused by this fieldwork, as a previous colleague of CMUH, I could use myself  
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as personal resource and offer help in this bureaucratic system. For example, I could 
help by referring a client or his/her child to other therapists or paediatrics, while  
also  preventing  my  limited  engagement  from  being  an  abrupt  and  disruptive 
interaction that took place just for research purposes.
For me, this fieldwork could be simply the return to my original work place and 
positions. However, to work as a researcher, in 2008, two main ethical conditions 
had to be sorted out. The first was the permission from the institutional review 
board  (IRBs)  in  CMUH  which  examines  the  ethical  application  from  different 
disciplines of research. The second condition was the permission of my clinical work 
in Taiwan as I  had left my work for three years.  According to Taiwanese Clinical 
Psychologist’s Law, I would have problems with conducting this work as I did not 
follow up on  my psychologist’s  continuing  education  for  over  three years.  As  a 
result, I either needed to attend the courses and acquire the required amount of 
annual  educational  credits,  or  I  needed  to  work  in  an  internship  while  being 
supervised by a qualified psychologist. Since I  could only stay in Taiwan for  few 
months in 2008, I chose to pursue the latter option and arranged to work in the 
Parenting  Consulting  Centre  (PCC)  of  Paediatric  department  with  my  previous 
colleague’s supervision. 
3.3.1 The Chinese Medical University and Parenting Consulting Centre
My research field, China Medical University Hospital (CMUH), is a medical centre 
established  in  Taichung  city  in  1980.  Attached  to  the  China  Medical  University 
(CMU),  CMUH is  situated in the city centre  of  Tai-Chung,  the largest city in the 
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middle region of Taiwan and is well known for its medical service of Western and 
Chinese medical integration. Since 1995, as the peripheral and highway transport 
system  was  gradually  finished,  CMUH  took  advantage  of  transporting  the 
integration population and developed fast from a local hospital to a medical centre 
which services the residents not only in Taichung but also in rural areas like Miao-Li, 
Chang-Hua  and  Nan-Tou  country. In  2009,  it  had  become  one  of  the  biggest 
hospitals which contained 2036 beds in various departments and 575 physicians, 
587 medical technicians, 1530 nurses and totally 3834 members in this big medical 
institute. 
In  the eight  buildings  for  different medical  practices,  the paediatric  department 
uses  one  11-floor  building  as  the  ‘Children  Medical  Centre’  for  the  purpose  of 
outpatient and inpatient services as well as academic and practical  training. The 
service of Parent Consulting Centre (PCC), established in 1999, is attached to the 
paediatric department. The patients’ medical benefit is calculated according to the 
Taiwanese  social  welfare  policy  of  ‘early  intervention’,  in  which  pre-elementary 
children  (the  age  before  six)  participate  in  the  free  medical  service  of  their  
physiological rehabilitation and psychological intervention. A paediatric neurologist, 
Dr. Huang-Tzung Kuo, one of the most influential persons who facilitated the birth 
of Taiwanese social welfare policy of ‘early intervention’, organised this centre with 
the  team  of  neurologists,  psychologists,  social  workers  and  special  educators. 
Between  2001  and  2005,  I  worked  in  this  centre  and  in  2008  this  study  was  
conducted here as well. As he was the main person who was responsible for the 
affairs in my research field and who authorised me to conduct the fieldwork, Dr. 
Kuo became the ‘gate keeper’ of my research.
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3.3.2 Gate Keeper: Dr. Huang-Tzung Kuo
Dr. Huang-Tzung Kuo, a medical doctor of Munich University in Germany and the 
dean of  the  Department  of  Children Behavioural  development  in  CMUH,  is  the 
current director and manager of the Parent Consulting Centre (PCC). In PCC, most of 
the patients who were under six years old and required psychological evaluation 
and intervention were referred by him. In my work between 2001 and 2005, I was 
trained  under  his  supervision  and  gained  clinical  knowledge  and  techniques, 
integrating my learning into interventional and therapeutic affairs. In this period, we 
defined our supervisory relationship not only as being between boss and colleague 
or teacher and student, but also between friends. 
Accordingly, my previous working experience and the relationship with him could 
therefore  make  this  research  easier  to  conduct  in  Taiwan  and  in  the  existing 
bureaucracy of the PCC and CMUH. Working again in this field, I entered the power 
structure in which I had before worked. Dr. Kuo, as the gatekeeper of this fieldwork, 
took responsibility for  monitoring not only my clinical  performance but also the 
research  procedure  performed in  CMUH.  The  participants  of  my research  were 
referred by him and so he was the first person who contacted the participants of  
this medical service. Under his supervision, after ethical approval was authorised by 
the Institutional Review Board and my clinical work in PCC was ready, I started to 
recruit my participants in March of 2008.
3.3.3 Research Participants
Recruiting  participants,  in  this  research,  had  its  socio-historical  and  political 
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background. In 2001, the Law of Psychologist was established in Taiwan and the 
establishment  formally  professionalised  Taiwanese  psychotherapeutic  praxis. 
However, because of the limitation of social and medical policy, the profession of 
psychotherapy was still dominated by psychiatric practice. Politically, in a hospital,  
the service of counselling and psychotherapy was still mainly supported by annual 
social-welfare  projects  from the Taiwanese government.  As  they  are  considered 
part of the medical field, psychotherapy and counselling often incorporate medical 
language; therapeutic practice in these field are subsequently often termed as the 
‘medicine’, which is taken from Western language, and implies a ‘healing’ of mental 
‘disease’. 
The participants of this research were focused on the parents who sought medical  
service for their children’s psychological and developmental problems. However, the 
socio-cultural context of ‘psychotherapy’ is concerned because this can be a process 
of stigmatisation. It is common in this field for counseling and therapy to be labelled 
as only being for people with ‘problems’. If someone seeks mental medical service, 
the records from their treatment can threaten one’s work and interpersonal life. In 
Taiwan,  the  terms  ‘illness’  and  ‘recovery’  acquire  their  cultural  meaning  from 
religions, folk shamanistic and oriental medical domains (Kleinman, 1987, 1996). To 
cope with a ‘disease’,  according to Yee (2005), one’s social  background, financial  
status, education and family structure influence an individual to seek certain help 
for his/her own psychological issues. 
In  the  ethnographical  background  of  my  research,  recruiting  a  participant  for 
counselling  or  psychotherapeutic  study  had  to  involve  consideration  of  its 
sociocultural  and political  contexts.  In  my case,  the fieldwork  of  this  study  was 
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conducted in the PCC of CMUH in which the patients were mostly children with 
neurological,  psychological  and social  developmental  problems.  In  fact,  from my 
empirical experience through my work, a significant number of these families were 
from the lower social strata and thus medical counselling and psychotherapeutic 
services were very seldom used because folk/religion resources within our society 
provided them with the majority of their psychological healing and support. 
In my research, the major concern of selecting a ‘proper’ participant was not only 
to choose the participant whose lived experience complemented the focus of this 
study but also to find a person who was willing to talk about his/her experience of  
life (Laverty, 2003; van Manen, 1997). Since this study focuses on inter-subjective 
reality rather than objective causality, research concepts like validity and reliability 
were not factors in deciding the number of participants. Rather, how the research 
data, the context of suffering, could be developed and generated by the genuine 
encounter  between  myself  and  participants  was  the  core  consideration  of  this 
fieldwork.  In  this  context,  since  psychotherapeutic  practice  itself  explores  one’s 
lived experience ‘deeper’ through interactive sessions, I determined that one or two 
participants  were enough for  this  research as  my practice  was focussed on the 
complexity and richness of the researched phenomenon.
The way in which I recruited my participants was intentional. In CMUH, if a child 
needs to be referred to a clinical psychologist and requires further treatment, the 
caregiver  has  to  first  begin  with  a  paediatric  neurologist  who  can  arrange  for  
additional evaluations such as electro-physiological or psychological assessments. 
Therefore,  as  a  practitioner  in  the  room  of  assessment,  I  could  have  my  first 
encounter with a patient who was looking for  clinical/psychological  help while  I 
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conducted the developmental  evaluation.  Following institutional  ethics,  this  was 
also a chance to engage in listening to patients’ stories, evaluate myself and explore 
whether I could use my counselling skills to help the parent in the limited period 
and sessions. 
Accordingly, through my work as a clinical psychologist in PCC, I began to search and 
recruit participants who were the parents of my evaluated child. Then the data was 
brought back to Scotland for further analysis. In the period from the beginning of 
March to the end of  June in 2008,  a mother,  Hui-Yu,  and a father,  Tai-Ya,  were 
invited to participate in this study. The details of this process will be presented in 
later chapters where I discuss each participant and my relationship with them.
3.4 Research Ethics: The Concerns and Reflection  
Two institutes, the ethical committee of University of Edinburgh and Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) of CMUH, examined and approved this study. These two bodies 
have  different  political  contexts  and  cultural  perspectives  regarding  ‘research 
ethics’. In this section, I discuss the main concerns of the institutional ethics or the  
‘procedural ethics’, which caused me to seek approval from distinct relevant ethics 
committees in order to undertake this research (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004) .
In  November  of  2007,  when  the  proposal  of  this  study  was  approved  by  the 
University  of  Edinburgh,  I  then worked to  acquire  ethical  approval  in  CMUH,  in 
which the project had to be examined and approved by the Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) in the CMUH. The ethical approval by IRB was from the United States 
(Richard & Huprich, 2009) and legislated as ‘IRB benchmark of Medical institutions, 
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organizations  and operations19’  by  the Department of  Health,  Executive  Yuan in 
Taiwan since November of 2003. Under its regulated procedure, my proposal along 
with the ethical guidelines of IRBs in both the English and Chinese editions were 
sent and examined by its committee, which was organised as a group of 7 to 21 
members. They were mainly medical professionals, non-single gendered, over 1/3 
of them professionals of law and social work and more than two of them being 
professionals who were not from CMUH20. After asking to enhance the pragmatic 
approach of my research conduct, this project was approved in February 2008 and 
began its data collection from March to July 2008; the ethical approval application 
form is been attached in appendix 1. 
According to the  Framework for Good Practice in Counselling and Psychotherapy  
(BACP, 2002) and Ethical Guidelines for Researching Counselling and Psychotherapy 
(Bond, 2004), a researcher of counselling and psychotherapy has been offered the 
baseline  to  manage  five  axes  of  ethical  consideration:  (1)  to  build  up 
trustworthiness within the fieldwork, (2) to monitor the potential risks associated 
with research, researcher him/herself and participants, (3) to establish and respond 
to  the  relationship  with  participants,  (4)  to  concern  research  integrity  of  data 
collection, analysis, publication and dissemination, to be reflexive in regards to the 
competence of the research design, plan and conduct, and (5) to consider how the 
governance  requirements  are  applicable  to  the  research  being  undertaken. 
According  to  these  guidelines,  the  relative  ethical  issues  which  fit  with  the 




3.4.1  The protection of participants
My research was conducted after a full explanation of the therapeutic and research 
process I planned to undertake and after gaining two clients’ consent, in which the 
information  of  the  rights  to  privacy,  safety  and  confidentiality  were  carefully 
discussed. In addition, the committee in CMUH, University of Edinburgh and clients 
required that the description of my research process had to be presented in both 
Chinese and English. In addition, the participant consent form was also submitted 
to the institutes and clients in the both languages (Appendix 2). After I acquired the  
necessary ethical approval, I arranged an appointment with both clients so that I 
could  further  inform them  of  the  settings  of  counselling  sessions  and  research 
procedure in person and provide them with the opportunity to have any questions 
answered.
In the process of data generalisation, part of what took place in my therapeutic 
sessions with research participants  was required to be reported to the institute 
supervisor,  Dr.  Kuo in CMUH, in order to confirm and monitor my research and 
working progress. For the same purpose, all  qualitative data from my work with 
clients, including the Chinese transcription and English edition of my therapeutic 
journal, was read by my therapeutic supervisor in Taiwan and research supervisor in 
Scotland. For further analysis and investigation, the names of both clients and the 
people  in  their  stories  were kept  anonymous.  The audited files,  transcripts  and 
copies were saved in my personal space where only I could access it in both CMUH 
and the University of Edinburgh. 
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3.4.2 The Management of Researcher’s Self-protection
The ethical  concern of  ‘protection’  in qualitative research should not  only focus 
upon participants  but  also  therapists,  because  psychotherapeutic  practice  could 
also cause risk to the therapist him/herself (BACP, 2002, 2004; Bond, 2004). This 
section is about how I managed the potential risk towards myself while conducting 
my research of psychotherapy and counselling (Bond, 2004). 
Being the therapist,  for  instance,  I  was put in a functional  position like a ‘silent 
container’ in which I had to hold the generated emotions and enable them to be 
developed in my body. The ‘contained’ emotions for a therapist could become a 
self-defeating  force  and  can  cause  ‘burnout’  experienced  by  the  therapist 
him/herself  (Abrahams,  2007).  My  work  with  homeless  children  in  the  921 
Earthquake in Taiwan was a demonstrative example. As disclosed in Chapter One, I 
suffered from self-criticising and self-devastating thoughts as I felt helpless by my 
inability to work with and provide help for them. From that experience, I assumed 
that my experience could be recalled by participant clients’ narration of suffering 
because I had to immerse myself in the experience of suffering ‘with’ them (Gantt, 
2002). When clients are telling stories that involve stress, sadness, depression or 
shame, as the therapist, I am also exposing myself to the same condition with a 
similar contextualised experience of suffering.
Like many counselling studies about traumatised clients (Abrahams, 2010), in this 
study, the research setting of supervision provided protection from the risk of injury 
to therapist him/herself. For me, the therapeutic supervisor in Taiwan could firstly 
give immediate advice and swift support when I was engaged ‘too’ deep in clients’ 
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or my own emotional experiences, whilst therapeutic supervision also helped me to 
explore what the ‘too-deep’ engagement could mean to me. Thus I theorised that I 
could more ‘deeply’  reflect  on my lived experience when responding to clients’ 
stories of suffering.
In the University of Edinburgh, my research supervisors helped me be reflexive as I  
evaluated the context of my analyses in which I related my lived experience with 
each client’s life history. Also, in the same way as my therapeutic supervisor offered 
me immediate support, I could find immediate feedback and support in Scotland 
when I  was  re-exposed to the crisis  through re-working my lived experience of 
suffering  in  the  further  analytic  research  process.  By  means  of  the  dialogic  
exploration I embarked upon with my supervisors, the potential risk could therefore 
be  transformed  into  a  possibility  of  self-exploration  and  thus  I  could  further 
investigate my lived experience of suffering. Simultaneously,  the risk of exposing 
myself to danger could then be managed and minimised.
3.4.3 The Reflection and the Management of My Multiple Roles
In  this  study,  I  had  to  manage  the  multiple  roles  I  played  in  relation  to  my 
participants:  I  was their individual  counsellor,  the therapist for their child in the 
psychological intervention and the researcher of their life history. Also, culturally, I  
was positioned as the ‘teacher’, a specific moral role in oriental society, while also 
being  a  researcher  who  aimed  to  generate  data  with/through  them.  With  the 
multiple  relative  responsibilities  of  being  a  therapist,  teacher  and  researcher, 
through my therapeutic encounter, I generalised, collated, analysed and published 
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the  data  from  my  clients’  confidential  stories  to  compose  their  thesis 
representation. At the same time, my clients also played additional roles than solely 
being participants in my research. In these multiple relationships which took place 
within a socio-cultural context, the way the research conducted itself could have 
caused  a  risk  of  encroaching  upon  my  clients’  confidentiality,  because  a 
responsibility  of  one of  my distinct multiple roles could contradict  with another 
(King  & Wheeler,  1999).  To cope with this  intrinsic  ‘dual-role’  ethical  conflict,  a 
researcher needs to seriously reflexively reflect on its contextual development and 
seriously examining the process of data generation (McLeod, 2011; Bond, 2007)
The process of seeking for my participant's consent was apparently an example of 
this 'dual role' conflict. The participants' consents were sought in an independent 
session  before  our  formal  counselling  services  and  children's  psychological 
intervention, in which I carefully explain the needs of this study and the uses of the 
transcribed data. Also, I clearly discussed with them about the protection of their 
confidentialities by utilising anonymity and the protection from my therapeutic and 
research  supervision.  Within  an-hour  free session  of  talk,  the  participants  were 
informed the use of counselling service in this study, and signed the consent form 
(Appendix 3).
As discovered, this research work was conducted in a medical space and intrinsically 
I interacted with my participants a medical profession. The consent form, which was 
signed as a contract, was conditioned socio-politically when participants urgently 
needed  their  child's  psychological  intervention.  As  a  researcher,  in  a  critical 
perspective examining the process of searching for client’s consent (Gans, 2002) 
although  I could try my best verbally to protect my participant's privileges of the 
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demanding medical services and their freedom of accepting my research purposes, 
however,  the  pre-existing  political  condition  had  caused  the  power  difference 
between us in which, non-verbally, the participants had to embody the fear that 
saying  'no'  could  cause  the  loss  of  their  child's  treatments.   For  this  power 
difference caused by the current Taiwanese medical reality, as the researcher, non-
verbally,  I  could only reflect  upon the awareness of  this  implicit  power struggle 
which is caused by my implicit another role as therapist (McLeod, 2001, 2005).
My therapeutic and research supervision in Taiwan and Scotland helped me reflect 
upon  and  manage  the  'dual  role'  conflicts.  In  Taiwan,  the  supervisory  dialogue 
helped me foresee crises when the counselling contexts were developed relative to 
my research aims. In Scotland, to subject clients’ data to collation and analyses, my 
research supervisors helped me reflexively contextualise my dual-role experience of 
conducting this fieldwork. In this sense, in addition to manage the protection the 
client's  confidentialities,  the socio-cultural  and political  meaning of  not  only  my 
therapist-researcher roles but also my clients' patient-participant positions could be 
genuinely discovered. In 3.5 and 3.6, more reflexive points of ethical consideration 
will be further discussed.
3.4.4 The Translation in Two Different Languages
In  the  two  different  political  environments  of  CMUH  and  the  University  of 
Edinburgh, not only did the literal meanings of my data need to be translated, but 
also the socio-cultural and political symbolic meaning also had to be transformed 
into two languages. Since I am not a native English speaker, ethical problems were 
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also raised by this process of translation and transformation: How could I make sure 
that I used the ‘correct’ words to interpret client’s lived experience? How could I 
relate and analogise my clients’ context of his or her local socio-cultural background 
with mine? How could I ensure that my translation in English did not lose its original 
Chinese meaning? How could I manage the ‘accuracy’ in using the two different 
languages between the two different political institutes?
Throughout my period of fieldwork in Taiwan, to monitor the research process, I 
continuously updated my research diary and discussed the data process with my 
research supervisors at  the University of Edinburgh. This process enabled me to 
initially translate my work from Chinese to English and also re-structure the context 
of my work into a different symbolic system. My supervisors at the University of 
Edinburgh were the first English audience for my research and therefore I  could 
interact with them in the English linguistic framework while I finished each research 
session of my therapeutic work in which I utilised the Chinese language. 
To  transfer  the  data  from  generalisation  to  analysis,  my  relationship  with  my 
proofreaders in this study was important because I needed to keep the ‘original and 
genuine’  meaning of  each client’s  words and context  throughout  their  linguistic 
transformation from Chinese to English. One of my proof readers has a major in 
translation from Chinese to English and another is a native English speaker. Through 
a number of discussions with them, my data analyses and the transformation of the 
raw scripts were kept in a managed or manageable condition so that the original  
‘meaning’  of  discovered  phenomenon  could  be  retained  in  the  final  edition  of 
English work. 
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 3.5 Practical Ethics: The Critical Ethical Concern
To monitor the potential crisis of a research conduct, institutional ethics become 
the  essential  consideration  for  a  research  project  of  social  science  like  mine. 
However, as discussed earlier, the socio-cultural and political context of research 
also needs to be considered and could not be ‘pre-estimated’ before the research is 
actually conducted. Institutional ethics is never enough when  conducting a study 
which involves interpersonal relationships and stories (Ellis & Bochner, 1992; Ellis, 
2007;  Frank,  2004).  Beyond  institutional  ethics,  except  for  baseline  ethics  as 
discussed by  Bond (2004)  and BACP (2002),  another  level  concerning  ethics ‘in 
practice’ mentioned by Guillemin and Gillam (2004) or the ‘situational ethics’ by 
Goodwin et,  al.  (2003)  should  also be considered when a  researcher  is  actively 
dealing with the unpredictable, subtle, yet ethically important moments that come 
up in  his  or  her  fieldwork.  In  this  study,  the ethical  issues  were generated and 
developed  through  my  relationship  with  my  participants,  and  therefore  the 
potential risks could be caused by my research and therapeutic approach ‘with’ and 
‘for’  them.  Considering  the  multiple  relationships  and  responsibilities  between 
myself and my clients, which has been explored in this section, the issues relative to 
the practical ethics of my fieldwork in Taiwan will be further discussed later.
Guillenmin and Gillam (2004) suggested the concern of ‘ethics in practice’ to be the 
everyday  ethical  issues  generated in  the process  of  doing  research with human 
beings. These sorts of ‘everyday’ ethics were regarded to be seemly unimportant 
interactions to participants but pushed researchers into the ‘micro-ethical dilemma’ 
of the research relationship, as discussed in the given example:
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There  are  many  more  immediate  ethical  concerns.  The  researcher  has  to 
decide how to respond to what [the participant] has said. Does the researcher 
let the disclosure pass or take it up in some way? And in what way- what words  
to say, what tone of voice to use? Turn off the tape recorder or keep it running?  
Abandon the interview plan or try to return to it? Off to discuss the situation or  
offer to help in some way? These are the issues about the ethical obligations a 
researcher has toward a research participant in terms of interaction with him 
or her in a humane, non-exploitative way while at the same time being mindful  
of one’s role as a researcher. (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 264)
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) used ‘ethically important moments’ to explain how the 
research approach taken or the decision made has important ethical ramifications,  
whilst the researcher ‘does not necessary feel himself or herself to be on the horns 
of a dilemma (p. 265)’.  They suggested that a researcher incorporates reflexivity 
into  his/her  fieldwork  to  achieve  awareness  of  the  day-to-day  basis  of  the 
situational dilemma (Goodwin, 2003). For me, I used my reflexive ethical application 
at CMUH and in my work with clients as an example which illustrates two ‘ethically 
important moments’ of the particular way I conducted my research. In 3.5.1 and 
3.5.2, I will further explore my application of IRB and my commitment to my clients  
due to this research conduct.
3.5.1 Institutional Review Boards in CMUH
To apply for ethical approval in a medical institute is a political process, because the 
approval is given by the ethics committee and is related to the members of that 
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committee.  Especially  in  medical  institutes  like  CMUH,  the  members  were 
composed by mostly the medical and scientific researchers. Their pragmatic and 
quantitative based perspective  could present  contradictive ethical  concerns  to a 
qualitative  researcher  like  me.  For  me,  the  application  for  ‘Institutional  Review 
Boards’ (IRBs) in CMUH was a conflicting experience. IRBs in CMUH is not translated 
from its original English context but named as ‘人體審查委員會 (the committee of 
human  body  experiments)’  because  it  is  mainly  used  when  examining  projects 
involving advanced medical techniques, medicine and clinical experiments. To apply 
for this approval, my application was intended to convince the committee that the 
psychotherapy performed in this study was not harmful and could prove beneficial 
to research participants. In this context, the term ‘psychotherapy’ or ‘counselling’ in 
my application was therefore analogised to be a medical technique, medicine and 
clinical experiment to be performed upon a ‘human body’. I also had to analogise 
my research conduct as an potential ‘invasion’ (treatment) of the human body and 
thus the therapeutic and counselling ‘techniques’ needed to be presented in order 
to actualise its positive effects of improving patients’ ‘clinical symptoms’. 
This medical analogy caused two conflicting experience to me in acquiring approval 
of the research conduct from the CMUH. Firstly, this IRBs’ examination of a research 
project  was  based  on  the  hypothesis-proof  rationality  which  did  not  fit  the 
methodological/ontological  framework  of  my  project  which  was  based  on  the 
empirical exploration of human lived experience. Secondly, in this political setting, I 
had to present psychotherapy to be a term of medical technique which could cause 
‘harm for  the  human body’,  which  is  contradictory  to  my comparatively  radical 
belief that through psychotherapy I am working with a human being but not solely 
91
one’s body. In my application to IRB, ‘suffering’ had to be regarded as a parent’s 
measurable  emotion  of  depression,  fear  and anxiety  which were all  due to the 
difficulties  created  by  their  child’s  disability.  In  short,  to  be  approved,  I  had  to 
change the empirical-based description of my research setting to another language 
which was based on the positivist setting of the fieldwork. 
Accordingly, in the application form to IRBs, I had to revise my research proposal 
with a more positivist focus on how I would engage myself in a client’s experience 
of suffering. I re-identified psychotherapy as the medical technique, defined how 
suffering  was  related  to  human  psychological  status  in  paediatric  clinical  work, 
added the information regarding person centred and narrative based approaches of 
psychotherapy, explained its expected clinical application on psycho-social support 
to  a  family  with  disabled  child,  and  re-examined the  low  possibility  of  injuring 
human  body  and  mind.  Ethical  approval  in  CMUH,  in  my  case,  became  an 
examination of proper political language and appropriated translation which I had 
to demonstrate in order to enter the door of this medical environment. To conduct 
my fieldwork, institutional ethics had to be politically considered prior to practical 
ethics.  To  enter  the  research  field,  I  also  had  to  accept  that  the  ethical  issues 
needed to be acknowledged by the positivist focus of this institution, despite the 
empirical concerns of psychotherapeutic practice.
3.5.2 An Example of the Practical Ethics: Tai-Ya and Kevin
In  the period  of  fieldwork,  I  arranged children’s  psychological  evaluations,  each 
child’s  intervention  as  well  as  the  parent’s  counselling,  and  then  chose  the 
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participants of this research. Between participants and myself, there is a significant 
power  difference  in  which,  as  a  medical  professional, I  have  more  pathological 
knowledge of a child’s development and more medical resources of treating the 
child’s problems. During the therapy sessions, I had a clear aim of re-connecting 
them with other social support so that when we end our therapeutic relationship, 
the treatment could continue. 
However, as discussed, a medical disease could cause local or cultural stigmatisation 
to the patient’s family. To cope with a long-term disease, a patient and his or her 
family could choose folk or medical resources but using medical resources for the 
further  treatments  required  a  great  deal  of  confidence  and  courage  (Kleinman, 
1981), and therefore my client’s ambition was highly related to the quality of our 
therapeutic work and the ‘depth’ of our relationship (Rogers, 1967; Cohen, 1986; 
Mearns & Cooper, 2005). In this kind of work that is based on a parent’s decision 
concerning his or her child, an ethical  problem could happen: if  my fieldwork is  
finished, would the willing use of another service be influenced by my departure? 
On the one hand, if  the participant  is  not  yet confident enough of  our medical 
service but I feel that the child’s intervention should be continued, should I insist 
upon my suggestion since the child would otherwise stop his progression because 
of my leaving? On the other hand, if the participant is willing to continue on with  
the medical service but our society had no resource for him/her, what should I do 
when the fieldwork itself has created the need for our interaction?
The participant Tai-Ya, an autistic boy’s father, was an example that my fieldwork 
with  them  created  new  ‘ethical  concerns’  re-generated  through  our  deepening 
relationship. While his stories will be presented in detail in Chapter Six, I will now 
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speak about my experience with this participant in order to illustrate the ethical 
implications of our research relationship. My sessions with this participant began 
with his accusation of our ‘unkind society’, in which Taiwanese society had no ability 
to enable a father like him, who lived in a rural region with very limited medical  
resources, to save his son. With disappointment regarding his son’s medical reality, 
he even refused his son’s diagnosis and the relative medical support, but after a 
long period, his disappointment changed to fear, anger, and self-condemnation and 
the  feeling  that  he  had  made  a  wrong  decision  about  his  son.  Therefore,  he 
‘surrendered’ to the reality and had to come back to medical help with regret. 
Facing  the son  labelled as  ‘autistic  with moderate  developmental  retardation’,  I 
arranged the psychological intervention which aimed to improve the boy’s social 
and cognitive ability, together with a special educator’s cognitive intervention. Also, 
facing Tai-Ya’s complicated emotions of suffering, we arranged eight sessions which 
focussed on his relationship with his son. 
In the period of this therapeutic work, his son made obvious progression and he 
again became confident as he continued his cooperation with medical professions. 
However, therapy itself had therefore become a pressure which gradually activated 
Tai-Ya’s  anxiety,  as I  realised that  the end of  our  therapeutic  relationship might 
cause the  possibility  that  he would not  be  able  to find a  proper  therapist  and 
maintain  his  son’s  progression.  In  the  area  where  he lived,  finding  a  place and 
person  for  continuous  intervention  was  difficult.  He  worried  that  his  son’s 
progression would stop.
Tai-Ya’s  anxiety  had  its  social,  political  and  geographical  reasons  which  will  be 
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discussed in later chapters. However, for Tai-Ya, what my fieldwork had created was 
not only the ongoing need of the medical support but also the need of a trustful 
relationship  with  a  medical  professional.  In  Levinas’s  (1969)  context,  we  had 
reconstructed the ethical context of the responsibility ‘for the son’ but the end of 
our therapeutic relationship had also repositioned Tai-Ya in the crisis in which he 
might not be able to take/assume this responsibility with the existing resources that 
surrounded him.  Because of  this  socio-political  reality,  the end of  my fieldwork 
could have meant a compulsive termination of a father’s willingness to help his son,  
and could create a dramatic violation of my practical ethics. 
In  other  words,  my therapeutic  practice  redeveloped the  ethical  context  of  my 
responsibility for them. Since my fieldwork recreated need, I  had to expand the 
limitation of medical resources and continue his son’s psychological intervention as 
an  act  of  my  responsibility  for  and  to  them.  Therefore,  from  my  own  social  
professional network, I found a therapist who could do Tai-Ya’s son’s intervention in 
Taiwan;  we  arranged  a  session  for  him  to  observe  the  son’s  psychological 
intervention. After I returned to Scotland, the therapist kept on my work with Tai-
Ya’s family and Tai-Ya could continue to help his son within the context we had 
reconstructed through his encounter with me. 
Tai-Ya’s example has showed that, as a result of conducting research fieldwork as a 
therapist,  the  issue  of  ‘ethics’  should  not  be  considered  as  only  a  method  of  
management by a governing institution such as IRBs. Rather, ethics, as Guillemin 
and Gillam (2004) discovered, should be regarded as the ongoing action in research, 
rather than the evaluated result produced by ethics committees. In this context, 
practical ethics can be regarded as the reflection upon Foucault’s ‘technology of 
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self’,  which is  the praxes ‘where individuals  perform operations on their bodies, 
psyches, thoughts or souls so as to construct the way of being by their own means 
of the help of others’ (Sewell, 2005, p. 92). Precisely, in terms of ‘practical ethics’  
ethical  issues  could  not  be  predicted  and  pre-managed.  It  was  acknowledged 
through the therapeutic  praxis with my clients and known by myself,  in which I 
‘knew’ the transcendental  reality  and responsibility  between myself  and others. 
These issues will be further discussed in the later chapters discussing my work with 
clients.
3.6 The Relational Ethics and Practical Ethics
Apart from situational ethics and practical ethics, Carolyn Ellis (2007) argues that 
ethical  issues  could  be  manifested  by  the  developing  relationship  between 
researcher and the participants.  From the interpersonal  perspective,  Ellis  (2007) 
articulated the third line of ‘relational ethics’  which recognised ‘mutual respect, 
dignity  and  connectedness  between  researcher  and  researched,  and  between 
researchers and the communities in which they live and work (p. 4)’. The relational 
ethics can be related to Levinas’s (1969, 1985, 1995) term of the responsibility for  
the ‘Other’ which is the inter-subjective context co-developed by researcher and 
participants. 
The  dimension  of  the  ‘relational  ethics’,  according  to  Carolyn  Ellis  (2007),  was 
closely related to an ethics of care (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984), feminist ethics  
and feminist  communitarian ethics (Denzin, 1997, 2003). Cited from Ellis  (2007),  
Slattery and Rapp (2003, p. 55) describe relational ethics as doing what is necessary 
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to  be  'true  to  one’s  character  and  responsible  for  one’s  actions  and  their 
consequences on others'. Relational ethics is subjective, which requires researchers 
to act from our heart and minds, to acknowledge our interpersonal bonds to others, 
and initiate and maintain conversations (Bergum, 1998; Slattery &Rapp, 2003; Ellis, 
2007). Echoing Levinas, relational ethics queries a researcher him/herself how we 
act and interact in a ‘humane, non exploitative way, while being mindful of our role 
as researchers’ (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 264). It is a researcher’s developing 
awareness of the responsibility for the other. 
Ellis  (2007)  used  an  example  of  her  auto-ethnographical  study  to  explore  her 
relationship with participants, in which she asked a core relational question: Can a  
participant be friends with the researcher? In her work in 1992, she reflected that a 
participant regarded her as a ‘good friend’, as she is ‘someone to talk to, to depend 
on and rely on for help, support, and caring, and to have fun and enjoy doing things  
with (p. 10)’. However, in her critical reflection (1986), she was not a ‘real’ friend 
because  her  care  was  conditioned  to  the  space,  field  and  time.  In  qualitative 
fieldwork, Goffman (1989) mentioned that a researcher ‘tries to subject himself, 
hopefully, to participants’ life circumstances’ and ‘wants to be close to participants 
while they are responding to what life does to them’. In Gans’ (2002) argument, a 
researcher is to ’be friendly but not friends with those you study’. Being a ‘friend’ 
with  participants  is  always  the  ethical  issue  developing  through  the  research 
interaction.
However,  Tillmann-Healy  (2003)  suggested  that  friendship  is  a  method  in 
ethnographic  studies as  it  promotes researching with an ‘ethics of  friendship,  a 
stance of hope, caring, justice, and even love’.  Cited from Ellis  (2007),  Tillmann-
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Healy argued that ‘friendship’ is ‘neither a program nor a guise strategically aimed 
at gaining further access. It is a level of investment in participants; life that puts a 
fieldwork relationship on par with the project’ (Ellis, 2007, p. 13; Tillmann-Healy, 
2001, p. 735). A researcher and friendship role should weave together, expand and 
deepen the other because s/he has the potential to affect participants’ lives more 
than  a  stranger  might  (Ellis,  2007,  p.  13).  Since  research  with  human  beings 
develops  the  relational  responsibility  between  a  researcher  and  participant,  a 
researcher’s  use  of  reflexivity  while  developing  a  relationship  with  participants 
shows how the responsibility ‘for the other’ could be developed, which should be 
regarded as the core of the relational ethics. 
In the field of psychotherapy, beyond the mutual responsibility between therapist 
and client, the therapy itself should be regarded as the practice in which not only 
client but also the therapist is engaged in an intertwined ethical reflection of the 
relationship ‘with-an-other’ (Gantt, 2001). Following Ellis’ discussion, ‘reflexivity’ is 
the way in which the ‘relational ethics’ could be acknowledged. In a therapeutic 
space,  when and  how  did  I  regard  my participants  as  a  participant,  client  and 
friend? In therapy, how could the relationship with and responsibility for each other 
be developed? In subsequent chapters,  I  will  continue to discuss this context of 
relational knowing from the ethical point of view, which has been introduced here. 
A relationship in psychotherapeutic practice and qualitative study is not developed 
as a single line. Rather, it is often developed intertwined. In the example provided in 
3.4.2  of  my  relationship  with  my  participant  Tai-Ya,  a  question  that  had  often 
emerged was whether I conducted this fieldwork purely due my responsibility as a 
researcher and psychotherapist. The answer was no, because my anxiety, pleasure, 
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happiness and worries for them were so real and genuine in the interaction with 
him and his son. What I was dealing with was not only the moral boundary of the 
relationship between a researcher and participant,  a  therapist  and client or  the 
Chinese  cultural  sense  like  a  teacher  and  student,  but  also  a  kind  of  blurred 
boundary of a relationship that closely resembles a real friendship. After all, the 
relationship would not be terminated by the research or counselling actions; rather, 
it could go further beyond the point in time when this research has finished. 
Accordingly, the ‘relational ethics’ in my study is not relating to the certain ethical 
rules like IRBs or to the practice itself; rather, it is relating to my reflexivity of my  
therapeutic practice and relationships with my clients.  The context of  ‘relational 
ethics’  is  the  core  ethical  concern  of  this  research,  which  will  be  continuously 
explored in the rest of this thesis.
3.7 Summary
In  this  chapter,  the  research  design  for  generating  my  research  data  has  been 
represented,  in  which  I  went  back  to  Taiwan  for  the  fieldwork  and  used  my 
counselling sessions with two clients  as  the data source of  this  study.  With the 
setting of therapeutic practice in CMUH, two sets of data were formed: one from 
the  transcript  of  therapeutic  sessions  and  the  other  from  my  transcribed 
supervision. Within the discussion, I  reviewed the ethical  issues which would be 
caused by  the setting  and my research  conduct.  From the report  of  my ethical 
approval in Scotland and Taiwan, I started the discussion of institutional ethics, in 
which I  presented my ethical  concerns  required by  IRBs  in  CMUH.  Also from a 
99
critical  point  of  ‘practical  ethics’  and  ‘relational  ethics’,  I  have  articulated  two 
different perspectives to consider the ethical issues arising from my practice with 
people  rather  than  institutes.  Being  reflexive  to  the  context  of  therapeutic 
relationships  caused responsibility  to  become the main concern of  my research 
ethics.
In the next chapter I will discuss how I used the collected data and turn to explore 
the other methodological concern of my analysis. As an empirical research study, I 
needed to re-develop an analytic  method to fit  my research design and ethical  
concerns. From the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology, I will show how I 
shaped  my research  method  in  order  to  discuss  the  phenomenon  of  ‘suffering 
transaction’.
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Chapter 4 The Door to Analysing Suffering: Analytic Concerns
4.1 Introduction 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  further  discuss  the  methodological  issues  regarding  my 
‘analyses’  of  the  data  generated  by  my  fieldwork  and  explore  the  chosen 
methodology  of  my  analytic  work.  Actually,  as  I  hoped  to  choose  a  ‘proper’ 
method,  I  experienced  difficulty  with  transforming  my  data.  Using  Chinese 
transcript as the ‘raw data’ of this research, I had to face the tasks of translation 
and transformation between two different languages and two different symbolic 
meanings, orders and systems, as discussed in 4.2. 
From a  structural  point  of  view,  an  analysis  of  narratives  involves  the  research 
intention of and motivation behind data thematisation and theorisation, in which 
both  clients’  and  researcher’s  self-experience  is  re-directed  and  reduced  into 
specific narrative categories (Riessman, 1991). Considering the ethical violation of 
totalising human experience discussed in the last chapter, I encountered difficulty 
with  analysing  the  stories  of  my collected  data.  Suffering,  as  explored,  has  the 
ethical component of intersubjectivity which refuses being conceptualised (Frank, 
1995). In this context, stories of suffering might be split up and hard to delimit in  
dialogues as they are rarely so clearly bounded (Riessman, 1991). Locating them is  
often a complex interpretive process and therefore a researcher has to be mindful 
of  the  boundary  between  a  researcher’s  introspective  experience  and  a 
participant’s authentic context of life.  
Following my earlier ontological and epistemological discussion of suffering, what 
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analysis  means  to  this  research  is  to  let  lived  experience  ‘tells  stories  by  itself 
(Frank, 1995)’ and to avoid totalising others’ experience of suffering (Levinas, 1969, 
1985, 1995). In my case, to relate my own lived experience to client’s stories and 
vice  versa,  two difficulties  became obvious  while  I  was  developing  the  analytic 
methodology for the collected data. The first difficulty involved the transmission 
between Chinese and English and the symbolic system behind both languages and 
cultures.  As  a  native  Chinese  speaker,  I  am  a  good  storyteller  when  using  the 
Chinese language but have difficulty communicating an attractive story in English. 
To make the collected Chinese data meaningful in English, the translation had to not 
only  consider  the  linguistic  rhetoric  and  structural  difference  but  also  the 
psychodynamic  meaning  of  the  storytelling  itself  (Iannaco,  2009).  In  the  next 
section, I further elaborate on how I located myself in the transformation between 
two languages.
The second difficulty I encountered was the presentation of ‘understanding’ itself, 
which  bridged  clients’  narrations  with  my  own  stories  but  was  not  really 
contextualised into the counselling practice. In what follows, I show how presenting 
the ‘understanding’  from its  dialectic  nature rather than my directive discussion 
became  the  core  methodological  and  ethical  concern  in  my  process  of  data 
transformation. In 4.3, I will then discuss how I dwelled upon the development of  
my practical and relational ‘understanding’ of this research conduct from the point 
of hermeneutic phenomenology, in which ‘understanding’ can be hermeneutically 
demonstrated  through  exploring  the  ‘historical  language/context’  of  suffering 
(Riessman, 2001) and representing the relational development of self and others by 
means  of  ‘phenomenological  reduction’  (McLeod,  2001;  Langdridge,  2007). A 
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genealogical review of ‘hermeneutic phenomenology’ will then be presented and 
related to the methodological concern of this study. 
In 4.4, focusing on the storied nature of the generalised data, I re-articulate the 
narrative-based  concern  of  the  ‘analysis’  of  this  study.  After  reviewing  the 
development of narrative analysis, I will focus on Arthur Frank’s (1995, 2001, 2005)  
concern  regarding  the  dialogical  nature  of  stories  and  use  James  Paul  Gee’s 
discussion on the poetic structure of discourse analysis as an example of the way I  
re-developed a ‘proper’  method to ‘represent’  and ‘re-interpret’  my generalised 
data. 
4.2 Different Languages and Different Meanings: Translation and Bilingualism 
As stated above, I am a good storyteller in my mother language, Mandarin. In my 
work  with  children,  I  used  stories  to  engage  them  in  play  in  the  therapeutic 
wonderland. In my work with teenager and adults, I connected their reflections on 
their  apparently  mundane  life  with  the  insights  of  specific  events  and engaged 
myself in the development of these stories. In my own life, I transform my everyday 
activities into a narrative context in diaries and share my learning with friends and 
partners.  However,  these  contexts  of  awareness  are  ‘conditioned’  by  using 
Mandarin as the medium so as to connect myself with others. Therefore, when I 
used my second language of English to articulate my clients’ and my experience in 
this  study,  I  found that  I  became a  ‘bad’  storyteller  because I  had very limited 
linguistic ability with English. I had to put myself between Mandarin and English. I  
was disappointed by the continuous loss of meaning I experienced as I abandoned 
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my mother tongue (Iannaco, 2009).
For, as previously stated, my findings of this study were translated from Chinese and 
presented in English. ‘Translation’ itself involves in not only the transformation of 
various  languages  like  Mandarin,  Ho-Kein21,  and  English,  but  also  the  self-
identification of the experience ‘between’ two languages, in which clients, readers 
and  I  actively  find  an  effective  way  to  retain  cultural  meaning  and  keep  the 
developing understanding comprehensible through our mutual relationship. In this 
way, between languages, we not only dealt with the transformation of rhetoric and 
grammatical  difference but  also the transaction of  meanings  and values  behind 
different cultural symbolic orders (Connolly,  2002; Iannaco, 2009). Unavoidably, I 
had to respond and be reflexive to the ‘impossibilities’ of translation which I could 
only approach using the proximity’ of the meaning itself (Bors[tnar, Makovec, Burck 
and Daniel, 2005).
In  a  phenomenological  context,  translation,  which  has  been  involved  in  the 
transformation of meanings and the things of orders, is also an inner processing of 
interpretation and knowing (Elliott, 2008). Things verbalised from one language to 
another need to re-organise the semantic fields and thus develop another window 
of  looking at  the original  theme (Iannaco,  2008). Connolly’s  (2008)  definition of 
‘bilingualism’  can  be  more  suitable  to  describe  my  effort  to  contextualise  my 
situation as a researcher using a second language and represent the finding found 
through the use of my mother tongue. According to her, 
Bilingualism consists  in  the capacity  of  an individual  to  express  himself  in 
21  Ho-Kein is a Taiwanese local dialect, which is still the main language in suburb and countryside re
gion. Two participants and I are also Ho-Kein user and we sometimes communicate in Ho-Kein.
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another language and to adhere faithfully to the concepts and structures of 
that language rather than paraphrasing his native language (p. 370). 
To conduct bilingual research, I  indeed trapped myself  in a labyrinth of difficult 
rhetoric  writing  and  experienced  what  Iannaco  (2009),  citing  Green  (1987), 
discussed when s/he argued that translation was irreproachably correct. With my 
proofreader, I experienced embarrassment when attempting to pick up accurate 
words  to  articulate  the  subtle  meanings  which  are  accumulated  by  layers  of 
interactions  and  communications.  The  difficulty  was  that  I  put  myself  and  my 
relationship with clients and readers into a more uncertain and unsafe research 
status. However, the benefit was that I could at the same time own two windows 
from which to see the complexity of my study and to work through the seeming 
fruitfulness of the interactions between Chinese and English symbolic systems. 
Iannaco (2009) argued that the ‘leap’ of interpretation between two languages is 
involved in the interpretative activity that takes place in the consulting room and 
therefore bilingual researchers and counsellors have to experience uncomfortable 
but  productive  uncertainty.  In  this  research,  I  experienced what  Iannaco (2009) 
described due to my interactions with proofreaders and my reflexive consideration 
of my research uncertainty. To cope with the ‘impossibilities of translation’, one of 
my  proofreaders  is  a  Chinese-English  bilingual  interpreter  and  one  is  a  native 
English speaker. From my interaction with them, I  continuously searched for the 
‘proper’ and ‘accurate’ words for identifying my observations and understanding of 
my  research  exploration. However,  for  me,  transforming  my  discussions  and 
findings between Chinese and English has been a distinctive barrier and thus I did 
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rely on the secure relationship with my proofreaders and supervisors. Very often I  
felt drowned in the process of translation and lost in retaining my native language. 
This feeling actually assimilated myself with my clients in the context of ‘disability’  
in which we were all exploring and expressing the experience unfinished and un-
verbalised,  and in  which we were engaging  in  the difficulties  of  identifying our 
relationship  with  others.  ‘Understanding’  itself  therefore  became  my  difficult 
attempts to present this work as a negotiation between two languages. With this 
difficulty, accordingly, I could approach the proximity of the meaning of things by 
positioning myself in the margin between two symbolic systems. 
4.3 The Data of ‘Understanding’: Hermeneutic Phenomenology
The core research question of this study is ‘how an individual lived experience of 
suffering  could  be  understood  by  an  “Other”’?  Exploring  the  answer  to  this 
question requires consideration of ontological aspects of the question itself: Firstly, 
through the action of the research itself, the lived experience was represented and 
transformed into different languages. Secondly, the language itself is understood as 
one’s experience of suffering. Thirdly, the meaning of suffering is given, collected 
and developed by the experience of being understood by an ‘other’. From the point 
of hermeneutic phenomenology, a researcher has to admit the uncertainty of the 
language  of  lived  experience  and  its  understanding,  which  involves  individuals’ 
configuration of the past,  the interpretation of the difference between past and 
now, and the modification of the ‘saying’ itself (Clegg & Slife, 2005). Relating to 
dialogue  in  psychotherapeutic  practice,  developed  by  Husserl,  Heidegger  and 
Gadamer, McLeod (2001) emphasises that phenomenology and hermeneutics are 
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the  core  of  the  qualitative  method  dedicated  to  describing  the  process  of 
counselling and psychotherapy. Accordingly, in this part of writing, I draw upon my 
methodological thinking by means of exploring how hermeneutic phenomenology 
could help me explore the lived experience of suffering.
In  terms  of  the  history  and  category  of  hermeneutic  phenomenology,  Dowling 
(2007)  gave  a  simplified  topology:  positivist  (Husserl),  post-positivist  (Merleau-
Ponty),  interpretivist  (Heidegger)  and  constructivist  (Gadamer).  Phenomenology 
was started by Husserl, who employed the descriptive methodology to focus on the 
structure of individual experience; hermeneutic research is interpretive focussed, 
and  explores  the  historical  meaning  of  experience  and  the  developmental  and 
cumulative  effect  on  individual  and  social  levels  (McLeod,  2001).  According  to 
McLeod (2001), the hermeneutic interpretive framework is historical and changes 
over time; the phenomenological position is that ‘natural attitude always applies 
within  a  set  of  horizon  or  boundaries  of  experience.  Both  approaches  seek  to 
elucidate the essences of these structures as they ‘appear in consciousness-to make 
invisible visible’ (Osborne, 1994; Laverty, 2003). However, Allen (1995) argues that a 
sharp  distinction  does  not  exist  because  one  cannot  be  approached  without 
engaging  in  the  other’s  methodology:  the  phenomenological  method  also 
contextualises  the  historical  development  of  one’s  lived  experience  and  the 
hermeneutic approach describes the meaning itself. In this research, the experience 
of ‘suffering’, as explored, is regarded as the context of individual history and the 
varying interpretation of lived experience. 
In this part of genealogical review, Levinas’s ideas of ‘methods’ are utilised in the 
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discussion of my methodological concern. Although Levinas was generally thought 
of as a ‘non-methodologist’ (Slegg & Slife, 2005; Kunz, 1998), he provided a clear 
dialogical method (Kunz, 1998) in his arguments based on the ‘primordial ethics for 
the other’ (Levinas, 1969, 1985, 1999).  Different from Husserl’s phenomenological 
methods  which  starts  from  the  individual  self22,  Levinas’s  contribution  provides 
qualitative researchers with another form of methodological thinking starting from 
the ‘non-self.’  This  concept,  which was developed in the final  stage of  Husserl's 
work, and which Levinas labelled as the ‘Other’, gave Husserl's phenomenology a 
new  transcendental  and  inter-subjective  approach. From  reviewing  the 
development  of  hermeneutic  phenomenology,  I  will  clarify  my  methodological 
concern of exploring the phenomenon of ‘suffering’. 
4.3.1 Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology
Edmund  Husserl  (1859-1938)  developed  his  phenomenological  method  from 
expanding his discussion of ‘Epoche’, the act of suspending the taken-for-granted 
assumption of everyday behaviours towards objects and everyday natural attitudes 
about  the  world  (McLeod,  2001).  What  Husserl  had  developed  was  the 
methodology  of  reducing  meaning  from  the  phenomenon,  ‘the  things  itself’ 
(Fischer & Wertz,  1979; Hwang, 2003). He argued that,  one cannot escape from 
his/her subjective understanding of the world and therefore the methodology of 
achieving truth is to explore the things between the individual and his society and 
22 Husserl articulated the concept of ‘Ego’ in three stages: The ‘non-Ego theory’ of consciousness in 
‘The Logical Investigations’ (1900), ‘True Ego’ in ‘Ideas’ (1913) and the ‘Dynamic Ego’ in ‘Cartesian 
Meditations’ (1931. 
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historical understanding, which he referred to as ‘Transcendental Phenomenology’. 
For Husserl, a researcher’s subjectivity is included in his taken-for-granted manner 
but  connected  with  the  socio-cultural  values  and  local  history.  The  method  of 
transcendental  phenomenology  is  therefore  aimed  at  purifying  the  individual 
description in an effort to ‘condensate’ his/her perspective of seeing the world. He 
used  Aristotle’s  logic  of  reduction  as  the  core  idea  of  his  transcendental 
methodology,  from  which  two  main  methods  were  developed:  firstly, 
phenomenological  reduction  and  secondly,  phenomenological  description,  to 
articulate the way of making meaning by ‘things themselves’ and attempting to set 
aside our natural attitude or all the assumptions we have about the world around 
us.
4.3.1.1 Phenomenological reduction 
Husserl  developed  the  concept  of  phenomenological  reduction  for  ‘Epoche’. 
According to Langdridge (2007), the core of ‘Epoche’ is ‘doubt’: not the doubt about 
everything  we  say  we  know,  but  about  the  mature  attitude  of  the  biases  of 
everyday  knowledge.  Husserl  developed the  methodology  of  ‘phenomenological 
reduction’ to develop his discussion of Epoche. In his book ‘General Introduction to 
a Pure Phenomenology’, he separated the phenomenological reduction as Eidestic 
Reduction to perceive the necessary and invariable components in our intention, 
and  as  Transcendental  Reduction  to  point  out  the  components  in  one’s  lived 
experience. Husserl focussed on putting aside the positivist method, concentrating 
on  the  existence  of  things  and  one’s  experience  with  them  and  aiming  at  the 
consciousness as ‘the stream of experiences’ (Husserl, 1913). The methodological 
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purpose  is  therefore  to  present  the  reality  that  individual  consciousness  and 
experiencing the world is in its nature involves universal changing.
In his book ‘Formal and Transcendental Logic’ Husserl (1929) embraced individual 
subjectivity  and  formed  the  ‘transcendental  Ego’,  in  which  the  stream  of 
experiences involves the nature of human self-consciousness. In that context, the 
methods of ‘phenomenological reduction’ are developed as the researcher filters 
and  restores  the  research  participant’s  experience,  extracts  the  undoubtedly 
impossible  research  data  and rationality  out  of  the  fieldwork,  and concentrates 
upon the ‘extreme empirical’ approach so that a research can be completely limited 
in  the  ‘unsuspected’  scope,  which  is  the  ultimate  aim  of  phenomenological 
reduction.
To this research, Husserl gives an empirical methodological perspective to start the 
exploration  of  the  transcendental  experience  between  sufferer  and  witness. 
Suffering transaction in this study, as discovered, is the experience between self and 
other and is explored as the ethical engagement of between one and another. Lived 
experience can therefore  be presented from this  methodological  basis  in  which 
clients and I  in counselling practice come into contact with the same stream of 
experience, then, to focus and challenge our authenticity of the experience and the 
ideas which we take for granted. 
4.3.1.2 Phenomenological description
In  Husserl’s  method  of  Phenomenological  description,  he  asked  researchers  to 
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ignore  the  rational  and  logistic  links  within  the  phenomenon  itself  so  as  to 
‘describe’ the ‘stream of experience’. A researcher should try not to conceptualise 
the participant and  not to  over-analyse the deep structure of  the phenomenon 
(Hwang, 2003). Rather, s/he keeps his/her subjective understanding, open to the 
phenomenon, passively exploring it without active interpretation or modification, 
and putting effort to avoid adding or lessening the changing what had occurred in 
order to make the description of  the phenomenon.  The methodological  goal  of 
phenomenological description is to represent the ‘natural attitude’ manifested by 
‘things themselves’ (McLeod, 2001).
Husserl  objectified  the  Cartesian  ‘principle  of  simplicity’  which  valued  Western 
natural  science  as  it  simplified  a  phenomenon as  only  the  causal  link  between 
reason  and  result.  He  used  the  metaphor  of  ‘Ockam’s  razor’  to  illustrate  the 
scientific methodology in which only the bones existed after analysis and the nature 
of the phenomenon had been totally changed. To emphasise the phenomenological 
description, he argued that a researcher could just describe the total experience of 
consciousness in as much detail as possible. Rather than configuring the rationality 
of  things,  Husserl  accentuated  the  ‘intentionality’  (McIntyle  &  Smith,  1989)  of 
consciousness which should be the core characteristic of studying human existence 
in which the understanding of a phenomenon is always intentional. An important 
methodological  aim of humanistic  research is to articulate the ‘intentionality’  of 
phenomenological description.
For  this  research,  Husserl’s  empirical  approach has  allowed me to maintain  the 
richness and complexity of individuals’ experience of suffering and support the non-
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linear ontological idea that suffering ‘refuse(s)’ to be simplified, conceptualised and 
theorised (Frank, 1995, 2001; Kleinman, 2006). However, pure phenomenological 
description is not sufficient to configure the intentionality of human understanding. 
In  his  later  periods,  Husserl  for  the  first  time  reviewed the  history  of  Western 
philosophy and science. In his unfinished work The Crisis of the European Sciences 
(1936),  Husserl  demonstrated  intentionality  by  emphasising  the  challenges 
presented  by  their  increasingly  empirical  and  naturalistic  orientation.  In  this 
context,  ‘understanding’  needs  to  be  strengthened  by  not  only  the 
phenomenological  description  but  also  its  historical  reflection.  While  Husserl’s 
revolutionary  focus  upon  subjective  intentionally  transformed  methodological 
thought, his student Heidegger further developed hermeneutic methodological into 
a perspective of knowing, which I will discuss in the following section .  
4.3.2 Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology  
As  Husserl’s  student,  Martin  Heidegger  (1889-1976)  modified  Husserl’s 
phenomenology  by  adding  a  hermeneutic  perspective  to  the  exploration  of  a 
phenomenon. According to Heidegger, hermeneutics can be seen as synonymous 
with the way we interpret the phenomena of our everyday life of ‘being-in-the-
world’. Being-in-the-world, what Heidegger called as ‘Dasein’, was the temporary, 
existential and relational basis of our daily lives and understandings of the world 
(McLeod, 2001; Langdridge, 2007).  Dasein means existence; no matter how much 
we empirically investigate the way we live in the world, we will never be able to say 
anything  more  about  the  ontological  status  of  Dasein, or  how  we  live  our  life 
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(Langdridge,  2007).  Dasein is  opposed to the traditional  metaphysical  notion  of 
experience and knowledge being separate, static and non-relational; rather, being-
in-the-world is the continuing experience of being connected with the lived history,  
local culture and social context. For Heidegger, Dasein is not only an epistemological 
question, but ontological.
The  discussion  of  Dasein enabled  Heidegger  to  anchor  this  methodological 
approach upon the understanding of empirical experience. From the etymology of 
phenomenology  as  ‘phenomenon‘  and  ‘logos’,  Heidegger  redefined  the 
phenomenological  method  as  the  way  in  which  things  present  meaning  by 
themselves  through  the  action  of  understanding,  rather  than  giving  them  an 
operational definition. From his discussion in the book publication ‘Time and Being’ 
(1962),  he  defined  the  nature  of  understanding  through  interpretation  (die 
Ausbildung) as the way in which the historical context of things manifest its own 
meaning of existence (Heidegger, 1962). Different from Husserl’s phenomenological 
reduction,  Heidegger  provided  researchers  with  the  methodological  thinking  to 
explore the ‘things themselves’ by tracing their historical voices.
Methodologically, Heidegger adopted Husserl’s critiques on Western natural science 
and added the historical perspective in order to explore a phenomenon or the state 
of  being.  In  this  research  of  suffering,  Heidegger  is  helpful  in  his  two  main 
arguments  regarding  hermeneutic  phenomenology.  The  first  is  his  extension  of 
‘intentionality’  from  Husserl’s  discussion  about  prejudice,  in  which  Heidegger 
formed  the  discourse  of  understanding  as  the  ‘fore-structure’  of  language.  The 
second is his most important contribution on language itself  as the proximity of 
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lived experience.  The following discussion will  link  both considerations with the 
methodological thinking I utilised in my research. 
4.3.2.1 Fore-structure of Understanding and Hermeneutic circle
To contribute to the discourse of the ‘first language’, in ‘Time and Being’, Heidegger 
(1962) extended Husserl’s discussion of ‘prejudice’ and focused on the conscious 
state  ‘before  language’.  He  articulated  ‘understanding’  as  the  process  through 
which  experience  is  transformed  into  language.  He  called  this  conscious  status 
before language ‘interpretation: die Ausbildung’, which for an individual has three 
‘fore-structures’ of understanding23:
Fore-having,  Vorhabe:   Before  understanding  the  self-experience,  one’s  local 
cultural  background,  social  custom,  lifestyle  and  lived  experience  have  to  be 
included  in  the  experience  before  processing  the  new  experience  for 
understanding. 
Fore-sight, Vorsicht:  Fore-having/Vorhabe makes one’s own perspective to see and 
feel the world. Before making the understanding of the new experience, the fore-
sight is the essence of making the ‘first cut’ of perceiving the new experience. 
Fore-conception, Vorgriff:  From the first perspective before understanding occurs, 
one gets the conceptualising structure of his/her understanding as the indication 
and so anticipation of  things.  As  Heidegger  (1962)  said,  ‘The interpretation has 
decided a definite way of conceiving it, either with finality or with conservation; it is  
23Heidegger, SZ 203, BT195
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grounded in ‘something we grasp in advance’- in fore-conception (p. 191).’ 
According  to  these  three  ‘fore-structures’,  Heidegger  developed  his  important 
argument  of  hermeneutic  phenomenology  that  ‘understanding’  is  before 
knowledge because things themselves have existed in the ‘Fore-having: Vorhabe’ 
and relate us to our existing world. Knowledge has to be conditioned as a person 
knows  it  by  his/her  pre-judice.  Heidegger  argued  in  ‘Time  and  Being’  that 
understanding  is  a  circle  of  truth,  ‘Faktum  des  Zirkels’ as  our  understanding 
becomes  a  now  ‘Fore-having,  Vorhabe’,  then  ‘Fore-sight,  Vorsicht’  and  ‘Fore-
conception, Vorgriff’. For Heidegger, the meaning is found as we are constructed by 
the world while at  the same time we are constructing this world from our own 
background  and  experience,  the  ‘Vorhabe’ (Laverty,  2009).  The  circle  of 
understanding,  which  Heidegger  termed as  a  ‘hermeneutic  circle’  illustrates  the 
transaction  between  the  individual  and  the  world  as  they  constitute  and  are 
constituted by each other (Munhall, 1989). 
From ‘fore-structures’ of understanding, Heidegger envisioned the method through 
which  understanding  is  a  reciprocal  activity  and  proposed  the  concept  of 
‘hermeneutic  circle’  to  illustrate  this  reciprocity  (Koch,  1996).  The  hermeneutic 
circle can therefore be viewed as the circulation of both one’s understanding and 
before-the-understanding,  which  Gadamer  (1976)  developed  as  being  ‘pre-
understanding’.  As  part  of  this  methodology,  Heidegger  provided  that  the 
historicality  and  the  hermeneutic  circle  may  be  perceived  as  a  ‘revision’  of 
phenomenological  reduction,  rather  than  a  rejection  of  it  (Dowling,  2007; 
Heidegger, 1962). Also, for this purposes of my research, suffering can therefore be 
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understood as the circulating process between lived experience and language as 
well as between client and myself since we are interpreting the experience of our 
‘Dasein’.
4.3.2.2 Language, the proximity to meaning
Heidegger’s work opened up phenomenology to interpretation through language in 
a  way  that  was  not  seen  before  (Langdridge,  2007).  As  Heidegger  (1982)  said, 
‘Language  is  the  house  of  being.’  In  his  publications  ‘Off  the  beaten  track 
(Holzwege)’  (2002)  and  ‘On  the  way  to  language’  (1982),  Heidegger  articulated 
clearer ontological discourse of the relationship between language and being. He 
argued that, through understanding, language mediates the lived experience from 
one to another as an individual  understands his/herself  and others by means of 
language. In other words,  through language processing,  in a research of  human 
lived experience, both the researcher and research participant(s) are mediated to 
articulate  the  lived  experience  together  and  interact  the  fore-structure  of 
understanding with each other. The understanding of one’s lived experience could 
therefore extend the proximity to reach its meaning and ontology.
In his later part of life, Heidegger (1982, 2002) developed the idea that a researcher  
can concentrate on intentionality from individual lived experience and connect it to 
its  language  (Mannen,  1997).  For  him,  as  discussed  as  being  part  of  the 
hermeneutic circle, lived experience itself is continuously creating new experience 
and language for developing the meaning of the ‘stream of experience’. Rather than 
Husserl’s methodological manner of making meaning by the things themselves, he 
116
described the focus on the language ‘in play within the matter itself ’ as the core 
methodology of uncovering the meaning of a phenomenon.
For me, what Heidegger has articulated is the intentionality of ‘Off the beaten track’ 
the ‘language’ which contextualises one’s lived experience and communicates with 
others.  Through the act  of  speaking and understanding,  the lived experience of 
suffering is given the voices developed by a sufferer and the witness. Heidegger 
provided a clear methodological goal that the abstract and paradoxical meaning of 
suffering can be studied without an operational definition of suffering and revealed 
by inter-correlating the language itself and the pre-understanding of suffering. In 
my research, by means of engaging in the circle of speaking and understanding, the 
historical stream of lived experience can be oriented into an understandable and 
changing context. Additionally, along with the phenomenological  description and 
reflexive account of a counselling relationship, the lived experience of suffering can 
be transacted in counselling practice. The experience can then be further traced by 
discovering the ‘hermeneutic circle’, in which our pre-understanding illuminated the 
intentionality of our understanding of the other’s language, and, simultaneously, we 
used our understanding to respond to the other as well.
4.3.3 Gadamer’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Being  both  Husserl  and  Heidegger’s  student,  Gadamer  published  ‘Truth  and 
Method (Wahrheit und Methode)’ in 1960, at the age of 60, in which he developed 
dialectic  methods  to  discover  the  meaning  found  in  art  and  history.  However, 
compared to de Carte’s ‘true and non-true’ dialectic method and dualistic thinking, 
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following  Husserl  and  Heidegger,  Gadamer  argued  that  the  methodological 
essence/objective is to make truth become the existing proof for itself rather than 
find the evidence through a totally objective attitude. As noted by Hwang (2003, p. 
341), the book name ‘Truth and method’ is bit sarcastic as the content of it talks 
about  the  process  through  which  ‘truth’  can  be  proved  by  itself  without  any 
‘method’. The book name was intended to be ‘Understanding and Happening’, in 
which Gadamer argued that ‘Dasein’ or any existential question is a historical and 
dialectic  process  between  self  and  other  (Hwang,  2003).  In  his  discussion 
concerning the appreciating of art and investing science, he choose aesthetic and 
historical context as the ‘(non)methodological route’ to achieve the core of ‘Dasein’.
Inheriting  Heidegger’s  argument  on  the  language  and  hermeneutics  of  lived 
experience, Gadamer contended that one cannot totally manifest the meaning of 
‘Language’  but,  rather,  uses  ‘Language’  to  mediate  self  and  other.  He  again 
illustrated the conscious state of understanding and extended Heidegger’s concern 
that  ‘understanding’  is  hermeneutic,  self-dialectic  and  in  its  nature  a  linguistic 
action and event. In the following discussion, I will review mainly his impact on the 
perspective  of  history,  language  and  understanding  and  relate  them  to  the 
methodological consideration of studying the experience of human suffering.
4.3.3.1 Language, Hermeneutics and Local Culture
Continuing  Heidegger’s  contribution  to the hermeneutic  perspective,  Han-Georg 
Gadamer (1900-2002) posited a historical perspective between understanding and 
methodology  in  which  methods  exist  as  being  inferior  to  and  after  one’s 
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understanding (Gadamer,  1976; Laverty,  2003).  In the second part  of ‘Truth and 
Method’,  Gadamer explored the ‘understanding’  of  humanistic  social  science (in 
Germen the psychiatry,  Geisteswissenschaften),  in which he clearly reviewed the 
hermeneutics of ‘understanding’ from religion hermeneutics by Luther, Chladenius, 
to  classic  hermeneutics  by  Schleiermacher  and then to  the  historical  aspect  by 
Ranke, Droysen and Dilthey24. Integrating Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
Gadamer defined ‘understanding’ as being a state of happening, an encounter, and 
a continuous  varying context  in  which lived experience is  a  history  of  language 
attached to the stream of time. 
Accordingly, what Gadamer’s dialectical method illustrated mainly focussed on the 
process  through  which  language  itself  develops  into  the  context  of  historical 
understanding  and  is  developed  by  historical  understanding.  In  his  analysis  of 
aesthetics  and  the  history  of  philosophy  (1960),  an  individual’s  local  cultural  
experience becomes  the  historical  ‘stream of  experience’.  Following  Heidegger’s 
discussion of fore-structure, he regarded ‘culture’ as the contextualised experience 
related to local tradition and custom, and, it follows, being tightly linked with the 
development  of  its  historical  contexts.  Through  his  methodological  approach 
Gadamer  articulated  that,  being  engaged  in  a  hermeneutic  interpretation,  the 
researcher unavoidably begins the retrospective exploration from the ‘before-the-
understanding’  and filters  the cultural  development  before  his/her  attitude  and 
intentionality has been created. Then, from this ’hermeneutic reflection’ (Gadamer, 
1976), the understanding itself could become the part of the ‘history’ in which one’s 
local  cultural  experience  is  given  subjective  meaning  and  develops  the 
24 Gadamer’s hermeneutic perspective is influenced by Dilthey’s historical hermeneutics.
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understanding of his/her lived experience. 
The nature of therapeutic praxis is the process in which counsellor and client are  
positioned as constituting the fragmental contexts of lived experience and achieving 
understanding  of  a  client’s  ‘partial’  life  history.  In  terms  of  ‘hermeneutical 
reflection’,  psychotherapy  could  be  described  as  the  practice  of 
completing/transforming an interrupted process of storytelling into a full  history 
(Loewenthal, 2005). In other words, a client’s ‘history of suffering’ is developing by 
therapeutic  interaction.  Language  articulates  history,  in  which  unspoken  lived 
experience is given the voice to communicate the relationship between self, other, 
society  and  culture.  Gadamer’s  methodological  concern  gives  ‘suffering’  a 
hermeneutic  route  to  trace the context  of  local  cultural  experience beyond the 
development of its language and history. 
4.3.3.2 Hermeneutic Cycle and Fusion of horizons
Continuing Heidegger’s discussion of fore-structure, Gadamer (1976) stressed ‘pre-
understanding’ as the essential  condition of ‘interpretation’ and ‘understanding’. 
The ‘pre-understanding’ is the meaning or organisation of a culture that is present 
before  we understand  and become part  of  our  background’s  history.  Preceding 
understanding,  according  to  Gadamer,  one’s  conceptualising  intention,  lived 
experience, cultural value, and taken-for-granted manners has influenced his/her 
interpretation of the world ‘before’ these experiences are transacted into language 
processing. Since  Husserl  argued  that  ‘prejudice’  should  not  be  thought  of 
dualistically  as  being  opposite  to   objective  comprehension  (and  based  on  a 
120
Western  scientific  model),  Gadamer  (1976)  further  emphasised  that  ‘prejudice’ 
could be regarded as the unavoidable influence on how one see the world from his 
accumulated experience. For Gadamer, the ‘understanding’ never begins from zero 
and  is  always  influenced  by  the  ‘pre-understanding’  constituted  by  our  lived 
experience with our family, culture, society and embedded values (Mannen, 1997). 
Pre-understanding is not something a person can step outside of or put aside as it is 
understood  as  already  being  with  us  in  the  world  (Laverty,  2009).  Before 
‘understanding’, lived experience does not exist as language but does exist in our 
conscious state. Understanding itself is a dialogue of the next understanding. As he 
said,
Understanding  is  always  more  than  merely  re-creating  someone  else’s 
meaning.  Questioning  opens  up  possibilities  of  meaning,  and  thus  what  is 
meaningful  passes  into  one’s  own  thinking  on  the  subject…To  reach  an 
understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward 
and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into 
a communion in which we do not remain what we were. (Gadamer, 1976, p.  
375)
Gadamer  employed  Heidegger’s  hermeneutic  cycle  to  illustrate  the  essential  
methodological  thinking of  humanistic  science (Geisteswissenschaften),  in  which 
pre-understanding  and  understanding  are  always  continuously  causing  and 
attributing each other. Since we are all exposed to the world of experience, there is 
the  sense  that  the  understanding  obtained  from  previous  experience  may  be 
available as pre-understanding when we next encounter a  similar  situation,  and 
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through reflection, the previous experience informs the next experience (McLeod, 
2001).  Gadamer  and  Heidegger  presented  a  three-stage  self-dialectic  reduction 
(Mannen, 1997) from the whole experience to its part then back to the wholeness, 
in which when a researcher is engaging in a phenomenon, she or he is also engaging 
in  reflection  of  their  individual  history,  local  cultural  experience  and  taken-for-
granted manner and then making the hermeneutic reflection between their pre-
understanding  and  understanding.  Gadamer  used  the  formation  of  horizons to 
illustrate the process from one’s ‘initial understanding’ of the lived experience to 
the further exploration of ‘pre-understanding’, and used the fusion of horizons  to 
explain the creation of new understanding (Laverty, 2003).
Precisely, our attempt to understand is framed by what Gadamer called ‘historical 
consciousness’  which  is  built  from  a  set  of  cultural  constructs,  embodied  in 
language  (McLeod,  2001).  Our  very  possibility  of  understanding,  according  to 
Gadamer (1990), is a hermeneutical vision which is limited by the ‘horizons’ which 
includes  everything  that  can  be  seen from a  particular  vantage  point.  For  him, 
moving from prejudice to interpretation involves a history of understanding which is 
eternally changing and is the interpretation itself. Because of ‘pre-judgement’ and 
‘prejudice’,  our  lived  experience,  culture,  tradition  and  lifestyle  constitute  our 
certain  way  of  knowing  and  so  we  have  our  certain  horizons  which  direct  our 
intentionality  of  seeing,  feeling  and  interpreting  things.  As  in  the  position  of 
discovering  ‘understanding’,  we can  never  step  outside  our  horizon  but  we can 
reconstruct how the horizon has been created, or, in other words, how we live our  
life.
122
Gadamer (1976) further emphasised that understanding is caused by the fusion of 
horizons,  in  which  an  interpreter’s  prejudice  and  an  interpretee’s  hermeneutic 
situations are fused and produce a new perspective to see what the phenomenon 
is. When Gadamer was exploring the aesthetic and historical existing experience, he 
argued that when one encounters the other who (or ‘which’, an art or a history, 
because  their  existence  also  shows  the  context  of  historical  messages  and 
conditions)  has  persisted  through  different  hermeneutic  situations,  s/he 
experiences ‘tension’ and existential conflict. He claimed this was because, on the 
one  hand,  s/he  has  to  understand the  other  while,  on  the  other  hand,  has  to 
explore  the  ‘difference  from  the  other’  due  to  his/her  ‘prejudice’  or  ‘pre-
understanding’. As Gadamer said, 
The projecting of the historical horizon, then, is only a phase in the process of 
understanding, and does not become solidified into the self-alienation of a past 
consciousness, but is overtaken by our own present horizon of understanding.  
In the process of  understanding there takes place a real  fusing of  horizons,  
which means that as the historical  horizon is  projected, it  is  simultaneously  
removed. (Gadamer 1975, p. 273)
Fusion of horizons means the interaction of histories in which new understanding is  
caused by the interaction of a hermeneutic situation between human and things, 
individual  and  environment,  and  self  and  others.  As  Gadamer  (1976)  noted, 
‘understanding’ is not to be thought of so much as an action of one's subjectivity, 
but  ‘as  the  placing  of  oneself  within  a  process  of  tradition,  in  which  past  and 
present are constantly fused (p. 528)’. For me, the use of horizons provides a rich 
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methodological reason to give ‘suffering’ ontological grouping angles: not to use a 
vertical perspective to present a thematicalised or a theoreticalised result, but to 
enable the histories of different components of the lived experience be revealed as 
dialogical ‘horizons’.
The  methodological  use  of  hermeneutic  horizons  has  been  useful  for  me  as  I 
explored the socio-embodiments of suffering from the language used to express it 
where, as reviewed in the last chapter, medical anthropologists talk about ‘social 
suffering’ (Kleinman, Das & Lock, 1997; Das, Kleinman, Lock, Ramphel & Reynolds, 
2001;  Wilkinson,  2005).  Psychotherapeutic  practice,  as  Laing  (1969)  and  Yalom 
(2001) noted, is politically based on the setting of the encounter between therapist 
and client. In therapy, therapists and clients use their own lived experience to listen 
and respond to each other. Through language by interaction, the horizons of the 
experience of suffering, in which the culture, social custom and political influence 
have been embodied in each other’s perspective of pre-understanding (Kleinman, 
2001),  is  fused in the dialogue of therapy.  In short,  Gadamer provided the core 
methodological  framework  for  studying human suffering whereas  in  fieldwork a 
researcher can engage in the hermeneutic circle in which s/he (1) starts from their  
understanding of the lived experience of suffering, (2) focusses on the local cultural 
experience  of  participants  and  challenges  the  context  of  socio-cultural 
embodiments  and  a  taken-for-granted  manner,  and  (3)  articulates  a  new 
understanding by tracing the historical link between (1) and (2). In this way, the new 
understanding can be destabilised (Langdridge,  2007)  and again explored in  the 
circle of focussing on the locals and then on the construction of the wholeness. For 
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me, this primary concern of the hermeneutic cycle is the core methodological idea 
behind the real analysis of my collected analysis. 
4.3.4 Levinas’s Ethical Phenomenology 
In Husserl’s ‘Cartesian Meditations’ (1931) published in his final years, he started to 
pay  attention  to  ‘intersubjectivity’  from  his  transcendental  perspective  on 
interpersonal  phenomenon.  In  doing  so,  he  especially  focussed  on  how 
communication about an object can be understood as referring to the same ideal 
entity, in which he used the concept of ‘Other Ego’, which is from the awareness of  
‘non-self’,  to  objectify  the  ‘Other’  from  its  subjective  existence.  As  Husserl’s 
student, Emmunuel Levinas focused on the relationship with the ‘Other’ and made 
a radical extension. Beyond the ontological and epistemological discussion of self-
other relationship, he noted, ‘all questions of epistemology follow in the wake of  
the  ethical  relation,  forever  a  step  behind  the  lived  experience  (p.  93).’  Levinas 
emphasised the ethics in which facing the Other involves ‘moral passivity’ and the 
‘first  philosophy’  (Levinas,  1984;  Kunz,  1998).  He  developed  the  aspect  of 
phenomenology  which  entails  the  methodological  turn  that  ‘understanding’  is 
caused inter-subjectively. 
As Kunz (1998) reviewed, Levinas is in dialogue with and builds on the work of many 
philosophers  that  preceded  him,  and  challenges  nearly  all  of  them.  He  uses  a 
phenomenological  methodology  to  emphasise  that  the  ‘Other’  cannot  be 
understood by methodology but can only be reflected through one’s relationship 
with  the  Other.  His  phenomenology  seeks  to  glimpse  obliquely  and  without 
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prejudice this coming-to-be of being before it gets there (Walsh, 2005). In this way 
he is true to Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s  existential  ontology,  but 
also surpasses these deployments of the phenomenological method  ethically,  for 
Levinas’s phenomenology shows that the human being is ethical  necessarily;  we 
cannot help but ‘be’ ethical.
Levinas questions the knowing and certainty in the Western psychology tradition as 
well as the culturally urgent challenges posed by individualism, other-centredness 
and intersubjectivity. House (2005) used Woodhouse's concept of ‘paradigm war’ to 
describe that Levinas held nihilist points on the ethics of ‘for-the-other’; he was 
often  regarded  as  anti-paradigmatic  and  anti-professional  (Woodhouse,  1996; 
House,  2005).  Levinas  often  used highly  metaphorical  and symbolically  charged 
terminology in making his  argument with an often vividly  hyperbolic  theoretical 
style (Gantt, 2001; House, 2005). The radical ethical arguments of Levinas were, for 
many  researchers  of  social  science,  difficult,  ambiguous  and  paradoxical  (Kunz, 
1998).
Levinas  did  not  form  a  structured  methodology  for  the  applied  practice  of  his 
argument. His writings did not lend themselves to straightforward systemisation as 
he seemed to merely reinforce the likelihood of their being ignored or marginalised 
by the conventional academy (Clegg & Snife, 2005). However, ‘writing in the margin’ 
in  postmodern  humanistic  practice  has  become  a  practical  field  in  which  a 
researcher  can  reflect  upon  the  influence  from  socio-cultural  realms  and  be 
reflexive about his/her own existing taken-for-granted manners (Kleinman, 1980, 
2001;  Frank,  1995,  2001).  Levinas’s  non-methodology  actually  provided  an 
126
alternative methodological approach from which the humanistic practice could be 
started ‘for-the-other’ (Gantt, 2001).
4.3.4.1 Uncertainty of Knowing and Inter-subjective Understanding
As part of his development of ‘understanding’ in phenomenological methodology, 
Levinas  actually  shaped  the  way  in  which  the  phenomenological  reduction  can 
focus  on  the  uncertainty  of  knowing.  According  to  Clegg  and  Slife  (2005), 
researchers have to experience the necessary  uncertainty of knowing which ‘does 
not undermine the possibility of knowledge’, as they are at pains to make clear that 
Levinas’s  philosophy  is  not  a  nihilistic  one  that  entails  ‘a  purely  negative 
deconstruction of  all  knowledge of  system’ and that  ‘uncertainty  should not  be 
confused either with falsehood or with a lack of knowledge (p. 71)’. Kunz (1998) 
suggested that a researcher could reflect on his ‘passivity’ rather than the ‘activity’ 
of  knowing.  Levinas  defined  knowledge  as  having  both  an  ethical  and  an 
intersubjective dimension, in that truth is made possible by its relationship with the 
Other.  Methodologically,  engaging  in  the  uncertainty  of  knowing  involves 
developing  an  intersubjective  understanding  of  the  relationship  ‘for-the-other’ 
(Gantt,  2002).  House  (2005)  thought  that  Levinas  provided a  ‘new paradigm of 
inter-subjectivity’:
While Levinas’s emphasis on the primacy of the humanism’s and modernity’s 
current  and  unbalanced  obsession  with  self-hood,  self-efficiency  and 
autonomy, it is also the case that his emphasis on the Other can easily be at  
the expense of the self, and is arguably just one more instance of ‘either-or’  
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dualistic  thinking.  This  leads  in  turn  to  questions  of  inter-subjectivity.  In 
moving beyond the discrete Aristotelian logic of ‘self’ and ‘other’, then, new 
paradigm perspectives  on intersubjectivity  illuminate  profound possibilities 
for the future evolution of human consciousness. In the therapy field itself, it  
is  also  arguably  in  the  realm  of  intersubjectively  that  new  paradigm  and 
spiritual perspectives have greatest relevance (p. 103)
The  exploration  of  ‘inter-subjectivity’  can  bind  Gadamer’s  dialectic  reduction  of 
‘whole-part-whole’  circulation.  House  (2005)  gave  a  clear  reflective  process  of 
‘inter-subjectivity’ by which we can achieve ‘uncertain knowing’.
…that relationship is created by two or more inter-pJenetrating subjectivities’  
and is crucially indissoluble into its component parts (your subjectivity and my 
subjectivity; transference and countertransference and so on)’, because the 
vary  act  of  analytical  decomposition destroys  the Gestalt  of  the relational 
whole,  and  the  whole  simply  cannot  be  successfully  apprehended  and 
understood by artificially decomposing it into its constituent parts (p. 104).
An  important  thing  to  note  here  is  that  the  intentionality  of  Levinisian 
phenomenological description is not dualistic—either an ethical individualistic or a 
selfless,  other-focused  reflection—but  part  of  a  process  in  which  both occur 
together,  in  a developing sense of  mutual  understanding (House,  2005; Clegg & 
Slife, 2005). In my study of suffering transaction, Levinas provided a way to focus on 
the  therapeutic  relationship  between  myself  and  a  client.  As  a  therapist,  the 
uncertainty  of  understanding  is  not  only  the  developing  variety  of  a  client’s 
narration but also the sense of how I am developing my self-understanding as the 
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therapist  and  engaging  myself  in  clients’  stories  of  suffering.  We  are  creating 
understanding with each other. In this relationship, we are our ‘self’ and the other’s 
‘Other’, none of us can be separated from the exploration of understanding.
4.3.4.2 Relational understanding
Clegg and Slife (2005) represented a common misunderstanding of Levinas’s ethical 
epistemology  in  which  one  puts  the  ‘self’  into  emptiness  and  achieves  an 
understanding of the ‘Other’. They argued that the ‘Other-based’ thinking is still the 
dualistic essence which basically does not differ from the traditional self-centred or 
individualistic  knowledge.  Rather  than  a  thematic  understanding  of  the  ‘other’, 
Clegg and Slife (2005) focussed on a ‘relational understanding’ in which self and 
other express themselves in an ethical relation that is ‘not the thematization of any 
relation but that very relation which resists thematic inasmuch as it is anarchic (p. 
5)’. According to Levinas (1996), the truth arises ‘where a being separated from the 
other  is  not  engulfed  in  him,  but  speaks  to  him  (p.  62) and  therefore 
‘understanding’  only  ‘appears  within  a  relationship  with  the  other’.  The  ‘other’ 
cannot be thematicalised as ‘to thematicalise it is already to lose it and to depart  
from the absolute  passivity  of  ‘self’  (Levinas,  1996,  p.  92).  To  a researcher,  the 
‘relational knowing’ means that research is not merely the exploration of either the 
data created from a participant or researcher, but the experience of encountering 
the relationship between self and other.
The  research  objective  of  ‘relational  knowing’  (Clegg  &  Slife,  2005)  provides 
counselling  and  psychotherapeutic  research  with  the  Levinasian  methodological 
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approach that explores how understanding between therapist  and client  can be 
developed  by  the  relationship  itself.  According  to  Clegg  (2005),  relational 
understanding is ‘populated by practices, by the ways of relating, by encounters at  
the level of the ethical and relational that they are adjudicated (p. 8)’. In the field of 
counselling and psychotherapy, face-to-face and session-by-session encounters on 
the  one  hand  develop  the  therapeutic  relationship  by  understanding  the  lived 
experience of suffering; on the other hand, these develop further understanding of 
the deepening relationship. As his ‘first philosophy’, although Levinas chose to not 
shape  the  ‘method’  of  ethics,  as  a  researcher  we  can  explore  the  route  to  its  
proximity in which the exploration of relational understanding can be regarded as a 
phenomenological  reduction of  how therapeutic  ethics are established and how 
relational  understanding is  developing.  It  is  primarily  situated in the intertwined 
context through the interaction between understanding myself  as the client and 
understanding myself as the therapist (Gantt, 2001).
4.3.4.3 The Methodology with ‘No Method’
By turning to ethics as the ‘first philosophy’, Levinas seemed to regard methodology 
as being inferior to his dialogue with other philosophers in which he did not speak 
very much about  hermeneutics  and even phenomenological  description (House, 
2005; Walsh, 1991, 2005). His concern regarding the ‘ethics for the other’ focussed 
on relational understanding and an awareness of the primordial responsibility for 
the  other,  but,  unlike  Heidegger  and  Gadamer,  Levinas  did  not  establish  his 
arguments in terms of a certain methodology, which made his debates difficult to 
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understand  (Walsh,  2005).  Nevertheless,  House  (2005)  suggested  that  the 
historical-cultural location of Levinas’s ideas should not be minimised or ignored 
because, in the field of psychotherapeutic and counselling practice and ‘for those of 
us for whom therapy should be genuinely subversive and a revolutionizing force in 
evolving  thought,  the  work  of  Emmanuel  Levinas  offers  us  one  highly  fertile 
starting-point of our questing, to which the papers in this symposium make a timely 
if, at times, ‘uneven contribution (p. 107)’. For me, Levinas actually provided a clear 
reflexive perspective in my research, to help me see ‘how I was called by my clients  
as  being  the  therapist’  (Loewenthal  &  Snell,  2001;  Gantt,  2002;  House,  2005; 
Gordon, 2009). It is not configuring what therapy is or how therapy is processing, 
but emphasises a reflexive approach concerning how the relationship between me 
and my client recalled our responsibility for the other, which is often beyond the 
scope and regular practice of ‘therapy’. The method developed from Levinas’s work 
is simply ethical  reflection, as Gantt (2002) noted, ‘the focus of Levinas’s ethical 
phenomenology is aimed primarily at me as the therapist, in my-self understanding 
as a therapist (p. 76)’.
For me, Levinas’s method of ‘no method’ gives me the cultural resonance which is 
based on the Chinese Daoist thinking that 多數言窮，不如守中 (duo-shu-yeng-
chun, bu-tzu-sou-chung): extensive speech for the sake of explanation exhausts our 
understanding; rather, keep the name free and keep what it is in the heart (Lao-Tzi, 
Dou-De  Jing:  5)’.  Walsh  (2005)  also  connects  Levinas’s  ethical  reflection  with  a 
Daoism understanding  ‘ 無 為 (wu-Wei)’:  doing  by  not  doing,  being  indirectly  or 
obliquely or invisibly instrumental without acting. In my understanding of Levinas, 
‘no method’ is a method, in which I am ‘in’ the relationship understanding; I reflect 
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on and understand more from my relationship with the ‘Others’, not only my clients 
and participant, but also ‘Others’ who connect with me as the therapist before the 
practice. A method of exploring ‘understanding’, in this context, can be discussed as 
how I interact with the data of ‘not-knowing’ and ‘unknowing’. 
4.3.5 Defining a Method for a Research of Human Suffering
To  present  how  my  ‘understanding’  of  suffering  was  developed  through  my 
relationship with each client, in terms of hermeneutic phenomenology, the clients’  
and my own lived experience of suffering can be regarded as a hermeneutic circle in 
which our  experiences  occurred as  the  25part-whole-part  understanding of  each 
other  and  were  transformed  into  speaking  language  and  the  ‘part-whole-part’ 
resultant interpretation (Howard, 1982). The ‘understanding’ was therefore traced 
by  seeing  how  the  ‘language’  of  communicating/sharing  our  experience  was 
developed (through involving our individual) horizons of knowing. Understanding 
itself can be seen as a fusion of horizons, which is a dialectic process that involves 
the pre-understanding of other’s stories, interpretive framework and the source of 
information  (Laverty,  2007).  However,  before  elaborating  upon  a  clear 
methodological  concern with the re-presentation and re-interpretation of data,  I 
need to further discuss the nature of my data itself, the developing ‘stories’ and 
‘narratives’ taken from my therapeutic practice with clients, so I can show how a 
method of  re-presenting  and re-interpreting  them was  developed into  practical 
methods of data analysis.
25 The part-whole-part understanding as the hermeneutic circle will be introduced later and clearer in 
Van Mannen’s work on Gadarmer. 
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Arthur  Frank  (1995,  2007,  1997)  used  ‘stories  of  the  illness’  as  a  way  of  
reconstructing narratives of suffering and re-drawing maps in efforts to find new 
destinations of life. When interacting with a patient with cancer, Frank regarded the 
sick person as a ‘narrative wreck’ and storytelling as the ‘way out of the narrative 
wreckage’ (p. 55). Frank drew on ill people’s stories, along with his biography and 
his engagement with ill people. He regarded stories as having the power to ‘repair’ 
the damage of suffering and suggested that research is a way of letting a story be  
told ‘by itself’ (2007). He did not base his analysis and detailed examination on the 
structure of first-person narratives. Rather, he dealt with them by creating genres 
composed  of  three  identified  types  of  narratives  in  which  cultural  forms  and 
personal  experiences  were  brought  together  (Atkinson,  1997),  as  Gantt  (2001) 
described:  The  restitution narratives are  stories  that  tell  how the body restores 
itself to health through compliance with medical regimes, the chaos narratives are 
stories that refuse to allow one’s lived experience to be told, and quest narratives 
describe a journey that exists in one’s memory, manisfesto and automythology so as 
to reconstruct their historical context of their experience of illness (Frank, 1995). His 
narrative analysis  showed a route to the ‘responsible relatedness’  (Gantt,  2001) 
between  a  researcher  and  participant  rather  than  the  structures  within  the 
narratives or narrations.
Another core issue in Frank’s studies is that he pursued moral reflection on the act 
of  research  itself  in  which  a  researcher  is  responsible  for  participants’  stories. 
Influenced by Levinas, Frank felt that such accountability reveals the dialogue in the 
relationship between self and other. He provided the context of self as a reflexive 
project  for  which the individual  is  responsible  and this  responsibility  is  enacted 
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through narrative. He gave researcher’s reflexivity a moral position from which to 
face participants’ experience of suffering: a ‘witness’. A researcher is called upon to 
be reflexive in order to face the commonsense world that we are ‘living for the 
other’ (p. 17).
Mannen (1990, 1997) suggested that, rather than shaping thematic dimensions of 
phenomenological  inquiries,  researchers  need  to  see  how  lived  experience  is 
‘evoked’  in  the  phenomenological  understanding  by  reflecting  upon  it  so  that 
research can share the pedagogical meaning of life itself with readers. For Mannen 
(1997), the term phenomenon is equivalent to human lived experience. Cohen and 
Omery (1994) argued that his type of phenomenology is located in what is termed 
the  Dutch  school  as  it  is  a  combination  of  descriptive  and  interpretive 
phenomenology. As he said, ’if we simply try to forget or ignore what we already 
‘know’,  we  might  find  that  the  presupposition  persistently  creep  back  into  our 
reflections ‘(Mannen, 1990, p. 47)
To research lived experience,  he drew upon six research activities (1990),  which 
promote freedom and initiative  in  researcher’s  interactive  involvement with the 
dynamic research process and the phenomenological inquiry. Firstly, from the data,  
a researcher engages himself in turning to a phenomenon of lived experience which 
seriously interests him and commits him to the world. Secondly, a researcher is to 
investigate experience as he lives it rather than as he conceptualises it. Thirdly, one 
is to reflect on the essential  themes which could characterise the phenomenon. 
Fourth,  one  should  describe  the  phenomenon  through  the  art  of  writing  and 
rewriting. Fifth, a researcher must maintain a strong and orientated relation to the 
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phenomenon, and sixthly, balance the research context by considering parts and 
wholes as composing the hermeneutic circle. These six notions provide the guiding 
principles  that  help  the  objective  of  human  science  methods  to  be  aimed  at 
strengthening the expressive-mantic dimension of phenomenology. Considering the 
validity of qualitative or phenomenological research, he referred to the transformed 
expression of readers, or a ‘phenomenological nod’, as a way of demonstrating that 
good phenomenological description is something the we nod to, recognising it as an 
experience that we had or could have had (Mannen, 1990).
For  research  dedicated  to  the  study  of  human  suffering,  Mannen  (1997,  1998) 
actually showed the ideal research procedure to use in exploring the contextualised 
experience of  suffering.  Similarly,  a  clear  goal  for  my study was to disclose and 
understand the contextual  meaning of  living with suffering.  Again,  my ability  to 
create meaning required reflexive sense and awareness of my own encounter as I 
contemplated an individual’s living experience with the phenomenon of suffering 
rather than attempting to professionalise or analyse the context of it. From locating 
the theme, maintaining orientation and then entering the hermeneutic part-whole 
hermeneutic circle in the six stages, Mannen showed another route to transform 
the  mundane  and  personal  everyday  experience  into  disciplinary  understanding 
(Mannen,  1990).  For  me,  I  made  use  of  three  interpreting  activities  Mannen 
described:  a researcher explores a phenomenon by (1) reflecting on the essential 
themes  which  characterise  the  phenomenon,  (2)  describing  the  phenomenon 
through the art of writing and rewriting and (3) maintaining a strong and orientated 
relation to the phenomenon. In this process, the initial understanding is redirected 
from  whole  into  the  hermeneutic  parts,  which  were  termed  as  ‘horizons’  by 
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Gadamer. Through my efforts to transform narrative storylines, this research has 
shaped my initial understanding and the reflexive perspectives to see the stories 
formed and shared by clients and myself, which are our  reflexive horizons of our 
narrated lived experience. 
In addition to van Mannen, Langdridge (2007) developed Critical Narrative Analysis 
(CNA), which is a circulating process of a critical  phonological  perspective which 
works on the whole-part-whole  interpretation.  Firstly,  a  researcher formulates a 
critique of the illusions of subjectivity. Secondly, s/he identifies narratives, narrative 
tone and rhetorical function. Thirdly, s/he works on the identities and identity work. 
Fourthly, a researcher manages the thematic priorities and relationships. Fifth, s/he 
destabilises the narrative, and, sixthly, gives a synthesis point and then returns back 
to the critique of the synthesis illustration. Langdridge (2007) used ‘destabilizing a 
narrative’  in  the  fifth  level  as  the  way  to  bracket  off  the  preconceptions  and 
recollect meaning from text. In his model, for example, the horizons of race, gender, 
class, and sexuality which hold the context of our taken-for-granted manners could 
be focussed and reset the exploration into another hermeneutic circle. The stage of 
synthesis fused the horizons generalised in the process of data interpretation. 
Therefore, using a social  constructive perspective, the phenomenon of ‘suffering 
transaction’ can be discovered by exploring how the stories of lived experience of 
suffering  are  being  circulated  and  interpreted  individually  and  interpersonally. 
Combining an anthropologist’s consideration and phenomenological philosophers’ 
arguments  of  socio-cultural  embodiments  of  human suffering,  from stories,  the 
interpretation  of  ‘suffering’  can  be  re-presented  by  tracing  its  development  in 
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different ‘horizons’ and exploring the synthesis of interpretation as the ‘fusion of 
horizons’.  Through  tracing  language  itself,  suffering  can  be  developed 
methodologically as having its ‘weight’ set upon efforts to inter-correlate people’s 
lived experience (Bourdieu, 1990; Kleinman, 1997) and thus ‘suffering transaction’ 
can be thematised. 
4.4 Lived Experience, Stories, Language and Analysis
From the collected data to the analytic stage, an essential problem is finding a way 
to  present  the  authentic  understanding  of  the  relationship  both  client  and  I 
engaged in. As presented earlier, the core thinking of my analysis, which has been 
based on Husserl’s argument that meaning be developed by ‘things itself’ and that  
of Frank (1995), who argued to ‘let stories be told by itself’, is to find a way, firstly, 
to give voice to clients’ lived experience of suffering and secondly give voice to the 
‘understanding’ that occurs in counselling practice. Gee (2000) also discussed that a 
researcher  is  always  facing  how  s/he  would  ‘re-present’  what  exists  and  ‘re-
interpret’  the  data  as  part  of  the  methodological  approach  to  analysis.e  Data 
analysis or any interpretation performed as part of a psychotherapeutic study, when 
the transcripts from the sessions are to be transformed into other forms of reading,  
is no longer a methodological problem, but the qualitative transformation driven by 
its ethical relationship (Gordon, 1995). 
For the purposes of this  study,  data ‘representation’ and ‘reinterpretation’  were 
methodologically considered as the way in which I could authentically reflect upon 
my  therapeutic  work  as  an  ethical  practice. The  goal  was  to  clarify  my 
137
‘responsibility’, which was created by my role of ‘witness’ as I assumed the position 
of  facing  my  participant/clients’  suffering  (Gantt,  2001;  Gordon,  1995).  As  the 
researcher, I had to be aware of the boundary that dictates whether a client’s lived 
experience is over-categorised, over-analysed and over-interpreted; therefore I had 
to be reflexive about my awareness of my research intention/motivation as well. 
Counselling  and  psychotherapy,  therefore,  could  be  conceived  as  a 
‘contextualisation of one’s lived experience’, in which both therapist/counsellor and 
client  together  tell  stories  through  mutual  responding,  understanding  and 
interpreting (McLeod, 2001). Qualitative data is then generalised by this process of 
co-construction.  In this  process,  ‘stories’  are constituted from the fragmental  or 
fragmented  contexts  which  could  be  communicated  many  times  in  different 
sessions to a history which could make the therapist and client know more about 
each other. In other words, the stories are co-created by client and counsellor, in 
which the very production of meaning occurs through a circle of listening, reflective 
thinking and reflexive interpretations. The development of stories in its nature is a 
hermeneutic circle of acknowledging ‘suffering’. 
Accordingly, an important methodological concern is how I, as the researcher, could 
explore the stories of suffering through my developing understanding of my clients. 
This  concern  is  in  its  nature  ethical  because  choosing  a  proper  method to  ‘re-
present and re-interpret’ the generalised data also required that I ‘re-present and 
re-interpret’  the  responsibility  between  myself  and  my  clients.  To  fit  into  this 
analytic role, how I could reflexively reflect on my lived experience needed to be  
more clearly presented and explored; therefore, I will now illustrate how I treated 
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and analogised my data as ‘stories’ and how I chose my analytic method for them.
 
4.4.1 Narrative Turn in the practice of Research and Psychotherapy
We live in a ‘storied world’ where people make sense of and communicate their 
experience through stories. The narrative that is produced in therapy sessions is not 
simply the client’s story, but is a story-told-to-another-person (McLeod, 1996). It is 
assumed to be the composition of defining who we are and gives coherence to 
experience and our purpose of life (Smith, 2000). A story can be regarded as a basic  
and universal mode of verbal expression (Bruner, 1991; McAdams, 1993; McLeod, 
2001, 2005) and a vehicle for expressing the ‘landscape of action’ and ‘landscape of 
consciousness’ of the narrator. Bruner (1990) suggested that ‘the function of the 
story is to find an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible 
a  deviation  from a  canonical  cultural  pattern  (p.  49)’.  Cited  from Smith  (1997),  
narratives  can  provide  meaning  and  give  coherence  to,  and  perspective  on, 
experience and one’s social traditions; construct a person’s knowledge, including a 
person’s  sense  of  self  and  identify;  produce  an  organising  principle  for  human 
action; alter the teller’s way of thinking about event, and/or sense of identity; and 
bring about emotional adjustment and healing.
In  1986,  Bruner  (1986,  1990,  1991)  presented the importance of  how narrative 
could construct the reality of our everyday living experience. Since then, according 
to  McLeod  (2001),  the  implications  of  narrative  ways  of  knowing  were  further 
articulated by many researchers like Gergen and Gergen (1988), Reissman (1993) 
and Bruner (1990, 1991). Paul Atkinson (1997) called this methodological impact as 
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a  ‘narrative  turn’  in  the  field  of  qualitative  research  and  argued  that  narrative 
analysis needed to be built into systematic, principled investigation and should not 
be treated as a single solution to the multiple problems of social analysis.
An exploration of narrative represents a distinctive ‘way of knowing’ which is quite 
different from the theoretical,  propositional  or  ‘paradigmatic’  knowledge in that 
period when the context of human lived experience was stocked in the trade of the 
scientific  community.  Narrative analysis  is  therefore based on the production of 
‘language’  which  transduces  thoughts,  feelings,  and  sensory  experience  into  a 
shared  symbolic  form  and  mediates  the  meaning  of  things  themselves  with  a 
socially  constructed  reality  (Smith,  2000).  For  different  academic  purposes, 
narratives have been used methodologically in various fields like linguistics which 
focus  on  the  psycholinguistic  structure  and  psychosocial  context  (Labov,  1972; 
Mishler, 1995;  Gee, 1991), developmental psychology which investigates children’s 
development of storytelling and narrative understanding (Nelson, 1993), life span 
theory (McAdams, 1993), cognition (McCabe et al., 1991; Nelson, 1993), and social  
anthropology (Reissman, 1993; McCabe, 1997; Kleinman, 1994, Frank, 1995).
In  psychotherapeutic  practice,  cited  from McLeod (1996),  this  ‘narrative  return’ 
caused an immense impact on the field of psychotherapy which re-positioned the 
therapist  as  being the one who provides  opportunities for  clients to ‘re-author’ 
their lives (Epstein ＆ White, 1990; Russell, 1991; Russell & Van den Broek, 1992). 
Since  then,  analysing  how  narratives  could  be  developed  in  psychotherapy  has 
become a formal analytic framework of empirical  experience (Russel  & Ven den 
Broek, 1993). For instance, in ‘narrative therapy’, as developed by Michael White, 
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therapists  actively  engage  in  the  co-construction  of  narratives  and  use  the 
storytelling process for therapeutic empowerment (Epstein & White, 1990; Frank, 
1995; McLeod, 1996; White, 2005). In responding to and engaging with the client’s 
stories, a therapist appears to be sensitive to the structural aspects of narrative—to 
the, for example, ‘point of view’ or ‘voice’ conveyed by the story (McLeod, 1996, 
Frank,  2001).  The reality that stories connect the individual  with the world also 
connects the way in which research is conducted with therapeutic praxis.
4.4.2 Constructing Storylines: Main and Subordinate 
As  discussed,  data  generalisation  in  qualitative  study  is  an  inter-subjective 
contextualisation. In this context, narratives and language are always mediating an 
individual’s  lived  experience  and  his/her  world  (Bruner,  1991,  2004).  Following 
Bruner’s  (2004)  argument that  the production of  language is  never  neutral  and 
objective,  Gee  (2000)  suggested  that  we  use  language  to  signify  ourselves  and 
others for understanding and building social relationships (p. 99).  Because of this 
inter-subjective property, a ‘context’ can be produced by our dialogical interaction 
with  social  situations,  activities,  groups,  institutes,  cultures  and  subcultures.  In 
language, words are associated with social relationships, not only from the one who 
speaks them but also from the one who engages in the responding relationship and 
its  responsibility.  Gee (2000)  used ‘discourse  models’  to  describe how words  in 
social  use  are  associated  with  their  situated  meaning  and  the  development  of 
meanings.  For  him,  the development  of  language  and context  in  social  use  are 
‘storylines’, ‘families of connected images, or (informal) ‘theories’ shared by people 
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belonging to specific social or cultural groups (p. 95).
From  the  perspective  of  hermeneutic  phenomenology,  ‘storylines’  from  Gee’s 
(2000)  reflection  can  also  be  understood  as  the  development  of  ‘hermeneutic 
horizons’ as they explain why and how words have the various situated meaning 
they  do  and  fuel  their  ability  to  grow.  From  words  to  stories,  due  to  social 
relationships, the development of meaning is worked into the socio-cultural context 
and given a historical symbolic order. A qualitative researcher is always exploring 
the  symbolic  order  from  the  data  generalised  by  research  action,  and  always 
shaping  the  alternative  order  for  the  interpretation  of  things.  Therefore,  in 
qualitative research, stories are developed into new stories, and understanding can 
become expanded.
A  psychotherapist  in  therapeutic  practice  does  no  different  than  a  qualitative 
researcher who works with participants because a therapist also redevelops stories 
from the session-by-session talks with their clients and re-explores symbolic order 
formed by the talking encounter. In Michel White’s work with a child in 2005, he 
used the ‘subordinate storylines’ to describe the ‘different territory of identity for 
children  to  take  recourse  to  in  speaking  their  experience  of  trauma  (p.  10)’. 
Opposite to the ‘main’ storylines which contextualise a client’s main concern of 
their  lived  experience  in  therapeutic  practice,  White  (1995)  regarded  the 
development of the ‘subordinate storylines’ as the intention which empowers the 
therapeutic  relationship  and gives  one’s  lived  experiences  different  perspectives 
and voices. Through repositioning both therapist and client in a relationship based 
on speaking and understanding,  he recast the development of the overtones of 
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one’s  narrations  and redeveloped the therapeutic  intention of  creating different 
understanding and encountering (White, 2005).
For  me,  I  drew  the  two  concepts  of  ‘horizons’  and  ‘storylines’  together  as  a 
methodological combination because, in my study, I had positioned myself as both 
the  qualitative  researcher  and  therapist  in  my  clients’  narration  of  their  life 
histories.  The data of this research, which was created while I was the therapist, 
had already been developed into different ‘storylines’ so that each lived experience 
was  given  different  perspectives  and  voices  and  therefore  the  therapeutic 
relationship had synthesised the voices into various interpretive ‘horizons’. When 
my  therapeutic  practice  was  over  and  the  data  needed  to  be  represented,  I  
reflected  on  how  the  data  was  developed  through  my  therapeutic  encounter. 
Therefore, when I talk about my work with two clients in Chapters Five and Six, I will 
take Michael White’s therapeutic representation of ‘subordinate storylines’ as the 
structure of  my data representation.  From my transcripts,  the representation of 
‘main storylines’ will be based upon the primary counselling that occurred in my 
practice,  which  was  my dedicated  to  helping  my clients  reach  their  major  goal 
through engaging in therapeutic service with me. The ‘subordinate storylines’ will  
be presented as the ‘other voices’ which were not my clients’ main concern, but 
contextualised different interpretative perspectives with the narrated data. These 
two storylines will be reflexively discussed according to Langdridge’s (2007) analytic 
direction, which will be further explored thereafter. 
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4.4.3 Poetic Transformation: a Form of Representing the ‘Developing Data’ 
Regarding the presentation of one’s ‘stories’, I focussed on James Paul Gee’s (1990, 
1991, 2000) work on the construction of language, by which we ‘intertextualise’ 
who we are and what we do for others. While we are speaking, listening or writing, 
according to Gee (2000), we are also engaged in seven ‘building tasks’ of language-
in-use: (1) Significance (2) Activities (3) Identities (4) Relationships (5) Politics (the 
distribution of social goods) (6) Connections (7) Sign systems and knowledge (p. 12; 
p. 98). Discourses, stories and narratives, according to Gee, are therefore the inter-
subjective construction in which people build up the symbolic meaning of these 
seven  levels  from  the  linguistic  action  ‘with’  and  ‘for’  the  others  (p.  98).  A 
researcher of qualitative study always has his or her attitude to parse the qualitative 
data and selective text so as to respond to his or her understanding of the world. 
Analysis of narratives, in this context, should not be thought as ‘the’ certain way of  
interpretation, rather, they should be recognised as ‘a’  method to represent the 
inter-subjective reality. In this dialogical position with others, a researcher always 
‘co-constructs’ the analytical results with his or her participants and readers (Gee, 
2000, p. 108). 
For  me,  accordingly,  I  needed to  re-consider  the  most  appropriate  way of  data 
representation and interpretation, so as to fit the inter-subjective nature of my data 
generation.  From  Gee’s  methodological  discussion  on  narrative  and  discourse 
analysis,  in  this  section,  I  will  discuss  a  way  of  representing  my  fieldwork  by 
transforming the narrative data into ‘poetic forms’. 
Since 1991, Gee started to document a creative method of discourse analysis. With 
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his idea that a discourse is a form of narratives (Stenhouse, 2009), he argued that 
speaking and listening has its linguistic structure and therefore understanding one’s 
stories  and  representing  one’s  words  could  be  a  re-construction  of  the  certain 
context (for example, cultural understanding). Different from a traditional way of 
citing or representing a set of text, he changed, parsed and relined the cited data, 
and his analysis was focussed on the development and diversity of the meaning 
‘units’  (Gee,  2000,  p.  109).  In  his  work,  a  cited data became lined-up and also 
reconstructed  texts  like  poetry;  he  then  could  articulate  his  reflection  and 
interpretation from the represented linguistic structure. In this ‘poetic form’ (Gee, 
1991, 2000, 2005; McLeod, 1996; Kendall & Murray, 2005, Stenhouse, 2009), he 
argued that speech and narrative have an inter-subjective function when developed 
into the poetic structure, which includes lines, stanzas and a macrostructure: 
Line: ‘When speaking English’, Gee (2000) argued that ‘speech is produced in 
small spurts (p. 110)’.  In these many little spurts, lines are made up of one 
tone unit with the changes of pitch. A line may conclude information, stress 
and intonation. It is a reference of a specific ‘idea unit’ or ‘meaning unit’ of 
speech  (Gee,  1991).  A  line  ‘demarcates  the  material  in  the  line  that  the 
narrator  wishes the listener to take as  new or asserted information (cited 
from Stenhouse, 2009, p. 107)’. 
Stanza:  Related  lines  form  stanzas,  focussing  on  one  perspective,  event, 
theme or topic, like a single camera shot (Gee, 2005, 1991, 1986). Gee call 
this  ‘shot’  or  bigger  ‘unit’  a  ‘Stanza’.  When  time,  place,  role,  event  or 
perspective of a thing shift, a new stanza is indicated (Stenhouse, 2009).  
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Macrostructure:  A  macrostructure  contains  many  stanzas  and  lines,  and 
different meaning units. It is the ‘body’ of different idea or meaning units and 
has the larger pieces of information like the parts of a body (Gee, 2000, p. 
128). The ‘parts’ are constructed to story as a whole, ‘as opposed to its lines 
and stanzas which constitute its “microstructure” (p. 128)’.
With this structure, Gee (2000) demonstrated an example of re-presenting a seven-
year-old child’s story as a poetic form. In this story, the beginning contexts gave the 
first idea unit as ‘Setting’ (p. 129) with two stanzas and eight lines. The original texts 
were:
Last yesterday in the morning, there was a hook on the top of the stairway.  
And my father was pickin’ me up, an I got stuck on the hook up there…an’ I 
hadn’  had  breakfast  he  wouldn’t  take  me  down  until  I  finished  l  my 
breakfast, cause I didn’t like oatmeal either…. (p.129)
It was then represented and transformed as:
I    SETTING
     Stanza 1
1   Last yesterday in the morning
2   there was a hook on the top of the stairway
3   an’ my father was pickin’ me up
4   an I got stuck on the hook up there
      Stanza 2
5   an’ I hadn’t had breakfast
6   he wouln’t take me down
7   until I finished all my breakfast
8   cause I did’t like oatmeal either  (p.129)
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Regardless of his use of analytic method as seen in the above poetic representation, 
and although Gee (2000) suggested that his poetic way of knowing was not the 
necessary step for analysing narratives (p. 117), for me, he had offered an example 
in which he could use the poetic  understanding to achieve Frank’s (1995,  2007) 
emphasis that a researcher is always in the dialogue with his or her readers. A set of 
data,  when it  is  transformed into poetry,  becomes the context  which has  been 
‘understood’  by  the  researcher.  A  reader  could  therefore  interact  with  the 
‘understood’ data from the process of the researcher’s structure of knowing.  
Gee’s method (2000) had contributed to the field of qualitative research the idea 
that  any  narrative  data has  a  poetic  property,  and,  for  me,   he  offered a  clear 
example  of  presenting  the  data  which  is  in  its  nature  developed  as  being 
‘understood’ by the therapeutic and research praxes. In psychotherapy, a therapist 
is  processing a client’s  narration like Gee’s description of  poetic  transformation, 
which makes client’s stories into different sub-themes and re-constructs the themes 
into other thematic  understanding.  This  method achieves Husserl’s  emphasis  on 
exploring  the  ‘things  themselves’  without  manipulating  data  separation  or 
simplification but keeping the data’s complication and richness so as to present the 
poetic condensation of lived experience (Ohlen, 2003). 
Many therapists have contributed a poetic understanding of their therapeutic work. 
In terms of ‘poetic understanding’, Gordon (2010) exhibited an impressive reflection 
on therapeutic language. 
In therapy people struggle to put their feeling and thoughts into words. For  
some there are simply too few words. ….The language of therapy, like the 
147
language of poetry, is just ordinary language. In this the project of therapy, 
like writing poetry, is a deeply democratic one; every one can do it to some 
extent if they are allowed to, which means being given time and space to do 
so, as well as encouragement and the right kind of help. What marks the great 
of fine poet from most of us is what he or she does what the same language,  
taking it to a different level to the making of a new thing altogether. (p. 83)
Actually, before Gee, in the book ‘Knots’, Scottish psychoanalyst RD Laing (1970, p. 
87) presented an example of his work with a schizophrenic patient. Similar to Gee’s 
method,  Laing  represented  a  patient’s  speaking  as  a  form  of  poetry.  With  this 
representation, the patient’s murmuring which seems non-sense and unstructured 
at the beginning was regarded as a clear route to understanding the patient’s lost 
connection between his ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Also, through the poetic structure, 
readers of this work were engaged in the inter-subjectivity of this ‘lost’ which were 
‘inter-textualised’ by Laing and the patient. 
One is inside
then outside what one has been inside
One feels empty
because there is nothing inside oneself
One tries to get inside oneself
        that inside of the outside
        that one was once inside
        once one tries to get oneself inside what
        one is outside:
        to eat and to be eaten
to have the outside inside and to be
        inside the outside
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But this is not enough.  One is trying to get
the inside of what one is outside inside, and to
get inside the outside.  But one does not get
inside the outside by getting the outside inside
for;
although one is full inside of the inside of the outside
one is on the outside of one's own inside
and by getting inside the outside
one remains empty because
while one is on the inside
even the inside of the outside is outside
and inside oneself there is still nothing
There has never been anything else
and there never will be
The  ‘understanding’  created  through  a  poetic  representation  can  therefore  be 
processed by the intertextualised work (Gee, 2000) between a research participant, 
researcher  and  reader.  As  Gallardo,  Furman  and  Kusarni  et  al.  (2009)  stressed, 
poetry encourages an empathic relationship between the author and its audience. 
Poetic representation of research data also relocates a qualitative researcher in a 
position to have a dialogue with his or her readers. In recent years, researchers 
(Furman, 2004, 2006; Furman, Langer, Davis, Gallardo, & Kulkarni, 2007; Stenhouse, 
2009; Gallardo, Furman & Kusarni, 2009) have utilised poetry as a mean of data 
representation  in  traditional  qualitative  studies.  Different  from Gee’s  systematic 
intention for data analysis in terms of lines and stanzas, Butler-Kisber (2002) regards 
poetry  as  an  ideal  medium  for  capturing  the  lived  experience  of  complex, 
emotionally  laden  experiences.  Gallardo  (2010)  proposed  that  poetic 
representation  helps  stimulate  empathic  understanding  in  the  readers  and 
transcendence  between  the  poem and  its  understanding.  Furthermore,  Furman 
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(2006)  also  demonstrated  how  using  poetic  forms  and  structure  can  provide 
different emphasis when representing in-depth interviews. 
Denzin (1997) encouraged the use of alternative forms of data representation and 
exploration as a means of evoking emotions in consumers of research. In terms of 
my  dual  roles  as  both  the  researcher  and  therapist,  I  regarded  a  poetic 
transformation of my generated data as a creative and useful method from which to 
begin  further  analytic  exploration.  However,  the  above  discussion  of  poetic 
representation is conditioned by using English as the first language in which the 
researcher  is  familiar  with  the  transition  between  tone,  rhythm  and  symbolic 
meaning of the use of words (McLeod, 2003). Since I am not a native English user 
and, in Chinese relative research papers, poetic methods of qualitative research is 
still  undeveloped   (Tsai,  2006),  to  work  between  two  languages  and  symbolic 
systems,  I  redeveloped  my  own  methodology  of  poetic  representation  of  my 
generated data as showed in 4.3.5. 
4.4.4 Developing a Method of Poetic Representation: An example 
Following  Gee  and  Furman’s  structure  of  analytic  work,  to  move  between  two 
languages from my therapeutic work (Chinese) and research presentation (English), 
my therapeutic work in Taiwan was processed by (1) Transcription (2) Translation (3) 
Poetic Transformation (4) Reflexive reflection (5) Interpretation. In Chapters 5 and 6, 
I  will  show  that  the  transcribed  clients’  stories  have  been  selected,  translated, 
represented and responded to. In this section I will use my work with my previous 
client Hui-Yu, which will be represented in the next chapter, as the example of my 
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poetic representation. In our counselling sessions, Hui-Yu’s main concern was her 
worry  about  her  autistic  son  YH,  who  seriously  injured  himself  in  front  of  his  
classmates and teacher. Since she had left medical resources for autistic children 
many years ago, returning to a hospital and enduring the stigmatisation of her son’s 
autism became the declaration of  the end of  their  ‘ordinary’.  To  present  how I 
understood her hesitation with being back at CMUH, her words in our first session 
were quoted and translated into an English context for my further response. She 
said:
Honestly, I was hesitated to be back to hospital, because I really do not want  
to again put myself into a period of feeling useless and helpless…You know, 
after the event (of YH’s self injury), my life was just like back to the period 
(of 2001) when I was beaten up by YH’s diagnosis as an autistic child…I have 
no other way to go but can only come here. However, everything is back to 
the original point, zero!...... Seriously, I am so confused and disappointed by 
myself….I really wondered what I  have done for YH in these three years. 
Coming back was such a difficult decision, it  violently reminds me of the 
most fragile period of my life…..(S1)
When I had shaped these contexts, as Gee and Furman did, I broke these words into 
lines of poetry. A title of ‘Hesitation’ was given as I understood Hui-Yu’s narrations 
as being her struggles with coming back to receive treatment in our first session.  
However, a bit different from Gee and Furman’s work, when I re-lined the data, I  
also re-positioned the ‘meaning units’ of the words in a line. For instance, some 
important words which could represent her core emotions of life events were put in 
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the centre of the line. Or, I would put words like ‘you know’ or ‘yes’ in the beginning 
of a line because they represented the rhythm of speaking. The poetry was given a 
frame  for  making  itself  a  whole  object  of  presentation.  With  this  way  of 
representation, the ‘idea units’ were given ‘distance’ from each other; readers too 
are  given  an  interactive  way  of  ‘understanding’  through  the  visual  contrastive 
representation. The above contexts were transformed as followed.
Hesitation
Honestly, 
I was hesitated to be back to hospital 
because I  really  do not  want to again put  myself  into a 
period 
of feeling useless and helpless.
You know,
after the event (of YH’s self injury), 
my life was just like back to the period (of 2001) when I was beaten 
up 
by YH’s diagnosis as an autistic child.
I have no other way to go but can only come here
However, 
everything is back to the original point, 
zero!
Seriously, 
I am so confused and disappointed by myself….
I really wondered what I have done for YH in these three years
Coming back 
was a difficult decision, 
it violently reminds me of 
the most fragile period of my life
Through  this  way  of  poetic  representation,  I  could  disregard  the  grammatical  
difference between Chinese and English and focus on how I understood my client’s 
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stories and then give the ‘understanding’ a structural form of representation. With 
this poetic presentation, a reader could then be able to understand Hui-Yu through 
my collated structure of knowing. In this presentation of my therapeutic work, a 
reader is also put in the position of interacting with my intentions embodied in my 
therapeutic conduct. 
Accordingly,  in  Chapter  5  and  Chapter  6,  my  two  sets  of  transcripts  will  be 
transformed  into  poetic  forms  of  representation.  As  discussed  earlier,  my 
exploration has been structured by my clients’ main concern, and I constructed my 
understanding and reflection by developing the main and subordinate storylines. 
Regarding  further  ‘reflection’,  researchers  have  developed different  attitudes  for 
‘analyses’. For example, Gee’s (2000) discourse analysis was processed by exploring 
the development of a socio-cultural and political context within the language line by 
line and stanza by stanza (p. 86). Furman (2006) and Gallardo, Furman and Kusarni  
(2009)  used  the  term  of  ‘narrative  reflection’  as  a  way  of  being  reflexive  to  a  
researcher’s experience with the represented poetry. Following the work of Furman 
and Gallardo, I will show how I was reflexive to my lived experience by presenting 
my narrative reflection and developing my own storylines. Through this process, a 
reader  can  see  how  the  lived  experience  between  me  and  clients  was 
contextualised  as  well  as  the  ways  we  interacted  with  each  other  in  both  my 
therapeutic and research practice.
4.5 Summary: The Analytic Frame of This Research
This chapter began with my reflection on the boundary of two languages of Chinese 
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and English, as well as the difficulties and my attitude of working with two symbolic  
systems.  Considering language to be the contextualisation of  lived experience,  I 
presented  a  genealogical  review  of  hermeneutic  phenomenology  from  the 
philosophical perspective of my methodology. From Husserl to Levinas, I explored 
the uncertain nature of the ‘method’, especially when research involves the study of 
human lived experience. I  focused on the context of  ‘understanding’  which was 
developed  through  my  therapeutic  and  research  conduct  with  my  clients  and 
readers.  From  Gadamer’s  concept  of  hermeneutic  horizons,  I  developed  my 
methodological approach where the context of culture, sub-culture, society, policy 
and ethics could be deemed as the interpretive horizons developed in my research 
work.  The  methodological  aim  was  to  generate  a  synthesis  as  the  ‘fusion  of 
horizons’. 
Figure 4.1
As showed in the figure 4.1, which visually demonstrates  my analytic structure, my 



















form. Clients’  stories  were collated  as  the development of  two storylines:  main 
storylines about a client’s primary struggle in therapy and subordinate storylines 
about  the  other  facets  of  the  main  stories.  While  engaging  in  the  process  of 
understanding and re-construction, I was reflexive to my own life experience and 
developed  the  storyline  of  myself  which  implicitly  responded  to  each  client’s 
narrative. Referring to Langdridge’s (2007) analytic suggestion of CNA, the storylines 
were then ‘destablised’ into the discussion of the socio-cultural embodiments of 
language as the interpretive horizons of ‘suffering’. The synthesis which focuses on 
the ethical perspective of ‘suffering transaction’ in my psychotherapeutic practice 
will be given thereafter.
From the next chapter on, my readers are invited to be engaged in my fieldwork in 
Taiwan and the stories from Hui-Yu, Tai-Ya and myself.
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Chapter 5    Hui-Yu
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters Five and Six will  explore and represent my experience with conducting 
fieldwork in Taiwan. This chapter will primarily present the stories from a mother, 
Hui-Yu, whose son YH was my client during the period between 2001 and 2005.  
Because of coincidently meeting her in the paediatric department of CMUH, after 
careful consideration and discussion, I invited her to participate in this research and 
my counselling  work  for  reasons  I  will  soon  discuss.  Therefore,  readers  will  be 
invited in a position of  witnessing a mother’s  lived experience of  suffering,  as  I  
actively reflect upon my therapeutic work with her. In 5.2 of this chapter, therefore, 
the process of how I met and recruited her will be carefully explained and readers 
will briefly know the history of how I worked with her and her son before. In 5.3,  
based on my previous discussion of Gee’s (1999) work on discourse analysis, Hui-
Yu’s stories will be transformed into poetic form and my therapeutic work with her 
will be represented as poetries.  In 5.4, I will link the context from Hui-Yu’s suffering 
with  my  lived  experience  and  represent  the  ‘knowing’  of  suffering  from  our 
developing therapeutic  relationship.  By doing so,  I  show how Hui-Yu’s  stories of 
suffering for YH are also articulated through my lived experience of suffering in our 
therapeutic process. Readers, therefore, are invited into the intertwined historical 
context of the ‘suffering transaction’ between Hui-Yu and myself.  
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5.2 Recruiting Hui-Yu 
In  the  February  of  2008,  with  surprise,  I  found  YH’s  name  on  the  list  for  
psychological assessment and I again encountered his mother Hui-Yu. 
YH is a boy diagnosed with high function autism. In 2001 when YH was three years 
old, I conducted his evaluation and confirmed his autistic tendency. The child was 
difficult  to  control.  He  could  not  speak  and  used  crying  and  shouting  to 
communicate; he also repeated ‘stereotypical behaviours’ like closing and opening 
doors and rotating everything he had seen. Confirmed by DSM-IV and BSID-II, YH 
was diagnosed as having a mild to moderate developmental delay with an autistic 
tendency. With this label, he was given a card which identified his mental disability 
which then gave him a preferential and priority service of medication, education 
and social welfare. 
After  the  evaluation  in  2001,  I  arranged ‘psychological  interventions’,  or  weekly 
therapeutic  sessions  with  YH  which  aimed  to  improve  his  social  and  cognitive 
functions  like  eye  contact,  verbal  and  nonverbal  communication  and  emotional 
expression through a cognitive training programme and play therapy. This medical 
programme was subsidised by Taiwanese public insurance. Furthermore, in order to 
help  improve  her  parenting  efficiency,  I  asked  Hui-Yu  to  also  attend  the 
interventions as the co-therapist and, from that point, YH, Hui-Yu and I maintained 
a therapeutic relationship for three and half a years until 2005. 
In the same period, apart from the psychological intervention with me, Hui-Yu was 
also working hard weekly on other interventional services such as language therapy 
(LT)  for  improving his  language ability,  occupational  therapy (OT)  for  fine  motor 
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development,  physiological  therapy  (PT)  for  gross  motor  therapy  and  special 
education  for  academic  performance.  In  the  clinical  psychological  field,  YH’s 
developmental  assessments  were conducted every year  and the results  showed 
significant progression. By 2005, YH had developed a broader range language skills 
and  cognitive  ability.  He  proved  to  be  a  gifted  child  after  assessment  by  the 
Wechsler  Preschool  and  Primary  Scale  of  Intelligence-Revised  (WPPSI-r)  test. 
Although YH could not get rid of  the label  of autism, his case became a strong 
example of how early intervention that involves good cooperation between medical  
professions  and  parents  can  change  the  reality  of  a  child's  early  diagnosed 
retardation. With this clinical success, he no longer required psychological support 
for training his cognitive abilities in medical  system. Since he had developed his 
ability to engage in social interaction with others, he could enter the mainstream 
school and attain education with ‘ordinary’ children. I, since I decided to have my 
postgraduate study abroad, left CMUH at the same time.
In March of 2008, in the room of psychological assessment, Hui-Yu was waiting with 
YH’s psychological evaluation. YH was now 10 years old, had entered a mainstream 
elementary school, and was always one of the top three students in the class tests.  
However, due to a request from paediatrics,  according to the existing evaluating 
route,  treatment  was  again  started  from  the  ‘IQ-test’,  which  was  not  only  not 
required, but at that time not adequate to address Hui-Yu’s main concern, YH’s self  
injury and a mother’s feeling of helplessness. 
Since  both  Hui-Yu  and  I  knew  that  an  IQ  test  result  would  not  be  helpful  in 
diminishing her frustration and worry regarding her son, I explained that the reason 
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for the assessment was due to its medical necessity and asked her about the details 
of YH’s self-injury. In the years since I last saw her, Hui-Yu had tried very hard to  
help YH maintain a good relationship with his teachers and classmates and she was 
satisfied with her role in YH’s positive performance in school. However, during a big 
argument with his teacher, YH used a sharp pencil to cut his neck and frightened 
the teacher and other students. After receiving the emergency call, Hui-Yu went to 
YH’s school and she was ‘asked’ by the teacher to bring her son to a psychiatrist or  
psychologist as soon as possible, which in a very real and immediate way implied 
and stigmatised her son as being  abnormal. 
‘My efforts were all in vain’, said Hui-Yu. 
I felt that counselling might help Hui-Yu and therefore, due to the purpose of my 
study, asked her to participate in the counselling practice aspect of my research 
project. We discussed the ethical concerns, audio recording and informed consent. 
We  agreed  that,  after  she  had  read  the  whole  transcripts  of  our  counselling 
sessions, if she felt comfortable, we could use them for research purposes as well as 
counselling and, if not, it would still be fine. 
For  me,  Hui-Yu  was  a  very  good  case  for  many  reasons.  Firstly,  the  three-year 
cooperation we experienced during YH’s initial progression had built a strong sense 
of trust between us. We could base the therapeutic practice of my research on our 
existing trust as well as extend our therapeutic relationship from the past. Secondly,  
the three years  of  being YH’s therapist  enabled me to understand how difficult 
being YH’s mother could be because during the therapeutic process I had witnessed 
all her experience of suffering. I know she had not failed as being YH’s mother and 
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felt  I  had  the  responsibility  to  prove  it  in  our  research  re-encounter.  This 
understanding from the past and my sense of responsibility for them provided this  
research with helpful information that aided both of us, as counsellor and parent, 
to find a better approach for my therapeutic relationship with YH. In the March of 
2008, we started our first counselling session as part of my research practice.
5.3 Forming Hui-Yu’s Voices of Suffering
As discussed in Chapter 4, in this study, the voices of suffering are communicated 
and analysed through the act of an-other’s listening and understanding.  To present 
Hui-Yu’s  data,  the  ‘voices  of  suffering’  were  approached and generated  by  two 
methodological issues. 
The first was the ‘storylines’ narrated by the responsibility ‘for the other’ in our 
counselling process. In the counselling sessions, Hui-Yu’s primary concern can be 
understood as a process of telling a story of herself, in which the lived experience of  
suffering for her son has been assigned historical order in our therapeutic sessions. 
Utilising  the  concepts  of  ‘hermeneutic  horizon’  as  found  in  hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Langdridge,  2007)  and ‘storylines’  as  used in narrative  therapy 
(White,  1995,  2005),  Hui-Yu’s  voices  of  ‘suffering’  are  reordered  as  the  ‘main 
storyline’, which was also the primary theme we worked together to create in the 
therapeutic sessions (McLeod, 2001; Yee, 2004). The ‘overtone’ behind the main 
stories (Lin, 2006) is therefore collated as the ‘subordinate storyline’, embedded in 
our  mutual  socio-political  experience  and  shared  cultural  background,  which 
naturally  give  different  voices to one’s  experience of  ‘suffering for  the son’.  For 
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example, in Hui-Yu’s case, her interaction with her family members and the moral 
belief inherited from her mothers were used to help produce her voice of suffering 
when  the  counselling  practice  focussed  on  her  relationship  with  her  son.  The 
formation of both storylines presented in this chapter aim to present multiple and 
rich angles of Hui-Yu’s experience of ‘suffering’ and the ‘understanding of suffering’ 
which was processed in her therapeutic relationship with me.
The second methodological issue of presenting the collected data in this chapter 
was finding the appropriate choice of  data transformation.  The qualitative data, 
since I collected it throughout our counselling interaction, had been ‘processed’ by 
my counselling acts from the very beginning. Unlike the data created by qualitative 
interview methods, the generated data had not been the ‘first hand data’ because 
my clients’ experience had been understood, responded, developed and processed 
by the therapeutic sessions. Therefore, to present my clients’ stories, my primary 
methodological concern or issue was to find a phenomenological way to include 
both my client’s speaking  and my understanding as the data presented here. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, based on Gee’s analytic idea (1989, 1991), I re-paused, re-
lined and re-focussed the collected  data,  just  as  I  had  done in  the therapeutic  
process, through re-presenting the stories produced in our sessions within poetic 
contexts  in  this  thesis.  The  data  is  therefore  shown  as  the  understanding  of  a 
therapist who actively encountered my client’s experience of ‘suffering’, as well as a 
researcher  who  has  attempted  to  convey  a  collaborative  representation  of  the 
research experience shared with my clients in our therapeutic space. In this section 
of  5.3,  I  am going to  explore Hui-Yu's  main storyline and subordinate storylines 
through the use of poetic transformation.
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5.3.1 Main Storyline: The History of ‘Suffering for the Son’
5.3.1.1 Hesitation with Returning to the Hospital
The first counselling session was inspired by my question of ‘how are you doing in  
the years since we last met’ because we had never contacted each other since I left  
in 2005. Hui-Yu started to tell me about the ‘ordinary life’ she had lived before YH’s 
self-injury in 2008. I began to realise that, after I left CMUH, she decided to leave  
the  medical  support  system  of  ‘early  intervention’  and  brought  YH  to  the 
mainstream elementary school. With the help from a special educator in school, YH 
had studied quite well in a class with the ‘normal’ children and usually got the first  
or second rank marked by his class teacher. Hui-Yu enjoyed the life of being an  
ordinary  mother.  She  brought  YH  to  school  by  motorcycle  every  day,  prepared 
dinner  and studied with her sons.  In  the following poetic  representation of  her 
words, Hui-Yu used ‘lost ordinary’ to describe what returning to the hospital meant 
to her. 
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The Lost ordinary 
I just feel like, 
I lost my ordinary life again
Before YH harmed himself 
      I just thought that 
             I can handle my son 
                                        without entering medical institute ever again. 
You know, 
In these years
apart from his diagnosis of autism, 
my  life  could  not  be  more  ordinary  than  the  other 
families 
in which 
           all I need every day is just being a 
‘mother’.
Since Hui-Yu and I worked together with YH for three years, I understood how this  
‘ordinary’ could be difficult to acquire and maintain and then how helpless Hui-Yu 
felt when losing it again. I always remembered my supervisor saying that ‘facing the 
parent with the lifelong disable child,  you have to understand that you are also 
facing  a  lifelong trauma,  and shame’.  The  decision  of  returning  to  CMUH again 
forced Hui-Yu to admit YH’s difference from normal children while also requiring her 
to reveal her recovered wounds to medical professionals. ‘Lost ordinary’ for Hui-Yu 
was a sense of fear. In the first session, although she demonstrated pleasure with 
talking with me again, she disclosed how she was hesitant to open the door of the  




I was hesitated to be back to hospital 
                because I really do not want to again put myself into a period 
of feeling useless and helpless.
You know,
       after the event (of YH’s self injury), 
              my life was just like back to the period (of 2001) when I was beaten up 
by YH’s diagnosis as an autistic child.
I have no other way to go 
but can only come here
However, 
everything is back to the original point, 
zero!
Seriously, 
I am so confused and disappointed by myself….
I really wondered what I have done for YH in these three years
Coming back 
was a difficult decision, 
it violently reminds me of 
the most fragile period of my life
Sitting in the counselling room, for both Hui-Yu and myself, the moment of facing 
her fear of her son in 2008 was very similar to our first meeting in 2001. We were in 
the same building, same interior; we experienced the same diagnostic procedure 
for  meeting-up,  and  again  talked  about  a  mother’s  worry  about  her  son.  The 
similarity  between  our  temporal  experiences  reminded  both  of  us  of  the  very 
beginning  of  our  work  together  and  reconnected  us  with  past  events  and 
experienced emotions. The phrases ’most fragile period of my life’ and ‘back to the 
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original point, zero’ show how Hui-Yu was disappointed by this return to CMUH. 
However, as YH’s therapist, this reference also reminded me that the ‘most fragile 
period’ she had ever been through was the very beginning of our relationship. In 
this period of time I witnessed how a mother experienced numerous failures but  
never  withdrew  from  her  son’s  intervention  and  continued  to  help  him  grow 
beyond the real ‘zero’. As I experienced Hui-Yu’s response to her son’s return to 
medical treatment, this ‘hesitation’ incited a personal recollection of this history 
which contained not only a mother’s  disappointments and failures, but also her 
courage and patience. Behind the voice of her hesitation, a continuous testimony of 
her courage could be seen by tracing this history and therefore, in my counselling 
intention, I aimed to reconnect her to the moments of successes which proved to 
be a result of her efforts with her son. 
5.3.1.2 Admitting YH’s ‘Autism’
In our second session, Hui-Yu started to tell me the story of how she could accept 
YH’s ‘autism’ as a very difficult family situation. With shock in 2001, the diagnosis 
caused her to develop a new understanding of her son, in which she had to learn 
what ‘autism’ was, push YH to progress through day-by-day interventional training, 
and finally re-identify herself as a mother of a different and special son, rather than 
a ‘not-normal’ boy. 
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‘NOT’ normal and Different 
Six years ago, 
I was just shocked when Dr. Kuo and you told me 
that my son is an autistic boy. 
I was just stunned there,
because YH was my only hope in this family.
This diagnosis broke my hope and dream….
At that moment, 
I was very down
because 
I had had a family with an irresponsible father
and now a son with the lifelong disease called ‘autism’
Therefore,
I had to learn what ‘autism’ was 
so that I could know who my son was.
It seems strange 
If ‘autism’ could explain his difference from other children,
 I had to get used to knowing how my son’s behaviours differ from them
as you know…
what behaviours are stereotypical, 
what emotions are clumsy and 
what kind of personality was stubborn…
I don’t like these words
                  but I have to be familiar with them 
so that I can be 'honoured' as a proper mother to an autistic child.
Life had to be changed,
I had to get used to the skills taught from OT and LT and from you.
  I had to apply them in my everyday life: 
the timing of using toys, 
the arrangement of interior decorations, 
the speaking styles, empathy…etc…. 
You know, 
every day is just a new fight
and
I had to learn to treat my life 
as a therapy for my son




I had to admit that YH is just an autistic boy. 
He is different from normal children.
I cannot deny my son is NOT ‘normal’. 
I have to tell myself and others that he is 
different and special.
The second session was also my first  instance of  hearing Hui-Yu talk  about  her  
family difficulty, which will be discussed as subordinate storylines in 5.3.4. Facing 
YH’s ‘autism’, in Hui-Yu’s double negation of ‘I cannot deny my son is “not” normal’, 
she concluded by describing YH as ‘different and special’, in which the conclusion 
was not only the process of admitting a disease of her son, but also the process of 
finding  a  proper  relational  identification  as  a  mother.  The  voice  of  admission 
codified how she had dealt with the difficult moral position of a ‘mother’ settled by 
the family ethics and our medical system, which will be further discussed in later 
chapters.
5.3.1.3 YH’s Teaching: Being a Mother of an Autistic Son
Therefore, between Hui-Yu and me, her relationship with YH and the history of how 
she  had  put  effort  into  YH  were  the  subjects  of  focus.  In  the  beginning  three 
sessions, she reviewed the years that passed since first  recognising YH as being 
autistic. In the first counselling session, she articulated that a voice of ‘suffering’ at  
the very beginning was the helplessness of losing the position and function of being 
the ‘mother’,  because the medical  procedure changed her relationship with her 
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son. For YH, she had to learn how to take responsibility on her own and help her  
son by herself. 
The mother of YH
Dealing with YH has proved that how the ignorant mother I could be: 
                                               I could not teach him; 
                                               I could not manage his daily behaviours; 
                                               I could not control his bad tempers and even mine. 
I had totally no ability of being a mother….
just like you said, 
‘No one could help your son if you feel you cannot’.
           I need to learn how to be YH’s mother and 
                     YH was teaching me how I can be his mother. 
I must find the ability to help my son.
I cannot feel helpless,
I have to move on.
The words of ‘No one could help your son if you feel you cannot’ were from our first 
meeting in 2001, which I used to explain YH’s autistic tendency and convince her 
that helping the sick son is always the parents’ responsibility, not the therapist’s.  
During  these years,  these words  have become the most  important  reminder  to 
herself  that  she  had  to  do  what  a  mother  should  do  for  YH.  Also,  from  the 
awareness of ‘being the mother’ she could discover the successes of teaching YH 
while also enduring periods of long waiting and numerous failures.
Hui-Yu made an example in our second session about YH’s barrier of understanding 
the other’s emotions, which is clinically labelled as an autistic child’s interpersonal  
difficulty:
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A Success of Teaching Empathy
You know, 
         a developmental barrier for autistic children 
 is very hard to develop the ability of ‘empathy’. 
YH cannot understand others’ feelings and emotions. 
I have to try every possibility to teach him 
but so far 
I am still sorting it out. 
we tried puppet dolls and played games of role exchange. 
I used story cards and taught him 
a person’s emotional change. 
But you know… 
he just cannot make it.
I have to try very hard just to make 
a very small improvement. 
You know,
           YH has a small blue whale doll. 
                 He loves the doll and 
                   talk to it. 
Therefore, 
I often made the small whale as a real person to interact with us…. 
One day 
I found the doll is a little bit dirty 
I washed it after taking the inside cotton out. 
                          Then, the small empty doll was hanged and awaited to be dried. 
YH saw it. 
used a red crayon drawing a cross on the doll’s eye. He said 
the whale is hurt.




That was the first time that 
I felt YH could feel other’s feeling and
we finally make 
a small progress.
To share this  difficult  success,  Hui-Yu articulated the lived experience with both 
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suffering and pleasure. The voice of suffering was found in the never-ending trials 
and long periods  of  waiting whilst  pleasure came from the ‘small  progress’  she 
finally made with her son. Actually, the experience of pleasure had proved to be the 
voice of suffering, and vice versa, the experience of suffering for YH had articulated 
the voice of pleasure regarding YH’s progression.
I noticed myself that, since the second session, I started to engage in more directive 
therapeutic  intentions.  Influenced by  my training  of  narrative  therapy  and brief 
therapy,  I  focused  on  how  Hui-Yu’s  active  realisation  of  her  past  successful 
experiences  could  happen  and  therefore  we  could  accumulate  these  small 
successes  (Freeman  &  Combs,  2000).  When  our  interaction  contextualised  the 
‘history of suffering’, with listening and attunement, how she had coped with the 
difficult responsibility was also developed as the other voices such as courage and 
pleasure.  As  White  (Laub,  2001)  argued,  the  narration  itself  testified  Hui-Yu’s 
experience of ‘suffering’. 
In  the  fifth  session,  Hui-Yu  ecstatically  shared  her  discovery  of  another  YH 
progression. She had waited for many years for YH to finally be able to ask her ‘am I 
looking good’. In psychological language, that was also the breakthrough of another 
difficult  barrier  for  YH,  the concept  of  ‘mirror  self’  or  ‘alternative  other’  (Fryer, 
2006).
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The Concern to an Imaginative Other
Yesterday, 
YH was standing in front of a mirror. 
He tried on a new suit and asked me 
‘am I looking good?’.
I was so amazed 
because he finally was concerned an  other’s view. 
You know… 
 he did not like new clothes and 
always wore the same texture with the same colour.
 I always had to try very hard to persuade him 
to throw the old clothes and put new ones on. 
However, 
he put new clothes by himself and ask me 
‘am I looking good?’
For other parents, they may find this question quite ordinary, 
but for me, 
I have waited for it for such a long time.
He finally started 
to care about another’s judgement of his look and
wanted to change himself for 
the imaginative other.
Following Hui-Yu’s narration of her successful trial with YH’s ability to empathise, 
Hui-Yu’s  surprise in the fifth session was an important moment that indicated a 
sense of success was indeed developing in our interaction. This moment directly 
proved her long time effort and sharply contradicted with the image of the ‘beaten-
up’ self  that resulted from YH’s self-injury.  I  was also surprised that I  witnessed 
again that Hui-Yu could see YH break another limitation.  For her,  I  was the first 
‘audience’  and the first  witness of  this encouraging moment.  Since in the same 
session she also mentioned providing assistance to other parents of an autistic child 
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in the Association of Autism, following White’s therapeutic advice (1990, 2005) of  
empowering a client to find the audiences and witnesses of his/her life events, I  
asked Hui-Yu to use her experience to think about how she could encourage and 
give advice to the parents dealing with autism. She said:
Advice to Parent like Me
So… 
I would just tell them two important things.
The first is 
‘No one could help your son if you feel you cannot’.
                                           Just like you have taught me that 
a mother’s role can never be replaced. 
The mothers with autistic children must have the awareness of 
                                                       being the ‘mother’ for their son or daughter.
The second is 
                      ‘never give up’,
                                     
                           you may have 500 failed trials 
                  but 
                                    you still have to enable yourself 
to prepare for the 
501st time
If you believe, things will just happen
The ‘preparation for the 501st time’ and ’if  you believe, things will  just happen’ 
were instances of Hui-Yu’s empirical learning which she could give to others who 
resembled herself.  In this process of gathering the voice of “creating success”, Hui-
Yu re-articulated the context of a mother’s difficult responsibility for her son and 
placed herself back in a ‘mother’s’ moral position. Therefore, the pain of taking this  
responsibility could be told with pleasure, and vice versa.
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5.3.1.4 The Moment of feeling ‘Ordinary’ and forgetting ‘Autism’
From the fourth session of our counselling practice, Hui-Yu’s emotions concerning 
YH’s  self-injury  could  be  obviously  seen as  being  soothed.  Also,  in  school,  YH’s  
teacher re-allocated his seat in order to acquire more peer support in the class and 
the  teacher  apologised  to  Hui-Yu  for  Yh’s  event.  As  Hui-Yu’s  life  was  gradually  
returning back to the original track, she again talked about her life embodying the 
description of ‘ordinary’, but the meaning of this word was different from its use in 
the first session, for she was now mindful that she could forget YH’s autism for the  
first time.  
An Ordinary Week (of forgetting Autism)
This week is very normal, nothing special. 
Everyday YH just goes to school, 
I go to work and 
do volunteering work in the association (of Autism). 
When YH came back home, 
we have our everyday fight for him to do his homework 
because he is too easily distracted….
Well, you know,
that is our everyday life.
really different from the period 
when he was doing early intervention. 
For the first time,
I can even forget his autism.
The context of ‘forgetting YH’s autism’ kept developing after the fourth counselling 
session. In the fifth, Hui-Yu re-defined the influence of YH’s autistic tendency upon 
their life in which her son could be ‘not different’ from the other children. Precisely 
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speaking, Hui-Yu had developed the two-fold discourse that ‘because of autism, YH 
is different from other children, but, except for the diagnosis of autism, YH is not 
different  from  them  (S5)’.  Returning  to  the  mother-son  ethics,  Hui-Yu  used  an 
example to illustrate her awareness of mother-son relationship regardless of her 
son’s medical diagnosis. 
An Autistic Son no different from Normal kids
like you showed as in YH’s therapy. 
                                I have to learn to wait 
                                and then push him with the right timing. 
                                                                               apart from the long waiting, 
YH just needs people to wait longer. 
Then,
he can make it!
once he makes it, 
you will find him not different from any other boy at all. 
Two months ago, 
      I was ill and lied on my bed because I could not move 
            I told YH that he needs to look after me. 
From his face, 
                       I know he worried about me. 
                        He went to his room and 
                                 took pencil and paper and 
                                 noted down the things I asked of him. 
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For example, I told him that
every hour 
he needs to bring a glass of water to me and 
measure my body temperature, 
at  3pm he would need to  push the start  button of  our  washing 
machine. 
He had done everything on the list very well!
He even escorted me to bathroom because I was too weak to walk!
It is a kind of feeling that 
                no matter if he has autism or any other disability,                          
                       the reality between me and YH cannot be simpler than that 
we are mother and son.
I appreciate 
God for giving me this son.
For me, 
now, 
the label of ‘autism’ is not important at all.
I often asked myself 
whether my effort on YH so far is to prove that he is not autistic?
                      I know he is 
                  and cannot change this diagnosis for life
Sometimes, 
                         I rather want my son as just a normal strange boy 
rather than 
a lifelong disabled child.
In this example, Hui-Yu’s subjective identification to YH had been changed from ‘a 
boy with lifelong disability’ to ‘normal strange boy’. With the new awareness, she 
also  distinguished  the  medical  discourse  of  YH’s  disability  from  her  everyday 
interaction between mother and son, and re-contextualised her relationship with 
the son, in which the ‘medical professionals’ had never affected the mutual care 
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and responsibility between them. ‘Autism’,  as the ‘foreign language’,  was not so 
important for it could be forgotten. 
5.3.1.5 Learning from YH and the Never Ending Worries 
Accordingly,  after Hui-Yu was recovering from the trauma of YH’s self-injury, our 
counselling practice also became oriented to the narrated history of Hui-Yu’s efforts 
with facing numerous failures and how she successfully worked through all of them. 
We worked on the two-fold meaning of how raising YH could be both difficult and 
fruitful; my intention was to focus on how she had to manage her own resources to 
get through the mother-son ethical  crisis.  By splitting the medical  and everyday 
context  of  this  history,  Hui-Yu  re-contextualised  her  moral  actions  of  being  the 
mother  in  these  years,  re-stated  her  responsibility  for  the  son  and,  most 
importantly,  re-located  herself  in  the  ‘primordial’  position  of  simply  being  the 
mother, not a medical professional, not a therapist, and not a special educator. 
In  the  final  two  sessions,  we  reviewed  the  stories  Hui-Yu  had  told  in  our 
conversations and the emotions that had changed in this period. In the seventh 
session, I stated that since this storytelling process began she had permitted us to 
experience her experiences together, and questioned how she wished to conclude 
our interaction. She replied that the most important thing was feeling able to talk 
about her worries and to be listened and understood. I asked her again how she 
would provide a conclusion to her stories in our interactions. She used the ‘never 
ending worries (s7)’ as the caption of the conclusion.
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Never Ending Worries
YH has good therapists, good teachers and good classmates to help him. 
However, 
although they and I can wait and tolerate his trouble, 
the real world is so cruel
that people do not have the patience to wait. 
Life is stressful, 
I cannot stop worrying about my son.
I know 
I will never have solutions for my lifelong worrying.
This event of YH’s self injury happened 
at a time when I started to believe that everything was back to 
ordinary. Just like the crises (in 2001), 
I had to work through it; 
I had to be aware of the reality 
that the similar crises will happen in the future, 
I do worry for YH very, very much.
Now YH is 11 years old, 
then he will pass the age of puberty. 
Then I will be old, sick and passed by. 
When I think of our future, 
I do worry my son.
 
In this session, Hui-Yu gives ‘suffering’ a concluding voice of ‘never ending worries’.  
As the ‘mother’, the heaviness of the responsibility is always on her shoulder and 
the weight of the worries is always in her mind. In this hermeneutic counselling 
route  of  drawing  upon  the  responsibility  as  the  mother,  her  worries  and 
responsibility are contextualised as the paradoxical causality: they are each other’s 
reason, and result. 
In  the final  session,  Hui-Yu further  illustrated  the paradox of  suffering  as  if  the 
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‘footnote’  to  our  conversations,  which  was  directly  related  to  our  cultural 
understanding of suffering/苦/Ku. With the metaphor of ‘回甘 Hui-Gang’, she used 
the metaphor of a cup of green tea to articulate ‘bitterness’ as suffering, which 
could also be tested as sweetness in its process. She said:
回甘 Hui-Gang
However,
like you said, 
‘no one could help your son if you feel you cannot’.
you let me understand and believe these words again, 
like our first meeting six years ago. (S8).’
You let me see how I could be stronger again 
from the process of facing the worries for 
my son…. 
The process 
is like the drinking green tea and enjoying the taste of 
‘回甘(Hui-Gang)’.
When we take a sip of it, 
                     we have to hold the taste of bitterness in our mouth, 
but when we swallow it, 
we actually enjoy
the elegant sweetness and fragrance
after the taste of bitterness.
I know 
‘Ku (Bitterness/Suffering)’ will never end.
But for me,  
                            it finally comes with 
                                       the taste of sweet from our difficult past
5.3.1.6 Voices from the Main storyline
As  discussed,  a  client’s  lived  experience  of  suffering  can  be  understood  as  the 
‘voices’  produced  through  the  process  of  telling  his/her  stories  ‘for’  his/her 
therapist.  To  take  on  this  responsibility,  a  client’s  lived  experiences  are  given 
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historical order by the act of interactive listening and understanding. The client’s 
narration is developed as his/her subjective ‘history of suffering’ by the therapeutic 
encounter.
Hui-Yu’s  historical  context  of  suffering has presented the process through which 
medical professions could become the narrated reality of ‘threat’ to one’s ordinary 
life.  From  the  beginning  of  our  counselling,  she  described  her  hesitation  with 
returning to CMUH as it reminded her of ‘the period when I was beaten up by YH’s 
diagnosis as an autistic child (in 2001) (S1)’. She developed a dichotic description of 
her  life  with  YH:  the  ‘difficult  period’  in  which  she  endeavoured  with  YH’s 
interventions between 2001 and 2005 and the ‘ordinary life’ in which she led YH 
back to normal education and found YH’s non-difference from others from 2005 to 
2008. In this history, Hui-Yu contextualises the process by which she conquered YH‘s 
limits  defined by the medical  profession and returned to a life  without  medical 
dominance but also found that she had to consider seeking help from the hospital 
again.  Her  hesitation  showed  how  medical  professionals  could  help  her  work 
through the experience of suffering, but could also be the ‘threat’ to the ordinary 
life which reminded her of ‘the weakest period of her life (S1, S6)’.
To focus on Levinas’s term of ‘suffering for the other’(Levinas, 1998, 2003; Todd, 
2003;  Gantt,  2002),  the  moral  meaning  of  the  ‘other’  in  the  case  of  Hui-Yu’s 
counselling practice can be seen by understanding it as the ‘son’ for which both 
Hui-Yu and I was responsible for. In Hui-Yu’s subjective history of ‘suffering for YH’, 
medical professionals not only medicalised her responsibility for her son, but also 
moralised her ability of being the mother of YH. This ‘threat’ from medical authority 
was also a moral pressure as it made her surrender to the medical dominance in 
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which ‘being a good mother’ was evaluated and judged. Hui-Yu’s two ‘crises’ were 
the examples that, in 2008, she was asked to return to CMUH for YH’s self-injury 
and, in 2001, she had to accept the arrangement of early intervention for treating 
YH’s autistic tendency and developmental retardation. While medical professionals 
conceptualised  YH’s  symptoms  as  clinically  autistic,  she  was  suffering  from  the 
medical political body in Taiwan. In her narrated history, not only how her past of 
‘suffering for her son’ was given the dominant storyline of suffering, but also how 
the process of ‘suffering for  the Taiwanese medical  system’ was offered a space 
behind her lived experience of suffering. Hui-Yu’s experience of ‘suffering for the 
son’, therefore, was offered the socio-political facet of knowing the reality about 
suffering.
5.3.2  Subordinate Storylines: Other Stories because of Hui-Yu’s Suffering
Compared to the stories of how Hui-Yu was suffering for YH in the main storyline, I  
have generated the ‘subordinate storylines’ of her relationship with others, which 
was not the main focus in our therapeutic relationship. These stories, although they 
were  not  the  subject  of  our  primary  therapeutic  concern,  present  other 
perspectives of seeing the main storyline and different voices of Hui-Yu’s experience 
of suffering. 
Three storylines which focussed on the relationship with three different ‘others’ will 
now be presented. The first storyline is about Hui-Yu’s relational change with her 
husband,  which Hui-Yu had subjectivity  interpreted as the transaction produced 
from the return of an irresponsible husband to a devoted son. The second part 
expresses her relationship with her daughter, in which she followed the traditional 
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patriarchal customs of Taiwanese tradition and made a dichotic choice between son 
and daughter. The third concerns her social relational change which reveals how 
YH’s  medical  label  moved her  social  map and formed a  new supportive  system 
within her local Association of Autism. Facing the parents in the Association, she 
developed her moral action as an example or resource for those who were coping 
with realities that resembled the past she herself lived and experienced.
5.3.2.1 The Irresponsible Husband
In our second counselling session, Hui-Yu firstly talked about her relationship with 
her husband, which was never mentioned in YH’s psychological intervention since 
2001, because it was ‘too painful to talk about’. 
Too painful to talk about
Why I have never told you about the period before YH was born 
was because 




the worst period 
had passed 
and 
the painful experience 
should not be told again
….(deep breath)…after the taste of bitterness.
I know 
‘Ku’’ will never end.
But for me,  
                            it finally comes with 
the taste of sweet from our difficult past
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This story was actually new to me as I had not realised that Hui-Yu’s relationship 
with her husband was a difficult issue to talk about. In my memory, YH’s father 
brought him to our therapeutic sessions many times. I had very few conversations 
with him and very limited comprehension of his position in his family. Sensing that 
the conversation was becoming serious, I kept myself quiet and let Hui-Yu feel free 
to talk about her partner.
YH’s Father, Lee
OK… 
       Before we knew YH as autistic, 
       Lee was not very responsible for this family 
                as he gambled and had complicated friendships with people. 
Most of the time, 
I had to be the only person 
who kept this family, including the finances. 
Being a wife, 
you know, 
I am very traditional.
Influenced by my mother, 
I believe that for a woman 
keeping a family is her responsibility
when she becomes a house wife.
Although 
I was frustrated by the fact 
                        that Lee could not be a good husband and father, 
I convinced myself 
                        that I could be at least the good wife and mother for this family. 
So, 
I helped him 
deal with his business 
and 
looked after YH and Ling 
                                                                                alone.
182
For me, the stories of Lee had offered a new entrance to dig deeper into Hui-Yu’s  
stories because, as assumed in this research, the context of one’s lived experience 
embodies multiple issues regarding to our patriarchal  social  customs and family 
ethics. Hui-Yu’s re-narration of her marital relationship and her insistence of her 
position in the family illuminated what the role ‘mother’ means to her. This will be 
further discussed as part of cultural issues and influences in Chapter 8.
With the understanding of our patriarchal culture, Hui-Yu then started to say how a 
‘son’ could compensate the loss inflicted by an irresponsible husband. She used ‘the 
centre of life’ to illustrate how YH could keep her ‘dream’ of her family, until he was 
diagnosed as autistic.
YH, The centre of life and the broken dream
At the period 
YH had been the centre of my life.
I told myself that 
although I could not rely on my husband, 
I could still have a son to 
rely on.
Therefore, 
        I tried to forget Lee’s irresponsibility. 
YH’s future became my dream.
        I convince myself 
that all my effort 
would not be relative to my husband. 
        I was making the future to my son. 
        I was helping YH grow up with happiness. 
However, 
        when you told me that YH has autism, 
I was totally dragged into total helpless and hopeless 
because the diagnosis 
completely broke my dream.
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I still remember 
when I finished that consultation with you six years ago 
                                        and had to go home alone. 
I did not take the bus to home 
but chose to walk. 
That was a two-hour walk and I could not stop 
crying.
I just did not understand 
why 'Lao-Tien' made my son as such a strict test. 
He had given me an irresponsible husband, 
why had he made my son have autism?’
For Hui-Yu, the diagnosis of autism broke Hui-Yu’s dream that she could rely on her 
son rather than her husband, and made Hui-Yu directly confront God, ‘Lao-Tien’. 
This  discourse  of  ‘broken  dream’  echoed  Levinas’s  (1969)  notion  that  in  ‘evil 
suffering’ one naturally challenges the theodicy. In this experience, which Hui-Yu 
had previously found too painful to talk about, she expresses how the number of 
people she could rely on, from her partner, son and God, had dwindled down to 
none and she was alone with her life issues.
5.3.2.2 Lee’s return and YH’s sacrifice
However, in Hui-Yu’s story, the confirmation of YH’s autistic tendency had also made 
a  dramatic  change  in  Lee.  Hui-Yu  formed  a  transactional  interpretation  to  this 
change,  in  which  YH  used  his  disability  to  negotiate  his  father’s  return.  In  our 
second session, Hui-Yu told me Lee’s ‘dramatic change’:
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A completely different man
When Lee came home, 
he knew our son would have lifelong disease. 
With mourning sadness, 
for the first time 
we could talk to and support each other. 
You may not believe it but 
after the day when our son was confirmed as problematic, 
Lee changed.
He  quit  gambling  and  those  complicated 
relationships. 
He started to work, 
manage our company, 
and come home on time every day. 
From that day, 
he started to take the responsibility 
as the householder of our family. 
In these years, 
Lee worked very hard. 
We saved some money and had a better life. 
Now 
we could support each other in our family business and family life. 
Since 
         YH had entered elementary school, 
                I started to work part time in our company. 
When YH was struggling with his homework, 
Lee was usually responsible for teaching YH English and mathematics. 
Yes, 
compared to himself to 6 years ago, 
he is a completely different man. 
 
Then, after a short hesitation with considering the ‘superstition (S2)’, Hui-Yu told me 





when YH was diagnosed as permanently problematic, 
my husband returned to me 
at the same day.
I have never told people 
about my fatalistic thinking 
about the relationship 
between Lee’s return and our son’s disability….
(deep breath)
I believe that 
YH sacrificed himself
to bring his father back to us.
I believe that
before he came to this world, 
he might have a bargain with God
and use part of his life
as sacrifice 
for saving this family….
This is the only way that I can explain Lee’s return
With the cultural and fatalistic context, Hui-Yu developed the body of this metaphor 
as  YH’s sacrifice  for  their  family’s  reunion,  in which her subjective transactional 
context from a son’s devotion to his father’s return could re-moralise the family 
ethic that the father, mother and son could all resume responsibility for each other. 
Also, for Hui-Yu, this metaphoric connection beyond the pathologic reality could 
therefore  heal  the  broken  context  of  being  a  disabled  wife  and  mother  and 
therefore give another voice of ‘suffering’. 
I was moved by this story because it provided a new perspective to see Hui-Yu’s 
experience. I will explore its connection with my own experiences and perspectives 
in the part 5.4 of this chapter.
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5.3.2.3 Neglected Daughter
Another storyline about YH’s elder sister,  Ling, was developed by telling Hui-Yu’s 
stories of  suffering for  YH.  A few years  ago,  in  the period of  YH’s  psychological 
intervention  between  2001  and  2005,  Ling  was  an  elementary  school  student. 
When Hui-Yu, YH and I were in the therapeutic room, Ling was always sitting and 
writing her homework in my office. In 2008, she had began her puberty age and 
started  to  have  frequent  conflict  with  Hui-Yu,  as  Hui-Yu  mentioned in  our  fifth 
counselling session. 
Ling, YH’s elder sister
I worry about my daughter Ling 
17 years old 
but still very childish. 
She always locks herself in her room, 
listens to music loudly 
and can sit in front of a computer for a day. 
She does not want to talk with me, 
her father and 
of course 
her little brother. 
Honestly, 
I found 
I cannot communicate with her, even more difficult with YH. 
Sometimes 
I just feel 
ironically
that I can understand my autistic son,
                but 
cannot understand my normal teenager daughter
In  this  ironic  context  of  ‘being  able  to understand the autistic  son  but  not  the 
healthy daughter’, she retracted the past that she had to make the choice of ‘either 
the son or the daughter’. Because of YH’s condition, she had to face making the 
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difficult decision to choose YH but not Ling. As she put all her effort on YH’s medical 
intervention in Ling’s childhood, Hui-Yu used the word ‘neglect’ to talk about her 
relationship with daughter. 
Neglected daughter
I know 
I spent very little time 
on accompanying my daughter. 
I do know 
compared to my effort on YH, 
I am actually an irresponsible mother 
to my daughter
because I had to concentrate on helping my son. 
When YH was young and I was responsible for YH’s early intervention
     she always complained to us 
about leaving her alone in the home.
You know 
YH needed my concentration on him 
and therefore 
I had really no time to look after her.
                I am 
usually feeling guilty
because I had never spent enough time on her…..
Actually, 
I had no expectation on her. 
I just hope she can have an ordinary life, 
 find a good person to get married to, 
and if possible,
                               I hope
she can take care of YH
                             
when Lee and I have no ability to help our son
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Actually,  in  this  disclosure,  Hui-Yu  showed  the  paradoxical  emotions  she  felt 
towards her daughter. On the one hand, Hui-Yu said she ‘had no expectation’ for 
Ling, but, on the other hand, she expected that one day Ling could take on her most 
important responsibility of looking after YH. However, again, we did not focus on 
this  complex with the daughter,  because our  main counselling concern was the 
mother-son relationship. Yet, Hui-Yu mentioned another transactional context of a 




I am influenced by my mother 
      so that 
         I treat Ling inferior to YH. 
I always try to teach her 
that since she is the elder sister, 
                        helping her little brother is her 
                                     unavoidable responsibility.
For example, 
              a few years ago, 
        I brought YH and Ling to a steak restaurant for dinner. 
              The restaurant was full and therefore we needed to wait 
                                                                           until there is space for us. 
You know, 
        when YH feels bored 
  he speaks to himself and 
plays strange games alone. 
He played with his slippers 
when we were waiting and 
accidentally, 
he slid one slipper into 
a nearest customer’s dish.
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We were too shocked to respond 
and the customer was furious and was shouting at us. 
Then, 
YH started screaming and
fiercely hitting his head
by his fists.
      I teared, 
immediately said sorry to the customer, 
held YH tightly and 
                                                tried to calm him down. 
I still remember that
           three of us crying together and
for the first time
                              I apologised to Ling.
With tears, 
             I told her that 
‘I am sorry to make you feel so lonely. 
That was all mom’s fault 
but              see…
I have to look after your brother 
every second and every minute. 
You have to learn to grow up by yourself’.
Hui-Yu’s ‘sorry’ articulates a cruel decision in which for YH she had to neglect Ling 
and ask her to ‘grow up by herself’. As the counsellor,  I  did not choose to keep 
focussing on her apology to Ling because Hui-Yu did not put the mother-daughter 
relationship into our main conversation. I chose to listen to these emotions, and 
understood how Hui-Yu transacted the ‘woman’s responsibility for the family’ from 
her mother to her daughter. Seeing how she was taught by her mother and now 
was teaching her daughter, I reflected that Hui-Yu was likely teaching Ling to be 
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another version of herself. Not only her way of taking responsibility for the whole 
family,  but  also the way she neglected Ling was akin  to the way she neglected 
herself  in facing difficult life events. In our fifth session,  she heaved a sigh, and 
explained the ‘gap’ between Ling and herself.  The cultural  meaning of ‘woman’s 
ethics’ will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.
A Big Gap
I actually know 
the reason why between us there 
could be such a big gap 
because 
Ling has been asked to look after herself 
since she was very little. 
Between a mother and the daughter, 
I found myself difficult to feel her needs and feelings.
For example, 
last week 
            I bought some ice cream for the dessert after dinner 
but I did not buy mine. 
When Ling found it 
                                  she became very angry. 
                                  She threw her ice cream onto the ground,
                                         shouted at me 
                      and said 
‘why can’t you treat yourself better?’
She irritated her father 
but 
              I took a period of time 
to understand that 
                                       she was taking care of me. 
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You know, 
               just like that, 
I knew we really love each other 
                           but 
we always feel the sign of 
               love 
      in different timing.
       Yes,
We just 
                                            kept missing each other
The context of ‘we really loved each other, but kept missing each other’ was a voice 
of pity, which became a sharply contradictory voice of Hui-Yu’s effort for her son. 
For me, we could not further explore this voice and, for me, that became the pity of 
our counselling practice.
5.3.2.4 Changing Friendships: Helping other mothers of autistic children.
The final storyline was Hui-Yu’s change of her interpersonal relational map. Since 
our counselling practice was an eight-session period of brief therapy, one of my 
therapeutic intentions was to help her integrate her social resources. Therefore, this 
storyline  codified  how  Hui-Yu  formed  her  social  support  and  changed  her 
relationship with society. For example, in the third session, I firstly asked her how 
she could manage her relationship with other friends. She used the term of ‘safe  
distance’  to  describe how she  prevented herself  from receiving  friend’s  care  or 




I don’t really want to talk about the same stories about my sick son 
again and again.
I think 
that was the reason what I don’t want to contact my friends. 
So 
if you ask how I could gather support from my friends, 
I would rather say that I had really no friend to 
                                                                          rely on…. 
In fact, 
YH’s autism has changed my friendship. 
I could not maintain it 
                            like when I was young and 
                                             could dream and play with them. 
Now 
I just want to have a 
                           safe distance with them 
so I don’t need to repeatedly 
spend time on 
                        showing my difficulty and frailty to them.
As discussed earlier that medical situation could change and threaten one’s life, the 
son with autistic tendency changed Hui-Yu’s social relationships and support. From 
her narration of YH’s medical interventions in our fourth session, she mentioned 
that  she  started  to  maintain  new  friendships  with  other  parents  who also  had 
children  with  disability  from  the  classes  of  early  intervention.  She  therefore 
attended the Association of Autism in Taichung city and became a member of it.  
Then, since YH was regarded as a model of remarkable progression in 2005, Hui-Yu 
was regarded as a parenting model and the Association referred other parents so 
that  she  could  help  them  through  sharing  her  personal  experience.  Her  social 
support  had  mainly  moved  to  the  relationships  she  developed  in  her  local 
Association of Autism. 
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Without Too Much Saying
Since YH was regarded as making ‘remarkable progression’, 
               We became an successful example and 
                         the association of autism started to refer 
              the mothers who have troubles with their autistic child 
                                                                                                                 to me. 
I could therefore share my experience 
                                                              with them.
 
From their eyes, 
                 actually, 
I saw myself in a previously difficult time. 
I know 
I can really help them and
I enjoyed talking with them.
So, 
I think 
the social support was mainly from the association of Autism.
The help from it is important 
                not only because it provides information about medical intervention 
                but also it made our experience of suffering 
                                                       understandable by other people like myself. 
You know, 
we can share the information of good hospitals, 
good doctors and 
                therapists 
but the most important thing is 
that our experience can be understood 
                                                                            in this institute. 
Since our children are all autistic, 
we could understand each other’s difficulty and effort for our child
without too much saying.
Being understood ‘without too much saying’ caused the association of autism to 
connect  Hui-Yu  with  the  parents  who  had  a  similar  experience  and  context  of 
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suffering. In the association, Hui-Yu redefined the context of ‘self’ from helping the 
others who were like her in previous different times. Her history of living with YH 
therefore could enable her to understand the similar experience of suffering in the 
context of the Taiwanese medical and political system. To know more, I asked how 
she could designate her ability of helping others. She answered and switched the 
learning from her relationship with me, in which only the parent can help the sick  
child, to discovering the most important thing is to ‘believe in their ability of being a 
parent’, as she said in the fourth session.
The Only Important Thing
What medical professions could provide is really limited. 
The reality is like 
      what you had told me in the very beginning: 
‘No one could help your son if you feel you cannot’.
If I haggle over how our society and government could help me, 
                                                                      I will be never satisfied. 
Therefore, 
   when association of autism 
                                   referred the mothers with autistic children to me,     
             I always told them that 
                    they should stop criticising our society and 
                                           believe in their ability of being a parent. 
We should rely on ourselves and 
admit our difficulties of    
                 teaching our children. 
Then 
we will start to have the space of 
appreciating the help from others.
That was 
the only important thing I could share with them
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The  incomplete  medical  system  in  Taiwan  emphasised  her  inescapable  lifelong 
responsibility  which only belonged to her moral  position as the ‘parent’.  In this 
position  as  a  helper,  she  could  transfer  her  conversation  with  me,  a  medical 
professional, and use it to encourage others who could share the same experience 
of suffering as herself. This storyline provides the sociological perspective of how 
Hui-Yu could find the social support to cope with the ‘social suffering’, in which our  
socio-cultural  and  political  world  conditioned  our  experience  of  suffering 
(Wilkinson, 2005). Since the label of ‘autism’ given by the medical reality and its 
political  structure  had  shaped  a  interpersonal  barrier  in  her  original  social  
relationship, in another socio-political institute, the Association of Autism, the label  
of autism also diminished the interpersonal barrier in the group with herself and 
the other parents ‘who were like herself’. In this storyline, when Hui-Yu described 
her mobility from finding help to supporting others, its context was also echoing the 
social anthropological notion that suffering is also political and sociological.
5.3.2.5 Voices from the Subordinate Storyline: A discussion of Sacrifice 
The three subordinate storylines above showed different contextual development 
from  the  main  storyline  around  which  Hui-Yu’s  life  was  based.  In  terms  of 
hermeneutic  phenomenology,  these  storylines  could  be  seen  as  the  difficult 
hermeneutic  horizon  of  Hui-Yu’s  lived  experience  of  suffering,  in  which  they 
informed and extended the sociological, cultural and political meaning of ‘suffering 
for  the  son’.  The  storylines  with  her  husband,  daughter  and the  Association  of 
Autism, as presented, had given the voices of how our local religion, culture and 
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custom in Taiwan could have influenced a mother’s  self-identification,  parenting 
function and family behaviours.  
The metaphor of ‘sacrifice’ could serve as the concluding discussion here which has 
illustrated the multiple facets of the ‘suffering transaction’. The ‘sacrifice’ where the 
son devotes himself to Lao-Tien, or God, showed the transaction between Hui-Yu’s 
husband’s irresponsibility and her son’s disability. In this transaction, ‘God’s help’ 
was subjectively developed as the exchange where God endowed her with a sacred 
son so that she had the moral responsibility for YH ‘before’ he became the son and 
she became the mother.  Hui-Yu developed the subjective rationality  also in  the 
transaction  between  YH’s  disability  and  her  lifelong  responsibility  in  which  her 
‘suffering’ was due to her son’s ‘sacrifice’ in his ‘last life’. Fitting our Buddhist-Daoist 
custom, the ‘responsibility’ was developed as the ‘debt’ she ought to pay in ‘this 
life’,  in which she has to experience and accept the lifelong suffering (Kleinman, 
1980).
Between  generations,  the  responsibility  was  transacted  from  a  mother  to  a 
daughter, as was the suffering. While Hui-Yu focussed her effort on a sick son, we 
were  also  developing  the  opposite  understanding  about  her  daughter  Ling,  the 
neglected daughter. As she said, for the intensive medical interventions for YH to 
truly  make  a  difference,  Hui-Yu  had  to  make  the  choice  between  her  son  and 
daughter: she chose the son. We have explored the background of Hui-Yu’s stories 
in which her patriarchal attitude was inherited from her mother and therefore she 
was also passing the same values to Ling. Hui-Yu tried to root out the context of  
‘having the unavoidable responsibility of looking after the sick brother (S5)‘ in her 
everyday  interactions  with  Ling,  in  which  the  woman’s  traditional  role  was 
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transacted  between  generations.  The  context  of  ‘sacrifice’  meant  not  only  YH’s 
endeavour before ‘this life’, but also Hui-Yu’s choice of neglecting the daughter. In 
the ‘last life’, YH sacrificed part of his life to save the family. In ‘this life’, Hui-Yu 
sacrificed the relationship with her daughter to save YH.  
In  addition,  Hui-Yu’s  stories  of  the  neglected  daughter  conveyed  the  common 
gender difference of parents’  attitude between the son and daughter in Taiwan. 
According to my work experience, in a family, by no means is the mother the main 
carer. If the ‘son’ was found having a chronic disease, the ‘daughter’ is usually given 
the responsibility as the carer of her brother. However, if the ‘daughter’ was found 
to have a lifelong sickness, the ‘son’ is usually given the responsibility of achieving 
good employment or academic performance so as to bring honour to the family 
rather  than  being  assigned  the  responsibility  of  taking  care  of  his  sick  sibling.  
Understanding  Hui-Yu’s  story  actually  requires  further  exploration  of  the  socio-
cultural embodiments of our interaction, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Seven.
5.4 The ‘Understanding’ from a Counsellor’s Point of View
In counselling practice, a counsellor can be understood as the ‘co-constructor’ of a 
client’s narratives as s/he engages in the responsibility of listening, probing, and 
responding to client’s narration (McLeod, 2001; Speedy, 2007). For Hui-Yu, I am ‘an 
old friend (S1)’, the person who ‘witnessed the worst periods of her life (S8)’ and 
the medical professional who ‘knows how difficult teaching YH could be (S2, S3, 
S4)’. Engaging in this relationship in 2008 involved not only the ethics of helping the 
other or  being helped, but also, due to our previous encounter,  recognising our 
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shared history before we positioned ourselves in this therapeutic re-interaction. 
This final part of this chapter aims to present the process of implicit ‘understanding’  
of Hui-Yu’s experience of suffering from a reflexive point of view. Along with the 
data  collected  in  the  counselling  practice  and  supervision,  I  explore  my  own 
responses toward the client and the lived experience behind these responses. In 
terms  of  hermeneutic  phenomenology  (Manen,  1990,  1997,  1998),  one’s 
interpretation  of  others’  lived experience  involves  how s/he  works  with  his/her 
‘pre-understanding’  which  is  from  his/her  subjective  interpretation  of  the  lived 
experience  of  him/herself.  To  explore  the  ‘understanding’,  I  will  be  reflexive  in 
regard  to  my  subjectivity  of  this  encounter  as  the  context  of  my  ‘pre-
understanding’.
For  me,  two  parts  of  my  own  lived  experience  influenced  the  way  in  which  I 
encountered Hui-Yu’s experience of suffering. The first is the period of being YH’s 
therapist between 2001 and 2005, when we were all conquering the difficulty of 
YH’s medical label. The second is my own history of living in a family with a disabled 
member, in which Hui-Yu’s stories and mine had a similar socio-political condition 
like social welfare and cultural issues of family ethics. Since through the therapeutic 
relationship,  we  co-contextualised  the  context  of  suffering  in  this  mutual 
understanding process, my own lived experience related to understanding how Hui-
Yu’s ‘suffering’ had been the part of storytelling. Therefore, this part of writing will  
focus on my exploration of self. Through my encounter with Hui-Yu’s experience of 
suffering, I could thereafter explore what ‘suffering’ meant to me.
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5.4.1 Therapy as The Construction of the ‘Mother’ Image
The therapeutic work between 2001 and 2005 was produced by positioning Hui-Yu 
as a co-therapist of YH’s psychological intervention. The way in which I put her into 
her son’s therapy was due to two therapeutic concerns. Firstly, Hui-Yu was the one 
who knows her son best and has the most natural emotions and responses to YH. 
For YH,  I  was a  stranger;  the best way was allowing myself  to slowly enter the 
relationship between them. Also, learning from Hui-Yu, I could observe how Hui-Yu 
comforted YH during the failed therapeutic  trials  and therefore could shape my 
interaction with both of them. Secondly, although the therapeutic aim was based 
on the concern for YH’s behavioural and cognitive change, as the therapist, I was 
also facing an injured parenting relationship. As a result, by deeming Hui-Yu as a co-
therapist, I could conceptualise a baseline of the interactive quality, so that Hui-Yu 
and  I  could  develop  our  alliance  and  recovery  so  as  to  make  the  mother-son 
relationship  a  ‘better’  interaction  from  this  point.  This  three-and-half-a-year 
intervention, as presented, caused YH’s remarkable progression which was regarded 
as the model of parent-professional cooperation by CMUH and the Association of 
Autism in Taichung city.  Further,  the progression caused not only a leap of YH’s 
intelligent, psychological and social developmental indexes, but also the ‘return’ of 
Hui-Yu’s ‘mother position’ in which she was capable of handling the difficulties and 
problems of her son. As the therapist, I was also in the moral position as a ‘witness’  
who  experienced  the  whole  process  of  YH’s  remarkable  leap  but  also  Hui-Yu’s 
endeavor in this medical environment to break through YH’s perceived limitation as 
an autistic child.  
Moreover,  in  this  process  of  making  the  mother  ‘mother’  again,  not  only  the 
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‘mother’  image in  Hui-Yu’s  relationship with YH was to  be rebuilt,  but  also  the 
‘mother’ image in my mind—that a female could do everything for her family and 
my son—was reshaped and re-contextualised. During the period between 2001 and 
2005,  we  unavoidably  had  to  deal  with  numerous  difficult  failures  due  to  YH’s 
developmental limitations. To help her son break through these limitations, Hui-Yu 
had  to  suppress  her  pressure  and  YH’s  strong  emotions  and  work  on  YH’s 
therapeutic tasks many times in our therapeutic room and in their home. For me, I 
often saw her holding the worry,  stress and tears,  so that she could lead YH in 
finishing what would be a simple task for a healthy child but was difficult for her 
son. Often, after our sessions for YH, she let herself cry for a moment. While I was 
supporting  my  client  as  a  therapist,  I  also,  through  this  work,  as  a  son,  was 
reconstructing  the  image  and  context  of  a  ‘mother’,  who,  in  the  context  of 
Taiwanese custom, could keep silence and do everything for her family. I related 
Hui-Yu’s  experience  for  her  family  and  son  to  my  own  mother’s  past.  The 
therapeutic work that took place between 2001 and 2005, in other words, allowed 
me to again understand the role of mother by seeing how another mother could do 
her  best  in  her  efforts  to  help  her  son.  Behind  the  triumph  caused  by  the 
subsequent evaluation of YH’s progression, this therapeutic work actually reassured 
and  codified  the  context  of  the  ‘perfect  mother’  who  could  eventually  reach 
unbreakable success.  I  found that I  was able to access this idealisation and was 
proud of this therapeutic relationship with Hui-Yu.  
5.4.2 My Ethical Crisis
To illustrate my individual ethical crisis articulated by Hui-Yu, I need to tell the story 
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of my mother, who, like Hui-Yu, silently behaved in a traditional 'mother's role' in 
my family. Growing up in a rich family in 1940s, as the first girl in her family, before 
she married my father, she did not need to do any house work. On the contrary, my 
father was from a family with low income. When they got married, he had still eight  
younger sisters and a little brother to look after. Although he graduated from the 
best university in Taiwan and acquired a respectable job as a senior high school 
teacher, with the undeveloped social welfare policy in Taiwan, his salary was not 
enough to cover the expenses of the whole family. This reality was accentuated 
when his mother had a stroke, while his youngest sister required special education 
and his five other sisters and the younger brother were all still studying at school. 
My mother therefore had to learn how to live in a poor condition with a large 
amount of housework.  
When I  was  two years  old,  my father  decided to attend an agriculture  support 
programme funded by the Taiwanese government in Congo; this was dangerous as 
Congo was still in the period of civil war but it could give very abundant payment to 
my father which could be used to support his family. Between my ages of two and 
four, my father was therefore far away from home and my mother, because she was 
the eldest son’s wife, in Taiwanese custom, had to take my father’s responsibility of 
organising the everyday family affairs and looking after other members, including 
my ill grandmother, disabled aunt, other aunts and uncle who were still in school, 
myself and my two younger brothers. According to her, my mother said that this 
was the most difficult period of her life. 
In  working  in  such  close  distance  with  a  mother,  my  relationship  with  Hui-Yu 
enabled  me  to  track  a  mother’s  lived  experience  of  accepting  and  taking 
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responsibility for her family. Based on my three-year therapeutic work with YH, I 
could now know why the mother would blame herself, why she was happy for her 
son, what she was crying for, and what she could spend a long time waiting for. As 
the  therapist,  I  saw  how  a  mother  could  endure  the  painful  failures  and 
achievements of her son’s progression. Through witnessing, Hui-Yu showed me how 
a mother faced and dealt with family difficulty and thus she helped me recreate my 
image of  my mother who had also silently experienced a difficult family history 
since I was young.   
Accordingly,  when  in  2008  Hui-Yu  returned  to  CMUH  with  depressive 
disappointment and described everything as being ‘back to the original point’ and 
‘all in vein’, she challenged our past ‘triumph’ with YH as well. Since the diagnosis of  
YH’s high function autism would never change, what it had challenged in me was 
not only reminding me of the therapeutic failures I had experienced before, but also 
threatened  the  collapse  of  the  ‘perfect  mother’  context.  Compared  to  Hui-Yu’s 
disappointment, this reunion put me in a similarly disappointed situation regarding 
to our work together. For me, the return had meant the relational crisis between 
herself  and her son, between herself  and me, and also between myself  and my 
mother. In short, YH’s return to the hospital caused me to experience ethical crisis 
as well.
5.4.3 The Anxiety of Knowing my Mother
The counselling practice in 2008 enabled me to have direct conversations with Hui-
Yu,  which  was  different  from  the  past  in  which  I  understand  Hui-Yu’s  suffering 
through my observation of YH’s therapeutic session. In 2008, we could maintain a 
203
simple  therapist-client  relationship  and  so  Hui-Yu’s  family  background  and 
interpersonal relationship could also be directly told and understood. The ethical 
meaning of the mother’s experience of ‘suffering for the son’, therefore, could be 
given in the process of speaking and being listened to. 
When Hui-Yu was constructing the context of her suffering for YH, in my position as 
her counsellor, I found that my anxiety was rising, especially when I had been so 
deeply involved in constructing the ethical context of being a ‘mother’. When Hui-
Yu was telling me how she insisted on being the silent wife and attached herself to 
the Taiwanese local expectation for a woman, I could understand my mother again 
with the context created in Hui-Yu’s stories. For instance, when Hui-Yu talked about 
Lee’s irresponsibility for the family, choosing silence and endurance, and trying hard 
to keep ‘the family’  so as to fit  the ‘woman’s tradition’ taught by her mother, I  
understood that when my father was in the Congo and when my mother silently 
accepted her responsibility of looking after my aunt, what my mother insisted upon 
was the same moral image of ‘the mother’ that Hui-Yu contextualised. Through my 
counselling  practice,  when lived experience was transformed into  language,  the 
story was told, listen to and understood, I saw how the two ‘mothers’, Hui-Yu and 
my mother, could made the unvoiced decision for the family because of our social 
tradition and custom. Through listening, I could understand how this decision could 
be incredibly heavy and cause emotional distress. 
Actually,  through  engaging  in  Hui-Yu’s  experience  of  suffering,  I  found  myself  
becoming  more  attached  to  my  mother  whom  I  had  never  known  before 
counselling Hui-Yu. Being the closest son, this awareness was stressful and anxious 
as the images of the two mothers became overlapped in our dialogue. When I grew 
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up, the other aunts and my uncle had also left home and had their own families. 
The big  family became smaller  and finally  only  the youngest aunt  lived with us 
because in our Confucian culture ‘the elder brother is as if the father, and his wife is 
as if the mother’ (Hwang, 2001a; Hwang and Chang, 2009). Seeing how Hui-Yu was 
fighting with the ‘unkind society’, I found I had neglected that my mother was also  
the main carer of my aunt. I started to remember that when my aunt was ill and 
needed to go to the hospital,  my mother,  like Hui-Yu,  rode her motorcycle  and 
brought her to the hospital with a worried face. Since my father worked, she was 
the main caregiver of not only myself and my two younger brothers, but also my 
aunt.  I  found that,  as  a  son  in  our  patriarchal  cultural  context,  I  could  see  my 
father’s responsibility and decision for his little sister,  but I  took for granted my 
mother’s support and how she did not take less responsibility for our family than 
my father. Since looking after my aunt was a lifelong effort, in the counselling in 
2008,  Hui-Yu’s  stories  helped  me  articulate  my  mother’s  lived  experience  of 
suffering.
Accordingly, the ‘understanding’ of the way in which Hui-Yu managed YH’s problems 
rewrote  my  understanding  of  my  mother.  Because  of  the  therapist’s  ethical 
responsibility  of  encountering  a  client’s  suffering  (Schmid, 2001,  2004),  I  could 
understand a mother’s struggles not only with the disabled son but also with the 
local  ethical  context of ‘the mother’ which is valued by our culture and society.  
From this counselling practice, Hui-Yu’s stories became the voice of my mother and 
subsequently I gained a new relationship with my own mother as I supported Hui-
Yu, another mother struggling with her own role as she balanced her life and family  
in the context of socio-cultural values and traditions.
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5.4.4 The Awakened Context of Suffering: My Self-Condemnation
Through therapeutic supervision,  the awareness of  understanding ‘mothers’  was 
transformed by the context of the criticism and condemnation of myself. Actually, I 
know how my family and my father had influenced my clinical work because his 
words, indications and decision were always the focus of my family. However, the 
years of work with Hui-Yu let me understand that, while I used my lived experience 
to work with other families like mine, I did not include my mother’s effort in my 
subjective context of ‘how my family had influenced me’. I was used to my mother’s 
silence so that I could not see the difficulties she had experienced.
My anxiety was becoming stronger as I came to know more about ‘mother’ and 
understand  more  about  how  I  did  not  understand  my  mother’s  experience  of 
suffering. This understanding of myself soon became a heavy moral pressure on me, 
on a son who was previously unaware of his mother’s suffering. For me, that is a 
new context  of  suffering collected from the responsibility  I  assumed in  Hui-Yu’s 
counselling practice.  I gave the anxiety a label of ‘being unfilial (SS426)’: I could not 
understand my mother’s sacrifice for our family and, because of this, took her effort 
for granted for thirty years! 
Accordingly, from Hui-Yu, this long-term accompaniment and narration became an 
impacting shock to me. ‘Suffering’, as having its cultural moral values and weight,  
was  transacted  from  her  mother-son  ethical  conflicts  to  mine.  When  Hui-Yu’s 
stories  were  understood  as  the  context  in  which  a  mother  was  taking  on  the 
difficult  responsibility  for  the  disabled  son,  in  the  witnessing  position  of  the 
therapist, I connected this suffering to my disability of understanding how my own 
26 The fourth session of my therapeutic supervision in Taiwan.
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mother took on full responsibility for us. The action of ‘understanding the other’ 
itself  became  a  moral  reflection  of  myself,  and  so  I  was  given  a  moral  issue 
regarding my relationship with my mother  in my thirties,  as  I  re-conceptualised 
myself to be an unfilial son. The moral weight and value of suffering, as reflected in 
Chapter  Two,  was  transacted  from  Hui-Yu  to  myself,  by  means  of  our  mutual 
encounter.  Further  discussions  about  Taiwanese  local-cultural  contexts  of 
transaction will be processed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
In the next chapter, I will represent my fieldwork with another client, Tai-Ya, a father 
with an autistic son. Similar to the representation of this chapter, I will reflexively  
review how this therapeutic could encounter made the ‘transaction of suffering’ in 




In this chapter, similar to the structure of the last one, I will represent my fieldwork 
of psychotherapeutic practice with Tai-Ya, a father with an autistic son, Kevin. In 
CMUH  in  2008,  Kevin  was  referred  to  my  medical  service  of  psychological 
intervention  and  Tai-Ya  was  then  invited  to  the  counselling  service  and  this 
research.  Therefore,  in  6.2,  I  will  share  the  narrative  representation  of  how  I  
recruited  Tai-Ya  into  the  services  of  CMUH.  The  socio-cultural  and geographical 
background of these stories will  be briefly introduced in this  this  section of the 
chapter. In 6.3, I will  show how Tai-Ya’s stories, transcribed after our counselling 
services,  are  transformed  as  poetic  forms  and  I  will  reflect  on  our  counselling 
relationship. Using the same analytic structure as Chapter Five, Tai-Ya’s contexts of 
suffering will  be poetically  represented by presenting the main and subordinate 
storylines  of  her  dialogue/narrative  in  our  therapeutic  sessions.  In  6.4,  I  will  
reflexively reflect upon how my experience of suffering was articulated by Tai-Ya 
and Kevin. The self-analyses and exploration on my life history will be presented in 
this final part of this chapter, and readers will be invited to explore the forest of 
intertwined history co-constructed by Tai-Ya, Kevin and myself.
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6.2 Recruiting Tai-Ya
In February of 2008, my colleague, a special educator, Mrs. Jiang, referred to me a 
four-year-old  boy  called  Kevin  with  autistic  tendency.  She  requested  that  we 
participate in multiple-disciplinary cooperation in Kevin’s treatment in which she 
was responsible for Kevin’s improvement of cognitive abilities as well as daily habits  
and  routines,  and  I  was  responsible  for  his  psycho-social  functions.  After  the 
arrangement of  his  psychological  evaluation in CMUH, together we planned our 
approach for  Kevin.  Also,  considering the benefit  of  counselling to Kevin’s  main 
carer and myself, I invited Kevin’s father, Tai-Ya, to participate in this research. The 
data presented in this chapter was collected through our practice in the counselling 
room in CMUH in 2008.
The referral by Mrs. Jiang was based upon the multiple-disciplinary model of early 
intervention  in  which  medical  professionals  could  refer  a  patient  with 
developmental delay to other professionals by means of the responsible podiatrist’s 
advice.  In  CMUH  for  example,  paediatric  neurologists,  clinical  psychologists, 
physiatrists,  clinical  psychologists,  language  therapists,  physiological  therapists, 
occupational  therapists  and special  educators  are  regarded  as  the  professionals 
who  provide  the  cooperative  treatment  of  a  child’s  developmental  delay  (Kuo, 
2005). 
However,  in  CMUH  in  2008,  referral  to  clinical  psychologists  for  psychological 
intervention had become nearly impossible. Because of the limitation of the policy 
of public health insurance, the process of psychological evaluation could cost the 
medical society far more than that of intervention. Accordingly, the managers of 
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CMUH  did  not  encourage  psychotherapeutic  methods  like  psychological 
intervention.  Also,  psychologists  tended  NOT to  do  it  because  the  intervention 
meant  having  long  term  relationships  with  their  clients  for  much  lower  salary 
incomes. However, Mrs Jiang understood that that I  was available for long term 
practice,  and that  is  why she requested my help  with  the  treatment of  Kevin’s 
condition.
Mrs. Jiang worked as a part  time special  educator in CMUH. At the time of our 
cooperation, she was 46 years old and had 27-years experience of teaching children 
who were labelled as having developmental retardation; she also owned her own 
kindergarten for disabled children which was situated in a church. When I worked 
as  a  paediatric  psychologist  between 2001 and 2005,  we had good cooperation 
from many families with children with mental disability. 
In 2008, when I returned to the same position as a paediatric psychologist in CMUH 
for this study, Mrs. Jiang and I met up and she criticised the ‘immoral’ irrationality  
of the health policy for labelling more children as having developmental problems 
but  giving  less  solutions  for  these families.  We were also  pessimistic  about  the 
reality that new clinical psychologists refused to do treatments because of money. 
In  the  period  of  my  return,  I  still  conducted  psychological  intervention  in  the 
paediatric department in CMUH but after I came back to Scotland, I saw that other 
psychologists still chose to work in the clinical diagnosis field, rather than in direct 
intervention work.
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6.2.1 Tai-Ya and Kevin
Mrs. Jiang knew Kevin’s father Tai-Ya from a mutual friend in her Kindergarten. Tai-
Ya lives and teaches Mathematics in the only private Christian senior high school in 
Pu-Li town, which is the geographical centre of Taiwan and a beautiful location far 
away from Tai-Chung city where CMUH is. In Mrs. Jiang’s description, Tai-Ya was a 
father ‘atoning for his wrong decisions of three years ago in not helping Kevin’. In 
2005, Kevin was suspected of being autistic but there was little medical information 
or services in Pu-Li. Tai-Ya, his wife and parents refused to admit to the label of  
‘retardation’ and trying any further medical service in the nearby cities. From their 
own social link, they found an alternative occupational therapist in Hsin-Chu city, 
further away from Tai-Chung, spent a huge amount of money and left the two-year-
old Kevin living with this therapist for training five days a week for nearly two years.  
That meant, that means from Kevin’s age of two to four, which is a critical stage in a 
child’s development when a child needs parents’ care, he was ‘abandoned’ with an 
outsider.  In  late 2007,  Tai-Ya found that  Kevin’s  pervasive development had not 
improved  much  and  was  even  more  delayed  than  other  children  of  his  age. 
Regretful about his wrong decision, Tai-Ya started to become worried and anxious. 
He desperately sought other medical help again and found Mrs. Jiang. From figure 
6.1,  a  reader can have a geographical  sense of  the distance between (A)  Pu-Li,  
where  Tai-Ya  lives,  (B)  Taichung,  where  CMUH  is,  and  (C)  Hsinchu,  where  the 
occupational therapist lives.
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Figure 6.1. The location of where Tai-Ya sought for medical help
6.2.2  The  Setting  of  Multiple-disciplinary  Intervention:  Special  Education, 
Psychological Intervention and Counselling Practice
In March, Mrs. Jiang arranged the appointment for Kevin’s psychological evaluation. 
Tai-Ya, his wife and Kevin arrived for assessment in CMUH and for the first time I  
saw Kevin.  He was four years and six months with dimples on his cheeks, a bit  
overweight and still  wore his diaper.  He spoke a certain amount of meaningless 
English vocabulary but no Mandarin. He also did not communicate with any of us in  
the evaluation room. I showed several toys to him. He quickly found an interesting 
one,  grasped  it  from  my palm  and  ran  into  a  corner.  Without  establishing  eye 
contact with anyone, he played with the toy and made pleased tones in his safety 
field as if there were no one beside him. I observed him, chose a similar toy, and 
slowly moved myself  closer to him. With that toy,  I  entered his  game and then 
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started to lead him to my desk for evaluation purposes. I showed him crayons and 
papers on the desk, and Kevin sat down on the chair, scribbled on the papers and 
exchanged his crayon with mine. Tai-Ya and his wife were shocked as their son had 
never played so well with a stranger like me. 40 minutes passed; the evaluation 
finished  smoothly  and  successfully.  I  made  my  pathological  interpretation  and 
explained to them: Their son had very good ability in fine motor development and 
memory function but, like previous diagnoses, he had very limited psycho-social  
abilities to act with others. Actually, Kevin had learnt a lot. In certain cognitive tasks, 
Kevin could even show better performance than other children of his age. However, 
because of the limitation of his social development, he could not behave properly 
when engaging in  appropriate  social  interaction.  Therefore,  people did  not  only 
underestimate Kevin’s ability but also underestimated his parents’ effort with him. I 
told  his  parents  that  Kevin  had  a  very  high  possibility  of  making  significant  
progression in a short time, if they could trust the intervention of Mrs. Jiang and 
myself. The process of my evaluation convinced Tai-Ya. He decided to work with us; 
Kevin  would  attend  Mrs.  Jiang’s  course  of  special  education  for  improving  his 
cognitive ability and my courses for improving his psycho-social ability once a week. 
Since Tai-Ya had to spend hours in traffic between Pu-Li  and Tai-Chung for  each 
session, after explaining the informed consent of this study, we decided the setting 
of  Kevin’s  intervention and his  counselling practice:  He would work  with me in 
Kevin’s psychological intervention in which he would be the co-therapist of his son’s 
psychological progression. When Kevin attended Mrs. Jiang’s course, we would have 
our counselling practice in the counselling room rather than the room of Kevin’s 
cognitive training. That means he had to come to CMUH twice a week, which was 
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less time-consuming and allowed him to participate in his son’s therapeutic session; 
meanwhile,  Kevin  would  do  Mrs.  Jiang’s  course  and  participate  in  his  own 
counselling sessions.
6.2.3 Kevin’s Intervention and Tai-Ya’s Counselling 
Accordingly, the process of Kevin’s interventions was tightly connected with Tai-Ya’s 
interaction with me. The trust between Tai-Ya and myself was not only developed 
through our weekly conversation, but also our work together with his son. Actually, 
from  the  meeting,  I  found  Kevin  demonstrated  a  good  performance  in  many 
psychological tasks but could not show them in the proper social situations. Also, 
Tai-Ya  understood  his  son’s  talent  and  potential  but  often  failed  to  help  Kevin 
behave  properly  at  the  right  time  and  right  place.  As  the  therapist  facing  this 
difficulty between a son and his father, the objective of Kevin’s intervention was to 
enhance Kevin’s social function and improve Tai-Ya’s parenting skills and ability to 
help his son.  Accordingly,  in Kevin’s therapeutic sessions, Tai-Ya was asked to sit 
aside Kevin and me, as well as in front of him, I did my work. I designed socio-
psychological and cognitive tasks which fit Kevin’s abilities, guided him to play the 
tasks with me, set up more complicated tasks and played with him. In front of Tai-
Ya, I tried to be a teaching model and showed him that what I was trying to do was 
simply find a way of playing with Kevin so that Kevin could know how to play with  
us. I showed him that, from a therapist’s view, a social interaction with Kevin could 
involve a very short time of mutual eye-gazing, and possibly a repetitive simple play 
of give-and-receive. I tried to show Tai-Ya that the playing process is interesting and 
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important, rather than focussing on how correctly Kevin was finishing my tasks. In 
fact, Tai-Ya was surprised that Kevin could play with me with good interaction. He 
tried the tasks at  home,  imitating my responses and started to enjoy the short 
moments of playing together. In doing so, I was proven to be trustworthy and my 
relationship with Tai-Ya therefore also developed through Kevin’s intervention.
Yet, the intervention process was not always smooth and successful. Sometimes I  
failed to interact with Kevin in my designed tasks and Tai-Ya watched the whole  
failing  process.  For  example,  I  might  unintentionally  design  a  boring  game that 
Kevin did not want to play and instead would cry or be angry. In instances like these, 
I appeared to be a ‘dysfunctional’ therapist to Tai-Ya and had to find ways to amend 
my failures. Tai-Ya therefore sometimes became the helper because he could inform 
me of the best way of soothing his son’s emotions. In this process, our position 
switched. In this case, I became a ‘helpless father’ like him and he was helping me  
sort  out  the  chaos.  Failures  provided  further  understanding.  Compared  to  the 
therapeutic success of Kevin’s progression, my failed trials provided Tai-Ya with a 
nonverbal empathetic reflection of his inability to control his ‘wild son’ (S2).
6.2.4 The Formation of Qualitative Data: The Work with not only Tai-Ya but also 
Kevin
How a  researcher  and  participant(s)  develop  their  relationship  with  each  other 
determines  the  qualitative  data  of  research  (Bruner,  1995;  Frank,  2007).  In  this 
research, although the data was produced mainly from the conversation that took 
place in Tai-Ya’s counselling sessions, the relationship between him and myself was 
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not only decided by our counselling encounter but also by Kevin’s therapeutic work. 
As Tai-Ya attend every session of it, he and I observed each other’s interaction with 
Kevin in his intervention sessions. For Tai-Ya, he watched how I succeeded or failed 
in my tasks for Kevin and, for myself, I  observed how he was ‘fathering’ his son 
through his responses to Kevin. The implicit conversation was therefore shaped in 
the  shared  experience  of  encountering  each  other  in  Kevin’s  psychological 
treatment,  and  deepened  our  dialogue  of  the  counselling  practice  itself.  The 
following section 6.3 will present how our developing relationship with each other 
developed our conversation and research data.
6.3 The Data gathered in Tai-Ya’s Narration in the Counselling Sessions
Following the structure of the last chapter, the data from Tai-Ya will be presented 
first  by  collating  the  stories  within  it.  The  aim is  to  convey  the ‘subjective  and 
genuine voice’  of  Tai-Ya  and to enable  the data  to ‘tell  the  stories  by  itself’  to  
readers (Bruner, 1986, 1990; Bourdieu, 2002) which will be presented later in this 
chapter.  Methodologically,  the  analysis  in  this  part  of  writing  is  to  put  Tai-Ya’s 
narrations in order by their own particular themes. Similar to the last chapter, the 
main storyline contextualises  Tai-Ya’s  principal  engagement with the counselling 
practice in which he was narrating the stories of how he was suffering for his son. In 
the  subordinate  storylines, the  stories  developed  by  other  contexts,  like  the 
developing relationship with his father, wife and religion, will be presented.
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6.3.1 Main Storyline: Forming Tai-Ya’s Voices of Suffering
In  our  beginning sessions of  counselling practice,  Tai-Ya  started our dialogue by 
telling me the stories of his life since Kevin was diagnosed as an autistic boy. Facing 
his accumulated sorrow, sadness, anger and unfairness, I kept myself almost silent, 
as I felt that these embodied emotions were eager to come out and he needed me 
to attentively listen to him. He teased himself about his inability to be Kevin’s father, 
accused the useless environment of society and family, and confessed regret about 
his perceived failures with his son. With silence, I became the non-judging listener 
and witnessed how living with Kevin could make this father suffer. 
6.3.1.1 The Useless Society
Unavoidably,  in  our  dialogue  in  the  counselling  sessions,  Tai-Ya  showed  strong 
emotional expression and criticism of his son’s label of ‘autism’. He used the term 
‘useless diagnosis’ to describe his son Kevin’s autistic tendency. On the one hand, 
Tai-Ya had to accept this label so he could benefit from the social welfare in Taiwan, 
although finding a medical resource for him was very difficult. On the other hand, 
he also found the medical  context did not make his life better  but even worse. 
However, when ‘autism’ was introduced to him as a lifelong disease, he had no 




Kevin’s uncommon behaviours and bad conducts 
could be explained by ‘Autism’, 
this explanation actually does not 
make any sense to me at all.
We do not need this medical explanation…
It is just the academic description of one tenth of Kevin. 
                    We know far better than doctors and psychologists do. 
                    We just cannot speak academically like them 
If it (Autism) is a disease, 
tell me how we can heal it. 
Doctors and psychologists convinced me 
that it is a disease, 
but have not told me the way to treat it. 
They gave me a road to go, 
'early intervention', 
            but they cannot promise me that 
Kevin will be back to normal. 
As presented earlier, Tai-Ya lived in a rural area where Taiwanese medical resources 
were never sufficient for his need of helping Kevin. The only way was to obey the 
policy of ‘early intervention’. However, travelling around Pu-Li and Tai-Chung was a 
big challenge to Tai-Ya.  For him, not only the medical  label  of autism and early 
intervention,  but  also  the  geographical  barrier  produced  by  our  inconvenient 
society  became  an  unchangeable  and  pre-existent  source  of  suffering.  In  our 
counselling  practice,  he  accused this  ‘unkind  society’  and  its  ridiculous  medical 
system.
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Unkind society and Ridiculous ‘Early Intervention’
Since Pu-Li had no resource for early intervention, 
we have to find resources by ourselves…. 
In Tai-Chung, 
the courses of ‘early intervention’ were always full whilst in Pu-Li, 
there wasn’t even a clinic 
                                   which knew what ‘early intervention’ was. 
We just felt the so-called ‘early intervention’ was 
ridiculous.
In Tai-Chung, 
Occupational and language therapists could only 
give 30-minute treatments for Kevin every week. 
We could not even choose our own flexible time. 
If I wanted to come for treatment, 
              I would spend over four hours in traffic 
                                 and only get 30 minutes for Kevin’s therapeutic play.
Even now 
     the transport system is far better than two years ago 
                                    and there are also more resources in Pu-Li. 
               I still had to find the better therapists in Tai-Chung.
Even then 
I would have to appreciate them 
for the precious opportunity of twice a week. 
so unfair 
The only truth is that 
the help from our medical system is useless 
                                       and our society is unkind. 
The helps so far we gained from them are 
                          so painfully 
difficult. 
Since I know how my father had raised my aunt with very limited social support, I  
understood Tai-Ya’s anger and disappointment with our unkind society as I also had 
assigned the same accusation to it. Facing Tai-Ya in the first session, he was angry 
219
about himself, disappointed by the current social support and afraid of the future. I 
continued to keep silent and listen to him as he was pouring the emotions which 
had  accumulated  for  years.  This  role  of  ‘witness’,  for  me,  seemed  to  primarily 
involve seeing how our kind society had caused the ‘suffering’ to ‘us’, not only him.
6.3.1.2 Everything returned to the beginning point!
In fact, the first counselling was held after my first therapeutic session with his son 
Kevin, in which Kevin cried and resisted many of my designed psychological tasks 
and I felt the session had not gone smoothly. Tai-Ya was sitting behind me helping 
me  to  cope  with  Kevin’s  tears  of  resistance.  Accordingly,  before  the  first 
counselling, Tai-Ya and I had already experienced close interaction with each other. 
In  the  first  session,  he  started  our  conversation  by  discussing  his  history  with 
knowing Kevin’s autistic tendency, which began two years ago.
Facing the diagnosis of Autism
The suspicion of Kevin’s autistic tendency was a shock to us. 
We were just
                             frozen
in the hospital
Actually, 
     we could not be convinced by this diagnosis 
                                            at all.
     
     We refused to accept this result of just 
                          nearly an-hour test 
                                  
                                   by a total stranger to Kevin. 
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In fact, 
       Kevin refused to interact with the psychologist and 
       we all saw that psychologist was unable to play with our son. 
However, 
        the psychologist gave Kevin a diagnosis of disability: 
                                    ‘autism’
                                                 because Kevin did not want to play with 
him 
                                   and 
                                     ‘retardation’




about that psychologist and the entire medical service. 
My parents too, 
      thought the whole medical check           
ridiculous.
For them, 
      Kevin is a clever boy: 
      He had absolutely developed better than any other child in his age;
           he ate lots, 
                ran fast and 
                learned things quickly, 
except for 
                         his language and socialisation. 
For Tai-Ya, the medical intervention that occurred two years ago was not a trusted 
process  as  an  hour  test  would  bring  a  lifelong  stigma  to  his  family.  The 
professional’s careless attitude made Tai-Ya choose ‘not’ to believe in the medical  
diagnosis. Therefore, as reflected by Mrs. Jiang, Tai-Ya found alternative help from 
his family’s interpersonal network, which was offered by a folk therapist who lived 
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far from them. In the first counselling session, Tai-Ya disclosed how he made this 
decision of sending Kevin away.
Finding alternative help
Since we were so disappointed with the medical help, 
   we decided to find 
                              ‘our’ own way 
to help my son
   
we found an occupational therapist in Hsinchu,
                                                                            far from our home
                     who claimed that 
                        she has a successful method 
                                     to heal mental retardation……
 
We finally decided to let Kevin live with her 
for five days a week and 
we could bring him back home on weekends…
That was a
                               tough decision.
This decision in 2005 proved to be a regretful choice in 2007 by another procedure, 
in  which  Tai-Ya  was  referred  to  as  a  failed  father.  However,  because  of  the 
insufficient medical resources and his insufficient trust of medical professionals, Tai-
Ya felt obligated to make the decision of sending Kevin away. He mentioned how he 
persuaded himself in 2005.
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The only solution
we knew we were sending him away from home 
and he will have five days a week 
without seeing his father and mother….
But
this decision
was the only solution between us.
Every Monday, 
when I had to send Kevin to the occupational therapists, 
Kevin’s mother and grandmother would cry… 
             
             When Kevin found he was not on the way home Hsinchu, 
he cried…..
You know,
The treatment was very expensive. 
Thus, 
I persuaded myself 
that I worked hard for money 
to exchange the expert’s effort of my son..
Since we have no ability to teach him, 
          at least
we should find an expert to do this job.
When Kevin is trained well and back to normal,
we can then be
 
a better father and mother.
By using the context of ’Since we have no ability to teach him, we should find an 
expert  to  do  this  job’  Tai-Ya  and  his  wife  transacted  their  responsibility  of  the 
parents with the payment for their son’s recovery. However, in 2008, Tai-Ya started 
to notice that Kevin had very limited progress after the two-year intervention by the 
folk  therapist  and found that  they  lost  their  son’s  attachment  with  them.  With 
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disappointment,  Tai-Ya  used  the  phrase  ‘lost  gambling’  to  describe  this  wrong 




      We had spent a huge amount of money 
                           paying for the treatment 
but Kevin has still no language. 
          My parents and ourselves started to worry about Kevin
again.
Kevin’s ability 
did not improve. 
It's time that 
the occupational therapist’s intervention 
should be regarded as 
                                           a failure.
I started to understand 
the fatal mistake of my decision 
that we can never ask a person 
to do our (parenting) work 
                                every day. 
We were too naive at that time. 
The cruel reality was that
                               I cannot gamble another two years with Kevin. 
That’s why 
we had to be back to hospital. 
Because
I could not tolerate any further 
my mistakes with my son. 
Actually, 
I cannot forgive myself about 
                                 the mistakes 
I have made with Kevin.
                                      
                    I always remind myself of 
not doing it ever again.
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Simultaneously, Tai-Ya’s financial situation could not support the 24-hours-a-day 
and five-days-a-week intervention. Tai-Ya therefore had to re-see and admit this 
‘failure’ so as to reconsider the medical resources, which in these two years had 
become much better and more convenient than they had been before. Tai-Ya used 
‘stop-loss point’ to explain his perspective on returning to ‘orthodox therapy (S2)’. 
However, this decision caused him to feel as if he had put himself again back at the 
beginning point in 2005. The process in which Kevin had to be tested, judged and 
criticised by medical professionals had returned. Therefore, in 2008, Tai-Ya had no 
other choice but to accept the medical context of Kevin and himself.
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Stop-Loss point/ Beginning point
Except for the reality 
that Kevin has not progressed much, 
we were actually running out of our savings. 
I had reached the Stop-Loss point. 
We should return to 
the orthodox medical system 
to use the government’s profits to help ourselves. 
Then…. 




are all the same
                                                   as they were two years ago.
However, 
     as said, 
            we have 
                      no other choice,
all I can do now 
          is to admit my faults and 
let these experts ‘correct’ me to
what is right and what is wrong. 
In Ruth William’s review article of ‘Everyday Sorrows are not Mental Disorders: The  
Clash  between  Psychiatry  and  Western  Cultural  Habits’  (2009),  she  argued that 
when everyday behaviours,  like sorrow and sadness, are medicalised as medical 
objects, they are also turned into objects of ‘threat’ to one’s everyday life. For Tai-
Ya, since Kevin had been labelled as having a developmental disorder, the medical  
professionals’  advice  meant  that  he  had  to  change  his  daily  life  to  fit  the 
expectations  of  paediatrics,  neurologists  and  therapists. His  everyday  life,  in 
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William’s term, was threatened by Kevin’s diagnosis, the ‘alien language’. The word 
‘direct’  which was used by Tai-Ya in describing how he let  medical  professionals  
judge  him  can  therefore  be  seen  to  infer  that  he  had  to  passively  accept  and 
surrender to the medical power. In this history of re-finding possible support for his 
son,  the  response  of  medical  professionals  represented moral  condemnation  in 
which he had failed his  son’s  sickness.  Eventually,  he had to accept the ‘failure’ 
defined by the medical diagnosis and its political power. Here, suffering became the 
unavoidable medical voice that he had to hear and accept as his own.
6.3.1.3 Kevin as the threat of the ordinary life; the imagination of Kevin’s death
In Kevin’s third session of intervention, he could already follow my commands in our 
interaction  and  conducted  a  few  cognitive  tasks  successfully.  This  small  act  of 
progress made Kevin and myself interact better with each other and also developed 
a more trustworthy relationship between us. In the third counselling session that 
took place a week after, Tai-Ya was more open in his disclosure and talked about his  




in front our house is a big road and cars run fast on it. 
We actually found several times 
that Kevin opened the door and 
sit on the side of the road 
where cars were roaring.
Every time                 
it just scared me. 
Our house has three floors 
and Kevin usually ran to the top floor 
without our notice. 
We worried about his safety 
in case he jumped down from it. 
Even 
when Kevin stayed at home, 
we still worry. 
You know...
Kevin has not got the same sense of horror. 
 cannot distinguish between safe and dangerous things…
He may grab a poisonous snake and be bitten. 
Our deepest horror is that 
one day, 
Kevin would accidently die 
because of our carelessness and omission.
Honestly, 
I cannot 
get rid of the imagination of Kevin’s death. 
I cannot 




we have to prepare many locks to limit his activity. 
However, 
although Kevin has no language, 
he is cunning and clever. 
He can unlock the doors 
because he always observed us 
and could remember where we hid the keys. 
Every time, 
when we saw the lock opened and Kevin disappeared, 
we were just frightened and had to find him immediately. 
The threat of his death
‘exists’ in
every minute and every moment. 
When Tai-Ya was telling me about his constant fear of his son’s death, for the first 
time, I could follow the context of a father’s worry and understood the ‘weight’ of 
this responsibility. I  thought of my father. I wondered, in these thirty years, how 
could he take on the weight of his responsibility? For Tai-Ya, it was ‘too heavy to 
take it’, but did my father think so? I replied that he had let me know how heavy 
and difficult bringing Kevin up could be.
In that session,  then,  Tai-Ya also confessed his shame and guilty imagination,  in 




in the two years when Kevin was away, 
I had quite a relaxed life….
an ordinary life actually….
maybe I should not say words like these 
but 
I sometimes missed my life without Kevin…..
However, 
          Sometimes
…(Silent)…
                   I would imagine that 
if Kevin were really 
dead 
by the accidents
…(deep breath and silent)…
I may be sad for a long long time, 
   and after then, 
              possibly, 
my life will be back to the ordinary
…. I don’t know….
Sometimes
I have this kind of 
dark and immoral imagination.
Actually, 
I hate it.
I am ashamed of this kind of thinking.
With shock, I heard a very dark thought which showed how a father could imagine 
his son’s death because the responsibility was too difficult to take. Understanding 
Tai-Ya’s self moral condemnation reminded me of an often implicit argument in my 
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family that, if my aunt does not live with us, we could ‘do many things that we could 
not  otherwise  do’.  I  had  never  heard  these  words  come  from  my  father  but,  
because  of  this  session  with  Tai-Ya,  I  could  understand  the  presence  of  dark 
thoughts caused by a father’s lived experience of suffering. Due to my relationship 
with Tai-Ya, from his sadness, worry, fears and shame, I subjectively felt that I had 
become closer to my father, through Tai-Ya’s voice of shame and confession. 
6.3.1.4 God’s help  
In the week between the third and the fourth session of our counselling, Tai-Ya 
called me in an emergency because he had witnessed that Kevin was physically 
punished by his school teacher and he had tried to disregard this occurrence. With 
the worry that Kevin would no longer have access to a kindergarten to stay in, he 
had to pretend he did not see the teacher’s maltreatment because Kevin could only 
stay in this institute in Pu-Li. He was guilty and self-critical as he could not protect  
his  son.  On the phone,  he described this  emergency event as ‘the most painful 
moment of these two years’. I  found that I  myself could not do anything except 
listen to him. I could only reflect on the realistic conflict that he wanted to protect 
his  son  while  also  regretting  that  he  could  not  protect  Kevin.  With  cynical 
comments,  we  re-confirmed  the  continuing  reality  of  his  present  situation  but 
found no remedy for the helplessness. 
In order to cope with this, Tai-Ya got help from ‘God’, and shared his insight from 
the night with the extreme helplessness in our fourth counselling session. 
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Attribution to God
You might have had the feeling 
               that you are extremely helpless 
               and no one in the world could help you, 
you can 
          only feel supported 
                       
                                   by praying to God.
I am not a Christian, therefore this session was my first experience with knowing 
about  a  Christian  ‘God’s  help’  due  to  my  own  ethnographic  Buddhist-Daoist 
background and context, which are quite different from Christianity. However, using 
his ‘reconnection with God’, we went through our relational crisis that I could not 
help him on the emergency night. In this session, Tai-Ya was perceptively different 
in our interaction: calm, quiet, thankful, and peaceful. I kept silent, listened to his 
metaphorical story which was full of religion contents, and tried to understand the 
difference after this event. He mentioned a story from Bible.
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A story remembered in the darkest night
A story in the bible, 
         which I usually listened to in my childhood,  
                                                 suddenly came into my mind. 
                      
this story released my suffering of criticising myself 
It is about a businessman and his three servants. 
        One day the businessman had to travel to a distant place 
                       and so left money of 1,000, 3,000 and 5,000 ‘dollars’ 
                                           to these three servants. 
He asked them 
           to keep the money well 
                                  and will check the usage when he is back. 
Therefore, 
to keep the money safely, 
            servant A with 1,000 dollars dug a hole 
                         and decided to save the money underground. 
However, 
            servants B and C 
                         decided to use the money for business 
                         and finally they earned 
                                        the extra 3,000 and 5,000 dollars.
Understandably, 
     when the businessman came back, 
           he was happy for B and C’s good financial management 
                 and rewarded the money to them, 
                
but he blamed A 
                     as he should put more effort 
                                              to make the money useful 
                  rather than to pretend the money 
                                                  was not there .
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This story was taken from the Gospel of Matthew in the 25th chapter, which I then 
also became firstly  aware of.  With surprise,  I  listened to his  re-definition of  his 
responsibility.  I  tried  to  find  the  connection  between  the  master-servants 
relationship and Tai-Ya’s father-sons relationship: Tai-Ya implied the master as the 
God, himself as the servant and his two sons as the various amount of fortune given 
by  the  master/God.  Through  this  connection  serving  as  his  enlightenment,  he 
redefined his responsibility of being the ‘father’. 
Enlightenment/ Responsibility of being a father
I suddenly realized that, 
if Kevin’s clever brother was as if he was 
                             the 5,000 dollars given by God, 
                             Kevin may be worth 1,000 dollars. 
Since I have tried so hard to educate Kevin’s brother, 
                        I can try to make Kevin better! 
I realized that,
         I was lost by the difference 
                   of the talent between normal children and Kevin 
         but I forgot that my responsibility was 
                     to make Kevin’s talent explored and used. 
All I have to do and all God ask of me 
                     is to make this 1,000 dollars useful, 
                                  
                                 rather than do nothing for Kevin 
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I should NOT think that 
          Kevin is less worth than his brother or the other normal kids 
                             so that I pity myself and give up on his life, 
like the servant A 
               who dig the money under the ground…..
To be responsible for God and Kevin, 
          I should aim for making at least twice than 1,000 dollars back.
No matter 
      whether Autism is a lifelong disease or not, 
the most important thing for me
is not Kevin’s autism;
it is 
my responsibility of being his father.
The responsibility, 
is simple now:
All I need is to make my son better and more valuable, 
        rather than 
                                     to make myself cynical
                                    and do nothing to both of us. 
I don’t know why this story came to my mind at that time  
as I have heard this story many many times 
                         since I was a child 
                              and it was just a fable. 
However, 
    in this painful moment, 
              this fable has its enlightenment for me. 
             I believe it is the supernatural help…
                                                                from God .
Tai-Ya’s new definition of his responsibility, as he said, was developed ‘to make my 
son better and more valuable, rather than to make myself cynical and do nothing to 
both  of  us’  and  attributed  it  to  God’s  help.  I  listened  to  the  context  of  the 
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attribution to God which I was not familiar with. I silently listened to him and, from 
the stories that the servants were responsible for the master, Tai-Ya analogised his  
responsibility for Kevin as being his responsibility for God. As he said,
The Responsibility for God
No matter how you believe in it or not, 
             we Christians are convinced by our connection with 
                                   ‘Holy Spirit’. 
I think God heard the voice of my suffering 
            and he helped me through the connection 
                 which let me understand the story 
                                          as well as 
                     
                                      the responsibility for Kevin and him’
In  our  interaction,  Tai-Ya’s  enlightenment  of  the  connection  with  God  also  re-
developed  his  relationship  with  me,  in  which  the  Christian  context  of  God-self 
relationship was subsequently put in our responsibility for Kevin. Actually, since the 
father-son ethics was re-defined, the relationship between God, Tai-Ya, Kevin and 
myself  as  well  had  been  equalised  into  one  re-moralised  context,  in  which  his 
relationship  with  me  became  part  of  his  moral  action  for  Kevin  and  for  God. 
Through  the  contextualisation  of  this  enlightenment,  in  the  middle  counselling 
sessions and Kevin’s intervention, Tai-Ya started his active effort as a ‘father’ for 
Kevin,  rather  than  remaining  cynical  and  critical  regarding  our  unchanged 
environment.  He  therefore  gave  his  lived  experience  of  suffering  a  religious 
perspective and voices.
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6.3.1.5 Making up Mistakes
After the fourth counselling session, Tai-Ya not only redefined his responsibility but 
also started to discover his way of being the ‘father’. The fourth counselling session 
happened one and a half months after our first session, when Kevin had complete 
six  sessions  of  psychological  intervention,  and  I  was  surprisingly  exploring  his 
diverse ability. Autistic children are often wrongly understood as having difficulty 
with paying attention and being unable to concentrate on learning tasks. However, 
in my empirical experience, they could have an excellent quality of attention but 
they are often ‘too’ concentrated on their preferred tasks to do our preferred tasks. 
In  our  beginning  sessions,  Tai-Ya  had this  misconception  and Kevin  was  indeed 
resistant to shifting his attention. Therefore, the therapeutic aim at the beginning 
for Kevin was focussing on his attention shift. I designed the tasks in which Kevin 
might be interested. Tai-Ya and I played with him and changed the tasks depending 
on our interactions. Then Tai-Ya and I kept reflecting on Kevin’s emotional change 
between tasks, in order to increase our self-awareness of how he had shifted his 
attention.   
This  kind  of  therapeutic  process  seemed  to  work  for  Kevin,  because  in  the  six 
sessions of  psychological  intervention,  he  demonstrated ability  which Tai-Ya  had 
never known and sometimes, the ‘new’ ability surprised us. Tai-Ya started to look 
forward to seeing his son’s performance and enjoyed the task of cooperative play. 
We began to happily laugh together when Kevin could finish the task by himself. In 
the sixth session, Kevin for the first time showed his talent with sketching, which 
brought about big positive feedback for Tai-Ya. 
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In our fifth and six counselling sessions, Tai-Ya told me that he had booked and 
attended a parenting group of early intervention. He could freely talk with those 
parents who were ‘like himself’. As he explained in the sixth counselling session, his 
current responsibility was to ‘push Kevin a little bit every day’ and the joy was that  
he could ‘be a father again’. 
Being a father again
I have attended the course of early intervention 
       and saw some parents with autistic children. 
             Some of them were just like me of several months ago….
By seeing them, 
        I realised that I am different from the past. 
        I need to have more power to help my son. 
What I have learnt from you and Mrs. Jiang was: 
      you both were improving Kevin’s ambition of learning, 
             rather than teaching him what is right or wrong. 
        I think I can do what you showed on Kevin’s course, too. 
        I have tried your tasks at home and 
                  I found I was doing quite well (laugh). …
I am thinking that, 
           if I could push him, 
moving a bit forward a little bit every day, 
           then maybe I will have the opportunity 
                     to make up for my mistake 
I start to be pleased that  
I can be Kevin’s father
again 
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In  this  process,  I  was  actually  as  pleased  as  Tai-Ya,  because  Kevin  had  steadily 
developed and performed his ability much better than his performance in our initial  
psychological evaluation. Apart from his cognitive progression, his relationship with 
me continued to become closer through our weekly play together. Kevin had many 
times stood in front of me and stared into my eyes for a long while. I was always 
touched by the deep looking and experienced the pleasure his father felt. At other 
places like home and school, Kevin also showed better social interaction. As seeing 
these abilities develop in our therapeutic sessions, when Tai-Ya said this process 
was as if being the father again, I understood that this process of seeing his son 
growing up had compensated for the two years he sent Kevin away.  
In our final session, we reviewed our whole process including Kevin’s intervention. 
Tai-Ya  told  me  that  he  could  accept  Kevin’s  autism  now  and  his  lifelong 
responsibility  based  on  the  medical  reality  of  his  condition.  He  ended  our 
counselling conversation with his subjective awareness of the morality, which is the 
responsibility  of  being  a  father  endowed  by  God.  With  this  awareness,  as  he 
mentioned, what he needed to do was simply be the father, which could never be 
influenced by the medical power or another outer force. In this context,  ‘seeing 
Kevin slowly growing up’ became a private pleasure, as showed in the following 
words, 
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Seeing Kevin slowly growing up
Kevin has progressed for sure. 
By seeing how he could slowly progress, 
           I came to accept the reality that 
                Kevin may not be like his elder brother or normal boy 
                                for life. 
However, 
   with this understanding, 
       strangely 
                     I am not feeling angry as before. 
Rather, 
    I come to have pleasure 
            of knowing that 
I can use my whole life
to see my son growing up
slowly,  … 
and 
subtly .
For me, these words meant a touching ending as I had witnessed a whole process in 
which a father was lost in the responsibility for his sick son but then found a route 
to be close to him. In the final session, the unspeakable promise of ‘I can use my 
whole life to see my son growing up slowly and subtly (S8)’ was told and I witnessed 
how this promise was developed in our interaction. From him, I could also correlate 
his lifelong promise with my father’s and understood that this responsibility could 
not  be  simpler  to  him.  If  our  counselling  was  a  process  of  searching  and 
contextualising ‘the responsibility for the son’, Tai-Ya had given it a moral defining 
process  that  being  the  father  was  primordially  inescapable.  This  ending  voice 
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echoes Levinas’s  notions of  suffering which will  be discussed further in Chapter 
Eight and Chapter Nine. 
6.3.2 Subordinate Storylines: The other voices of suffering
The aim of collating the subordinate storylines is to present the other ‘voices’ of Tai-
Ya’s  lived  experience  of  suffering.  Although  these  storylines  were  not  the  main 
concern of our counselling practice, they were developed by the narration of Tai-
Ya’s primary concern: his suffering for Kevin. The subordinate storylines present Tai-
Ya’s relationship with different others, his father, partner and the religion, which 
were the three voices attached to his history of suffering and therefore could give 
us the different perspectives of seeing Tai-Ya’s lived experience of ‘suffering’. 
6.3.2.1 Between Father and Son
Kevin’s return in 2007 often caused conflicts and arguments between Tai-Ya and his 
father, because he needed his father to look after Kevin in the daytime when he and 
his wife were working. Looking after Kevin was not easy and so Tai-Ya’s father often 
complained about Kevin’s bad conduct. Facing the disturbance given to his father, 
on the one hand, Tai-Ya felt sorry as he could not give his father a healthy grandson; 
on the other hand, he was upset that his father unfairly treated Kevin as a trouble 
maker. In the second session, he talked about the paradoxical emotions.  
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Complicated Emotions to father
Since I am working, 
      I often have to ask my parents to look after Kevin. 
However, 
      I know they are not happy with that. 
               They always complain 
                       “why is ‘your son’ is so difficult to teach”?. 
You know… 
     I am sorry because my parents are supposed to have a better retired 
life 
          but I have ‘ruined’ it 
                  because Kevin is not a ‘healthy’ grandson. 
However, 
      they are always kind to my brother’s children, 
you know, 
        especially my father. 
                   He was always like a Santa Claus, 
                     but to Kevin, 
                           his face was extremely different.... 
                always telling me that the ‘trouble’ comes again 
you know,
I am sorry to be an unfilial son
I really am 
because 
I cannot give him 
a healthy grandson.
However, 
I really don’t like my father regarded Kevin as 
a trouble.
From Kevin’s return in 2007 to the beginning of our counselling practice in 2008 was 
a period of about half a year. In this family, not only Tai-Ya but also the whole family 
members were getting used to the life with the boy who left home for two years 
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and had his special needs. The description of ‘trouble maker’ represented how this 
family found difficulty with dealing with Kevin in this period; also, Kevin’s return 
created an ethical crisis between father and son. Tai-Ya’s apology for not being able 
to give his father a ‘healthy grandson’ became a moral condemnation of himself.  
With the cultural context, Tai-Ya identified himself as an ‘unfilial son’. 
This experience of ‘unspeakable suffering’ reminded me of my position between my 
father  and  aunt.  My  aunt  was  always  the  ‘trouble’  of  my  family,  because  her 
uncontrollable  appetite  often  caused  herself  to  be  involved  in  danger.  For  the 
example presented earlier, she could use a bleacher bottle to store water and food. 
To prevent this dangerous behaviour, my father used the traditional way of physical 
punishment to punish the aunt who is 17 years older than me. Hearing my aunt’s 
crying, I often wanted to stop my father’s punishment but I could not, because I  
knew my father’s punishment was dependent on his ‘old’ moral belief that teaching 
strictness is his responsibility as the master of the family. All I could do was keep 
silent  and bear  the witness  of  her  crying.  Tai-Ya’s  unspeakable  conflict  with his  
father recalled my implicit conflict with my father. 
However,  in  the therapeutic  process,  Kevin  showed steady improved interaction 
with us and Tai-Ya’s father also reported that he could have more pleasant moments 
playing with Kevin. While Tai-Ya’s relationship with his son was getting fixed in the 
psychotherapeutic sessions, his relationship with his father was also changing. In 
our  sixth  counselling  session,  Tai-Ya  mentioned that  for  the  first  time he  could 
apologise to his father for a day of asking his father’s help. 
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The First Apology 
Last week, 
for the first time 
          I apologized to my father 
                         when I went home 
                                  and saw he was looking after Kevin. 
      I just found that 
                  I have been so used to my father’s help. 
      As the son, 
                  I have never apologized to him 
                         because I gave him an autistic grandson. 
                  I have never thanked him either 
                         for looking after Kevin so well 
                                          when I am working.
That was the first apology 
               that I have ever spoken to my father. 
I said, 
     ‘papa, I am sorry that I have to ask you to look after Kevin. 
            Thank you for helping me and Kevin’. 
     He just replied very shortly, 
             ‘Come on. That’s not your fault. 
              Kevin is not the boy whom 
                      you can just teach by talking with him’… 
I don’t know why I wanted to apologise to my father….
           I just found my father was truly old and 
                      I had taken his care and time 
                                for granted . 
Maybe because of seeing 
             how Kevin has progressed in these days, 
    when I think of my relationship with my father, 
               I understood 
                     how I was so confident to leave Kevin to his care…
even more confident than 
                  to leave Kevin to the therapists in hospital.
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Tai-Ya’s apology surprised me because I was always disappointed with myself that I 
could not actively change my relationship with my father. For me, I admired the 
brevity of this apology as this decision also reflected my disability in my relationship 
with my father. With complicated emotions, I silently listened to this process of how 
making this decision had released his moral crisis. From his father’s verbal response 
to him, Tai-Ya then disclosed that this apology brought his father’s real support and 
understanding, as he said in our six counselling session.
The Understanding from father
But, 
my father’s reply of 
‘That’s not your fault.
Kevin is not the boy whom you can just teach by talking with him’
                    let me know 
              that he had eventually 
                     understood my 'suffering' 
                     and forgave my troubles 
                                       which I had placed on him. 
His words, 
                                      ‘that's not your fault’
released my ‘rooted’ guilt to him.
In that day, 
     I finally understood 
how my father’s understanding could be 
so important for me.
For the first time, 
      I started to feel that my father is 
also on my side and supported me.
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In the context of gratefulness and forgiveness, I witnessed an important change of 
father-son issues in that Tai-Ya could now put off his position as ‘Kevin’s father’ and 
returned to his position as the ‘son’ to face his father, which I hope to have but I  
have not tried yet. From this apology, Tai-Ya obtained his father’s forgiveness and 
understanding and so he could face his father as the ‘father’ rather than his son’s 
‘grandfather’, which had caused the crisis between them. For Tai-Ya, the context of 
suffering  therefore  was  given  the  development  of  the  moral  return.  He  voiced 
suffering as the moral conflict of father and son.
As the counsellor, this session for me was important, because despite my own issue 
with my father, I could see how a son could make the first apology, have the first  
understanding, and gain the core support from his father that I had never tried to 
obtain  in  my conversations  with my father.  I  shared his  experience of  suffering 
through the process of understanding; I understood and responded to him in the 
position of a witnessing listener who shared the cultural context as the ‘son’. The 
voice of suffering, therefore, was giving the cultural  context of father-son ethics 
through this inter-subjective narrating process. 
6.3.2.2 Between Husband and Wife: Jene
I met Tai-Ta’s wife, Jene, only once in the evaluation for Kevin before our counselling 
practice was begun and in our sessions Tai-Ya told me that, in his family, he was 
mainly responsible for Kevin’s intervention because only could he afford the time 
and vigour for the long-distance driving between Pu-Li and Tai-Chung city. However, 
since Tai-Ya started to have close interaction with Kevin’s therapists, Tai-Ya started 
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to treat Kevin differently from Jene. The conflict between husband and wife was 
therefore  also  becoming  obvious  during  Kevin’s  intervention.  In  the  third 
counselling  session,  Tai-Ya  complained  about  Jene  and  thought  that  Jene’s 
parenting  attitude  was  the  major  reason  which  caused  their  frequent  tiring 
arguments, as he said in our second and third session,
Arguments
My wife is always pampering children. 
She cannot be the ‘Black face who could punish our sons. 
Maybe because 
she wants to compensate to Kevin 
for the mistake of sending him away, 
she could not enforce the ‘rules’ in educating Kevin. 
She always surrendered to Kevin 
and that is a reason 
why Kevin became so difficult to be taught 
I often have arguments with Jene. 
I sometimes really shout at her like 
‘Why can’t you follow our rules? 
Since you know the rules which could help our son,
how can you know it, 
but 
                                         still choose to make us 
                                            
so tired? ’
Indeed  before  Kevin’s  intervention  was  begun,  both  Tai-Ya  and  Jene  showed  a 
pampering style to cope with Kevin’s chaotic behaviour when I first met them at 
evaluation room. Kevin was able to use the toilet by himself but still wore a diaper. 
However,  the  special  educator  Mrs.  Jiang  successfully  improved  Kevin’s  toilet 
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training within a month. As Tai-Ya gained parenting skills, he became more often 
argumentative with Jene mainly concerning her indulgence of Kevin. He complained 
that Jene was ‘ruining the rule of making Kevin better (S4)’ and tried to ‘teach Jene 
that  we  should  change  our  pampering  attitude  for  Kevin  (S4)’.  Tai-Ya  used  an 
analytic language of  ‘compensation of making the wrong decision to Kevin (two 
years ago) (S4)’ to interpret Jene’s parenting attitude. Tai-Ya illustrated an example 
of their argument for Kevin, which happened in the day before our third session.
Example of arguments for Kevin
The argument today is that…. 
Kevin wanted to come to the front seat, 
I said no 
because a child sitting on the front seat is 
illegal and dangerous.
Then Kevin started to cry. 
And
 Jene surrendered and let Kevin sit 
on her knees.
  I was very angry and shouted at her 
‘Why do you always choose to undermine us? 
If you could insist, 
Kevin would have learnt more and 
we could have an easier life!
These arguments happened in the period of our third and fourth session, also when 
Kevin’s  progression  was  reported  by  his  other  therapists.  Since  Tai-Ya  attended 
every  session  of  Kevin’s  intervention  and  observed  the  progression,  he  quickly 
learned the languages and skills used within these therapeutic sessions. Between 
him and his wife, Tai-Ya started to act as the medical expert as he wanted to make 
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family life an extension of our therapeutic sessions. Since the language Tai-Ya used 
was not familiar to Jene, the negotiations became arguments. Additionally,  as in 
Taiwanese patriarchal society the husband is the centre of life, in the arguments, 
Tai-Ya was like a director and Jene followed his ‘guidance’ after these arguments.  
Therefore,  at  home,  the  mutual  negotiation  and support  based on the  medical 
context of a parent’s responsibility was gradually built up within the arguments, as 
in  an  ‘intervention’—the word Tai-Ya  used to describe his  work  for  Jene in  the 
fourth session. 
Intervention for Jene
Not only our son Kevin, 
Jene also needed to be taught and trained 
by ‘early intervention’.
Since 
she has never brought Kevin to the courses of early intervention, 
I have to tell her
 that we cannot be always good to Kevin 
and we have to be stronger, 
              different from ourselves two years ago. 
Sometimes, 
Jene wants me to send Kevin back to the therapist 
                                                                             in Hsinchu again 
because 
looking after Kevin is very tiring. 
I told her that, 
‘No, we should overcome the difficulty by ourselves 
because
 we are Kevin’s parents. 
Actually, 
we should not send him to Hsinchu 
and should have done it two years ago.
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Using  the  context  from  Kevin’s  intervention  and  the  power  structure  between 
himself and therapists, Tai-Ya used the term ‘empower’ to explain his work in his 
relationship with Jene, which was how I explained my therapeutic aims for Kevin to 
him.  His  work  was to have an  ‘alliance’  with her  and so  they could help Kevin 
together. He encouraged Jene to attend the parenting group with him and, in the 




postpone our next session for a week, 
because I wanted to arrange 
a long trip to Tai-Tung.
That is the first family trip 
since Kevin was found to have problems. 
I know 
Kevin will be the biggest trouble of this journey 
but my wife and I are expecting it. 
We should be confident in our abilities…
I think
I should, 
just like you have done to Kevin, and 
‘empower’ Jene.
Let her know 
that she can actually handle 
Kevin’s problems. 
In  this  plan  of  the  ‘first  long  family  trip’,  Tai-Ya  made the application  from our 
therapeutic sessions to his family, in which the whole family could become one to in 
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order to collaboratively fight against Kevin’s clinical symptoms. From the saying that 
’we should be confident about ourselves’,  between his husband-wife relationship 
and  therapeutic  relationship  with  me,  I  saw  our  therapeutic  cooperation  was 
transacted  from a  medical  condition  to  their  everyday  family  life,  in  which  the 
medicalised  and  moralised  parent’s  function  had  been  inserted  into  this  family 
within the Taiwanese patriarchal custom. Their interactions and the developments 
of their arguments provided the process of how a couple of parents could cope with 
the medical context of their son’s disease as a threat and engage in a reconstruction 
of family ethics.  
6.3.2.3 From Presbyterian Church to Salvation Army
The third subordinate storyline developed in our counselling practice was Tai-Ya’s 
relationship with his Christian community where he worshipped God with his family 
since he was a child. Since his relationship with God was always at the fore of his 
safety, he hoped his children were ‘under the same protection by God’ (S3) and 
brought his family to Sunday school every week. However, Kevin’s return in 2007 
challenged this hope and belief,  and caused him religion crisis.  Growing up in a 
Christian  family,  he  had  a  close  relationship  with  the  congregation  in  the 
Presbyterian Church in Pu-Li, which had been his important social support for quite 
a long period. However, Kevin’s return blocked the support. Since Kevin could not sit 
still  and behave well in worship, Tai-Ya was regarded as the father who failed to 
control his son’s disrespectful behaviour by his ‘old friends’. To secure his regional  
belief,  another  ethical  conflict  was  therefore  caused:  On  the  one  hand,  Tai-Ya 
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blamed himself for Kevin’s ‘bad’ conduct in the church but, on the other hand, he 
blamed these ‘old friends‘ who should have been able to understood his difficulties 
and helped him. For Tai-Ya, this conflict became a ‘shame (S4)’ and he made the 
decision of leaving these people.
Leave Presbyterian Church
Since we were young, 
the whole family 
 including my father, mother, and brother 
                          have been worshiping God in the Presbyterian church 
                                                                                                       in Pu-Li. 
The congregation was just like 
another big family. 
Especially 
as Pu-Li is a small community, 
people in this congregation know each other 
very well. 
When Kevin was back, 
I brought him to the weekly Sunday-school. 
You know 
Kevin cannot sit still on a chair. 
He may run and make loud voices 
without regarding people 
and therefore 
he often interrupted the course of bible study. 
You know, 
the Presbyterian Church is very traditional 
I always had to apologise
because Kevin disrupts our worshiping. 
Then,
I became aware of the reality 
that the congregation could not tolerate Kevin. 




people in the congregation were all my old friends 
and should have been able to tolerate my disabled son. 
However, 
they always looked at me and my wife 
with blaming eyes. 
Sometimes 
one of them may just point out the atmosphere 
and ironically tease me 
as to why I cannot teach my son well.
I want to be able,
of course,
but the problem is I can’t!
They did not and even didn’t want to 
understand my difficulty of having Kevin. 
They only care about the procedure of worshiping 
                 and I became the person who should be responsible for Kevin. 
Therefore, 
          I found 
I could not stay in this communion and 
left this group 
which I have stayed for over 30 years .’
To maintain his religious belief and bring it to his son, Tai-Ya decided to leave. He 
moved  to  another  church  of  ‘Salvation  Army’  and  re-settled  his  worship  and 
support from a congregation, which was rooted in Pu-Li, but had a very different 
Bibliographical interpretation from the Presbyterian Church. In here, as he said in 
the fourth session, he could reconnect ‘themselves’ with God. 
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Salvation Army
Now I am in another church, 
where we have no burden from the past. 
You know,
                     I had to find another church 
because 
worshiping God is the most important thing
in this difficult moment.
Have you ever heard of the ‘salvation army’? 
(I: No, what is it?) 
The priests there are very cool 
because they wear military uniforms. 
I have changed myself to this congregation and Sunday-School, 
                                         in which I am new and no one knew me. 
The important thing is that 
they could tolerate Kevin’s troubles. 
I actually knew nothing 
about the history of this branch 
but I am pleased that 
Kevin and I were quickly accepted 
by the members of this communion. 
They don’t regard Kevin’s troubles as problems. 
They let Kevin run in the Sunday-school and 
tell me that Kevin’s noises are the song from 
the heaven. 
They regarded that Kevin was 
using his way to worship God 
    together with us.
The fourth session was also the time that Tai-Ya gained the enlightenment from 
Mathew 25 in the Bible which reassured his responsibility for Kevin: ‘All I need is to 
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make my son better and more valuable, rather than to make myself cynical and do 
nothing to both of us. (S4)’. With a secure relationship with God in Salvation Army, 
Tai-Ya’s  could  align  his  family  ethics  with  the  Christian  belief  in  a  new political 
organisation  and  social  support,  which  importantly  helped  him  reconnect  his 
religious belief with the context of his responsibility ‘for the son’. 
In  the  development  of  this  storyline,  Tai-Ya  and  I  developed  a  socio-political 
perspective of seeing his mobility from the Presbyterian Church to the Salvation 
Army and thus we together shaped a socio-political perspective of understanding 
the given voices of suffering and spiritual help. Suffering, in this development, was 
articulated not simply as the Christian context but also the context with Tai-Ya’s 
political  interactions  with  the  local  religious  organisations.  As  discussed  in  the 
second  chapter,  suffering  was  socially  and  politically  embodied  by  multiple 
interactions of one’s local  culture (Kleinman, Das & Lock, 1997; Kleinman, 1999; 
Wilkinson, 2005). Behind Tai-Ya’s narration of his insight from the Bible, there was 
also the experience of suffering caused by the local  socio-cultural  embodiments 
within the context relative to our relationship with God. The embodiments will be 
further explored and discussed in Chapter Seven.
6.4 Beyond Therapeutic Silence 
6.4.1 The Arisen Worries 
Different from Hui-Yu, from the very beginning, I had strong anxiety about facing my 
work with Tai-Ya. Firstly, Kevin had just returned. Tai-Ya was restarting his everyday 
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life with Kevin and the family was just starting to again experience the difficulty of 
bringing Kevin up. The lifelong pressure was just becoming the context of lifelong 
suffering.  Secondly,  the  environmental  factors  nowadays  are  still  harsh  on  him. 
Although he could put all his effort on Kevin in the next few years, could he insist on 
the effort for decades and even for life? Since he gave up family life with Kevin two 
years ago, would he give up Kevin, again? I was anxious that I would fail this chance 
of helping and I feared for the un-estimated failure. 
This  anxiety  was  explored  in  my  therapeutic  supervision  in  Taiwan,  in  which  I 
seemed to be judging Tai-Ya’s  decisions  for  his  son and estimating his  parenting 
ability. Actually, this anxiety was not unfamiliar to me because I worked with it every 
day in CMUH. In this work with the families of a disabled child, I had a very high 
possibility of facing the parents from the bottom of Taiwanese society, who had no 
recourses to help their children, had to depend on our governmental welfare system 
but had never enough time and money to cope with the corresponding bureaucracy 
of  our  society.  They  very  often  lost  the  confidence  of  trusting  the  so-called 
professionals and gave up the support they were supposed to have; eventually they 
gave  up  the  chance  of  making  their  children  progress.  To  avoid  this  sadness 
happening  in  front  of  myself,  to  hold  the  power  of  a  medical  ‘professional’,  I 
therefore made myself a tough intervener who always actively found resources for 
patients  so  as  to  secure  them  in  the  Taiwanese  bureaucratic  system.  I  always 
worried that if I failed my intervention, a parent would give up the medical help for  
his/her  child;  I  was  the individual  holding  the  position  of  providing  the  medical 
support. 
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My supervisor and I explored my own implicit anger with the ‘unkind society’ in Tai-
Ya’s accusation, as I had known how our society failed to support my family in these 
twenty  years,  as  Taiwan  has  just  developed  the  integration  between  education, 
social welfare and benefits system for the people with special needs in the past ten 
years. In this work, the difficult struggle a patient experienced with finding a social 
worker,  educational  institute,  and relief  fund were actually  re-contextualising my 
understanding  of  my own history  in  which  my  family  was  unable  to  search  for 
governmental help for my aunt. Additionally, a disabled child in this society, has the 
folk stigmatic meaning that the sickness in ‘this life’ is to compensate the debt or  
evil of the ’last life’. Our society and culture indeed is not ‘kind’ or eager to settle a  
patient, treat his/her disease and interpret the illness. The term ‘disability’ always 
reminded me of the anger of our ‘disabled society’. Therefore, since I had not the 
moral  right  to  blame the  parents  about  their  parenting,  I  could  try  my best  to 
empower them for using every possible resource and to face the ‘disability’ of our 
‘unkind society’. The ‘unkind society’, according to Daoist's scripts (Dao-De-Jing, Lao-
Tzi), was a cultural context and will be further discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
6.4.2 The Unspeakable Critics
In supervision, I related my fear and anxiety of a parent’s omissions with my own 
relationship with my father. On the one hand, I respect him because he took the 
lifelong responsibility for my aunt and has looked after her for more than twenty 
years. On the other hand, however, when I started to work for the families with a 
disabled child, I began to criticise him because, due to his parenting attitude, my 
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aunt has been isolated from our society. Since the social warfare was not helpful to 
us, my father has chosen to disregard our current social benefit for my aunt, as well 
as give up her further education and work opportunity. He stopped her education 
and work training in disability institutes where she could have learned skills and 
made friends. He forbade her to go out as he worried she would get lost in our city.  
Long  periods  of  looking  after  her  have  tired  him  and  so,  with  less  and  less 
conversations  with  her,  I  found  her  mental  function  and  linguistic  ability  was 
decreasing, from my ‘professional’ point of view. 
In addition, the way in which my father educated my aunt was sometimes not very 
suitable as he could be ‘cruel’ when dealing with my aunt’s mistakes. For example, 
as mentioned earlier, she often hides food somewhere in her room; sometimes the 
foods  go  rotten  and  stinky  but  she  still  eats  them.  Or,  sometimes  she  uses  an 
unwashed bleach container as the bottle of her drinks. Due to his worry, anger and 
the  willingness  to  protect  her,  my  father  usually  physically  punished  her  and 
sometimes  the  punishments  could  be  quite  harsh,  just  like  the  punishment  I 
received when I made trouble in my childhood. When I saw my ‘40-year-old aunt  
with  a  5-year-old  mental  age’  punished  or  heard  her  cry  because  of  the 
punishments, I could not do anything but hide myself and keep silent.
I  used  my  work  to  cover  my  anxiety  and  the  implicit  conflict  with  my  father, 
although  I  had  never  confronted him.  In  the  four  years  of  therapeutic  work  in 
CMUH,  I  saw  that  many  parents  tried  their  best  to  realise  their  child’s  clinical 
progression. Realistically, some children could never have good provision and sadly, 
many parents would ‘give up’ the medical  intervention of their child. Facing the 
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parents, I tried to be influential by sticking to therapeutic work rather than clinical 
neurological assessments, because in this position I can push, urge and encourage a 
parent do more for his little child. My work with Kevin, in which I invited parents to 
participate in their child’s therapeutic sessions and working as the observer and my 
co-therapist,  was  the  most  frequent  way of  engaging  myself  in  the  therapeutic 
relationship between a parent and the disabled child. In this therapeutic position, I 
could observe the child’s interaction with their parent, have the parent’s view of my 
therapeutic  work,  and  fulfil  the  therapeutic  goal  by  simultaneously  helping  the 
parent rather than only treating the child. I put great effort into my work and enjoy 
being the ‘medium’ of bridging a parent’s confidence to their child’s success in our 
mutual interactions, in which I could feel myself helping a family like mine.
As  disclosed  in  the  first  chapter,  my  work  with  the  parents  in  the  paediatric 
department was what I wanted to do with my father but I could not. I wanted him 
to cease the physical punishment and if possible, remind him that once upon a time 
he was trying very hard to find this little sister a good environment for work and 
education. I doubted he had ‘given up’ her, and so I do not want my clients to ‘give 
up’ their children. Being a clinical psychologist in a hospital who labels, evaluates 
and influences  my client’s  life,  I  was  becoming used to the power of  judging a 
parent’s effort with their children in terms of medical justification. Good and bad 
family, right or wrong parents, appropriate and inappropriate parenting manners 
also became the moral spectrum for evaluating my clients’ effort of looking after 
their child. However, the better I did on the advice and help in my work, the worse I  
felt that I had done little for my own family because my positive conduct with the 
clients  was  totally  opposite  to  my  act  of  staying  quiet  in  facing  my  father’s 
259
relationship  with  my  aunt.  As  a  paediatric  psychologist,  I  could  ask  a  resistant 
parent to accept medical intervention, but as a son, I could not. To face my father, I 
had no ethical position or authority to be against him so as to change his attitude 
for his little sister. Engaging in Tai-Ya’s father-son context of suffering put myself into 
my own family issues and raised my anxiety of my father-son conflict.
6.4.3 Moral Return: Between a Father and Son 
Being a father of a disabled son, engaging in Tai-Ya’s narration recalled my own life 
history and implicit conflict with my father, because the conflict had become the 
background of understanding Tai-Ya. In this process, the relationship between Tai-Ya 
and his  father,  Tai-Ya and his  son,  between me and Kevin,  him and myself,  and 
between me and my father, myself and my aunt were all intertwined in this process 
of  interaction.  Through  speaking,  understanding  and  responding,  our  individual 
history interacted with the others’ and thus, intersubjectively, Tai-Ya’s story became 
the voices of my own lived experience and caused me to reflect on my implicit  
experience of suffering. 
Through the dialogue in counselling sessions, not only Tai-Ya but also I experienced 
the  return  of  our  moral  position  and  released  our  moral  crisis  of  father-son 
relationships. On the one hand, Tai-Ya worked through the crises of being a ‘father’, 
in which he could not help his son but then re-defined his responsibility as the 
father, and of being the ‘son’,  in which he was angry about his father’s attitude 
towards Kevin but apologised and appreciated his father’s nearly everyday help. He 
returned to his moral position as the ‘father’ and ‘son’. On the other hand, from the 
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narrating  process,  I  could  correlate  Tai-Ya’s  words  with  my  father’s  unspoken 
decisions and feelings about my family, and so I could understand my father’s past 
in the position of being a ‘son’. Because of our therapeutic relationship, I could hear 
the voices of suffering from a ‘father’ and be reflexive in my everyday life as the 
‘son’. Being closer to Tai-Ya and Kevin, accordingly, enabled me to be closer to my 
father and aunt. In this responsibility for each other, not only Tai-Ya’s but also my 
lived experience of suffering was told, developed, understood and  ‘witnessed’ by 
the  other.  ‘Witness’,  therefore,  became  a  co-developing  moral  position  and 
‘witnessing’  became  the  inter-subjective  developing  context.  Psychotherapy 
entangled the moral web; the inter-subjectivity of our moral return will be further 
discussed in the following chapters. 
6.5 Summary: The Two Chapters of Data Representation
In Chapter Five and Six, my fieldwork of psychotherapeutic practice in Taiwan had 
been represented and reflected upon. Illustrating a process of transformation,  my 
therapeutic encounters in Taiwan have been represented in a poetic form. I  kept 
my transcribed data,  in  its  linguistic  structure,  in  Chinese and represented it  in  
English.  Between the two languages and meaning systems,  this  'poetic'  form of 
representation enabled me not only to break through my own language barrier  but 
also to create a dialogical space with my readers in the linguistic structure of my 
mother tongue.  
In these two chapters, the poetic representation of my work with the two families 
was inter-correlated with the data from my therapeutic supervision and reflexive 
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journal. I have reflected upon how both the clients’ stories had become a mirror of 
lived experience, from which the contexts of a clients suffering  developed parallel 
to the context of evaluating my own relationship with my important others. From 
Hui-Yu’s stories, I saw that she had struggled with being a traditional quiet mother 
and realised that  I  had  taken my mother’s  silent  efforts  for  my own family  for  
granted. From the work with Tai-Ya and his son, I encountered a father’s lifelong 
loss and rediscovered a sense of my own responsibility for my father and aunt.  This 
intersubjectivity,  the  process  of  understanding  the  'other'  in  psychotherapy, 
facilitated  the  process  of  understanding  the  'self.'  The  responsibility  and  ethics 
between a father,  mother and son could therefore  be re-contextualised and re-
defined  by  a  therapeutic  encounter.  These  two  chapters  have  presented  the 
transaction of suffering: the values and weight of responsibility for ‘Others’.     
In  the rest  of  the  chapters,  the  idea of  a  ‘suffering  transaction’  will  be  further 
explored. The socio-cultural and ethical contexts behind my therapeutic encounters 
in Taiwan and also the term of ‘suffering for the Other’ will be reflected upon and 
re-discovered.
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Chapter 7     Socio-Cultural Embodiments of Suffering
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters where I discuss my work with Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu, I represent 
the reality that narratives from client and therapist can compose an intertwined 
historical  understanding of suffering and develop the meanings and values of it. 
Through the therapeutic practice of this study, Tai-Ya contextualised his father-son 
conflicts and pressed me into my own context of father-son conflict, whilst Hui-Yu 
showed her mother-son moral crisis and involved me in my self-condemnation of 
ignoring my mother’s effort for my family. In this intersubjective context, my clients 
and I had ‘co-constructed’ not only each individual’s history of suffering, but also 
our mutual understanding of the values embodied by our environments, culture, 
politics and society. 
In this  chapter,  the narratives will  be destabilised into socio-cultural  horizons of 
understanding, according to Langdridge’s (2007) concept of hermeneutic analysis. 
This chapter will return to an exploration of relational development between myself 
and  my  clients,  back  to  the  reality  that  we  are  suspended  in  webs  of  cultural 
meanings and moral significance (Geertz, 1973, 1983). From developing the context 
of ‘knowing suffering’, I  will discuss how socio-cultural horizons of understanding 
one’s lived experience of suffering could be further cultivated in the fieldwork of 
this study. The data of the narratives from my clients and myself and my poetic 
understanding  of  them  will  be  discussed  in  further  detail  concerning  their 
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background  historical,  socio-cultural  and  political  issues.  From  the  analystic 
perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology (Cushman, 1990, 1995; Frank, 2001; 
Langdridge,  2007)  the  analysis  processed  in  this  chapter  will  re-identify  the 
relationship between a sufferer and the ‘Other’ s/he suffers for. 
7.1.1 The Symbolic ‘Other’: Culture, Society and Politics 
The discussion of this chapter focusses on further developing the meaning of the 
responsibility ‘for-the-other’ (Levinas, 1982, 1986). The previous two chapters have 
presented  that,  in  psychotherapeutic  sessions,  both  clients  contextualised  their 
lived experience of suffering and redefined their responsibility as the father and 
mother.  Also,  in  the  work  with  them and  their  children,  the  stories  developed 
through our therapeutic practice or interaction articulated my own experience of 
suffering. The ‘son’, in a Levinasian context, can be interpreted as the developing 
object or the ‘other’ in that Hui-Yu, Tai-Ya and also myself were suffering ‘for’ in the 
development of the narrations. Based on the last two chapters, I continue to show 
how we were each engaged in the moral  crisis  of  parenting a disabled son and 
adjusting the self-identification of being their parent.
In this chapter, I will develop the argument that the ‘son’ is not only the specific 
object of the ‘other’ because our counselling practice not only transformed their 
lived  experience  into  language  but  also  validated  the  moral  value  of  the 
‘responsibility-for-the-son’ which is embodied in their everyday life by Taiwanese 
culture and social custom. To be the father or mother, both clients were not only 
suffering  for  the  disabled  son,  but  also  suffering  for  the  society  which  had 
264
compulsively embedded the virtue in their parent-son relationship.   Accordingly, 
the ‘son’  can  be regarded symbolically  as  the plural  of  Taiwanese socio-cultural 
ethics which frames the ‘proper’ parent-son interactions. Further, the exploration of 
this chapter will extend the symbolic meaning of ‘son’ by means of uncovering the 
socio-cultural embodiments in our counselling dialogue and redeem our culture and 
society  as  the  ‘Other’  that  engage  us  in  the  phenomenon  of  understanding 
suffering. 
Actually,  the ‘Other’ as an object with symbolic meaning has been discussed by 
many researchers and therapeutic practitioners. For example, in Pierre Bourdieu’s 
book ‘The weight of the world’ (1999), society itself constructs the meaning of the 
experience of human suffering while sociological processing of the experience of 
suffering shapes its  moral  weight  to a  sufferer.  Connecting  Levinas  with Lacan’s 
concept  of  the ‘other’,  Fryer  (2004)  illustrated that  encountering  the other  is  a 
process of re-constructing symbolic orders of tradition and moral values. In the case 
of this study,  when a parent is engaged in the phenomenon of ‘suffering for the 
son’, at the same time, she or he is acting against the difficulties and limitations pre-
framed and  moralised  by  the  local  culture,  tradition,  and social  politics.  In  this 
context,  a  psychotherapeutic  counselling  practice  itself  also  contextualises  the 
socio-cultural  embodiments  of  suffering,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Two.  Tai-Ya’s 
accusation  of  the  ‘unkind  society’  was  the  example  that  extended  beyond  the 
relationship  with  the  autistic  son  and  showed  that  his  relationship  with  an 
unsupportive society caused this father to suffer.
Accordingly,  this  chapter  will  discuss  the  socio-cultural  embodiments  in  our 
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dialogue and generate the symbolic  image of the ‘Others’  that Taiwanese social 
policy,  cultural  customs  and  religion  had  embodied  in  the  values  of  suffering 
through  the  language  developed  by  psychotherapy.  Medical  anthropologists’ 
contribution  that  the  experience  of  suffering  is  a  subjective  social  construction 
(Kleinman, Das & Lock, 1997; Kleinman, 1999; Wilkinson, 2005) is very helpful for  
discussing the social embodiments of human experience of suffering. According to 
Das (2001) and Kleinman (1980, 2001, 2006), the subjectivity of illness, pain, and 
suffering are cultural, social, and political. In this context, suffering is not termed as 
psychopathology  but  the  attachment  to  the  values  pre-framed  by  one’s 
sociocultural and political structures. 
7.1.2  Hermeneutic  Horizons:  From  the  Useless  Society  to  Socio-cultural 
Embodiments
To describe their experience of helplessness, Tai-Ya used his relationship with the 
‘world’ and Hui-Yu used her relationship with political issues of ‘early intervention’  
as the object to which they attached. 
Tai-Ya: ‘I very often feel that only four of us are abandoned in this  
unkind world.  It  is  a  feeling  that  in  this  world  no help  could  be 
helpful and no one can be trusted. In this world….. we can only rely 
on ourselves….(T:S2) 
Hui-Yu: ’(The only thing) I can only do is to find a way out of my 
agony!  We  had  no  resources  to  help  us  except  for  ‘early 
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intervention’ you showed to us. (H:S2)’
In counselling sessions, these clients’ history of how Taiwanese society and culture 
caused  and  embodied  suffering  in  their  mundane  life  was  spoken,  interacted, 
contextualised and developed. As explored in Chapter 2, to develop their historical 
understanding,  the interpretive ‘horizons’  of  their  stories (Gadamer,  1990)  were 
also formed as their socio-cultural understanding of our experience of suffering. Tai-
Ya’s accusation towards the ‘world’ and Hui-Yu’s actions towards ‘early intervention’ 
were therefore becoming clear linguistic objects in our therapeutic relationship. In 
my work with Hui-Yu and Tai-Ya, the historical understanding of their stories could 
be  regarded  as  the  objectisation  of  our  socio-cultural  embodiments  and  the 
development of our subjective histories.
In terms of hermeneutic phenomenology (Cushman, 1995; Warren, 2005),  three 
‘horizons’ will be illustrated as the articulation of socio-cultural embodiments as the 
‘Others’ in my construction of my clients’ meaning of suffering. In 7.2, the political 
setting of ‘early intervention’ will be discussed by exploring how ‘early intervention’ 
was becoming a dominant influence on both clients’ and my own interpretation of 
suffering. The second horizon will be presented as the cultural setting of our ethical 
role and responsibility for each client’s son, in which the moral issues of a parent’s 
responsibility  for  the  son  and the  socio-cultural  terms  of  ‘family  ethics’  will  be 
explored in 7.3. As in the last two chapters I present Hui-Yu and Tai-Ya’s moral crises 
of being the failed parent, I will now further discuss the cultural meaning of the 
understanding the ‘failure’. The Confucian moral of the relationship between family 
members  will  be  used  to  illustrate  how  ‘family’  itself  causes  an  experience  of 
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suffering.  The  third horizon  is  about  ‘God’,  the  religious  embodiments.  In  7.4, 
through  discussing  the  context  of  ‘God’s  help’,  I  will  explore  how  both  clients’ 
relationship with God could be spoken, heard and developed. Through speaking 
and understanding, this horizon shows how a therapeutic relationship could also re-
allocate the ethical position between God, self and others. A synthesis discussion 
will point out the fusion of these horizons in our practice in which the experience of  
suffering turned a relationship into moral crisis whereas psychotherapy fulfils and 
articulates itself as the ethical practice.  
7.2 Suffering from ‘Early Intervention’ 
In my work with clients, we re-contextualised the history of Taiwanese social policy 
for each family coping with developmental disability. Precisely, from their concern 
for their son and my work with them in the paediatric department, the narratives 
developed  through  our  therapeutic  practice  were  backgrounded  by  the 
development of the Taiwanese social welfare component ‘early intervention’. Due 
to  this  governmental  approach,  as  the  public  rapidly  grew  the  need  for 
psychotherapy and psychotherapeutic  practice also expanded and,  subsequently, 
was  fast  professionalised.  For  both  clients,  early  intervention  was  a  developing 
medical policy, and psychotherapy was a developing medical service. Coping with 
their confidence and uncertainty became a process of bearing the social suffering 
and the reality that one’s experience of ‘suffering’ can be due to the local social and 
political  structure  (Das,  2001;  Kleinman,  1980,  2001,  2006).  This  part  of  the 
discussion will discuss the history of early intervention as a psychologists’ medical 
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intervention  was  formed  in  our  dialogue,  and  discuss  how  medical  power  can 
become a moral force to our families.  
7.2.1 Taiwanese Professionalisation of Early Intervention
Both  Tai-Ya  and  Hui-Yu’s  stories  were  based  in  the  decade  before  2008,  when 
psychologist professionalisation in Taiwan was also decisively contributing to the 
public’s medical habit of using counselling and psychotherapeutic services. In 1999, 
Taiwan’s  fiercest  earthquake  killed  2412  persons  and  therefore  the  Taiwanese 
government had to face the public’s traumatic experience and set up a system to 
address psychological recovery. For the first time, immense funding was put into 
coping with the natural disaster and numerous psychiatric professions were settled 
into  the  medical,  social  and  educational  system  of  the  public’s  psychological 
recovery. In 2001, the law for counselling and clinical psychologists (心理師法) was 
legislated (Mai,  Wang,  Wu and Lee, 2006). Counsellors and clinical  psychologists 
were officially incorporated into the medical practice and funded by national health 
insurance. In 2004, the first association of clinical psychologists was set up in Taipei,  
the capital of Taiwan. Then, the psychotherapeutic and counselling services were 
rapidly  professionalised and practiced in  the educational  and medical  institutes. 
Also, big enterprises began to incorporate counselling service as part of labour’s  
mental health and hire therapists for their employee assistant programmes (EAPs) 
(Xie,  2009).  The  professionalisation  of  psychological  services  led  the  public  to 
redeem psychologists’ work as a demanding multi-dimensional service for people in 
different  levels  of  Taiwanese  society,  rather  than  the  traditional  therapeutic 
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impression in which therapists only work with either problematic students in school 
or psychotics in asylum. However, in the Taiwanese medical field, the work related 
to ‘psychology’ still had to be attached to psychiatry and the political setting of a 
psychologist’s  work was still  controversial  (Wang,  2001).  Psychologists  like Wang 
(1999)  and  Wang  (2001)  showed  strong  criticism  for  psychology’s 
professionalisation and commercialisation. An association against the Psychologist’s 
Law was organised  by  Taiwanese influential  therapists  in  2002 to  object  to  the 
dominance of the psychiatric medical system (Chen, 2000).
In this decade of dramatic change to the field of psychology, ‘early intervention’ 
became  another  professionalised  field  in  the  paediatric  domain  rather  than  in 
psychiatry. As mentioned in Chapter Six,  since 2001,  ‘(Have)  earlier intervention;  
(have)  earlier  recovery’ gradually  became the slogan of  public  policy which was 
broadcasted on TV, radio and transportation advertisements. The concept of ‘early 
intervention’ was therefore becoming accepted by the public and practice based 
upon neurology and psychology became the necessary diagnostic and therapeutic 
foundation  of  a  paediatric  psychologist’s  work.  The  departments  of  paediatrics, 
rehabilitation  and  family  medicine  in  various  hospitals  therefore  started  to  hire 
clinical psychologists to offer the newly standardised diagnostic service based on 
developmental pathology, developmental psychology and paediatric neurology. In 
1999, Chinese Medical University Hospital (CMUH) in Tai-Chung city set up the first  
‘Parenting Consulting Centre’ in Taiwan in which clinical developmental assessments 
and  standardised  psycho-social  interventions  were  to  be  offered  by  paediatric 
psychologists. In the same year, the Association of Early Intervention was founded. 
Funded  by  the  Taiwanese  government,  paediatric  neurologists,  psychologists, 
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rehabilitationists, social workers and special educators were integrated into the so 
called ‘multi-disciplinary intervention system’  (Kuo, 2005) and were asked for the 
medical service with governmental financial and material support. In 2003, for the 
first time 'Early Intervention’ was regarded as a necessary service for honouring or  
for qualifying a hospital as a ‘teaching hospital’ or ‘medical centre’. 
Tai-Ya’s stories showed how ‘medical mobility’, the movement of medical service 
from urban to rural,  could influence not  only  the medical  user’s  willingness  for 
medical help but also the user’s decisions on how to cope with illness. Between 
2005  and  2007,  the  medical  service  of  'Early  Intervention’  was  spreading  from 
urban areas to rural regions. When people in cities became quickly acquainted with 
this medical service, individuals like Tai-Ya who lived in the remote area could only 
become aware through interacting with the nearest medical centre in a different 
city. Before 2005, in the Taiwanese mountain district of Nan-Tou, early intervention 
was supported weekly by the team from the paediatric team of CMUH in Taichung 
city.  When a  child’s  developmental  problems  are  confirmed,  the  social  workers 
would visit his or her families and guide them to the nearest medical points in their  
region or, mostly, the nearby cities. A parent like Tai-Ya could only wait for medical  
professional's visiting otherwise s/he would need more than three hours to receive 
treatment. In 2004, the highway connected Nan-Tou and Tai-Chung, where CMUH 
was, and therefore the parents of sick children and medical professionals found it 
easier  to  travel  between  rural  and  urban  regions.  Pu-Li  Christian  Hospital,  the 
biggest hospital in Nan-Tou country, was upgraded as a medical centre and started 
to undertake the affair of early intervention from the original team in CMUH. In 
2005,  Pu-Li  Christian Hospital  established the Centre  of  Child  Development and 
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started to have clinical psychologists responsible for the affairs of early intervention. 
The original social work then fully transited from CMUH to Pu-Li Christian Hospital; 
the parents could choose the medical service for their child within their region. In 
2010, the highway connected Pu-Li town, where Tai-Ya lives, and Tai-Chung, so that 
both medical professions and users then only needed 30 minutes to travel between 
these two cities. The parents could eventually find it easier to choose and search for 
'better'  doctors  and therapists,  and could make 'enough'  treatment possible  for 
their children.
7.2.2 The Political Imbalance of Psychological Intervention
Hui-Yu  and  Tai-Ya’s  difficulties  of  finding  a  psychologist’s  intervention  had  also 
exposed the imbalanced setting of a clinical psychologist’s work, in which medical 
politics had caused a clinical psychologist to choose to perform assessments rather 
than interventions. In Chinese Medical University Hospital (CMUH), according to its 
leaflet,  a  paediatric  psychologist  is  settled  as  the  gatekeeper  of  the  multi-
disciplinary work of early intervention. His or her responsibility is to provide clinical  
assessments, consultation of a child’s neurological and psychological development, 
and counselling  service  for  the  family  with  the  children  who were  going  to  be 
labelled  as  ‘developmental  retardation’.  When  a  child  is  suspected  as  having 
developmental  problems, the report from their psychologist and neurologist can 
determine the extent of assistance from the Taiwanese social welfare system. Based 
on these practitioners’ report, the child could therefore be given a reduction of the 
fee  for  further  medical  intervention  like  rehabilitation  and  CBT  based 
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psychotherapy. 
However,  for  a  clinical  psychologist,  the  process  by  which  Taiwanese  public 
insurance funds the service of early intervention has caused an imbalance between 
assessments and intervention.  Firstly,  since a medical  institute can charge much 
higher  rates  than  the  Taiwanese  government  for  items  used  as  part  of  clinical  
assessments than those used in an intervention, in terms of financial benefit to the 
hospital, clinical psychologists are not encouraged to do therapeutic work used in 
an  early  intervention.  Secondly,  psychologists  in  hospitals  tend  to  engage  in 
evaluation rather than therapy. For a paediatric psychologist, conducting a one-hour 
assessment  produces  higher  income  but  carries  less  responsibility  than  that 
involved in a long-term therapeutic relationship with a child and his/her family. The 
practice  of  early  Intervention  for  a  psychologist  was  therefore  developing  as  a 
constant diagnostic and labelling work rather than administering a real intervention 
which some argue should be the ultimate goal of a psychological evaluation and 
neurological diagnoses. In 2008 when I returned to CMUH for this study, I found 
that  I  was  the  only  psychologist  conducting  intervention  work  in  the paediatric 
departments. When  a  psychologist’s  work  has  been  regarded  as  the  work  of 
business  and  marketing,  his  or  her  fundamental  responsibility  of  giving  further 
treatment after diagnostic evaluations is then disregarded (or diminished), due to 
its sociopolitical context.
The priori political deficit of a paediatric psychologist’s work also caused an unfair 
condition in which a child could be thoroughly examined and carefully diagnosed, 
but one can never find enough resources for further treatment, especially when the 
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child  demonstrates  the  possibility  of  psychopathological  problems.  Taiwanese 
hospitals  may  label  hundreds  of  children  as  having  ‘developmental  retardation’ 
within  a  day  but  are  only  prepared  to  offer  very  limited  space  for  paediatric 
psychologist’s treatment and intervention. In Hui-Yu’s narration, the storied context 
of ‘the only way to go (S1)’ showed that she had to follow my advice otherwise YH 
would not be treated by a psychologist. Tai-Ya’s words of ‘no help was helpful (S1)’ 
were also the example of how the imbalanced setting of ‘early intervention’ caused 
helplessness  as  he  struggled  to  find  medical  support  for  his  son.  The 
professionalisation  of  a  psychologist’s  work,  actually,  because  of  its  political 
contexts, demonstrates this ‘helpless help (T:S1)’ when a disease is developed to be 
given as a diagnosis without any accompanying solution. Then, as the sick child’s 
parent,  the  helplessness  could  become  an  act  of  moral  condemnation  for  the 
medical profession. 
7.2.3 Medical Power as the Moral Force
The medical  profession not only confirms a child’s disease but also compulsively 
inserts the medical context into parents’ everyday life. ‘Therapy’ therefore becomes 
not only the ‘new’ medical language for clients to use and become familiar with, 
but also the moral context that a parent should obey and follow for their child’s 
health. In this context, ‘not’ using medical help for a sick child can be regarded as 
moral condemnation of the parents. Ascribing a medical setting to a child’s disease 
could be seen as moral judgement by the child’s parent.  
This study provides examples of how, in ‘early intervention’, a parent has to learn 
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another  language from medical  professions  so that  they may also interpret  the 
child’s development from the mundane life to the pathological rationality.  Hui-Yu 
and Tai-Ya’s  cases  both  show that,  once  a  child  is  proved to  be  ‘retarded’,  the 
appropriateness  of  the  main  caregiver’s  parenting  efficiency  and  his  or  her 
relationship with the sick child are immediately evaluated and judged. In the cases I  
have  presented,  early  intervention  medicalised  not  only  these  clients’  child’s 
development  but  also  their  parent-child  relationship  at  once.  Further,  medical 
professions moralised the parent’s endeavours for his or her child. Tai-Ya’s example 
clearly shows that, to the child with developmental retardation, medical professions 
of early intervention not only medicalise the family’s everyday life but also moralise 
the parent’s responsibility for this child. As he reflected on his fault of not choosing 
medical service when Kevin was first diagnosed as autistic, Tai-Ya had to ‘surrender’  
to the medical domination.
‘ We are so weak to face the doctors.  As his father, I  could not 
argue with them….no…I even could not have the right to argue 
with them. The medical diagnoses were such the strong evidence 
that I had to admit my wrong decision to my son and surrender to 
them. They were as if standing at a higher position and scolding 
me  like…”If  you  don’t  use  (the  medical  resources),  you  are 
irresponsible” (S6: T)’
The two participants of this study showed different attitudes while coping with how 
their  life  had become dominated by medical  professions.  Facing Kevin’s  label  of 
autistic  tendency,  Tai-Ya  chose  to  argue  against  this  diagnosis  by  choosing  an 
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alternative option in 2005, and was blamed for making an ‘irreversible mistake’ by 
paediatrics. For, while coping with this mistake, Tai-Ya ‘had no other choice (S1: T;  
S2, H)’ to surrender to the medical system in 2007. In Hui-Yu’s example, she chose 
to defer to the medical professions in 2001 and was honoured by the remarkable 
feedback of the ‘significant successes’ for  her effort  with YH. For both of  them, 
medical  professions  of  early  intervention  not  only  evaluated  their  son’s 
development,  but  also  judged  their  accomplishment  as  being  the  father  and 
mother. Their  narrations showed how medical  power embodied the medicalised 
parent-son ethics in the conversation with medical professions so as to moralise the 
parent’s actions for his/her sick child.
This  study  also  showed  that,  in  the  process  of  early  intervention,  a  medical 
profession could morally prejudice a parent’s responsibility and obligation which 
then causes parents little choice about whether to follow the ‘orthodox’ route to 
cope with the child’s disease. For me, in my process of doing research, I also came 
to realise that I was so used to my medical position that I did not know I took the 
power of judging a parent’s effort for granted.  Hui-Yu’s reflection of my words ‘No 
one could help your son if you feel you cannot’ showed that I asked her to take the 
responsibility for helping her son in a medical context solely because she was the 
mother. I learned that, as a paediatric psychologist, I used my professional position 
with my medical resources to face a family: not only providing the result of a health 
evaluation, but also dictating moral interpretation of the family relationship.   
For  me  and  the  two  clients,  what  and  how  the  counselling  practice  was 
contextualised did not only involve the history of their medical  actions for their 
276
children,  but  also  the  history  of  fighting  the  moralising  voices  of  the  medical 
professions, policy and environments. Suffering, in this process, was not only the 
difficulty of coping with the son’s illness, but also the crisis of facing the medical 
profession’s  moral  judgement,  despite  the  reality  that  the  overall  medical 
environment  had  never  developed  enough  ability  to  fully  address  the  family’s 
needs. For us, while our narration in therapeutic practice re-defines responsibilities 
for the son and other family members, we also formulate a ‘body’ to the unwell 
Taiwanese medical reality with the moral context of socio-cultural dominance, and 
therefore, in this power relationship, we could only surrender to it since we could 
not disobey its moralisation. In developing our mutual relationships, clients and I 
were  suffering  for  our  common medical  reality  in  Taiwan,  which  has  also  been 
developed as the ‘Other’ we were suffering ‘for’.  
7.2.4 The Language of medical embodiments: Medical Reality as the ‘Other’
The  discussions  above  illustrate  a  developing  understanding  of  my 
psychotherapeutic practice in a paediatric department as a historical reflection on 
the Taiwanese medical policy of early intervention. Our psychotherapeutic practice 
had developed a hermeneutic horizon that, beyond our experience of suffering, the 
political setting of our interactive work for the son had also embodied moral values 
concerning  our  responsibility  for  others,  interpretation  of  lived  experience  and 
interaction with each other. In this macroscopic imbalance, we could only passively 
accept the reality that our society had not developed enough resources so that we 
were  forced  to  suffer  for  this  ‘useless  society’.  In  our  intersubjectivity,  ‘early 
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intervention’  and  the  psychotherapeutic  work  in  early  intervention  had  been 
developed as the contextualised object which caused the language of suffering and 
its comprehension. In short, in the field of mutual understanding, we suffered for 
the son with a developmental  problem and also for the early intervention in its  
developmental history. 
7.3 The Bigger Rooster Crows Later: Suffering for our Culture
The previous chapters show that,  when a ‘son’ is diagnosed as having a lifelong 
disease, the medical context of a disease can become a threat to his family; this 
study  has  offered  examples  of  two  family’s  defence  and  acceptance  of  a  son’s 
autistic  tendency.  This  threat,  in terms of  language,  naturally  contradicts  with a 
family’s interpretation of the ‘son’s’ development. In contrast to the medical reality 
as an ‘other’ which causes the experience of suffering, the mundane context, the 
everyday  language  about  a  child’s  development  and  the  family  ethics,  were 
developed as another ‘other’ in our therapeutic practice, which had pre-framed our 
knowledge and interpretation of a son’s disease in the cultural sense. This section 
will  explore and trace the formation of the cultural  embodiment of suffering, in 
which  Taiwanese  culture  and sub-culture  had influenced our  ethical  concern  of 
‘suffering’ for the son.
As presented in Chapters Five and Six, the medical context of Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu’s 
sons’ disability contradicted with our folk belief regarding a child’s normal growth in 
Taiwan,  especially  the  growth  of  a  child  who  has  no  obvious  physiological 
abnormality like Kevin and YH. The pathological language of ‘developmental delay’ 
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and ‘retardation’, like a real insult, challenged the parent's understanding of child 
development. From the old Taiwanese old saying ‘大隻雞慢啼, ‘the bigger rooster 
crows later (S1, T; S1, H)’, which implies that a cleverer child would learn language 
slower than the ordinary children, both Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu’s family reflected upon 
their feeling that Kevin and YH could not possibly be the child with ‘developmental 
retardation’  and ‘autistic  tendency’.  In  this  slang,  the context  of  ‘developmental 
delay’ does not mean an illness of a child; rather, it can be refer to the possibility of 
‘being cleverer’.  However,  when the traditional  term of  ‘learning language later’  
became the medical label of ‘retardation’, a parent has inevitably been placed in the 
conflict between tradition and medicalisation as well as the conflict between family 
ethics  and  the  medical  moral  condemnation  that  drives  individuals  to  be  the 
‘proper parent of the sick son (H: S1)’.  
The exploration will be started from the concern about the ‘debt’ between a parent 
and a child. In my own and Hui-Yu’s narration, we both developed the context of  
understanding in which a parent and the son’s responsibility for each other was 
transmigrational.  Our  culture  embodied  our  understanding  of  this  context  of 
suffering, and we both developed the debt we ‘ought to’ pay for the ‘Other’ in ‘this’ 
life.
7.3.1 The Debt of Being a Parent
Illness, in Taiwanese folk culture, has an interpretation due to Buddhist and Daoist 
rationality that the ‘suffering’  for  someone in ‘this  life’  is  due to the unfinished 
business  as  the  ‘debt’  for  him/her  in  the  ‘previous  life’  (Yee,  2005).  One’s 
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relationship with a family member who has a psychotic or chronic disease, in the 
ethical  context,  is  often  regarded  (and  sometimes  stigmatised)  as  the  ‘debt’ 
acquired through acts performed in the ‘previous lives’ so as to ‘pay’ in ‘this life’.  
The ‘debt’ could mean the ‘faults’ the family had committed with regards to its sick 
member in ‘previous lives’ and therefore the family unavoidably has to compensate 
and attend to the patient in ‘this life’. Accordingly, a family with a disabled child 
could be labelled as a family in which the members have to assume the ‘unfinished 
businesses’ before ‘this life’ as the ‘debt’, or the family’s ‘immoral’ affairs in the ‘last 
life’. Therefore, , in this cultural sense, the diagnosis of a disease not only involves 
the pathological context of a human body, but also the moral context of our culture. 
To account  for  illness  and suffering,  medical  professions  not  only  label  a  child's 
disease  to  his  family,  but  also  transact  the  cultural  sense  of  the  'debt'  to  the 
parent's responsibility for the child, and thus could stigmatise the parent's effort as 
the ‘original mistake’ committed before the child was born. Hui-Yu’s discourse of 
her son YH’s sacrifice for the whole family was the example which clearly showed 
the transactional context in her stories as represented in Chapter Five.
However, when our counselling process generated Hui-Yu’s discourse of ‘debt’, my 
own discourse of ‘debt’ was also formed through this process of understanding. My 
work with the families like mine would be regarded as a work of paying the ‘debt’ to 
my own family because I had recognised that my aunt was not adequately cared for 
in my family structure. For me, my work as a paediatric psychologist enabled me to 
pay the ‘debt’ for my father so that I may endeavour to make a family like mine 
‘better’, as reviewed in the last two chapters, in my relationship with other family 
members and the connection we share with existing social welfare. 
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Culture, in this process of mutual understanding, gave us the contextual values and 
weight to interpret our own responsibility for the others. In the mundane life, a 
father and a mother were suffering for the son or a son was suffering for the father 
and family.  This  responsibility  of  suffering is  intrinsically  rooted and pre-morally 
framed in our culture. To engage in ‘suffering’, we also contextualised the ‘family 
ethics’ codified by our culture.
7.3.2 Confucsian Family Ethics: Five Ethics and its Power Structure in a Family
In his book ‘Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture’ (1980), Arthur Kleinman 
observed how a Taiwanese family would approach the cultural and ethical context 
of ‘healing’ when a child was suspected as being sick (p. 188):
If a child is sick, and the illness is expected curable, the parents will be the  
decision maker (usually the mother) and start from Western medication. 
However,  if  a  child  had  found  the  chronic  and  non-life-threatening 
sickness, the grandparents will involve in the decision-making process and 
will  be  the  main  decision  makers  who  would  search  for  non-western 
medication. Usually, the Chinese medicine, Shamanism and folk therapy 
from the grandparents’ interpersonal network will be the alternatives of 
Western medication.
Although this observation was reported nearly 30 years ago, it  has not changed 
much. As a resident who lived in Taiwan for more than thirty years, I am used to this  
pluralistic action and interpretation in which a family is a ‘unit’ when considering a 
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family member’s experience of illness and recovery. As seen in the observation of 
Kleinman (2006),  illness  in  Taiwanese  society  is  not  only  a  person’s  physical  or 
mental problem but also incorporates the family’s action against the influence of 
the disease. To act on a disease, a family could choose Western medicine, Chinese 
medicine and Taiwanese Shamanism (Kleinman, 1980; Hwang,  2001a; Yu,  2007). 
The interpretations of the disease are different from each medical perspective but 
are not controversial to each other (Yee, 2006; Yu, 2007). For example, one’s illness 
diagnosed by Western medicine may become the imbalance of the ‘qi’  in Chinese 
medicine or the  karma by folk therapists like ‘乩童 Donki’  in Taiwanese society 
(Kleinman,  1990).  The  rationality  of  one’s  illness  and  recovery  is  examined and 
interpreted not only by the medical professions but also by his or her family. 
Influenced  by  Confucianism,  the  ‘family  ethics’  can  be  regarded  as  the  most 
fundamental moral concern of interpersonal relationships in Taiwan (Hwang, 2001a, 
2001b). In the ‘five cardinal human relations27’ (Hwang and Chang, 2009), three of 
the five essential  morals  codify the family  relationship between father and son, 
between husband and wife, and between elder brother and young siblings. Culture 
embodies the moral  values in  the responsibilities  between family  members and 
therefore psychotherapy could unpack the values from the language of suffering 
processed between therapist and clients. In this context, the therapeutic practice 
with the two clients acknowledged the cultural framed family ethics of ‘suffering-
for-the-son’ which examined their moral position as the parent. Therefore, in the 
following  discussions  in  7.3.2.1,  7.3.2.2  and 7.3.2.3,  I  will  trace  the  interpretive 
27 The ethics between ruler and subject, between the father and son, between husband and wife, 
between siblings, and between friends,
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horizon of family ethics contextualised by my fieldwork, and discuss how Taiwanese 
culture and society had pre-framed our action,  narration and comprehension of 
‘suffering  for  the  other’  in  terms  of  the  Confucian  family  ethics  of  partner 
relationship, father-son ethics, and mother-daughter complex.  
7.3.2.1 The Ethics between Partners: the Suffering Interdependence between 
Client and Me
In  our  therapy  which  was centred  on  the ‘son’s’  progression,  Tai-Ya  and Hui-Yu 
developed  an  alliance  dedicated  to  making  their  son  ‘changed’.  We shared  the 
responsibility of being the parent and co-suffered for the son. In this alliance, I had 
two symbolic roles re-contextualised in our interactions and dialogue. The first is 
like the partial parent who was knowing, acquainting and teaching their child. The 
second  is  like  the  client’s  spouse who  co-experiences  and  shares  the  ‘son’s’ 
difficulty and the responsibility as ‘the parents’. Our therapeutic actions ‘for’ the 
son could be seen as the developing context of the ethics of partners:  how the 
parents could help the son together. In the cultural context of family ethics, we re-
contextualised the responsibility between husband and wife and reconstructed the 
subjective  ethics  as  the  ‘parents’.  In  our  developed  language,  the  context  of 
‘suffering’ was thereby transacted between therapist-client relationship and parent-
son relationship.
In Tai-Ya’s case, Kevin’s psychological intervention could mean that we interacted 
with each other as if we were cooperative parents, in the same way he and his wife 
Jene constantly behaved for their son. As presented in Chapter Six, our counselling 
283
practice  re-contextualised  this  experience  of  ‘co-suffering’  because  we saw  and 
shared each other’s failure so as to understand how difficult Kevin’s progression 
could be. In this process of sharing the parenting failure, we also learned the tricks 
of interacting with Kevin from each other’s successes and mistakes. Gradually, our 
mutual responsibility was developed and confirmed, in which helping Kevin moving 
forward  to  the  next  developmental  milestones  was  the  main  focus  in  Tai-Ya’s 
relationship with me.
The therapeutic alliance between Tai-Ya and I in our cooperative work for Kevin was 
developing similarly to his relationship with his wife Jene because when the context 
of  the  mutual  responsibility  between  Tai-Ya  and  I  was  becoming  concrete,  the 
mutual responsibility between him and Jene was becoming clearer as well. Since 
Kevin’s progression became the dominant context of the family work, the context of 
fulfilling the husband-wife ethics was transacted from our therapeutic encounter to 
his husband-wife relationship. Tai-Ya’s example of using the therapeutic concept of 
‘empowering Jene’ showed how he created another therapeutic alliance between 
him and his wife at home. The action he took when embarking on the ‘ first long trip 
in the marriage’, as he discussed in our fifth counselling session, was an opportunity 
for him to practice his new awareness of their mutual responsibility for their son. 
Similarly,  Hui-Yu  and  myself  developed  a  therapeutic  alliance  which  was  like 
partners helping their son, in the period between 2001 and 2005. Since we had 
worked  together  on  YH’s  psychological  intervention  for  over  three  years,  our 
relationship transacted to her relationship with her partner in her family. As shown 
in  Chapter  Five,  Hui-Yu  was the  successful  model  for  she  obeyed the  orthodox 
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treatment  and  gained  her  son’s  progression  which  was  applauded  by  medical 
professions. In her social groups, our therapeutic relationship became the model of 
the relationship between a patient and medical profession in the practice of early 
intervention.  However,  in  this  relationship,  I  also  worked  as  a  model  for  her 
expected husband’s role, as in YH’s intervention she acquired a partner who could 
attend to her effort of teaching YH and also shared the difficulty of it. From YH’s 
intervention, she brought our therapeutic games and tasks home and asked Lee to 
attend to the games with her and their son. In the period of YH’s intervention, her  
relationship with her husband Lee was improving alongside her relationship with 
me. Like Tai-Ya, she oriented a therapeutic alliance with her husband at home which 
is similar to the development of her relationship with me. In her history between 
2001 and 2005, the context of her husband Lee was changed from an irresponsible 
father to the ‘head of household (S2)’ who worked hard and took on the father’s 
responsibility.
For the ‘son’ with autistic tendency, both clients and I developed and contextualised 
mutual responsibility for each other, which was similar to the ethics of partners in a 
family. How the encounter in counselling practice had developed not only involved 
the context of the child’s progression but also the context of the parents’ ‘ethical re-
position’,  in  which  the  father  and  mother  returned  to  the  properly  traditional 
position  within  the  family  ethical  structure.  By  means  of  the  therapeutic 
relationship,  Tai-Ya  and  Hui-Yu  re-defined  and  re-developed  their  context  of 
responsibility: not only the responsibility of being a father or a mother but also the 
responsibility ‘with’ the partner which then enabled them to work together for the 
sick son. Accordingly, in the development of their stories, they could not only make 
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themselves a responsible parent but also give their partner an ethical position in 
being the child’s ‘parents’  together in order to deal  with their son’s sickness.  In  
these cases or in my experience, counselling practice remoralises the husband-wife 
ethics in its process and transacts its context between the therapeutic relationship 
and the partner relationship. 
7.3.2.2 Between Father and Son: The Conflict with Filial Piety
In Tai-Ya’s third to fifth sessions of counselling, he started to narrate the relational  
change between him and his father and, at the time, I was engaged in my own 
relational issues with my father. In this relational encounter, for Tai-Ya, because of 
his son Kevin’s disability, he was also involved in an ethical conflict with his father; 
for  me,  because  of  this  fieldwork,  I  recalled  my ‘unspeakable’  conflict  with  my 
father in which I had to repress my arguments with my father regarding his attitude 
towards  his  disabled  sister.  The  ethical  role  of  father  and  son  as  well  as  their 
relationship were therefore developed into an ethical interpretive horizon regarding 
father-son ethics. In our conversation, the lived experience of suffering, therefore, 
transacted  between  the  different  generations  of  his  family  and  my  own.  The 
discussion in this part of Chapter Seven intends to show how, for my two clients, 
our counselling practice reframed the moral value of being a father and a son, and 
re-contextualised the ‘father-son ethics’  in the context of  Confusian culture and 
family ethics.
‘Filial Piety’ was the moral context developed in the narration of our implicit conflict 
with the role of father. Being a son, as presented in Chapter Six, Tai-Ya felt guilty 
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about Kevin’s autistic tendency and giving his father the  ‘autistic grandson (S2)’, 
because the label of autism could stigmatise the whole family. When Kevin returned 
home after two years’ separation, due to his reliance on his father’s assistance with 
looking after Kevin, the guilt of ‘giving father the big burden (S2)’ was intense. The  
unspeakable anxiety he experienced made Tai-Ya feel ‘unfilial (S2, S6)’ to his father. 
Although he was sometimes irritated by his father’s ‘unfairness’(S2) in treating his 
brother and other grandson,  as the son,  being ‘unfilial’  always demanded moral 
condemnation until when, in our fifth session, he apologised to his father and was 
released through his father’s forgiveness. 
As  disclosed,  judging  my  father  also  made  me  feel  ‘unfilial’  and  therefore  my 
experience  of  implicit  conflict  with  my  father  was  transformed  into  the  self-
condemned context of being ‘unfilial’. I criticised my father’s physical punishment of 
my aunt,  but  being the son,  I  also understood my father’s  ‘old  school’  attitude 
because that  was the education of  his  generation and because our  society  had 
never supported a family like mine. For me, I could not ‘correct’ my father’s way of 
teaching because I know the difficulty we experienced was due to our undeveloped 
society,  not  him.  My  critique  of  him  was  because  I  later  became  a  medical 
profession and was then able to use medical moral values to judge him. If I had not, 
I would never have been made aware of my father’s violation of the appropriate 
treatment  of  a  disabled  family  member.  At  the  same  time,  despite  my  new 
knowledge, I could only remain useless to my family and keep silent with my father. 
For me, my conflict caused me to be, like Tai-Ya, silenced but also enabled me to 
deeply understand my client’s helplessness. When Tai-Ya was telling me how the 
Taiwanese society is useless and how its medical system caused helplessness, as the 
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therapist working with the children whose future could be like that of my aunt, I  
could understood Tai-Ya because we both suffered from our undeveloped society. 
Accordingly,  Tai-Ya  and  my  experience  of  ‘unspeakable  suffering’  was  re-
contextualised by Kevin’s psychological intervention in which his relationship with 
his son could be re-constructed through his ongoing endeavours to support and 
promote  Kevin’s  progression.  Also,  in  this  process,  the  father-son  ethics  was 
ascribed  the  cultural  context  of  our  language.  For  Tai-Ya,  Kevin’s  progression 
brought positive knock-on effects to the father-son relationship between himself, 
his father and Kevin in which Kevin’s interaction with both of them was obviously 
better. The better relationship between him and Kevin made Tai-Ya decide to break 
through the silence between him and his father, and his apology to his father was 
proof  of  this  break-through.  For  me,  witnessing  Tai-Ya’s  acts  enabled me to re-
examine my criticism of and appreciation for my father; through promoting Kevin’s 
progression I  was  able  to gain  more understanding of  the difficulties  my father 
faced while looking after my aunt in such a cruel environment as Taiwan. In other 
words, the work with Tai-Ya made me feel closer to my father as well. When the 
therapeutic  relationship  present  in  Kevin’s  intervention  was  helping  this  boy  to 
progress, the relationship between the adults in Tai-Ya’s sessions grounded our trust 
with not only each other but also our fathers. 
The therapeutic work, in Tai-Ya and my interaction, became the process of making 
ourselves  return  to  our  moral  position  as  the  father,  and  as  the  son.  In  our 
language,  ‘Filial  Piety’  was  the  cultural  embodiment  of  how  we  both  faced 
unspeakable  anxiety  in  our  paternal  relationships.  In  this  process,  Tai-Ya’s 
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experience  of  ‘unspeakable  suffering’  shared  the  cultural  values  and  weight  of 
father-son ethics with me, and therefore we shaped the context of ‘feeling unflial’  
and  reconstructed  its  ethical  values  in  our  conversation  and  everyday  life.  The 
context  of  ‘suffering’  was  accordingly  transacted  between  us,  by  this  moral 
reconstruction of father-son ethics, and we both found ourselves returned to, for 
Tai-Ya, the ‘father’ who had the ability to bring up his son and the ‘son’ who could 
thank his father, and for me, the ‘son’ who could again see his father’s difficulties 
and his father's efforts to maintain his family.   
7.3.2.3 Between Mother and Daughter: The Transaction of Women Ethics
Hui-Yu’s  stories  re-contextualised a gendered cultural  embodiment of  the ethics 
between mother and daughter, although her main therapeutic concern was for her 
son YH. Yet, while YH was the priority, her conflicts with her daughter Ling were also 
narrated in our counselling sessions, in which ‘women ethics’ in Taiwanese culture 
became the context of a transactional cultural exchange from Hui-Yu’s mother to 
her daughter. 
As discussed in the last section, the five cardinal human relations codified the ethics 
between father and son but not between mother and daughter. In the old Chinese 
tome ‘孝經 Hsiao Jing (the book of filial piety)’ which codified the ethics of ‘filial  
piety’, the father is set as prior to the mother in a family that a ‘son’ should be 
filial28 while no behaviour of a ‘daughter’ is mentioned. The context of ‘filial piety’ in 
28 資於事父以事母而愛同．資於事父以事君而敬同．故母取其愛．而君取其敬．兼之者父也。孝經士章第五 
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Chinese society is developed from father-son ethics and therefore father-daughter, 
mother-son  and  mother-daughter  relationships  are  subordinate  relative  to  the 
father-son based ethics of ‘filial piety’. This section will discuss the gender issues 
behind Hui-Yu’s effort towards YH and its influence on her relationship with Ling.   
Mother,  in  Taiwanese  society,  is  mostly  seen  as  the  main  person  who  takes 
responsibility of looking after the sick children in the family (Kleinman, 1980, 2006). 
As the old Taiwanese slang ‘men take the responsibility of the affairs outside of the 
home, and women inside29’, when a member has a chronic disease, the women in a 
family take the responsibility of caring for this sick person. Mostly, the grandmother, 
mother and sisters are responsible for rearing and taking care of the patient, while 
the father and son are not. Hui-Yu’s conflict with Ling showed how this patriarchal 
term  was  transacted  from  the  last  generation  to  the  next  generation,  which 
reconstructed their moral position in the family and recontextualised the ‘women 
ethics’ found in Taiwanese cultural terms.  
For me, as presented in Chapter Five, engaging in Hui-Yu’s narration of how she 
looked after YH gave me a new perspective of seeing the role of ‘mother’, which I  
had  previously  taken  for  granted  in  my  own  family  history.  My  interactive 
counselling practice developed my perspective not only because I saw first-hand 
how Hui-Yu’s took on the difficulties of her family but also how a ‘mother’  had 
insisted upon her  moral  position in  the family  and took this  responsibility  with 
silence.  Knowing  her  story  enabled  me  to  understand  my  mother  again  in  the 
position  of  the  ‘son’.  For  both  her  and  myself,  we  were  actively  finding  the 
29 男主外，女主內
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contextual value of the ‘mother’ in the language of our ‘families’, by means of the 
mutual understanding of women ethics from our culture. 
Women’s family ethics are codified as the ‘Three Obediences and Four Virtues’ to 
follow, which means that a woman in her life has three persons to obey and four 
virtues to guide their behaviour: According to the Confucian literature‘儀禮、喪服、
子夏傳( Manner, Mourning, Tzu-Xia Chuan)’, a woman has to obey her father when 
she is not married, to obey her husband when she is married, and to obey her son 
when her husband has passed on. From ‘周禮、天官(Chiu-Li, Tien-Guan)’, a woman 
has  to  conduct  herself  morally,  speak  proper  words,  keep  a  beautiful  face  and 
master domestic skills. These codified moral regulations define a woman’s proper 
manners in  her  family.  In  her interaction with me, Hui-Yu never  mentioned her 
father, but told me how she was taught by her mother in the traditional countryside 
Yi-Lan  (S1,  S7).  Since  she  was  little,  the  values  of  being  a  proper  woman were 
embodied in her everyday life and 'obeying the husband and the son (S1)' became 
the core rule that she had to keep in her family even though her husband was ever 
unfaithful and her son was labelled as having a lifelong disease. Therefore, facing 
her  husband’s irresponsibility,  she chose to endure the shame of  the husband’s 
infidelity so as to switch her hope of family satisfaction from her husband to YH at  
the expense of her daughter. 'I have never denied that I am treating girls as inferior 
of boys (S2, S4, S6)', as she said. When Lee was disloyal to this family, YH was her 
only hope until he was found problematic by medical professions. Understandably,  
the diagnosis of autistic tendency nearly ‘destroyed’ this hope in 2001. However, 
her narration had represented that, to obey the mother’s teaching that the son is 
the centre of her life, she was forced to put her entire effort on YH’s intervention 
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and had to neglect her daughter.  
Ling therefore became a neglected child since Hui-Yu spent most of her family time 
on YH’s intensive interventions. At the same time, following what her mother had 
taught her, Hui-Yu tried to educate Ling to be anther ‘traditional woman (S6)’, just 
like herself. Therefore, Ling was taught to be a girl who had to obey her father's 
words  when  she  was  young  and  to  also  feel  responsible  for  her  sick  younger 
brother. Through mother-daughter ethics, Hui-Yu attempted to transact the context 
of women ethics and again embed them in the next generation. However, Ling is  
not Hui-Yu after all, and Hui-Yu’s teaching gradually turned into conflict with Ling 
when her daughter reached puberty. As she said, ‘The society is not the same from 
20 years ago;  Ling could not accept my words (S6)’.  In her disappointment, she 
worried that Ling would not accept the responsibility of looking after YH, the ‘son’  
who  was  supposed  to  serve  as  the  centre  of  this  family.  The  disappointment 
represented a failure in efforts to transact the family ethics between mother and 
daughter. 
In  summary,  different  issues  emerged in  my relationship with  Hui-Yu.  This  case 
presented a gender issue involving the passing of family ethics between the three 
female generations of her family. In counselling practice, we gave the ‘mother’ a 
cultural context with sociological understanding; Hui-Yu’s wholehearted focus on YH 
and her neglect of Ling challenged my paternal understanding of her but enabled us 
to  re-develop  a  maternal  perspective  incorporating  woman’s  ethics.  With  the 
developing interpretation of mother, our conversation contextualised a cultural but 
patriarchal interpretive horizon of the family ethics. The context of ‘women ethics’ 
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became a symbolic object embedded into our understanding of the ‘mother’ in our 
everyday life as a silent caregiver. When our therapeutic practice focussed on the 
experience  of  suffering  for  the  ‘son’,  due  to  the  moral  structure  of  Taiwanese 
society, Hui-Yu had to unavoidably put herself in the position of suffering for the 
women’s tradition and family ethics, as well as suffering from the impaired mother-
daughter relationship these ethics cultivated. Culture embodies the moral values in 
one’s responsibility for the other and, in language, becomes a symbolic ‘other’ that 
one has to suffer for.  
7.3.3 Summary: When Culture Itself as an ‘Other’
Cultural values and practices are never static, according to McLeod (2005), but shift 
to reflect the ways that individuals develop contextual responses to environmental 
processes. Tayler (1988) argued that we are all situated within a moral topography 
that orients us to life by demarcating the good. In our therapeutic work, we develop 
a horizon of understanding about how our culture embodies the ‘moral topography’ 
and its values in our relationship with others. Culture, in this sense, is a symbolic  
‘Other’ which codifies the context of ethical orders in the everyday language we use 
for communication. Being horizontal to a medical perspective of illness (Kleinman, 
1987), family ethics in Taiwanese society actively shaped the relationships created 
between  myself,  participants  and  their  sons.  This  study  also  developed  an 
understanding of  a  mother’s  moral  position,  from the patriarchal  context  which 
Confucian  tradition  has  embodied as  ‘Women ethics’.  Echoing  McLeod,  through 
dialogue in psychotherapeutic practice, we built the ‘Culture’ as a relational object 
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upon which we applied our reflexivity. On the one hand, we attached ourselves to 
the responsibility  found between parent  and son.  On the other hand,  we were 
developing the comprehension of suffering through the values rooted in our culture 
and our everyday life. Responsibility is heavy, not because of the reason for the 
son’s  lifelong  illness,  but  because  of  the  ethics,  the  lifelong  context  of  fitting 
ourselves into our culture and tradition. 
7.4 Religion: The Deconstruction of the Relationship between Self and God
Religion  was  also  developed  as  an  important  ‘Other’  in  the  psychotherapeutic 
process of  constructing the meaning of  suffering.  Illness is  pathological,  but the 
experience of suffering is not (Summerfield, 2004). It has been explored as political, 
cultural and, in this section, will be discovered as religious, because both clients put  
‘God’  in  an  important  position  when  narrating  the  experience  of  suffering.  As 
discussed, an individual could feel recovered from a disease not only because of the 
reduction of clinical symptoms but also because of his/her subjective interpretation 
of ‘becoming better’ which is strongly related to the relationship between self, body 
and others (Kleinman, 2006; Frank, 2001, 2005; Wilkinson, 2005). In this context,  
religion  does  not  heal  people  through  pathological  recovery  but,  rather,  allows 
people  to  subjectively  ‘feel  helped  by  God’.  Different  from  the  experience  of 
recovery from an objective disease, religion help one subjectively re-interpret his or 
her experience of suffering and recovery as well.
This  final  section  presents  the  development  of  the  language  of  an  individual’s 
relationship  with  ‘God’,  the  language  which  involves  a  religious  context  that  is 
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spoken, communicated and responded to in the process of counselling. When both 
clients mentioned their experience with an awakening of responsibility for their sick 
child, they developed the language of ‘God’s help’ at the same time. In their most 
agonising moments, both Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu transformed their unbearable suffering 
into actions of lifelong responsibility, and they both attributed this transformation 
to God’s help. In this sense, God became a contextualised ‘Other’ who is beyond 
the ‘son’ that Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu are responsible for. In our therapeutic practice, we 
also developed relational understanding not only with our important others, but 
also  with  God.  This  part  of  discussion  will  explore  the  development  of  this 
interpretive horizon of suffering and responsibility for God. 
However, Taiwan is a society with multiple religions. Due to its Daoist and Buddhist 
historical  background,  a  dominant  part  of  the  population  embraces  polytheistic 
perspectives  of  God,  in  which  different  ‘gods’  may  help  people  in  different 
situations for different reasons. Especially for non-Christian people, being religious 
may mean one’s  strong and safe  binding  with different  names of  ‘gods’.  In  this 
ethical  context,  I  adopt  ‘God’  as  the plural  form of  our  religious  context  in this 
research. The context of ‘Lao-Tien-Yei (老天爺)’ or ‘Tien (天)’ mentioned in Hui-Yu’s 
sessions and the first chapter of this study mean ‘God’ in the context of general use. 
However, ‘God’s help’ for a Christian like Tai-Ya, although it has the context that God 
helped him through the ‘Holy Spirit (S5)’, has the Taiwanese historical background 
of how he found himself settled between different Christian branches. Tai-Ya and 
Hui-Yu showed that ‘God’s help’  and their  attachment to God contain historical, 
political and geographical contexts. Nonetheless, from an understanding of how Tai-
Ya and Hui-Yu developed their appreciation for God, their experience of suffering 
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was given an extra-ordinary meaning: for them, suffering meant not only assuming 
responsibility for their son, but also re-connecting themselves with God.  
Accordingly, the context of ‘God’s help’ will be discussed from my clients’ subjective 
perspective on their lived experience of suffering. For instance, Hui-Yu developed 
the discourse of ‘sacrifice’ where she believed her son made a bargain with God for  
saving the whole family. I will further discuss this understanding from a Taiwanese 
folk perspective of trans-lives suffering. In Tai-Ya’s stories, the chaos of interpersonal 
relationships in his Presbyterian community threatened his relationship with God, 
but  when  he  settled  down  himself  in  the  Salvation  Army,  he  re-secured  his 
relationship between God, his son and himself as well. In the therapeutic practice,  
their  experience  was  developed  as  the  interpretation  in  which  God’s  help  is  a 
subjective context with the integration of socio-political resources. Rebuilding the 
secure relationship with God in language re-contextualises the ethical responsibility 
for the other, and re-secures relationships with others. In our intersubjectivity, God 
has been developed as an object which we attach to. In my clients’ experience,  
suffering  for  the  son  was  developed  as  the  ongoing  history  of  taking  the 
responsibility of God. Religion, through the hermeneutic understanding of suffering, 
embodied the values of our everyday responsibility in the experience of suffering.
7.4.1 Hui-Yu’s ‘God’s Help’: The Trans-life Suffering 
In the sixth counselling session, Hui-Yu mentioned this help from God, and 
contextualised how she transformed it into the responsibility for God:
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In my most depressed moments,  there are always people guiding me 
where  to  go  and  directing  me  how  to  do…seriously,  apart  from  the 
moment that you told me Yi-Hung is possibly an autistic boy, I never get 
lost afterwards. I believe that ‘Lao-Tien-Yei’ is truly helping me. (S6)
I will never give up!! From these years, what I have learnt is that I should  
and will not give up! If you ask me what I could teach those mother (with 
autistic child), I think all I can tell them is never giving up to the child. It is  
not only the responsibility for yourself, but also the responsibility for Lao-
tien-Yei. (S6).
The  development  of  ‘Lao-Tien-Yei’  in  Hui-Yu’s  stories  explains  how  Taiwanese 
society  interiorises  the  ‘causality  of  suffering’  which  contains  a  folk  context  of 
transmigration:  A suffers for B in ‘this life’  in order to compensate B because A 
harmed  B  in  ‘previous  lives’.  In  Kleinman’s  fieldwork  in  Taiwan  in  1980,  he 
mentioned how the Taiwanese folk therapist ‘Donki’ related one’s physical illness to 
his/her interpersonal relationships with others from the person’s different ‘lives’. 
Hui-Yu’s story shows how the folk-religion perspective of suffering was embodied in 
her subjective context of transformation, in which the experience of suffering is 
transacted between different ‘lives’. As showed in Chapter 5, Hui-Yu developed the 
discourse of YH’s ‘sacrifice’,  in which YH,  before he entered this world,  used his 
autism to exchange his  health for his father’s return.  As she said in our second 
session, ‘I believe that YH sacrificed himself to bring his father back to us. Before he 
came to this world, he might have made a bargain with God and used part of his life 
as a sacrifice to save this family….This is the only way that I can explain Lee’s return.  
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(S2)’, Hui-Yu felt that in ‘this life’ she had the intrinsic responsibility for repaying her  
son’s sacrifice.
In our work together, Hui-Yu developed her subjectivity around her interpretation 
of a balance between lifelong ‘suffering’ and her ‘responsibility’ for her son. This  
interpretation is not only the son’s sacrifice so that the family can be reunited but 
also God’s help so that the father, mother and son could return to their ethical 
positions in this family. For Hui-Yu, YH’s disability reminded of her unavoidable and 
primordial responsibility for YH in which YH’s sacrifice was the moral ‘debt’ which 
she had to pay and existed prior to any present relationship with others. Beyond the 
subjectivity of her responsibility, the relationship between Hui-Yu and YH is not only 
the  family  context  of  suffering  for  the  sick  son  but  also  the  context  of  the 
responsibility ‘before’ YH was sick, in which the ‘Lao-Tien-Yei’ of God has already 
affirmed  her  efforts  concerning  YH  as  her  lifelong  responsibility  for  God.  The 
meaning of ‘suffering’ was transacted to the responsibility for YH; also, the meaning 
of ‘suffering’ was transacted to the ‘responsibility for God’.
Hui-Yu’s  case  provides  a  different  perspective  in  terms  of  ‘recovery’  from  the 
medical empirical model, in which she did not develop the storyline of getting rid of 
suffering but of  ensuring her  moral  connection with her  son and God. Through 
translating  her  subjective  experience  of  life  into  language  for  our  counselling 
conversation,  she  reframed the  ethical  power  structure  of  God,  YH and herself 
based  in  a  Taiwanese  polytheistic  context,  and  extended  the  context  of 
responsibility from ‘this life’  to the ‘last life’.  For her,  understanding ‘God’s help’ 
could  heal,  not  in  the  context  of  taking  ‘suffering’  away,  but  in  the  context  of 
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confirming the moral weight of her responsibility.
7.4.2 Tai-Ya’s ‘God’s help’: The Christian Context of Suffering: 
For Tai-Ya, he showed how he related his responsibility for Kevin to his awareness of  
‘God’s  help’  in  the  context  of  Christian  morality.  Like  Hui-Yu,  in  our  counselling 
practice,  he  redefined  his  ‘responsibility  of being  Kevin’s  father (S7)’  and 
transformed the responsibility for the son as also the context of the responsibility 
for God. From the ‘enlightenment’ of the Bible story, he gained a new interpretation 
of being the father in which he re-located his moral position between Kevin and 
God  and  re-defined  his  responsibility:  Taking  the  responsibility  for  Kevin  also 
became his lifelong responsibility for God, as he reflected on this enlightenment in  
our sixth counselling session:
‘….We believe that God would empower us by his certain power, we call it 
the ‘Holy spirit’. Through our awareness of Holy Spirit, we feel the important 
message that God is trying to pass to us. You know…I have listened to this 
story30 for many times since I was a child and cannot explain why in that 
special night this story could come to my mind and cause my insight at the 
time? After that night, I am more certain that God was helping me teaching 
me the responsibility I should take for him and Kevin…(S6)
As presented in Chapter Six, Tai-Ya grew up in a Presbyterian Christian family. Since 
he  was  a  child,  he  was  used  to  attending  the  religious  activities  in  the  Pu-Li  
30 The story from bible about the master and servents
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Presbyterian Church, which is the biggest church in Pu-Li town. As Pu-Li is a small  
town with people who have close relationships with one another, the congregation 
had been a ‘big family (S2)’ to him, which meant the congregation worked with the 
context  of  family  ethics.  However,  when  Kevin  returned  home  in  2007,  Tai-Ya 
started to bring him to the congregation and Kevin was regarded as the ‘wild kid’ 
who ruined the worship and caused the members to blame Tai-Ya for  failing to 
educate  his  son.  For  Tai-Ya,  ‘having  an  autistic  son’  became  the  stigma  in  this 
communion because his son was labelled as the difficult boy and he was thought of 
as  the  irresponsible  father.  Kevin’s  return  affected  his  relationship  with  his 
worshiping partners  and threatened his  relationship  with God.  Therefore,  Tai-Ya 
found his  own family was rejected by the congregation,  and because of  Kevin’s 
difference, his most important social support became cruel social condemnation. 
He had no choice but to leave. In order to secure his relationship with God, he  
joined the nearby church of ‘Salvation Army’ despite the fact that he had no idea of  
the difference between the two branches. 
The  Presbyterian  Church,  since  1865,  has  been  the  oldest,  biggest  and  most 
influential  Christian organisation in the history of Taiwanese Christianity and has 
influential power over Taiwanese religion politics. In Pu-Li, the Presbyterian Church 
was the only Christian church built in 1873 and provided the sole place to worship 
God (http://www.pct.org.tw/aboutus.htm, 2009).  In 2000, the year after the Earth 
Quake  921,  the  Salvation  Army  established  its  ‘base’  in  Pu-Li 
(http://www.salvationarmy.org.tw,  2009).  Comparing the two Christian institutes, 
the Salvation Army has very different interpretations of the Bible and various moral 
concerns  regarding  proper  Christian  behaviour,  but,  apparently,  the  biblical 
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difference was not involved in Tai-Ya’s consideration of his relationship with God. 
For him, the relationship between himself and God was only dependent on having a 
church where his son could worship God with him without receiving any criticism 
from  the  congregation.  In  the  process  of  developing  his  relationship  with  the 
Salvation Army, Kevin’s ‘mistakes in my previous congregation became not a mistake 
at all (S4)’, rather, from the priest, ‘Kevin’s meaningless language and voices were 
part of our religious service (S4)’ and ‘became the teaching from God’ (S4). For Tai-
Ya, the most important thing in the process of re-securing his relationship with God 
was that Kevin’s autistic tendency was regarded as part of their worship ceremony, 
which reconnected God with both him and his son. 
Beyond the context of Tai-Ya’s transformation from suffering to worshiping God, Tai-
Ya’s  stories  provide  the  subjectivity  that  ‘God’s  help’  is  not  merely  a  spiritual  
comfort to a person like him but also the relational support conditioned by socio-
political reality. To secure his relationship with God, the Biblical context of ‘God’s 
help’ was not developed as the necessary condition of the transformation. Rather, 
his subjective awareness of the attachment to God had to be in tune with the socio-
political and geographical harmony in which the location, people and worshiping 
procedure in the Church dictated/affected his reconnection with God.  To re-shape 
the responsibility for God, he had to re-organise the safe attachment to his son as 
well as other people, space and God.
7.4.3 God as the ‘Other’ Whom We Are Suffering For
From Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu’s examples, their relationship with God was developed into 
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different  contexts  of  understanding  where  Hui-Yu  showed  the  development  of 
Taiwanese folk interpretation of God and Tai-Ya provided a Christian perspective of 
spirituality  and  the  Taiwanese  political  background  of  Christianity.  However,  for 
both of them, taking the responsibility for God, as the infinity in terms of Levinas 
(1986), was developed as the lifelong task with their son who has been labelled as  
having a lifelong autistic tendency. In this horizon, the moral order between God, 
self and son was constructed and affiliated in the narratives about their subjective 
experience of suffering. The embodied ethics and moral values were contextualised 
in the God-self relationship, in which taking the responsibility for their son could 
make them suffer and, on the other side, cause them pride. 
7.5 Summary: Politics, Culture and Religion as the ‘Others’ in Suffering Transaction
In this chapter, my research data re-explored the three hermeneutic horizons from 
the  development  of  three  socio-cultural  embodiments  of  politics,  culture  and 
religion. The three parts of discussion showed that, in the narratives from Tai-Ya, 
Hui-Yu and myself, the Taiwanese political setting of early intervention, a cultural 
tradition of family ethics and the religious understanding of ‘God’s help’ pre-set the 
interpretation  to  our  responsibility  not  only  ‘for’  the  sick  son  but  also  ‘for’ 
themselves, as the three greater symbolic objects as the ‘Others’. When therapeutic 
practice formulates the context of suffering for the sick son, this chapter showed 
the process whereby we are also suffering for immature medical policy, patriarchal  
social customs, folk cultural values and local religious beliefs. In terms of a Lacanian 
context, Early Intervention, Family Ethics and ‘God’s help’ became the three objects 
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of  ‘symbolic  order’  which  contextualised  our  responsibility  of  suffering  (Fryer, 
2004). In Levinas’s concept of ‘suffering for the other’, they were developed as the 
symbolic ‘Others’ which embodied the moral values in our languages.
These three symbolic ‘Others’ also indicate the moral orders of our responsibility 
from a socio-cultural perspective: in the medical field, family and our local culture, 
when we experience suffering, we have to change ourselves to adapt to certain 
socio-cultural  roles  and  moral  positions.  When  engaging  in  Taiwanese  early 
intervention  and  providing  their  children  with  treatment  through  medical 
intervention,  both  clients  and  myself  had  to  bind  to  each  other  through  the 
medicalised responsibility of being a functional parent and therapist, so that we 
could use medical language for conversation in both everyday life and the medical 
field. Family ethics, in cultural terms, pre-framed our family positions and facilitated 
the  ethical  context  of  family  relational  responsibility.  The  link  with  God 
reconstructed the moral affiliation from the sick child, ourselves and family, to the 
contextual body of ‘God’. In therapeutic practice, the language of suffering and the 
understanding  of  lived  experience  were  developed  in  a  bigger  horizon,  the 
contextualisation  of  taking  the  responsibility  for  the  ‘other’.  Psychotherapy, 
therefore, aimed to achieve a mutual understanding of our ethical actions in various 
moral settings, and did not focus on the pathological change. 
The fifth chapter In Dao-De-Jing may be a good synthesis of these three ‘Others’ 
which represents our ‘unkind society’ developed in the psychotherapeutic dialogue, 
where, like Levinas’s illustration of ‘useless suffering’ and ‘evil’  (1988),  a Chinese 
philosopher  Lao-Tzi  (1000BC)  used  ‘benevolent’  to  talk  about  the  people’s 
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attachment  to  God,  society  or  ‘heaven  and  earth’,  and  used  the  metaphor  of 
‘bellows’ to illustrate one’s  practice of his or her moral position. 
Heaven and earth do not  act  from (the impulse of)  any  wish to be 
benevolent; they deal with all things as treating straw dogs. The sages 
do not act from (any wish to be) benevolent; they deal with the people 
as treating the straw dogs as well. 
May  not  the  space  between  heaven  and  earth  be  compared  to  a 
bellows? It  is  emptied, yet  it  loses not its  power.  When it  is  moved 
again,  it  sends forth air  the more. Much speech to swift  exhaustion 
lead we see. Your inner being guard, and keep it countered.
(Dao De Jing, Chapter 5, Lao Tzu, 100BC)31
Psychotherapy  reconstructed  the  ethical  order  in  our  therapeutic  practice  and 
enabled us to reflect upon the everyday practice of our moral position (Kleinman, 
1999). Encountering suffering, in our psychotherapeutic relationship, was processed 
as an inter-subjective practice of ‘moral return’, in which both my clients and myself 
were finding ourselves a new moral affiliation in our family, culture and society. The 
discussion  of  ‘moral  return’  will  be  more  clearly  discussed in  the  next  chapter.  
However, we were finding a way to be a better father, mother and son from the 
understanding of the other’s ‘praxes’ of being the father, mother and son. The next 
chapter will conclude this thesis with the arguments that the psychotherapy is an 
inter-subjective  ethical  practice  (McLeod,  2001;  Loewenthal,  2005),  not  only 
31老子：天地不仁。以萬物為芻狗。 聖人不仁。以百姓為芻狗。 天地之間。其猶橐籥乎。 虛而不屈。
動而愈出。多言數窮。不如守中。 （道德經，第五章） 
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because of a client’s moral return from his or her self-disclosure of suffering, but 
also because of the therapist’s moral return when witnessing clients’ experience of 
suffering. 
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Chapter 8  Transaction in Psychotherapy: Moral Return and 
Witnessing
8.1 Introduction
Continuing the discussion of the last chapter, the exploration of the three socio-
cultural embodiments of suffering commonly points to the ethical perspective of 
the responsibility for the other. This chapter, therefore, will articulate a synthesis 
discussion  on  the  ethics  which  has  been  constructed  in  the  language  of 
psychotherapy. I  will  firstly focus on the ‘discourse of disability’ which made the 
therapeutic  practice  in  this  study  a  process  of  ‘understanding  suffering’.  The 
intersubjective point of ‘disability’ which was co-constructed and co-experienced by 
my therapeutic relationship will  be presented in 8.2. In 8.3, turning back to this 
thesis’s  topic  about  the ‘transaction of  suffering’,  I  will  generate an interpretive 
model from what I have explored about the transaction between the socio-cultural 
embodiments and the language processed in therapeutic practice. Finally, I will re-
illustrate  the  development  of  intersubjective  ethics  in  this  psychotherapeutic 
process. How a therapist manifests self-other ethics and local morals in this process 
will be related to the method of building up the relationship between therapist and 
client. Responding to the postmodern argument that psychotherapy is an ethical 
practice,  an  argument  in  which  psychotherapy  offered  myself  as  therapist  a 
reflexive horizon of ‘being witnessed’ will be made. In 8.4, I will also try to engage in 
dialogue with the researchers who have contributed to the humanistic perspective 
of psychotherapeutic practice. In doing so, I aim to illustrate the contribution of this 
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research concerning the ethical values in the conduct of psychotherapy.  
8.2 The Discourse of Disability
The narratives of  suffering,  in therapeutic  process,  are developed as  the careful 
consideration  of  the lived  and experiential  nature  of  suffering  (Cushman,  1990, 
1993,  1995;  Gantt,  2002).  The nature  of  narratives  is  one’s  subjective  life  (Das, 
2001) and the hermeneutic or interpretive dimension of the language of suffering 
(Cushman,  1995).  As  reviewed in  Chapter  Two,  in  therapeutic  relationships,  my 
clients and I engaged ourselves in a ‘hermeneutic circle’ whereas both client and 
therapist interpret,  understand, response and reinterpret the lived experience of 
suffering  with  each  other,  so  that  the  nonverbal  lived  experience  can  be 
transformed into ‘hermeneutic horizons’ and the language of understanding can be 
achieved by the ‘fusion of horizons’ (Heidegger, 1982; Gadamer, 1990). Following 
the last chapter’s discussion about the socio-cultural embodiments of suffering, I  
will continue with my analysis based on hermeneutic phenomenology and discuss 
the discourse developed through the common understanding of suffering, and the 
discourse  and  hermeneutic  circle  of  ‘disability’  that  was  developed through  my 
therapeutic relationship with my clients.
In  this  context,  Kevin  and YH’s  ‘disability’  became the  beginning  discourse;  this 
original  narrative  facilitated  our  therapeutic  work  because  the  therapeutic 
programme was set in the medical service of CMUH which included the diagnostic 
process of the children’s ‘developmental retardation’ and the political setting of the 
‘early intervention’. The context of responsibility explored in this study was largely 
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regulated by  the medical  ethics  administered  in  paediatric  treatment  in  CMUH. 
However, in the process of therapeutic conversation, as represented, what we had 
been engaged in was not only the way of changing the child’s disability, but also the 
process of showing our own ‘disability’ coping with the son’s constant label and the 
overall  ‘unkind’  environment.  In  the  discourse  of  ‘disability’,  not  only  the  son’s 
everyday life was transformed into a medical history of ‘autistic tendency’, but also 
our everyday life was reviewed critically as the hermeneutic understanding of our 
own inability. The development of different reflective and reflexive horizons, in this 
process, enabled us to contextualise our inability of shouldering the weight of the 
responsibility  for  the  son.  The  development  of  these  narratives,  as  it  is  always 
responding for the son’s disability, constituted the ‘discourse’ which represents ‘our 
disability’  in  the  process  of  encountering  suffering  (Gee,  2001).  In  this  part  of 
writing, I will discuss the ‘discourse of disability’ and focus on its formation in the 
process of our therapeutic practice.
8.2.1 Objective reality: The Disabled Children
YH and Kevin’s ‘disability’ was the first subject developed in the language used to 
facilitate medical communication between both clients and me. In the Taiwanese 
medical system, Kevin and YH were labeled as having ‘developmental retardation 
with mild to moderate autistic tendency’. Their ‘disability’ began with the assigning 
of  a  medical  label  which  had  political  implications  that  concerned  medical  
intervention  and  the  use  of  social  welfare.  Beyond  paediatric  pathology  and  a 
diagnosis with clinical developmental indexes, Tai-Ya, Hui-Yu and my responsibility 
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for the children was shaped by the decisions I made regarding medical treatment, 
social welfare and educational reference. My psychotherapeutic practice in CMUH 
was conditioned by the mutual acknowledgement of the children’s illness with its 
medical  and political  contexts.  As  a  practitioner  in  Taiwan,  I  had  to  accept  the 
objective reality that these children were clinically delayed and thus needed ‘help’  
and ‘progression’, so that therapeutic trust could be developed in our relationship. 
In the Taiwanese medical and political setting, the relationship between myself and 
clients could be very close but fragile, because the therapeutic ‘results’ decide the 
clinical progression of the child and determine whether the medical label of the 
child could be replaced by a less harmful one before the child is six years old. The  
final psychological assessment before a child’s age of six would decide whether he 
or she is permanently ‘disabled’ or ‘retarded’ which is used in Taiwanese common 
medical  description.  These  therapeutic  politics  naturally  caused my  relationship 
with clients to have long-term tension before the age of six, because, in YH’s case 
for example, my assessment enabled a child’s disability to be treated by medical 
service and social policy on the one hand but on the other hand my service could  
not ensure that the stigmatisation of a child’s permanent ’retardation’ faded away. 
Disability could dictate stigma, hope, pressure and ambition in clients’ cooperation 
in a relationship within medical professions. Nonetheless, there was no other way 
but to accept the dominance of medicalisation (Kleinman, 1997). 
The discourse of a child’s disability, therefore, was developed as part of the history 
of coping with Taiwanese medical politics. Although, in our therapeutic relationship, 
we needed to design task-oriented plays for the children in therapeutic sessions 
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and at home in order to evaluate the child’s progression, we needed to bind our 
good relationship with other medical  professionals  so that  the multi-disciplinary 
work between paediatric, rehabilitation and special education could help facilitate 
or accelerate the possible change. To enable the use of other services with social 
workers for governmental social care, Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu had to apply for the proof 
of disability,  which is a stamp of ‘retardation’ on the son’s ID card. For the two 
families,  this  long  process  was  undoubtedly  uncomfortable  and unsafe.  For  the 
disabled child, they have to extend not only the medical knowledge but also the 
political actions from the unknown and with compressed anxiety and stress. This 
process  of  coping  with  politics  constituted  the  different  facets  of  each  son’s 
disability.   
The  illness  was  also  cultural  and  social  (Kleinman,  2000;  Frank,  2006),  as  our 
practice  developed  the  understanding  of  a  disabled  ‘son’  in  a  society  with  a 
patriarchal  moral  structure.  For  example,  Hui-Yu  developed  the  context  of 
‘obedience to the son’ to cope with the family stress in which YH is the only son in 
her family. Tai-Ya’s discourse of feeling ‘unfilial’ was also because he could not ‘give 
his  father  a  healthy  grandson’  (S1).  Strictly  speaking,  what  this  research  has 
contributed concerns ‘the discourse of disability’ relative to a ‘son’s’ developmental 
retardation, not a ‘daughter’s’, because in the moral structure of Taiwanese society 
a daughter with lifelong disease could be treated with different family dynamics. 
For a ‘son’, a parent has a strong ambition to break medical stigmatisation and thus 
maintain  a  cooperative  relationship  with  the  medical  profession.  However,  very 
often a greater ambition causes a bigger loss. When the label of a son’s lifelong 
disability fails to be removed, the indelible stigma, with its contexts of family ethics, 
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could be transformed as a lifelong loss. 
Accordingly, although the label of a son’s disability in this study was started from 
the ‘medicalisation’ of children’s development, in the work with the parents, we 
also coped with the child’s ‘disability’ with our social politics and local morals. In the 
dialogue developed in  counselling  sessions,  the  child’s  illness,  responding  to an 
anthropological  perspective,  was  not  only  pathological  but  also  political  and 
sociological.  Nonetheless,  the discourse of  a  son’s  disability  is  tightly  connected 
with the parent’s loss and failures. In the other side of responsibility for the son, the 
parent’s work and his/her abilities were also medicalised within the political and 
socio-cultural contexts. I will  articulate the discussion of this ‘other side’ of each 
child’s disability, and argue that the parents’ own ‘discourse of disability’ was also 
shaped through the process of psychotherapy.
8.2.2 The Disabled Parent
Medicalisation, as discussed in the previous chapters, is the process by which, in 
order to deal with the son’s autistic tendency, medical professions, social policies 
and local  culture compulsively change the context  of  parents’  everyday life  and 
responsibility;  they have to passively  accept  the embodiment of  the values and 
weight  of  the  ‘new’  responsibility  assigned  to  them  by  external  bodies.  This 
‘passivity’ requires the parents to learn the new language of the medicalised and 
remoralised responsibility. To prove themselves as a ‘responsible’ father or mother, 
they have to use this language to communicate with medical professions. They lose 
the freedom to use everyday language in the medical field, and have to translate 
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the languages between home and hospital, without other choice.
In this study, for instance, Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu had to re-identify their son’s everyday 
behaviours  as  the  autistic  typical  symptoms  so  that  they  could  report  them to 
therapists and cooperate with them in order to improve their son’s abilities. With 
responsibility  involving  embodied  medical  values,  they  attended  the  parenting 
group of ‘self-growth’, repeatedly brought the child back to doctors ‘on time’, and 
evaluated the child’s progression from medical professionals’ feedback. To fit the 
medical moral system, they were passively accustomed to the medical conversation 
and had to re-construct the parent-son ethics with their original embodied socio-
cultural and political values. However, this was never an easy process for my clients. 
Compared with the work of facilitating a child’s language development, to deal with 
the son’s disability, parents were positioned in the similar status of disability. They 
had to identify themselves as having no knowledge, lacking the ability to work with 
medical professionals, which they had to ‘learn’ in the medical field from the very 
beginning.  This  difficulty,  in  therapy,  was  developed  as  the  moral  horizon  of  a 
parent’s  ‘disability’,  which served as  the history of  losing their  ordinary life  and 
accepting medical dominance. 
In Tai-Ya’s case, the ‘discourse of disability’ was his moral crisis of being unable to be 
a good father, which was with the context of resistance, shame and regret. The 
developing context of his self-disclosure about Kevin became the history in which 
he had to use to get through this moral crisis evaluated by our medical system and 
cultural tradition. For instance, since he arranged Kevin’s removal from family for 
two years which was done against medical advice, he was blamed by the medical 
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profession  and was  regarded as  the  reason for  Kevin’s  further  ‘retardation’.  He 
referred to himself as a ‘failed father (S1)’ and criticised himself with the medical 
context as the ‘dysfunctional father (S1, S2)’. When he talked about the event when 
he witnessed Kevin being physically punished by a school teacher but did nothing, 
he condemned himself as ‘the father who cannot protect his son from the teacher’s 
maltreatments (S4)’,  although he had to deal  with the reality  and fear that  the 
school was the only place which could handle Kevin. Since Kevin had developed as a 
boy who could not speak like ordinary people in his life, the medical reality had 
obstructed his communication with his son through the medical causality of ‘autistic 
tendency’.  For  him,  Kevin’s  ‘disability’  not  only  created a ’son’s’  limitations  with 
using  medical  and  educational  resources,  but  also  created  the  ‘father’s’  loss  of  
fitting himself in a proper moral position which had been revalued by the medical 
and educational reality. Like the example of Kevin’s school event, because of the 
reality,  Tai-Ya had to keep silent even in front of Kevin. The medical  contexts of  
‘disability’  became the moral  barrier  between a  father  and son,  and became a 
father’s  ‘disability’  with taking the responsibility  for  the son,  which had already 
been pre-valued by Taiwanese socio-cultural and political reality.
As the mother, Hui-Yu’s narratives showed the different contexts in her stories of 
coping  with  a  son’s  autistic  tendency.  Compared  to  Tai-Ya’s  beginning  attitude 
against Kevin’s diagnosis, she chose to obey the medical power and accepted its 
dominance  over  their  mother-son  everyday  interactions.  In  the  narratives 
developed by YH’s three year intervention and her counselling work with me, we 
co-experienced  her  failures  and  success  in  the  process  of  helping  YH  progress. 
Actually,  as  explored  in  Chapter  Seven,  Hui-Yu  and  I  had  a  ‘successful’  history 
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regarding  the  medical  context  of  cooperation  because  her  endeavours  for  YH’s 
interventions were proven by his re-identification as a gifted child. In this history, 
however, although we co-created a successful example of ‘early intervention’ and 
Hui-Yu was honored as the model of a mother with a disabled child, beyond her 
endeavours, she lost her ‘ordinary life ‘(S1) by making the medical values about her 
relationship  with  YH  prior  to  anything  and  anyone  in  her  life.  In  the  virtue  of 
‘obedience to the son (S3)’, she sacrificed her relationship with her daughter. As she 
sighed,  ‘I  can  understand  my  autistic  son,  but  cannot  understand  my  normal 
teenager daughter (s5)’. Her choice for the son became the disappointment of her 
daughter. Although she acknowledged that the decision was inevitable, she had not 
yet developed a way to amend the regret she felt regarding Ling. When relating to 
YH, she had a successful history with the son; when she related to Ling, she labelled 
herself as a dysfunctional and useless mother. 
For Hui-Yu, after YH was recognised as a gifted child in 2005, the ‘success’ involved 
the difficult exchange of taking the ‘ordinary’ back, as the six-year-old YH could now 
enter a mainstream school and study with ordinary children. However, the label of 
autistic tendency could not be taken off and was always the shadow beyond the 
‘ordinary’. YH was clever, could be taught and managed, but was still different from 
normal. He could get the best academic performance in the class but needed a 
careful  teacher in school to help him maintain good social relationships. Beyond 
that, the ‘ordinary’ was Hui-Yu’s everyday three-hour push on YH’s learning after 
school and hundreds of hours of social training at home. Between 2005 and 2008, 
Hui-Yu often felt as if she was ‘getting lost (S2, S6)’ because the ordinary was so 
difficult to keep. Compared with other normal children, she had to try so hard to 
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‘make YH no different from others (S8)’. Therefore, ‘any trouble from YH can beat 
me up and make my efforts go to the very beginning (S2)’, as Hui-Yu said. In her 
discourse of disability, success was fragile and she was never good enough to be the 
mother. Being the mother was difficult because challenges never ended and she 
would be always proven as a failed mother. YH’s self-injury in 2008 was the self-
proven example that she will never know when she ‘will lose everything again and 
crawl up from the beginning (S7)’.
Staying in the difficult position as the father and mother, both Hui-Yu and Tai-Ya 
made the confession of their inability of taking responsibility for the sick son in our 
therapeutic practice. Suffering, in this sense, was the reflection on the process of  
taking the values and weight judged by our culture, society and medical politics. In 
their  discourse of  disability,  suffering was their  moral  crisis,  in  which the moral 
weight of being a parent could be too heavy to take. The ‘discourse of disability’, as 
a parent’s suffering, was not only socio-cultural and political, but moral.
8.2.3 The Disabled Therapist
As  a  therapist,  I  developed my own ‘discourse  of  disability’  in  response  to  my 
clients’  narrations.  As  a  clinical  profession  in  paediatric  psychology,  my 
responsibility was facilitating a child’s progression and clinical changes through my 
therapeutic practice. The work was based upon the working ethics in which the 
child’s ‘retardation’ has to be doublely acknowledged by both parents and myself, 
so that I could position myself in the work between a disabled child and his or her 
family. 
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However, psychotherapy or psychological intervention was not always a successful 
process, and I usually exposed myself in the 'manipulated' failures experienced in 
front  of  clients.  Take  Tai-Ya  and  Hui-Yu  for  example,  as  presented  earlier,  my 
preferred way of psychological intervention was to invite parents to stay with their 
children so that I could model a psychological task and mediate the unspeakable 
communication between a parent  and the child.  For example,  I  would design a 
cognitive task/game, model the process of play and reorient the parent’s and child’s 
responses to each other. However, in Tai-Ya’s case for example, in the beginning 
stage, I often had ‘failed trials’ of interacting with Kevin. He could not play with me 
in the games and it was difficult for me to manage the unexpected interactions. Tai-
Ya,  since he sat by our side,  always witnessed my failures and I,  therefore, was 
exposed as having my own inability to properly conduct therapy. In the three years 
of YH’s psychological intervention, I often had failed therapeutic trials in front of 
Hui-Yu as well. 
These  ‘failed  trials’  in  my  work  with  a  family,  however,  switched  my  position 
between my client and the son from a therapist-client relationship to more like a 
family membership, and offered me a reflective horizon to reframe my own family 
experience.  In the therapeutic  relationship between parent,  son and myself,  my 
inability responded to Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu’s  inability of being the parent. Different 
from the cognitive or behavior based approach of psychotherapy, the failed trails 
did  not  mean  therapeutic  failure;  rather,  in  the  alliance  of  teaching  the  son 
together, the experience of my failed operations, on the one hand, become the 
phenomenon of  ‘co-experiencing’  the parent’s  inability  and,  on the other  hand, 
facilitating deep empathy and mutual responses (Schmid, 2001). In other words, my 
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therapeutic failures became the articulation of the experience of ‘disability’. They 
were as if I was telling them that in facing the child I was no different from them, a  
mother  or  father  with anxiety  and worry.  The way in  which I  could not  always 
effectively conduct a ‘successful therapy’ with my client was just like the way in  
which  they  could  never  be  a  ‘”good  enough”’  father  or  mother’.  Through  this 
therapeutic encounter, the failed trials re-presented our common difficulties that 
we could not always do our parenting well. The development of the term ‘disability’, 
therefore,  co-responded  to  each  other’s  lived  experience  of  feeling  disabled, 
articulated  the  experience  of  suffering  and  formed  advising  voices  like  Hui-Yu’s 
saying that ‘making my son progressed is so difficult that we have to learn to slow 
down ourselves (S6)’.  Accordingly, my ‘failures’ enabled the discourse of disability 
developed as the mutual understanding shared with Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu.
Also, in therapeutic supervision, I  developed an interpretive horizon towards my 
own life  history in which I  was deconstructing my medical  position and relating 
client’s contexts of suffering to my everyday life, which caused my moral crisis. For 
me, my therapeutic approach always positioned myself in the ethical dilemma of 
the conflict between a parent and the child and my own lived experiences of living 
‘between’ my parents and my aunt with Down syndrome were usually recalled. As 
disclosed previously, in my family position, I wanted to change my family’s attitudes 
towards  my aunt  but  I  could not.  I  was unable to make a change in  my family 
relationship and so I had to keep silence to fit myself in my family traditions. When 
my  therapeutic  work  enabled  me  to  engage  myself  in  a  client’s  family  as  if  a 
member, they had been de-medicalised from my clinical position but re-moralised 
in  regard  to  the  therapeutic  relationship  with  our  shared  family  ethics. 
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Psychotherapy with family ethics, therefore, became the practice of developing the 
hermeneutic understanding of my own life history along with that of my clients.
In Chapter Five, I discussed how knowing Hui-Yu’s efforts with YH caused my crisis in 
my relationship with my own mother. Being the witness who attended to Hui-Yu 
and  YH’s  history  from  2001  to  2008,  as  a  male  therapist,  the  developing 
comprehension  of  a  mother’s  efforts  and  sacrifices  challenged  my  patriarchal 
understanding of my own history in which, as the son, I took my mother’s efforts  
and sacrifices for granted. Hui-Yu’s narrations about the socio-cultural meaning of 
the  ‘mother’s’  responsibility  and  the  way  in  which  Hui-Yu  took  responsibility 
reminded me of how my mother chose her attitude to live in my family with the 
same paternal ethical frame since she entered a family with a disabled member. As I  
started to know Hui-Yu better, awareness of ‘taking a mother’s effort for granted’ 
shocked me. In therapeutic supervision, I began to confess that I was the ‘unfilial  
son (TS4)’ who could be accustomed to ‘not’ seeing my mother’s sacrifice. However, 
being ‘unfilial’ meant I failed to be the son, which was a strong cultural critique of  
my position due to our Confucian family values. In other words, developing Hui-Yu’s 
horizon of a disabled mother repositioned myself in the ‘disability’ of being a son. In 
this  process,  the  encounter  with  Hui-Yu  re-valued  my  understanding  of  the 
‘mother’,  but  acknowledged  myself  as  the  ‘son’  who failed  to  comprehend the 
responsibility of my ‘mother’. 
My  therapeutic  approach  also  positioned  myself  in  the  mutual  ethical  conflict 
between father and son in Tai-Ya and Kevin’s therapeutic work. As discussed, with 
the local family ethics of a father-son relationship, this psychological intervention 
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facilitated the common comprehension of Tai-Ya’s discourse of disability, in which 
he was conflicted with his relationship with his son and father, and re-developed his 
ethical  attachment with them. For  me, on the other hand,  our work connected 
myself  with  my  family  history  where  I  suffered  from  a  similar  ethical  situation 
between  my  father  and  aunt.  From  Tai-Ya’s  narration  about  his  unspeakable 
arguments with his father, I experienced my own unspeakable conflict in which I  
had to repress my medical  role and keep silent when watching my father inflict 
inappropriate  punishment  upon  my  aunt.  Tai-Ya’s  stories  articulated  my 
unspeakable suffering and ethical conflict, in which my two roles as a paediatric 
psychologist and a son contradicted with each other in our acknowledgement of 
family ethics. Facing Tai-Ya’s experience of suffering, therefore, I developed my own 
discourse of disability. In the father-son ethics, I was unable to change my family 
whilst  I  was  always  endeavouring  to  change  a  family  like  mine.  The  process  of 
engaging in Tai-Ya’s stories developed my discourse of ‘disability’, in which I lost the 
ability of communicating with my father and suffered from the conflict between 
Taiwanese family tradition and the medical values to which I also adhered. 
Accordingly,  in  the  therapeutic  work,  my  own  ‘discourse  of  disability’  was 
contextualised by the process of responding to my clients’ discourse of disability. 
‘Feeling inability’ was developed as an inter-subjective experience. My therapeutic  
operational ‘failures’ became an important part of our intervention and enabled 
myself to experience a parent’s experience of ‘disability’ of helping the son together 
with them. In this developing ethical relationship with common acknowledgement 
of  family  ethics,  I,  like  both  clients,  stepped  away  from  my  medical  role  and 
returned to my moral position as the ‘son’ and a family member. The clients’ stories 
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not only articulated the suffering caused by their ethical conflict, but also reframed 
my interpretative horizon towards my own lived experience and gave voice to my 
unspoken ethical conflicts. To respond to the medical reality of the son’s disability,  
in our therapeutic relationship, we reflected upon our own experience of disability, 
which was the confession of our moral conflicts and where we all contextualised a 
return to our moral position and moral responsibility. 
8.2.4 Disability of a Moral Role; The Discourse of ‘Moral Return’
Hence, in this study, through developing the co-comprehension of suffering, I have 
tried  not  to  build  my  argument  based  on  therapeutic  effectiveness;  rather,  I 
focussed on my therapeutic failed trials and discussed the experience of our own 
shared ‘disability’. However, in recognising ourselves as assuming a disabled role in 
our responsibility for the other, we recognised our moral role in this relationship. 
This study, therefore, developed the other side of the discourse of disability, which 
can be argued as the discourse of ‘moral return’: our subjective return to the moral 
position of the father, mother, and the son. 
This research has represented examples of how a son’s ‘disability’, whilst it has been 
diagnosed as a medical reality, could be transformed into ethical values and moral 
weight, and hence taking on the responsibility for him could become a process of 
attaching ourselves to our own moral positions. It is the discourse in which engaging 
in  the  suffering  caused  by  looking  after  the  sick  son,  we  re-acknowledged  our 
responsibility and endeavour for the son. To illustrate the values and weight of the 
responsibility, the parent-son ethics and family ethics were contextualised so that 
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our perspective of the experience of suffering could be switched from our medical  
responsibility for the disabled child to the moral responsibility to no one else but 
the ‘son’.  Beyond the therapy,  parallel  to  the ambition of  facilitating  the child’s 
progression,  we  had  practiced  ourselves  back  to  the  everyday  ethics,  with  the 
context of our cultural values and local tradition. 
From  ‘disability’  to  ‘moral  return’,  this  study  has  represented  that  a 
psychotherapeutic  practice  could also  reconstruct  the moral  values  in  language, 
which are socio-cultural-based and beyond its medical reality. At the beginning, our 
therapeutic relationship was set to be medical because the diagnoses of ‘autistic 
tendency’ and ‘developmental retardation’ served as the common relational sense 
which  conditioned  our  therapeutic  trust  with  each  other.  To  cope  with  the 
medcialised  everyday  life,  a  parent’s  responsibility  had  to  be  changed  by  my 
therapeutic intervention, and in this process our experience of failing our moral 
responsibility  was  exposed  in  front  of  the  other:  the  inappropriate  parenting 
responses, the useless action of helping the child, and the failures of my therapeutic 
operations.  In  this  practice  in  the  medical  field,  we co-constructed  the medical 
ethics in which I took my responsibility as the therapist in relation to their roles as  
patients and clients. To take the medicalised responsibility, we developed our own 
discourse  of  disability  and  the  ‘disability’  re-valued  the  way  we  experienced 
‘suffering’ for the son with autistic tendency. 
Parallel to the development of medical ethics, the morals between a son and parent 
were then shaped through conversation with me. In our therapeutic process, what 
really impressed us was our common achievement with the son’s progression, in 
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which we shared the responsibility as simply the mother and father, and, like Tai-Ya 
and Hui-Yu,  I  also developed a relationship with the child like his  parent.  When 
Kevin and YH were stopped at a certain developmental level, I worried, and, when 
the children broke the limits, I was as happy as Tai-Ya and Kevin. This development 
of our relationship was not relative to my medical responsibility of being a therapist 
but  was  the  most  important  thing  in  my  therapeutic  experience  with  enabling 
myself to encounter their family dynamics. The difficult ‘progression’ of Kevin, on 
the one hand, was teaching us how to respond to the rigid life with the son; on the 
other hand, it was re-shaping a parent’s connection with the child in the context of 
everyday life. Responsibility, which belongs to the primordial ethical position as the 
father and mother, was therefore given as a practical direction to take. With the 
success  in  therapy,  I  was  more  able  to  make  my  therapeutic  intention  in  my 
interaction  with  Kevin  and  YH  with  Tai-Ya  and  Hui-Yu,  and  they  developed  the 
ambition  of  being  a  more  capable  parent.  The  context  of  ‘progression’  was 
becoming a rooting contextual loop and made us attach to our acknowledgement of 
‘the’ responsibility for the son. To facilitate the communication between a parent 
and son, psychotherapeutic practice enabled us to return to the simplest role of 
‘the’ father and mother, acknowledge the intrinsic ethical values, and simply taking 
responsibility for ‘our’ child.
In addition, the ‘responsibility for the sick son’ developed between clients and me, 
as discussed, was similar to the ‘partners’ of a family, in which a father and mother  
were together helping the sick son. This ethical context developed in our practice 
manifested the contextualisation of family ethics. For example, Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu 
brought their  conversation and interaction with me back to their  family and re-
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organised their partnership in relation to their relationship with me. For the three 
of  us,  the  ‘responsibility’  was  given  the  cultural  terms  of  understanding  as  the 
‘family ethics’ which transformed the value of ‘alliance’ between the therapeutic 
room and their  home.  In  the period of  conducting this  study,  Tai-Ya recognised 
himself  as  having  a  key  role  in  his  family  where  he  could  ‘empower’  his  wife, 
regarded the first  long trip  as  being a challenge for  him and his  wife,  and also  
thanked and apologised to his father. His ‘moral return’, was facilitated not only 
through his role as the ‘father’, but also the moral position as the ‘husband’ and 
‘son’. For Hui-Yu, she brought our therapeutic tasks to home and asked her husband 
to take part in training YH together in their everyday life, and she also started to 
think of the barrier between her and her daughter. Her discourse of ‘moral return’  
repositioned herself as not only the mother of the sick son but also the wife and the 
mother of her ‘normal daughter’. For me, because of them, I could also be reflexive 
about my family role between my father, mother and son and therefore, beyond 
therapy, I returned to my ethical identification as the ‘son’ rather than a medical 
professional  in  my own family  life.  Therapy,  for  us,  became the inter-subjective 
acknowledgement of the moral relationship with others, in which we could return 
to our intrinsic moral position as the father, mother and son.
Accordingly,  psychotherapy, in this process, could be regarded as the practice of 
ethics  (Lowenthol,  2005;  Gantt,  2002),  because  from the  narration  of  suffering,  
both clients and I were put in the hermeneutic circle of re-constructing the values 
of our ‘responsibility for the other’. ‘Moral return’ is an interpretative synthesis of 
the therapeutic experience and process of this research, because in the medical 
context about the son’s illness and recovery, clients’ and my ‘responsibilities for the 
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others’ was developed as having their moral values manifested in the horizons of 
the  ‘everydayness’  of  suffering.  In  face-to-face  encounters  between  myself  and 
clients, the moral ethics of our responsibility become the core issue to acknowledge 
our lived experience of suffering, rather than our political  settlement in medical 
realities. Accordingly, from this ethical horizon, I would now like to further discuss 
the ‘encounter’  between myself  and clients,  which I  labelled the ‘transaction of 
suffering’ between myself and clients.
8.3 The Hermeneutic Interpretive Model of Suffering Transaction 
From ‘disability’ to ‘moral return’, psychotherapy in this study was given an inter-
subjective space in the hermeneutic circle of the lived experience of suffering. In 
having mutual responsibility for each other, between therapist and client, the lived 
experience of suffering was transformed into language, and, through understanding 
and responding, the experience could be experienced by the other (Frank, 2001). 
Narratives developed by therapeutic interactions, in this dialogic nature became the 
history in which one is recognising the lived experience of suffering and defining the 
values of the responsibility. Psychotherapeutic practice starts with the responsibility 
between therapist and client, and extends the symbolic meaning of the relational 
responsibility  to  the  linguistic  world.  From  unspoken  lived  experience  to  the 
language for the other, and then to comprehension to verbal responding, ‘suffering’ 
and ‘responsibility’ have been explored as having socio-cultural values and moral 
weight which were also formed, given, accepted and contained between therapist 
and the client, and transformed between living experience and language. This part 
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of writing, from  Wittgenstein‘s linguistic approach and Heidegger and Gadamer’s 
perception of the hermeneutic circle, will focus on the margin between suffering 
and responsibility, which has been conceptualised in this study as the ‘transaction 
of suffering’. 
Accordingly,  from the construction of ‘disability’,  I  will  further illustrate how the 
meaning of suffering was manifested in the dialogue between clients and me. In 
9.3.1, a phenomenological model of this process will be generated but it should be 
emphasised that this model is not a conclusion for suffering transaction but, rather, 
it  is  meant  to  be  used  to  explain  the  circulating  process  of  a  therapeutic 
relationship, in which responsibility could be transformed from the experience of 
inability  and  developed  into  everyday  actions.  Language,  in  this  context,  is  a 
medium that facilitates the hermeneutic circle of suffering. From the discussion in 
previous  chapters,  we  developed the  socio-cultural  horizons  of  interpreting  our 
experience and therefore ‘suffering’ could be understood between people through 
its transformation from lived experience to language. In 9.3.2, the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal  levels  of  understanding  will  be  discussed.  In  9.3.3,  from  the 
perspective of moral return, we can really discuss the ‘transaction’ of the values and 
weight exchanged through the responsibility for the other.
 
8.3.1 An Interpretative Model: The Transformation of ‘Disability’ 
The Figure  8.1,  which  appears  below,  shows  the  interpretative  model  of  the 
discourse of disability. From the initial contact of psychotherapy, my clients and I 
were positioned in the mutual responsibility between a therapist and client and 
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developed our mutual responsibility with and for each other. Due to the therapeutic 
responsibility based on medical ethics, client’s lived experience was narrated and 
responded to  by  me.  ‘Understanding’  became the  procedure  of  developing  the 
hermeneutic  context  of  ‘disability’.  Intra-personally,  both  clients  and  I  were 
engaged in a narrator’s position which transformed our own lived experience into 
the communicable language. The narratives, which contained the ethical order of 
the  responsibility  for  the  son,  transformed  their  unspoken  or  unspeakable 
experience of suffering into language. Also, interpersonally, between us, on the one 
hand, one’s verbal responses articulated the other’s lived experience; on the other 
hand, the relationship with the specific and symbolic ‘Others’, as discussed as being 
part of the son and family Taiwanese tradition, was concluded in our conversations. 
In this process, from Lacan’s point of view (Flyer, 2004), our subjective reflection on 
our  own  social  positions  caused  the  experience  of  ‘suffering’  to  be  co-
acknowledged with its ‘symbolic orders’. In Levinas’s context, we encountered and 
witnessed suffering, and turned ourselves back from the primordial responsibility to 
its  very  beginning  face-to-face  in  our  everyday  life.  To  take  this  responsibility, 
suffering  has  its  contextualised  values,  and  enabled  us  to  return  to  our  moral 
position in our ethical system, as illustrated in the last section about ‘moral return’. 
The therapeutic process was therefore presented as the continuous recognition and 
identification of self-other ethics.
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Figure 8.1 The interpretive model of the discourse of disability 
From this interpretative model, the term ‘transaction’ was endowed with two levels 
of  hermeneutic  meaning.  The  first  level  is  intrapersonal  transaction,  which 
incorporates Heidegger’s  and Wittgenstein’s  term concerning the transformation 
between language and embodiments when one is facing an-other. The values of 
ethics and the weight of responsibility could be given in language and transacted 
between non-verbal and verbal. The second is interpersonal transaction, in which, 
from  Levinas’s  phenomenology,  suffering  is  given  its  meaning  through  taking 
responsibility for the other, and its values and weight could be transacted between 
one and the other. In this research, suffering has been explored as having its socio-
cultural contexts of moral values which are embodied by our society, politics and 
culture.  Psychotherapy  has  been  also  explored  as  the  process  through  which 
suffering has its values and weight received, held, contained and passed between 










8.3.2 Transaction between Language and Lived experience
Between lived experience and language,  the term ‘suffering’  has  been explored 
from  an  anthropological  point  of  view  that  Taiwanese  medical  politics,  social 
structure and cultural tradition embodied the values in our everyday actions and 
the use of their language. The hermeneutic horizons presented in the last chapters 
have also showed the history of how our culture and society set the moral frame in 
which we acted and interpreted our responsibility for  the ‘son’  with permanent 
disability. To make one’s experience of suffering understood by the other in our 
psychotherapeutic practice, the moral values embodied by our society and culture 
were revealed through speaking and being conceived by understanding.
Hui-Yu’s  example  was  the  story  which  transacted  the  cultural  patriarchal  family 
ethics  with a  middle-class  mother’s  responsibility  for  her  son.  In  the Taiwanese 
Confucian family ethics system, her story presented how she learned the ‘Women 
Ethics’ from her mother and wanted to teach the ethical values to her daughter. In 
the history of suffering for YH, to keep the family which is valued by the male, she 
had to repress her emotions and took on her husband’s business when he was 
disloyal  and away from the family.  When YH was diagnosed as having a lifelong 
disability, she used the whole family as a resource to help the son. To manifest the 
Woman Ethics of ‘obedience to father, husband and son’, she kept a woman’s family 
virtue  but  ‘sacrificed’  her  intimacy  with  her  daughter.  Her  sigh  of  ‘I  could 
understand my autistic son but could not communicate with my normal daughter 
(S6)’ presented her loss and moral conflict because of her choice of the son. 
In her subjectivity of YH’s ‘sacrifice’, Hui-Yu transformed his son’s autistic tendency 
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to our folk cultural context of transmigrational suffering, in which YH’s disability was 
regarded as the sacrifice to God for saving the whole family. The ‘disability’ was 
given the local-cultural but subjective values transacted between her unspeakable 
experience  and  the  language  spoken  in  counselling.  When  she  reviewed  our 
therapeutic practice in our final session, with our cultural context of ‘suffering’, she 
used the metaphor ‘回甘 Hui-Gang (s8)’ to illustrate the process of bringing up her 
son in which the light sweetness could re-exemplify a bitter sip of good tea. Socio-
cultural embodiments of our everyday life, through language, could be developed 
as  having  the  moral  values  and  responsibility  weight  in  the  interpretation  of 
suffering. Hui-Yu’s narrations showed clear examples of intrapersonal transactions 
between socio-cultural embodiments and the language for an-other.
With a similar  process, Tai-Ya’s stories also formed our cultural  ‘family ethics’  in 
which the ethical values between father and son as well as between husband and 
wife were re-defined in the process of speaking the ‘suffering’. Through insight and 
attribution  to  God,  Tai-Ya  developed  spiritual  confirmation  of  the  affiliation 
between God, himself, his family and Kevin. The responsibility for Kevin was then 
given religious meaning as his lifelong task for God. The experience of suffering for  
the  son,  from  embodiments  to  language,  transacted  the  ethical  values  to  our 
therapeutic conversation. 
For me, as presented in my therapeutic supervision, my implicit conflicts with my 
parents contained my subjective rationality of ‘family ethics’, which also constituted 
my  therapeutic  intention  and  verbal  responses  to  my  clients.  I  formed  the 
perspective of ethical compensation in which ‘being a good therapist could help a 
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family like mine’. Not only my clients but also myself had reconstructed a moral  
structure with the mutual acknowledgement to ‘fit’ ourselves and the others in this 
system with moral values. The process of therapy was developed as a history of 
transacting  the  common  knowing  of  our  socio-cultural  embodiments  to  the 
language of mutual therapeutic responses. 
Beyond the medical  reality of our mutual responsibility for each other, the lived 
experience of suffering was developed as having its own ethical order in which we 
used language to convince the other that taking family responsibility was difficult.  
Being a good father and mother is difficult; simultaneously, being a son is difficult,  
too. In our ‘discourse of disability’, language had its moral order as the confession, 
in which none of us in therapy could be ’good’ in our relationship with the son. In 
order to speak with one another, we gave our experience of suffering the meaning 
of ethical values from our embodied experience. To understand, we contained and 
held  the  values  and  weight  of  our  responsibility  in  our  bodies.  The  process  of  
speaking and understanding is also the process of giving and receiving, in which the 
moral values set behind our responsibility as the father, mother and son could be 
manifested. Intra-personally, therapeutic practice revalues the ethics of suffering by 
endowing  it  the  transactional  values  and  weight.  Facing  the  other,  suffering 
therefore could be transacted between body and language.     
8.3.3 Interpersonal Transaction: Understanding the Other’s  Suffering as  Holding 
and Containing
In  the  face  of  the  other,  ‘from  the  start,  the  encounter  with  the  Other  is  my 
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responsibility  for  him  (or  her)’  (Levinas,  1987,  p.  103).  In  terms  of  therapeutic 
relationship,  I  extend Levinas’s  arguments  of  the  ‘responsibility-for-the-other’  in 
this research where my clients and myself are calling and called by the responsibility 
for each other in the very beginning of our encounter,  and manifest  the ethical 
values through the transaction of suffering, in which one’s subjective ethical order 
of  suffering  could  be  acknowledged  by  the  other.  Suffering,  therefore,  is 
interpersonal and can be focussed on how the moral contexts of suffering could be 
developed. The ‘discourse of disability’ is an example that my clients and myself 
were engaged in each other’s inability by sharing the common moral values from 
our society and bearing the weight of responsibilities together. This section intends 
to discuss how or the ways in which language itself conserves the values of suffering 
and transacts suffering interpersonally.  
Veena  Das  (1996)  used  Wittgenstein’s  context  of  ‘your  pain  is  in  my  body’  to 
illustrate the transaction between pain and body. Her perspective of ‘pain’ endows 
this research of suffering an interpersonal perspective of transaction, in which ‘your 
history of suffering is in my lived experience’ so that one’s language could articulate 
the other’s experience of suffering. Psychotherapy is a practice of making the other 
understand and understanding the other. Between therapist and client, when one’s 
lived experience is contextualised into history with the other, the values and weight 
of suffering is also chosen to ‘answer’ the call from the other (Levinas, 1979, 1988; 
Naef, 2006). To respond and develop the history, the other has to acknowledge the 
value and contain the weight of suffering from the conversation. Interpersonally, 
through language, ‘suffering’ is  interacted and transacted between therapist and 
client, and its ethics can be co-acknowledged.
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Blackwell (1997) used a psychodynamic perspective to see the inter-subjectivity of 
communication. He used Winnicott’s concept of ‘holding’ and Bion’s ‘containing’ to 
illustrate a mother’s subtle adjustment to her baby’s body responses as well as the 
mutual influences between therapist and clients. To face the other, my clients and I 
had to hold and contain ‘suffering’, which always comes along with the moral and 
cultural  contexts  embodied  in  our  everyday  life,  to  achieve  the  common 
understanding and acknowledgement. In this process of interaction, we enabled the 
language from the other to embody their subjective ethical orders of things with/in 
our own lived experience. For example, we had to understand how the other has 
been sacrificed and feel  how the ‘heavy’  shouldering of  a  lifelong responsibility 
could be; then, we responded for the other with our own ethical order of things.  
Face  to  face,  following  Levinas’s  context  (1979),  suffering  is  also  transacted 
inescapably:  we received,  held,  contained and returned the ‘suffering’  back and 
forth in our therapeutic conversation. 
For this research, to encounter the ‘suffering’ from a mother, father and son, the 
psychotherapeutic practice in this  study transacted the cultural  values of  ‘family 
ethics’ through our mutual responding. In Hui-Yu’s case, we together acknowledged 
the virtue of the ‘mother’ in Taiwanese culture and society, because the years of 
witnessing enabled me to understand the difficulty of her achievement. Also, from 
this understanding, I had to hold and bear the patriarchal context of a mother’s 
suffering which challenged my taken-for-granted understanding of my mother. The 
challenge became my moral condemnation as an ‘infilial son’ and enabled myself to 
change my relationship with my mother. In this ‘transactional inter-subjectivity’, we 
exchanged  the  mother’s  ‘difficulty’  in  our  families  and  re-defined  our  moral  
332
responsibility  for  others.  In  Tai-Ya’s  therapy,  his  narrations  about  our  ‘unkind 
society’ gave strong voice to my anger that our society was unkind to my family as 
well. My lived experience, due to the common background, enabled me to hold the 
anger  together  with  Tai-Ya  and  responded  to  his  helplessness.  His  unspeakable 
conflict with his father and the break-through of that conflict articulated and re-
examined my unspeakable relationship with my own father. Our cultural values of 
the  ethics  between  father  and  son,  through  ‘transaction’,  were  recognised  and 
identified  so that  we could re-settle  ourselves  in  the ethical  affiliation between 
father and son. The narratives of both clients and my ‘suffering’, when the lived 
experience was transformed as the language for the other, were developed by our 
therapeutic practice and also articulated and responded for the other’s ‘suffering’. 
Using Schmid’s (2001) reflection on Buber and Levinas, in the therapeutic process, 
suffering is transacted and acknowledged by the state of ‘encounter’, in which one 
becomes the presence to the Other.  In the face-to-face encounter,  by means of 
Das’s (1996) context of transaction of pain, the Other’s suffering is in my history. 
8.3.4 Moral Return: The Acknowledgement of Moral values
In the discussion of the ‘presence’ of psychotherapy, Peter Schmid (2001) used the 
terms ‘co-experiencing’ and ‘co-responding’ to illustrate the inter-subjectivity of an 
‘encounter’ acted between therapist and client. He cited Rogers’s (1967) context 
where therapeutic comprehension is ‘from percept-ion to ac-cept-ance’ and ‘from 
knowledge to ac-knowledge-ment’  (Schmid,  2001,  p.  76).  Through a therapeutic 
encounter,  narratives  contextualise  suffering,  which  is  then  co-accepted  from 
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conversation and co-acknowledged from the mutual understanding. In therapeutic 
inter-subjectivity,  one  is  called  to  respond  by  his  response-ability  to  respond 
(Schmid,  2001).  This  research  showed  the  intersubjective  process  of  ‘co-
experiencing’, ‘co-responding’ and ‘co-acknowledging’, which has been explored as 
the process of ‘moral turn’: the process of constructing the ethical order between 
self and other. 
As discussed, local moral structures between self and others could be manifested in 
the process  of  psychotherapy (Kleinman,  1986).  During the counselling practice, 
both client and I started to reflect that we returned to the family position as the 
father, mother and son because of our awareness of our mutual responsibilities. 
Therapeutic  conversation,  rather than its  medical  rationality  of  the son’s  illness, 
reconstructs ethical meaning of suffering as it constituted the history in which we 
could  fit  ourselves  in  the  our  common  acknowledgement  of  our  culture  and 
morality.  In  therapy,  the  son’s  lifelong  medical  label  was  represented  as  our 
‘conflicts’ with not only the sick son, but also the family, politics, culture and God. 
Psychotherapy, in this study, developed and practiced the relational responsibility 
for different symbolic Others, as discussed in the last chapter. In our relationship 
with God, society, politics and son, the ethical structure and moral affiliation of our 
responsibility for the ‘Other’ was acknowledged and the values of suffering could be 
confirmed with its ethical orders.
Accordingly,  the ‘acknowledgement’  itself  is  ethical,  which represents  our  moral 
return to the presence of therapy (Schmid, 2001). Here, with our cultural context of  
‘人倫 (jen-lun): ethics’, I want to further discuss the ‘acknowledgement’ developed 
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in  psychotherapeutic  process.  According  to  the  Oxford  Dictionary (2008), 
acknowledgement means the ‘Acceptance of the truth or existence of something’. 
In  this  study,  Tai-Ya,  Hui-Yu  and I  acknowledged suffering  through encountering 
each  other’s  lived  experience  and  contextualising  the  history  of  taking  the 
responsibility for their son. The ‘suffering’ was acknowledged with the values and 
weight we held, contained and transacted with each other in this dialogical process. 
However, ‘acknowledgements’ have the meaning of ‘the expression of gratitude or 
appreciation for something’. Through the other in therapy, we acknowledged not 
only  the  history  of  how  we  suffered,  but  also  the  history  of  how  the  other’s  
responses  articulated  the  experience  of  suffering  so  as  to  be  heard.  Since  in 
suffering  we  returned  ourselves  back  to  the  moral  affiliation  with  others,  the 
responsibility for the other, when it is acknowledged as ‘primordial’, can be grateful  
as well. As Tai-Ya’s release form the awareness of the lifelong responsibility for God 
and Hui-Yu’s metaphor of ‘Hui-Gang’,  the acknowledgement of suffering has the 
other side of its ontology: the thanks to the other.
8.4 Beyond Therapy: Co-Suffering, Bearing Witness and Being Witnesseed
In  his  argument  that  therapy  is  a  ‘co-experience’  between therapist  and  client, 
Schmid  (2001)  contributed  to  Buber’s  philosophy  of  the ‘I-Thou  encounter’  in 
humanistic psychotherapy as the constitution of manifesting the ethics of ‘We’, in 
which in the therapeutic ‘presence’,  client and therapist worked together as the 
‘we’ who co-create the therapeutic relationship (p. 75, p. 81) . To acknowledge the 
encounter,  both therapist  and client  co-experience the lived experience of  each 
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other and co-respond for each other (Schmid, 2001, p. 78). In this study, I would like 
to  address  the  therapeutic  inter-subjectivity,  or  Schmid’s  discussion  of  ‘co-
experiencing’ and ‘co-responding’ as an interpretative label. I will address this term 
with more socio-cultural contexts explored in this study: the ‘Co-Suffering’, in which 
clients  and  myself  were  together  engaged  in  the  experience  of  suffering  and 
manifesting the ethical values of the responsibilities for the ‘other’. 
In terms of co-experiencing the context of suffering, ‘co-suffering’ can mean the 
same concept with Buddhist’s  perspective of ‘集 (Ji)  Collection'  as mentioned in 
Chapter  Two,  in  which  understanding  of  other’s  lived  experience  of  suffering 
collects and experiences the ‘suffering’ with the other. This study shows a process 
that,  thorough  the  dialogic  process  of  therapy,  my  clients  and  I  together 
experienced moral crises and relational conflicts in which ‘a father failed to be a 
good father, a mother failed to be a good mother, and the son failed to be the son’.  
In these subjective reflections, the ‘discourse of disability’ was constructed by the 
therapeutic ‘co-suffering’. We learned from the other that we could not bear the 
weight  of  our  moral  responsibility;  we experienced the  ‘disability’  together  and 
acknowledged our shared sociocultural values of suffering.
From  the  perspective  of  ‘co-suffering’,  this  research  tries  to  enrich  the 
psychotherapeutic  practice  as  the  practice  of  ethics  for  the  other  (Loewenthal, 
2005),  in  which  suffering  in  this  research  has  been  explored  as  transactional 
between  therapist  and  client.  Facing  other’s  experience  of  suffering;  the 
conversation in therapeutic process itself became the ‘testimony’ for not only the 
clients but also the therapist.  As argued before, in therapy we have to hold and 
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contain the ‘suffering’ which we receive from the other and pass to him. In the 
dialogues  including  client’s  narrations  and  therapist’s  reflections,  ‘suffering’  has 
moral  order  in  terms  of  our  common cultural  and  local  ethical  background.  To 
engage in having a response for the other, we embodied the embodiments of moral  
order from other’s response for us. The narratives from us reconstructed the shared 
moral values and weight of one’s responsibility, and in therapeutic ethics no one in 
it  can  escape.  Perceiving  other’s  language,  we  have  to  bear  the  ‘unbearable 
lightness  of  being’,  as  the  title  of  Milan  Kundera’s  novel  (2000),  and  bear  the 
witnessing of the other’s suffering.
Psychotherapy  testifies  suffering  (Laub,  1995;  Gantt,  2000;  Oliver,  2001,  2004). 
From this  ethical  point  of  view,  I  want  to further  argue that,  in  the process  of 
holding  and  containing  the  other’s  experience  of  suffering,  the  ‘witnessing’  in 
psychotherapy is an intersubjective context between therapist and client as well.  
Not only is the client witnessed by the process of psychotherapeutic encounter, but 
also  the  therapist  is  offered  the  ethical  responsibility  of  ‘being  witnessed’.  This 
research has represented that my suffering is in my therapeutic intention, because 
my implicit moral conflict in family was articulated by clients’ narrations as I was 
called to respond to and for them. This study showed the intersubjectivity that,  
when I  bear the witnessing of client’s suffering, I  was engaged in the inevitable 
openness to our own experience of suffering. Clients were at the same time taking 
and witnessing my suffering as well.
Accordingly, this research forms an argument about therapeutic ethics that, in the 
context of ‘suffering’, a psychotherapist is witnessed by the client. In the explicit  
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level,  when  a  client’s  history  is  constituted  and  understood  commonly  by  only 
him/herself and the therapist, the psychotherapist becomes the only witness for 
the client; vice versa, in the implicit level, when the therapist’s lived experience is  
historically developed in his or her reflections on client,  she or he becomes the 
unique witness for the client. In this part of discussion, I would like to extend my 
argument against the traditional perspective on a therapist’s ‘witness’ position, in 
which the therapist is an ‘expert witness’ (Oliver, 2001). Rather, here, from how I 
was witnessing and witnessed by my clients, I argue that ‘witnessing’ and ‘being 
witnessed’ is the two-fold ethical practice of psychotherapy. Engaging in the other’s 
suffering  is  offered  the  primordial  morals  as  the  ’I-Thou  encountership’  that 
‘suffering’  is  co-experiencing,  co-responding  and  co-acknowledging  by  the  ‘us’ 
(Schmid  2001).  The  therapist’s  power,  in  this  context,  together  with  his  or  her 
experience of suffering, was shared with his and her clients. The ‘co-suffering’, in 
therapy, is also the process of witnessing and being witnessed by the others.
8.4.1 Being Witnessed by Clients
Accordingly, this study presents an argument that the therapist is witnessed by his 
or  clients  in  the  process  of  psychotherapy.  In  my  therapeutic  supervision,  my 
implicit  moral  conflicts  were  formed  as  two  ethical  horizons.  The  first  is  the 
reconnection between myself and my father in which Tai-Ya’s moral conflicts with 
his father and son articulated my unspeakable conflicts with my father. The second 
was the re-contextualisation of my relationship with my mother because witnessing 
Hui-Yu’s silent sacrifice for her family enabled myself to develop the context of my 
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mother’s sacrifice for my family.  To face Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu, I  too engaged in the 
enlarging anxiety of my un-explored and unspoken experience of suffering. While 
my responsibility as a therapist, in my person-centred training background, was to 
facilitate client’s authenticity in their relationship with others, their narration at the 
same time caused myself to be authentic in the relationship with not only them but 
also my important others. My therapeutic response to their ‘moral conflict’ at the 
same time exposed the context of my moral conflict with them. Two examples of 
our  dialogue  about  Tai-Ya’s  unspeakable  conflict  with  his  father  from  his  third 
session and my reflection on Hui-Yu’s insistence in her fourth session could show 
how ‘witnessing the other’ could be intersubjective in our relationship.
I: ‘Ya….for you, it’s kind of the feeling that you don’t know where you could 
put yourself in your family. On the one hand, you hope your father can 
see your independence of keeping your own family; however…, on the 
other hand, you hope your father can really help you look after your son.  
These feelings….you had to hold them in your mind and keep silent. They 
really makes you uncomfortable….’(S3)
Tai-Ya: ‘Yes! I just could not say these feelings to my father. I even doubt myself  
why I was like a child begging for my father’s help… Yes, just like what 
you have said, I had to keep my feelings silent. They were as if the bricks  
staked into a big wall set between my father and myself….’(S3)
My response for Tai-Ya was also responding to myself that the unspeakable conflict 
was contradictory and uncomfortable. For me, that was the feeling that I hoped my 
father could understand but I could not make it. Then, Tai-Ya created metaphorical 
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‘bricks and wall’ also contextualised our shared unapproachable distance with our 
fathers. 
In Hui-Yu’s example,
I: ‘As the mother,  you had to take EVERYTHING on your shoulder. These 
things are so heavy, but, even though no one could really see or feel  
them, you still had to insist by what you have told and believed.’
Hui-Yu: ‘Yes, Yes, Yes, as you said, ” No one could help your son if you feel you 
cannot .“ I had no other way out but only to insist my responsibility for 
YH, because I am his mother.’
The words I used for reflecting on Hui-Yu’s insistence was from my new reflection 
about my mother’s insistence in which she had to shoulder the responsibility of 
being the ‘wife of the eldest son’ and had to quietly keep the family when my father 
was away in Congo,  Africa.  However,  Hui-Yu’s reflection,  by means of  my words 
from our first encounter that ‘No one could help your son if you feel you cannot’, 
showed  me  that  my  mother  was  like  her  and  just  takes  ‘the’  mother’s  family 
responsibility. Her use of my own words subtly revealed to me the weight that my 
mother also chose to shoulder, which then reconnected myself to knowing my own 
mother.    
‘Suffering transaction’, which has been discovered in this research, is a process of 
articulating the experience of suffering through the formation of psychotherapeutic 
relationship and responsibility. As therapists, we actually not only ask our clients to 
tell their stories to us, but also ask ourselves to be engaged in the self-other ethics  
within their stories.  Carl  Roger’s  ‘Authenticity’  (Schmid, 2001),  here,  argues that 
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therapy in the face-to-face encounter offered the therapist a reflexive horizon to 
reflect  on  his  or  her  own  ethical  responsibilities  within  his  or  her  local  moral  
systems. As the audience of client's narrative disclosure, therapeutic practice itself 
offers a therapist a moral position to witness client’s experience of suffering (White, 
1999,  2000).   However,  this  study further argues that,  in order to respond to a 
client’s narration, therapy itself also embeds the therapist in a reflexive horizon to 
re-interpret  his  experience  with  his  or  her  clients.  This  study  has  provided  an 
example that, while my life history enabled me to deeply ‘encounter’ a family like 
mine,  in  these  deep  encounters,  clients  voiced  my  unspoken  and  unspeakable 
suffering. To acknowledge ‘our’ suffering, I also perceived the witnessed therapist I  
assumed with gratefulness. 
8.4.2 A Therapist’s Position of Bearing Witness and Being Witnessed
Therefore, from the point of ‘witnessing and being witnessed’, a further discussion 
about  the  therapist  moral  position  can  be  presented.  I  argue  here  that 
psychotherapy offered the ethical openness to ‘being witnessed’. A therapist ‘bears 
the witness’ when he is exposed to and witnesses a client’s experience of suffering 
(Laub, 1995; Blackwell, 1997; Olive, 2004). To face other’s suffering, if therapy is 
focussed on the level of Techne (Flybjerg, 2002), a therapist’s ‘witness’ is positioned 
as  an  expert’s  company  and  a  psychotherapeutic  practice  is  narrowed  as  the 
techniques of facilitating a client’s narrations of suffering. However, as argued and 
explored since Chapter Two, a therapist  should not  regard himself  as an expert 
engaging in the process of witnessing but, to acknowledge the encounter,  is bound 
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to the reflexivity of the experience of 'witnessing': how he could be witnessed by 
encountering suffering and bearing the witness. As Lin (2001) reflected on Levinas,  
facing  an-other’s  suffering,  we  have  articulated  the  ‘suffering’  together  for  the 
other. In the therapeutic encounter, the moral  position of ‘witnessing the other’ 
and ‘bearing the witness for the other’ has been set in its ‘initial contact’ (Buber,  
1937;  Levinas,  1976;Schmid,  2001).  At  very  beginning,  a  therapist’s  suffering  of 
‘bearing  the  witness’  has  already  been  witnessed  by  clients  in  the  face-to-face 
encounter. Beyond therapy, a therapist can never avoid the openness of his implicit 
context of suffering, but is always choosing his authenticity when ‘being witnessed’ 
by his or her clients. 
This research articulated a critical perspective on a psychotherapist’s reflexive ethics 
in  the  position  of  ‘being  witnessed’,  which  has  been  reported  by  very  limited 
researched (Laub, 1995). I argue that psychotherapy develops the inter-subjectivity 
of  ‘co-suffering’,  in which ‘suffering’  is  given its  meaning by the common socio-
cultural  framework and moral  contexts.  In this inter-subjectivity,  the dialogue of 
therapy  constructs  the  ethical  order  of  suffering  and  enables  the  mutuality  of 
witness and bearing witness. This research argues that, to encounter suffering, a 
therapist is also offered the primordial responsibility to reflect upon his experience 
of suffering, which enables his client bearing and witnessing the implicit suffering. 
8.5 Summary
In Chapters Five and Six,  I  have represented the intertwined history of suffering 
between  my  clients  and  myself.  From  the  representation  of  the  narratives,  in 
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Chapter  Seven,  I  explored  the  hermeneutic  horizons  in  our  historical  review of 
suffering  and discussed the embodiment  of  suffering  from our  medical  politics,  
society  and  culture.  The  formation  of  these  horizons  oriented  my  synthesis 
discussion on the ethical reality of suffering, in which we acknowledged the moral  
structure  of  our  relationship  with  others  and  returned  to  our  moral  position 
through the language interaction.  Suffering,  therefore,  in this  chapter,  has  been 
illustrated as the history in which we develop responsibility for others. 
From the analysis of the discourse of ‘disability’, I firstly explored how the context of  
‘disability’ could position my clients and myself in our shared socio-cultural values. I 
discussed how we transacted the values and weight of our responsibility with the 
other, and constructed our own discourse of ‘disability’ differently from the medical 
reality of the children’s ‘disability’. In the process of developing the discourse, both 
clients and I redefined our responsibility with our co-acknowledged moral values. In  
developing the mutual language, we returned to our moral positions in our shared 
socio-cultural orders. The first conclusion of this study echoed an anthropological 
perspective  of  ‘social  suffering’  (Kleinman,  1991,  1997;  Frank,  1995,  2001;  Das, 
1997; Wilkinson, 2005) that psychotherapy is not only medical but also moral and 
ethical,  which  re-connects  one’s  responsibility  for  the  other  and  facilitates  the 
practice of local ethics and a moral return.
The discussion in Chapter Seven can be extended to showing how the contexts of 
the socio-cultural embodiments had reframed our ethical understanding and pre-
understanding of suffering. Using the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology, 
we engaged ourselves in the hermeneutic cycle to manifest our responsibility for 
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the  other.  Through  the  presentation  of  interpretational  model,  I  re-defined 
‘suffering’ as having its transactional level between intrapersonal and interpersonal, 
in which embodied values of suffering are transacted between lived experience and 
language  and  between  self  and  others.  To  illustrate  the  second  conclusion,  I  
presented and argued that suffering is developing its values and weight through the 
transaction of suffering, in which a therapist and client develop and exchange the 
moral values and weight of their lived experience of suffering to achieve mutual  
comprehension.  
The third argument proposed in this chapter is that the therapeutic conversation is 
developed as  the  testimony  of  not  only  the  client  who  constitutes  the  implicit 
history  of  suffering  but  also  the  therapist  who  shapes  the  implicit  history  of 
suffering in order to respond to and for his or her client. I extended Schmid’s (2001)  
term  of  co-experiencing  and  co-responding  with  the  Buddhist  context  of  ‘co-
suffering’ as in therapeutic conversation suffering has been developed as mutual 
language and experience. In the ethics, psychotherapy offered an ethical horizon to 
a therapeutic practice that witnessing, bearing the witness and being witnessed is 
inter-subjective to the therapeutic relationships. A therapist is offered an ethical 
position and responsibility of ‘being witnessed’.  
The next chapter will conclude this research thesis. Following the extension from 
Levinas’s philosophy of ethics and Schmid’s arguments of psychotherapy, I will focus 
on the paradox of therapeutic reality. I will argue that when we are acknowledging 
and knowing ‘suffering’, we are also 'unknowing' the values of suffering embodied 
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by our sociocultural  and political  reality.  In the final  chapter,  I  will  also propose 
suggestions and improvements for further research of suffering.
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Chapter 9   Ending: The unknowing and acknowledgement
9.1 Introduction
This study, as discussed in Chapter Two, has a property encompassed by Aristotle’s 
term  of  ‘phronesis’  as  the  practical  wisdom  in  which  I  learned  and  gained 
knowledge  from  the  practice  itself.  According  to  Flyvjberg  (2002),  phronesis 
manifests  ethics  and  incorporates  ‘deliberation  about  values  with  reference  to 
praxis (p. 24)’. In this final chapter, I will lead an ending discussion of my reflection 
on  therapeutic  practice  and  reflexivity.  In  9.2,  the  discussion  will  start  from  a 
counter-perspective of ‘understanding’ in which, from two therapeutic moments, I 
will illustrate the contextualisation of ‘unknowing’ and discuss the ethical meaning 
of its process. In 9.3, I will provide an ethical perspective on the therapeutic practice 
presented in this study, in which the contexts of morality and ethics are developed 
in  the  third  space:  between  self  and  the  other.  Following  the  argument  that 
psychotherapy  is  the practice  of  ethics,  in  9.4,  the two main arguments  of  this 
research  will  be  summarised  as  this  study’s  contribution  to  the  discipline  and 
practice of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy will be argued as the process of ‘moral 
return’  and  the  therapist’s  encounter  will  be  discussed  as  a  retrospective  and 
reflexive horizon of ‘being witnessed’. A self-evaluation of my research conduct will 
be presented afterwards in 9.5, and then, as the conclusion of my relationship with 
readers, I will share and reflect on what I have learned from this long long journey.
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9.2 A Process of Unknowing
As discussed in previous chapters, both Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu had developed a two-fold 
discourse about their experience of ‘moral return’. On the one hand, in therapeutic 
practice  they  generated  a  new  ethical  affiliation  concerning  their  relationship 
between  themselves,  God,  family  members  and  son.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
formed a new subjective perspective on the lived experience of suffering as the 
ethics for life. In opposition to the empirical point of view, when they acknowledged 
the ethical context of responsibility, they developed a de-medicalised perspective 
on their son’s illness in which the boundary between ordinary and illness became 
blurred.  For  example,  in  the  sixth  session  when  Hui-Yu  reflected  on  being  the 
mother, she challenged the medical term of YH’s ‘disability’:
‘YH is not “disabled” to be educated. He just needed more time to achieve  
the learning goals. If other child needs 100 times of practice, YH would 
need 500 times or more.  What I  have learnt from teaching YH is  that, 
when I am focusing on YH’s 100th failure, I  should ask myself, whether I 
have  made  myself  prepared  for  the  101st practice,  or  even  the  102nd 
practice…When I  think  like  this,  I  found I  am not  different  from other 
mothers (S6)’. 
Tai-Ya developed a similar reflection on Kevin’s autistic tendency. In our seventh 
session, he was excited about, when meeting with a friend, he found he himself  
‘forgot’ Kevin’s autistic tendency. This caused him to start thinking of the medical  
dominance on his life and the allowances he was told he’d have to take as a result  
of Kevin’s ‘autistic tendency’. 
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‘ I  was  sitting  there,  like  you  in  Kevin’s  lessons,  and  observing  Kevin 
playing with Jack (his elder brother): whatever Jack was playing, he was 
following him, not like the kind of child (autistic boy) at all…Also, last 
Friday, when I was talking with my guests, I saw he sat between us and 
tried to communicate with us. We just interacted with him so naturally. 
WE ALL FORGOT KEVIN IS AUTISTIC! Although he could not use language 
for conversation, everything is so ….natural. I am not denying Kevin as an 
autistic  child.  I  am just  saying that there is  a  moment,  actually  many 
moments, that I forgot he is autistic. I  am thinking that whether he is  
autistic is not important. (S7)’
Hui-Yu also mentioned that she ‘forgot YH’s autism’ in our fourth session, when 
she described the first ordinary week since YH hurt himself.
‘ This week is very normal, nothing special, and very ordinary. Everyday 
YH just goes to school, and then I go to work and do volunteering work in 
the  association  (of  Autism).  When  YH  returns  home,  we  have  our 
everyday  fight  about  his  homework  because  he  is  too  easily 
distracted….Well, you know, that is our everyday life. It is really different 
from the period when he was doing early intervention. I can even forget 
his autism (S4).’
In the book ‘Aiden’s Way’, Crane (2003) used a Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu’s 
fable to describe his journey of knowing and unknowing his son Aiden’s lifelong 
disability.
Chuang Tsu, an ancient Chinese philosopher,  tells  a  story of  a tree 
348
sheltering the village shrine:
…a chestnut oak so huge thousand of oxen could gather in its shade. 
It  measured  a  hundred  spans  around,  and  in  height  it  rivaled 
mountains. It rose eighty feet before the branches began, and dozens 
of them were so large you could make them into boats. People came 
in droves to gaze at this tree. It was like a fair.
One  day,  a  master  carpenter  walked  past  it.  He  did  not  stop.  His 
apprentice, however, was deeply impressed:
‘Since I firstly took up the axe in your service, master, I’ve never seen 
timber so marvelous, so full of potential. But you didn’t even bother 
to look at it.’
The master carpenter scoffed at the lowly apprentice, pointing out all 
the flaws that his  practiced eye could  see in the massive,  gnarled 
hulk.
‘It’s worthless wood. If you make a boat from it, the boat would sink. 
If you made a coffin from it, the coffin would rot in no time. If you 
made doors and gate form it, they’d sweat sticky sap. If you made 
pillars  from  it,  they’d  soon  be  full  of  termites.  That  tree  has  no 
potential whatsoever.’
That night as the master carpenter slept, the tree spoke to him in his 
dream:
‘ What were you comparing me to? Tree with beautiful fine-grained 
349
wood? Fruit trees – hawthorn, pear, orange, and citron? Once their 
fruit  is  ripe,  they’re  picked  clean,  ransacked  and  plundered.  Their  
large branches and broken down; their small limbs are scattered. It 
makes  their  lives  miserable.  And  instead  of  living  out  the  years 
heaven  gave  them,  they  die  halfway  along  their  journey.  All  that 
abuse of the world—they bring it upon themselves. It’s like that for all  
things.
I’ve been perfecting uselessness for a long time. Now, close to death, 
I’ve finally mastered it. And it’s of great use to me.’
When the master carpenter mentioned this dream to the apprentice, 
the younger man was puzzled. Why, if the tree was determined to be 
useless, did it serve the village shrine so well? The master carpenter 
replied:
‘ Shhh! Say no more about it! It’s only resting there. If people don’t 
have a way of understanding such a great oak, they’ll rail against it. 
Don’t you think someone would have cut it down long ago if it wasn’t 
by  the  shrine?  Look,  it  isn’t  like  the  rest  of  us:  it’s  harbouring 
something utterly different. If we praise it practicality, we’ll miss the 
point altogether, won’t we?’
(Crane, 2003, p. 1)
Using this old Chinese Fable as a metaphor, Crane analogises his relationship with a 
son as the relationship between the carpenter and the chestnut oak in this fable. In 
this book about the experience of accompanying his son for 20 years, the son did 
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not develop language. However, in the caring process, the author developed his 
interpretation  of  the  son’s  unknown  disease:  Not  from  the  dichotomised 
perspective of defining or non-defining the experience of suffering, but from the 
unspeakable  process  in  which  he  was  ‘unknowing’  of  his  son’s  illness,  simply 
because of the fulfillment of being the father. Tai-Ya and Hui-Yu were developing the 
same perspective that they are in the same way of ‘unknowing’ their sons’ autistic 
spectrum, as they were in the same way acknowledging themselves as the father 
and  mother.  Without  manipulative  intention  of  language,  ‘unknowingly’,  they 
returned to their primordial moral position of suffering for the others.   
To  connect  Oriental  and  Occidental  thinking  of  human  suffering,  this  research 
focusses  on  the  ethical  level  of  the  interactions  between  client  and  therapist. 
Oriental philosophy, as reviewed in Chapter Two, has offered ethical perspectives on 
one’s  interpretation  of  suffering  before  a  ‘disease’  is  diagnosed  by  the  medical 
profession. An illness can have both its cultural definition and medical contexts in 
Taiwanese  society  (Kleinman,  1986).  For  instance,  Daoism,  Buddhism  and 
Confucianism have offered the rationality of suffering the ethical  based thinking 
about ‘人情 (jen-qing)’, the interpersonal ethics (Kleinman, 1986; Hwang,  2001a, 
2001b) so that one’s disease can serve as the debt the other needs to pay for him. 
For a ‘patient’, when psychotherapy has medicalised his or her everyday life as the 
‘symptoms’ requiring change or ‘progression’, his or her interpersonal relationship 
changes as well. This research showed that to cope with the ‘son’s’ medical label, 
the ‘family ethics’ of a family had to be reconstructed so that its members could 
then re-attach to it. Suffering, in this sense, is developed as having its paradoxical  
reality  of  suffering  and  responsibility,  but  echoes  the  post-modern  thinking  of 
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acknowledgement: ‘Not-knowing’ is a way of knowing (Bion, 1970). To return to our 
moral position, this research has presented that, we acknowledge suffering through 
the process of unknowing it. 
9.3 The Third Space: An Ethical Position for the Transaction of Suffering
The therapist’s ethical window, according to Loewenthal (2006), is typically a two-
dimensional model, in which ‘the main axis concerns whether the psychologist put 
the psychologist first or the client. The other axis is whether the client put the client 
or psychologist first (p.215)’. In the self-other relationship between therapist and 
client,  therapeutic practice has been redeemed as the practice of facilitating ‘an 
ethical  space’  between  the  individual  and  the  environment  where  the  cultural 
experience could emerge (Gans, 2000; Weiner, 2001; Loewenthal, 2006). The ‘third 
space’  in psychotherapeutic  practice,  as Jan Weiner (2001) argued,  is  an ethical 
space from which to view the relationship between our moral principles and our 
personal  ethical  attitude so that the subjective and objective can become more 
companionable bedfellows (p. 160). This research has explored human suffering as 
the  manifestation  of  cultural  and  local  ethics.  Through  mutual  responding  and 
understanding, the co-acknowledgement of suffering could be contextualised into a 
local cultural context. In the ethical space, as explored in this research, suffering 
could be transacted intra-personally between embodied experience and language 
and interpersonally between client and therapist. Neither from the perspective of 
the ‘Self’ nor from the perspective of the ‘Other’, this research argued that in the 
third  place with constant  ‘face-to-face’  between Self  and Other,  the values  and 
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weights can be manifested by its constant transaction as well. Robert Walsh (2005) 
used Levinas’s work to illustrate the things that happen ‘between me and you’ in 
psychotherapeutic praxis.
‘What is left after this phenomenological reduction of ‘psychotherapy’ is 
me ’speaking with ‘you’, me listening to you as if being inhabited by you, 
being heard; you and me conversing where your desire and need to be 
heard have immediate priority over my wish to speak, as if I were being 
held  hostage  by  you;  where  I  am  at  your  disposal  –  disposed  of  all,  
destitute,  facing  you;  and  where,  in  losing  myself  for  you  in  this  way, 
mirabile dictu, I find myself finding myself’ (Walsh, 2005, p. 34)
In  terms  of  ‘transaction’,  this  study  has  explored  suffering  from the  interactive 
narrations between my clients and myself, and argues that the margin ‘between’ 
Self and Other should be recognised as having a specific position involving human 
ethics.  This  study  does  not  form  an  ‘egology’  of  suffering  (Kunz,  1998),  a 
construction of ‘empty self (Cushman, 1990, 1995), or a development of the ‘other’  
in terms of ‘non-self’ or ‘altered self’ (Lin, 2005). Rather, trying not to fall too deeply 
into a dualistic debate, from Levinas’s perspective of suffering ‘for’ the other, this 
study focusses on the ‘responsibilities-for-the-other’ developed by the language of 
the therapeutic process (Gantt, 2000). This study has explored that the therapeutic 
practice in this research manifested the ethical orders of suffering for the son, and 
reconstructed the self-other ethics between members of a family.  
However,  I  need to emphasise here that this research does not posit  an ‘other-
centered’  perspective  on  ‘othering’  suffering  in  a  psychotherapeutic  practice 
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(Strong & Zeman, 2005). From hermeneutic phenomenology, this thesis offered the 
‘Other’  the  meanings  developed  in  this  third  space  so  that  one  could  make  a 
connection to it. Although in Chapter 8, I illustrated the local-culture and politics as 
the  symbolic  ‘Others’  which  embody  the  ethical  values  in  our  everyday 
interpersonal interactions,  through hermeneutic exploration, these ‘Others’  were 
given an historical reflection on how they have been attached to it. To construct the 
inter-subjective history of suffering, the values and weights of responsibility were 
constantly transacted in the space ‘between’ therapist and client. From the point of 
hermeneutic phenomenology, not only contextualising the ‘Other’ is a transcendent 
experience, but also the ‘Self’, which is contextualised by the contextualisation of  
the ‘Other’, is transcendent as well (Deuck & Parson, 2006; Long, 2006). Between 
Self and Other, the transcendence itself becomes a moral paradox constructed as a 
two-person psychology (Cushman, 1990, 1993), in which suffering can have and use 
its  own  grammar  to  contain  the  reality  fraught  with  dilemmas  for  those 
experiencing suffering (Strong & Zeman, 2008). This study posits the argument to 
the ‘third space’ where the ethics of suffering are articulated in the giving-receiving 
intersubjectivity, rather than to evaluate its values and weight. 
In the ethical space without ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ the experience of suffering, in 
this  research,  clients  and I  turn ourselves back to the value found in  the initial  
contact of suffering, which Levinas called ethics and Lao-Tzi named ‘道德 Dao-De’ 
(Nuyen, 2000). Suffering, as Levinas said, is the face-to-face, the bread on the hand 
and the bearing witness, and is a process of recalling the virtue (Deuck & Reimer, 
2003).  To  present  the  mutuality  of  calling  for  responsibility,  this  thesis  has 
presented intertwined histories of suffering articulated by therapeutic interaction. 
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In Taiwan, Lee, Yee and Lin (2003) used the ‘formation, manifestation and change of 
ethical  subject’  to  represent  that  in  the  space  between  self  and  other  the 
experience  of  ‘we-ness’  is  constantly  ‘flowing  and  changing’  and  always 
‘manifesting the ethnic and ethical values’ of a society. As reviewed, Buber (1937, 
1947) used ‘encounter’ to illustrate this status of being as the presence of ‘I’ in the 
relationship with other. As he said, ‘The I becomes through the Thou. Becoming an 
I, I say Thou’ (Buber, 1923, p. 18). In therapeutic practice, client and therapist co-
acknowledge  the  ‘encounter’  and  manifest  the  values  of  suffering  in  the 
conversation  between  self  and  the  other.  Levinas  (1986)  used  ‘alterity’  to 
emphasise the manifestation of ethics of facing the other’s experience of suffering. 
In  Alphonso  Lingis’s (1998) introduction to the English version of ‘Otherwise than 
being’, ‘I am responsible before the Other in his alterity, that is, not answerable for  
his empirical and mundane being only, but for the alterity of his initiatives, for the 
imperative  appeal  with  which  he  addresses  me’.  The  ‘third  space’  between the 
client  and  therapist,  argued  in  this  research,  is  a  transcendent  and  paradoxical 
position where one ‘is responsible before the other in his alterity’.
In this study, I tried to use the idea of ‘transaction’ to re-conceptualise the ethical 
level of suffering between one and the other. As having its own moral order and 
virtue grammar (Deuck  & Reimer,  2003),  ‘suffering’  has  been conceptualised  as  
having its weight and values taken and given through the process of understanding. 
My psychotherapeutic  conduct  with  Tai-Ya  and  Hui-Yu  offered  two examples  in 
which we acknowledged suffering in our cultural-moral  structure and transacted 
the values  of  the responsibility  of  being the father,  mother and son,  with each 
other. The discourse of disability presented in Chapter Eight showed how we made 
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the therapeutic conversation into the ethical space to exchange our confession of 
inability with each other. Frank (2001, 2007) emphasised that suffering is dialectical 
and the stories are from dialogues in which one tells his or her stories for the other. 
To return to Cushman (1999, 2005), suffering is a two-person psychology, in which 
the relationship of lived experience needs a dialogic space when searching for the 
embodied values of suffering. In this space, from a psychodynamic point of view 
(Blackwell, 2005), the lived experience of suffering is inter-subjectively contained 
and  held  as  if  the  contact  between  a  mother  and  her  baby  experiences  and 
responds to the existence of each other. Psychotherapy, in this context, is not the 
practice of ‘positive psychotherapy’ which aims on causing ‘rational conversation, 
corrective acknowledgement and self-affirmation’ (Yee, 2003) but the practice of 
ethical recognition which facilitates the reflexivity of self-other relational knowing. 
To  be  clear,  as  the  practice  of  ethics,  this  study  argues  that  the  focus  of 
psychotherapy is not an egology or ecology oriented practice in which therapy is 
focused on re-positioning a client in the context of objective reality and positive 
rationality.  Rather,  psychotherapy  should  be  focussed  on  the  two-fold  but 
paradoxical reality which could re-value the relationship in suffering and manifest 
the moral values within the responsibility for the other.
9.4 As an Ethical Practice: To Therapy and To Therapists
Two  arguments  in  this  research  can  be  concluded  as  the  findings  and  the 
contributions for presenting counselling and psychotherapy as being the practice of 
ethics. Following the discussion of ‘Moral return’ found in the last chapter, firstly, 
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this  research  suggests  that  therapy  makes  the  re-identification  of  one’s  moral 
positions and responsibilities. Beyond the medical reality, therapy itself also makes 
the moral affiliation in the context of local morals and culture. Secondly, from the 
inter-subjective  reflection  on  ‘witnessing  suffering’,  this  study  posits  a  de-
professionalised perspective on the therapist’s responsibility for his or her client. I  
argue that, to engage in the meaning-making process of suffering, a therapist is at  
the same time offered the responsibility of the ethical position of ‘being witnessed’ 
in order to be reflexive upon his or her live experience of suffering. To therapy and 
therapists, this study concludes these two research findings.
9.4.1 Psychotherapy as the Facilitation of Moral Return
In this study, the experience of suffering for the son and the experience of coping 
with the son’s autism are developed as the different hermeneutic horizons in which 
the autism could not be excluded from our common medical reality and political 
rationality,  but the experience of  suffering was acknowledged and honoured by 
gaining its moral values from my act of sharing the parent’s responsibility. Suffering,  
as  having  its  socio-cultural  context  of  ethical  order,  has  been  explored  as  the 
transaction of moral values and weight. This study has showed a process in which 
beyond  the  medical  concerns  of  the  son’s  autistic  tendency,  psychotherapeutic 
practice facilitated a parent’s ‘everydayness’ of suffering, in which a parent could re-
define  his  or  her  responsibility  as  the  father  or  mother  within  the  context  of 
everyday  life  rather  than  the  medical  language.  Also,  the  therapist’s  self-other 
relationship  could  be  articulated  by  the  language  developed  with  the  clients. 
357
Psychotherapy,  accordingly,  can be  regarded as  the  practice  of  ethics  which  re-
values suffering and causes the reflexive horizon of ‘moral return’, in which father, 
mother and son can be returned to the original dynamic of family ethics.  
In his phenomenological  study of an ethnic psychotherapist’s service in a Daoist 
religion institute, Lee (2004) used ‘ethical adjustment’ to illustrate the ‘therapeutic’ 
work  developed  between  the  therapist  and  patient.  This  research  posits  no 
different argument from Lee’s finding that, beyond the medical reality of a disease, 
psychotherapeutic practice, when it is related to suffering for someone, involves 
therapeutic  work  in  the  moral  affiliation  between  oneself,  others  and  bigger 
‘Others’ which in this research are explored as social politics and cultural tradition. 
Illness, suffering and therapy, in this context, are ethical events because they link 
people with the responsibilities valued and embodied by the society and culture. 
Lee, Yu and Lin (2007), in their phenomenological research about the families with a 
chronic schizophrenic member, argued that the very nature of ‘therapy’ is the ‘care’ 
within the family, rather than the ‘cure’ from medical experts. From the discourse of 
‘moral return’, psychotherapeutic practice is argued as the practice of manifesting 
the values of  self-other ethics,  which is  parallel  to the medical  horizon of  cure-
based intervention. This study shows that,  since having an autistic tendency is a 
lifelong label  for the family and may cause a son’s progression to become more 
difficult,  psychotherapy can instigate ethical reflection on a parent’s care for the 
son, which is beyond the treatment of the son’s medical label. To make the medical 
rationality of a child’s behavioural  change, psychotherapeutic practice could also 
make the ethical re-connection to the relationship injured by the son’s illness. 
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In this study, the discourse of ‘moral return’ contextualised an ethical horizon to 
acknowledge  the  experience  of  suffering,  which  is  parallel  to  my  therapeutic  
approach.  In  the  work  with  YH  and  Kevin,  using  a  traditional  cognitive  and 
behavioural approach, the aim was to make a significant change in reference to the 
baseline scores and observation. However, as reviewed, the child, parent and myself 
in the process became an alliance and worked together like a family. I was not only 
the therapist but also a member in the family who conducted my therapy practice 
with co-acknowledged family ethics. The recognition of a parent’s responsibility, as  
represented in the chapters of clients, was based on my CBT therapeutic intention, 
but from the family dynamic developed among us.  
Beyond the conduct of psychotherapy, Walsh (2005) linked Levinas’s influence to 
therapeutic praxis with the Chinese Philosopher Lao-Tzi’s concept of ‘  無為Wu-Wei’: 
doing by not doing, being indirectly or obliquely or invisibly instrumental without 
acting  (p.  35).  The  ‘moral  return’  is  not  a  therapeutic  intention  but  a  reflexive 
reflection on the ‘doing’. Suffering, as Frank reflected (1995), is unspeakable and 
refuses  to  be  conceptualised;  therefore,  in  psychotherapy,  suffering  can  be 
acknowledged  by  ‘unknowing’  its  objective  reality  and  causality.  This  study,  as 
represented,  has  presented  two  cases  that  unknowing  the  son’s  disease  and 
knowing the parent’s  responsibility  were developed with each other as the two 
folds of a thing, which Fromm (1960) signified as the paradoxical reality. From an 
ethical perspective, the lived experience of moral conflicts can be generated as the 
acknowledgement of suffering, which can be a paradoxical existence. 
Accordingly, different from the postmodern approach that psychotherapy aims at 
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facilitating a meta-perspective on one’s lived experience so as to find solutions of 
life impasse or re-write a client’s life story (White, 1999, 2001, 2005; de Shazer, 
1984, 1997), this study argued that psychotherapeutic practice should also reflect 
on the ethical order developed by the mutual encounter. Therapy, therefore, can be 
a dialogic  space in which clients and therapist  together stay in the narration of 
moral conflicts, and endow the ethical values to the paradoxical reality of suffering. 
Hui-Yu’s metaphor of ‘回甘 (Hui-Gang)' is the example in which she analogised the 
experience of suffering as the process of enjoying the taste of the bitterness and 
sweetness in a sip of tea. In this metaphor, bitterness, which in Mandarin shares the 
same character with ‘suffering’,  and sweetness were developed as a paradoxical 
existence:  one  is  the  other’s  causality  and  reality.  For  her,  the  experience  of 
suffering means her lifelong responsibility for YH but taking such responsibility re-
valued herself as the mother. Suffering, in this process, was not developed as an 
‘object’ like a clinical symptom that a client and practitioner work to remove from 
one’s life. It was contextually given the ethical values in a therapeutic relationship to 
take, recognise and share with each other (Kunz, 1998). Psychotherapy became the 
practice of ‘not’ taking the ‘suffering’ away, but living with it by acknowledging its  
local ethics and subjective causality. 
In summary, the conversation in therapeutic process, since it is termed as ‘therapy’,  
has been expected to facilitate the ‘changes’ of one’s objective or subjective reality. 
However, this research suggests that, except for relating it to objectivity, ‘suffering’ 
has its reflexive subjectivity in which both client and psychotherapist are offered an 
interpretive horizon on the self-other ethics and, in the context of moral return, re-
attached to the mutual socio-cultural morality. The ‘changes’ of psychotherapy, in 
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this  context,  could  mean  not  only  the  behavioural  progression  or  cognitive 
difference  but  also  the  mutual  acknowledgement  of  the  paradoxical  reality  of 
suffering, in which a therapeutic practice facilitates both ‘knowing’ and ‘unknowing’ 
the moral frames of suffering. In Wong’s (2007) research of life histories, he used ‘
覺解 Juei-Jei (De-acknowledged Acknowledgement)’ to illustrate how the years of 
psychotherapeutic practice could ‘de-acknowledge and acknowledge’ the Chinese 
cultural moral values in his life history and, vice versa, the awareness of cultural  
values could make him work with clients within the mutual cultural understanding 
of suffering. Psychotherapy, with its paradoxical reality, causes not only clients but 
also  therapists  to  return  to  the  making  of  ethics,  and  its  values  could  be 
acknowledged and manifested by the ‘mutuality’ of suffering. 
9.4.2 Psychotherapy as therapist’s reflexivity of ‘Being Witnessed’  
From reflexive explorations, this study makes an argument for a therapist’s own 
practice that, by facing client’s suffering, the therapist is also offered a position of 
‘being witnessed’ by his or her client. This argument gives another ethical horizon 
regarding the therapist’s existence in the conduct of psychotherapy. By using myself 
as a research case, this thesis presented a storyline that client’s narration could also 
testify  to  the  therapist’s  lived  experience  of  suffering.  Following  the  discussion 
about the paradoxical reality of suffering, ‘being witnessed’ is argued as the other 
side  of  ‘witnessing’,  and  they  together  happened  because  of  the  therapeutic 
encounter. A question, therefore, is articulated to a therapist: ‘How I am witnessed 
by my client in the process of psychotherapy?’
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‘ Being  witnessed’  in  this  study  has  articulated  a  reflexive  reflection  on  the 
therapist’s therapeutic responses. The client, in this context, is re-acknowledged as 
the ‘witness’ awaiting their therapist’s response, and the therapist is argued to be a 
sufferer  who  also  transacts  his  experience  with  the  language  for  the  client.  As 
Schmid (2001) discussed, a therapist’s authenticity towards clients is shaped by a 
client’s  disclosure.  A therapist,  beyond authenticity,  also exposes  himself  to  the 
language of his own suffering recalled by the face-to-face encounter with his clients. 
According to Levinas’s (1985) discussion in Ethics and Infinity, ‘the witness testifies 
to what has been said through him, because the witness has said ‘here I am before 
the other (p. 185)’,  without the regards of being an expert, stories developed in 
front of the client testify the therapist, because to respond to his responses, the 
client has also engaged in the position of ‘here I am before the other’. 
In this context of enabling myself to be witnessed by my clients, ‘therapy’ became 
intersubjective because my clients made therapy ‘happen’ to me as well. In Stephen 
Kurtz’s (1989) analysis of a psychotherapist’s ‘suffering’, he identified the ‘resistance 
to unknowing’ as a therapist’s essential anxiety of the ‘compulsion to make sense’.  
Cited from Gordon (1998), Kurtz posited a reflexive question to use when reflecting 
upon the ‘analysis’ itself: 
The  analyst,  Kurtz  argued,  usually  has  not  analyzed  his  addiction  to  the 
analytic  role,  the  addition  to  understanding  and  the  ‘cohesion-producing 
functions’  (e.g.  through  offering  interpretations  and  weaving  narratives) 
which  is  a  route  to  power  not  just  over  the  other  person,  but  more 
importantly over his own discomfort with unstructured experience. ‘Can the 
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analyst’, Krutz asks, ‘allow the patient to cure him of this need and to open up 
a world that does not make sense? (p. 91)
‘There is in psychotherapy a double witnessing’, Gordon (1998) argued. Laub (1992)  
illustrated that in the process of making ‘testimony’, the listener is a ‘participant 
and a co-owner  of  the traumatic  event:  through its  very listening,  he comes to 
partially experience trauma in himself (p. 57)’. To argue that a therapist is ‘being 
witnessed’,  this  study  adopted  the  concept  of  ‘transaction’  and  presented  my 
empirical context of ‘co-owning’ the experience of suffering. From its hermeneutic 
circle, the horizon of ‘being witnessed’ de-professionalised our therapeutic work. To 
echo Krutz,  this therapeutic practice acknowledges the suffering from ‘the world 
that does not make sense’ to both clients and myself, and shared the moral values 
and weight  that  our  world  has  given  us.  Through ‘being  witnessed’,  a  therapist  
could be ‘unknowing’ himself as the sole figure administering ‘therapy’.
Echoing Kurtz’s argument that ‘a world does not make sense’, in his  research on 
terminal care and bedside counselling, Yee (2006) related Levinas’s term ‘Il-y-a’, the 
‘there is‘ of things, to the Buddhist context ‘  無明 (Avidyā,  ignorance)’,  the pre-
existing of suffering. He used ‘  無無明 (No ignorance)’ to state the ‘not-knowing’ the 
Buddhist context of encountered suffering, and used ‘  無明明盡 (the end of no 
ignorance)’ to illustrate that the therapeutic action of ‘knowing’ always brings the 
therapy itself to acknowledge the ‘unknown’ as the fact of life. Yee (2006) criticised 
that,  when a  therapeutic  practice  is  focussed on  the solutions  of  suffering,  the 
‘ignorance’  would become rooted in  therapeutic  anxiety  and never be touched. 
However,  when  a  therapeutic  practice  could  reflect  on  the  ‘ignorance’  as  the 
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ontology  of  knowing,  the  anxiety  due  to  the  experience  of  suffering  could  be 
‘unknown’ in the process of encountering suffering. 
This study argues that a psychotherapeutic practice makes a ‘witnessed therapist’ in 
its  process.  To  acknowledge  the  uncertainty  of  suffering,  psychotherapy  is  re-
deemed as also the process of reconstructing the therapist’s subjectivity of ethical 
order.  Beyond  the  therapeutic  intentions  for  finding  solutions  for  clients,  being 
witnessed,  in  this  context,  is  argued  as  an  ethical  horizon  of  reflexivity  which 
enabled the therapist to acknowledge suffering ‘with’ clients (Gans, 2000). In this  
reflexive and reflective horizon,  the therapist  is  asked to take off  the glasses of 
being a psychological expert and to acknowledge the client as the one who sheds 
light on his own suffering. A client, in the process of psychotherapy, is also the other 
we can serve and learn from. As the fore-discussion about ‘acknowledgement’ and 
its  literal  meaning  of  appreciation,  ‘being  witnessed’,  as  a  therapist's  reflexive 
horizon, is not only an expertise of therapeutic reflection or the analysis of counter-
transference,  but  also  the  'acknowledgement',  a  real  connection  through  a 
authentic  dialogue as  the mutual  testimony,  so that  one in a psychotherapeutic 
relationship can be listened and responded to, as well as appreciated by the other. 
In  the  co-acknowledgement  of  being  witnessed  by  the  other  (Schmid,  2000),  
psychotherapy can therefore be a container of ‘our’ suffering. 
9.3.3 Beyond Therapy; Ethics of Suffering
From  an  oriental  society  in  Taiwan,  this  research  contributes  to  the  Chinese 
philosophical  context  of  suffering  as  well  as  the  international  discussion  of 
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therapeutic ethics. From an anthropological perspective of social suffering, ‘ethics’ 
was given a socio-cultural and political perspective to explore the stories developed 
by a therapeutic relationship. ‘Suffering’, in the argument as the practice of local 
ethics,  is  illustrated as having its values and weight embodied by the Taiwanese 
socio-cultural  and  political  reality.  Regardless  of  therapeutic  or  clinical  change, 
psychotherapy is argued to be the practice which manifests morality and ethics.
Paul Gordon (2009), in ‘The Hope of Therapy’, reflected that what psychotherapy 
can do is ‘pretty helpless’ when facing the world scale versions of suffering like war,  
torture, hungry or homelessness. ‘As an ethical space’, he reflected that ‘there will 
always be people who want something other than the application of technique (p. 
92)'.  From  a  reflective  and  reflexive  perspective,  this  research  argues  that  the 
therapeutic practice facilitates a space for both therapist and client to return to the 
primordial  moral  responsibility  for  the  others,  in  which,  in  the  face-to-face 
encounter,  we suffer  for  each other,  we acknowledge  the values  and weight  of 
suffering, and we live with the ‘suffering’ together.
Following Gordon’s words, the hope of this study can be ‘small’. Its objective has 
not been to cause the change of things, but making ‘nothing happen’, which is how 
Gordon  (2009)  used  W.H.  Auden’s  word  of  poetry  to  analogise  the  process  of 
psychotherapy. This study presents that in therapy the ethics have already been set 
in  the  therapeutic  relationship  and  ‘nothing  happened’  to  manifest  the  ethical 
contexts and values. Rather than a medical model, psychotherapeutic practice, in 
this  research,  is  represented as the way in which we re-attach ourselves to our 
ethical  system and re-acknowledge ourselves with familiar  ethical  values.  In this 
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context where ‘nothing happens’, psychotherapeutic dialogue is presented as being 
no different from people’s everyday conversation and, rather, simply acknowledging 
the ordinariness of who we are, for instance, as the father, mother, or the son, and 
our responsibilities for others. As the practice of ethics, beyond the ‘techne’ based 
arguments  of  psychotherapy,  this  research  contributes  to  ‘phronesis’  based 
discussions to therapy itself and a therapist himself (Flyjvberg, 2002). Although, in 
this  ending discussion,  nothing really happened because the debate of suffering 
goes back to its beginning, ‘in holding out against the medicalisation of suffering 
and  against  the  technicisation  of  the  responses  to  it’,  using  Gordon’s  (2009) 
reflection as the ending of this section, ‘in insisting on respect for the person at all  
costs and against the odds, in continuing to assert the values of personal autonomy 
and  community  and  the  importance  of  ordinary  ways  of  being  together,  we 
continue to do something, maybe even radical in its own small way, but, certainly 
important (p. 119)’. 
9.4 Evaluation of this Research and Further Development 
In the process of conducting this research, although I was sure about the aim of my 
research  conduct  and  analytic  intentions,  facing  the  fruitfulness  of  the  process 
itself, many interesting horizons related to the context of suffering transaction were 
shaped but could not be further developed. These horizons could be reflected as 
being  the  limit  of  this  research  and  illuminates  the  need  for  further  research 
investigation. I conclude these further ideas in what follows. 
A family with a Daughter with Permanent disabilities: The first idea is the gender 
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issue  about  the  exploration  of  families  with  a  disabled  ‘daughter’.  When I  was 
conducting the fieldwork in Taiwan, I discovered the gendered context of a parent’s 
suffering. Especially, when I was aware of my own patriarchal ethical glasses I used 
to see family experience which then allowed me to re-understand Hui-Yu’s different 
attitudes towards her son and daughter, I understood that the language developed 
in my fieldwork was about a parent’s experience of suffering for the ‘son’ rather 
than just the neutral context of a ‘child’. The stories discovered in this thesis could 
not articulate a family’s experience with a disabled daughter. As discussed earlier, in 
the rooted Confucian ethics, the gender context about a parent’s experience has 
been  represented  in  the  same  way  Taiwanese  local  culture  has  embodied  the 
patriarchal understanding of a father and mother’s responsibility within a family. 
However,  from Hui-Yu’s attitude towards her daughter,  there is  the horizon that 
culture also embodies a different context between the son and daughter. Therefore, 
the story of  a  family  with a  disabled son and with a  disabled daughter  can be 
expected to turn out differently in the way of contextualising the parent’s suffering. 
Further study is accordingly suggested to explore the experience of suffering from 
the family who have a daughter with disability and see the family dynamics the 
parents  choose  to  maintain.  A  case  study  would  be  powerful  and  become  a 
comparison piece to my thesis. 
Transaction between people and landscape:  The second horizon is the broader 
conceptualisation of ‘suffering transaction’ not only between body and language, or 
a sufferer and the witness, but also people and environment, which is from the 
understanding  of  Tai-Ya’s  stories  in  which  suffering  was  closely  related  to 
environmental  changes.  For  Tai-Ya,  living  in  a  rural  area  with  uneven  medical 
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resources and behind-hand social policy became his core context of suffering, but 
when the  highway  system had  built  up  and  connected  Pu-Li  and  Taichung,  the 
highway itself released Tai-Ya’s anxiety for finding medical resources and recorded 
his history of suffering with the useless medical services. 
This research has contributed to the discussion on intrapersonal and interpersonal 
transaction  but,  from  Tai-Ya’s  experience,  suffering  is  transacted  from  the 
geographical  environment  itself,  because  nonverbal  suffering  can  be  recorded, 
stored  and  passed  in  not  only  the  local  history  of  social  politics  but  also  the 
geographical landscapes like a medical centre and buildings such as clinics of early 
intervention. The medical centre built in Pu-Li is an example of Tai-Ya’s subjective 
change  of  the  experience  of  suffering.  In  this  sense  of  transaction,  one  can 
encounter  suffering  with  the  context  ‘stored’  in  the  landscape  itself.  Therefore, 
further ethnographical study about the ‘transaction of suffering’ can be suggested 
to  explore  the  values  and  weight  of  suffering  transacted  between  human  and 
certain landscapes. 
Co-experience and co-comprehension: As the researcher and therapist, I  related 
my family  experience  to  each  client’s  context  of  suffering  so  as  to  analyse  the 
correlation of what suffering meant to us. My clients’ own suffering, since I am also 
from  a  family  with  a  disabled  member,  has  been  pre-set  as  my  response  and 
inclination  to  articulate  my  own  family  history.  However,  although  this  study 
presented my example of  suffering transaction,  in general,  psychotherapy is  not 
processed with such a similar background of lived experience between therapist 
and client.  Although in  this  study,  the  argument  of  a  ‘witnessed therapist’  was 
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based on my connection with my clients, how can it be analogised to the common 
therapeutic relationship?
As  discussed,  this  study  provides  an  empirical  reflection  on  the  ‘transaction’ 
between therapist and client and argues that ‘bearing the witness’ is the essential  
anxiety  of  a  therapist  (Laub,  1992).  However,  the  understanding  of  the  other’s 
experience of suffering could not be just due to one’s similar lived experience, and 
the transaction of moral values and weight could not be just based on a similar 
context of suffering. According to Schmid’s (2001, 2005), the co-comprehension and 
co-acknowledgement in psychotherapy are from its process of co-experiencing and 
co-responding between therapist and client. From experiencing to comprehension, 
further study can be suggested in order to focus on the process of ‘co-experiencing’  
which could not  be explored in  my study  due to my similar  lived experience;  I 
suggest that additional research looks at how the other’s experience of suffering 
could articulate the self’s experience of suffering. Accordingly, the argument of the 
‘witnessed therapist’ could be the subject of further exploration on the formation 
of  therapeutic  dynamics  rather  than  its  contextual  correlation  with  the  client’s 
similarity of circumstance.  
9.5 Ending of the Research, Recapturing my Therapist’ s Image
This study is about the therapeutic  process in which I,  as an ordinary therapist, 
conducted  two  psychotherapeutic  processes,  and  therefore  a  reader  may  have 
judgements regarding my therapeutic conduct in the particular sessions. However, 
this research is not aimed at presenting a successful or failed therapy. Rather, it is 
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aimed  at  exploring  how  meanings  of  ‘suffering’  could  be  developed  in  my 
therapeutic encounter and thus could be acknowledged in the dialogic interaction 
between clients, myself and even the readers of this thesis.
In the autumn of 2010, two years after my fieldwork in 2008, I went back to Taiwan 
for a short holiday and sought respite from my serious homesickness. To attend a 
conference,  I  went to Pu-Li  and saw Tai-Ya’s  family.  In this  two-year period,  the 
highway system was completely done and it only took 40 minutes on coach from 
Taichung city to Pu-Li. At this time, Kevin was now six years old and still had limited 
conversational skills and was keeping ‘early intervention’ in Pu-Li and Taichung city,  
but his art talent had been recognised by the local public and made him a champion 
in  a  local  art  competition.  Tai-Ya,  a  mathematics  teacher,  was  doing  his  master 
degree of social work; his dream was to establish the Association of Autism in the 
Pu-Li  area and integrate  medical  and educational  resources for  families like  his. 
Both Tai-Ya and his wife Jene became leaders of a support group for the parents of 
an autistic child. 
During this visit, in a small rural hot-pot restaurant, Tai-Ya, Jene, Kevin and I met 
each other for dinner together. Kevin remembered me; he laid and crawled on my 
knees with his special language and even showed me the photos he took with his  
father’s mobile phone. Tai-Ya and Jene happily chatted with me and talked about 
their gains and losses experienced in the two years of our separation, and their 
constant worry about the boy on my knees. 
The chat that tangled itself in the vapour rising from our boiling hot-pot made me 
recognise myself and my relationship with them. Conducting this study since 2006, I  
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always asked myself, what am I doing? Is this research and therapeutic service for 
my clients, for myself or for my family? Why do we suffer? What are we suffering 
for?  In  this  dinner,  after  two  years  of  ‘immersing’  myself  in  my  study  about 
suffering, I understood that I am not only a therapist but something beyond the 
traditional  role,  because  in  this  position  I  had  been  trusted  by  this  family  and 
honoured for taking responsibility for embracing and sharing their lifelong worry for 
Kevin. For me, the worry for the son has become an ongoing part of my own life as 
well. When Kevin sat on my knees, the responsibility for them since the encounter 
in 2008 was shown to be a continuing present reality, no matter whom I was sitting 
with and where we were. In this face-to-face encounter, it was not only like how 
Levinas said that responsibility for the other begins at the initial contact, but also 
that  the  responsibility  for  the  other  is  called  to  be  developed  without  ending. 
Understanding their gain, loss and the new context of suffering, I, because of them, 
understood what I had been learning in this study. 
To conduct this research, although I could not continue with my therapeutic work in 
the UK since I arrived in 2006, I learned a therapeutic attitude of remaining reflexive 
of  my own responsibility  that  my clients  endowed to me and the ethics of  our 
relationship.  In  the  research  work  of  finding  meaning  in  our  therapeutic 
relationship,  between  two  different  languages  and  moral  systems,  this  study 
became the process of reflecting on every therapeutic detail,  deconstructing the 
meaning  of  suffering  from  Chinese  transcript  and  reconstructing  the  context  in 
English and re-identifying my relationship with my clients, my family, our culture 
and society in both languages. By conducting this research, I could recognise myself 
as a therapist again. In the process of linking each client’s history with mine, like 
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peeling an onion, as a learning practitioner, I came to understand how being a good 
therapist could be difficult but it  was honourable to touch the core of suffering 
‘with’ and ‘for’ a client, as Gans (2000) emphasised.
Accordingly,  for me, this study has served as therapeutic training while I  live far 
away from my hometown in Scotland, because it has rebuilt my relationship with 
not only my clients but also my important family members. When this research was 
reaching its end, I started to be curious about my therapeutic work. When I again sit 
in  the  position  of  encountering  the  other’s  experience  of  suffering,  how  will  I  
include myself into a client’s stories? This research let me understand that my lived 
experience  has  been  opened  to  clients  and,  to  ‘acknowledge’  suffering,  I  fully 
appreciate that a client could make his or her stories told while with me, and we  
could witness the other’s experience of suffering together. Therapeutic practice, in 
this stage of learning,  is  more ‘here and now’ and involves more ‘we-ness’ (Lin, 
2005; Buber, 1937). I found one of my favourite therapist’s therapeutic notes, which 
was before too abstract and paradoxical to me, which has now helped me to now 
see how therapy could be possible. In this note, she reflected that,
Psychotherapy, as a two-person exploration by both me and my clients, is like 
a process that we are stepping together in the darkness. It is neither who is  
leading nor who is led. It is neither hard nor pleased. It is uncertainty in its  
nature and I am learning to enjoy the uncertainty with my client.  After 30 
years of therapist life, I  come to realize the change inside of myself: At the  
very beginning, I may expect myself to be a lamp which can light and guide my 
client through the darkness, but now I just want to be a lamp which just lights 
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up our next step and so we can safely have our exploration…. (Sha, 1998, p.  
46)
Creating  and  sharing  this  research  for  me  is  difficult  not  only  because  of  my 
language barrier in English but also because of the uncertainty of the ‘unspeakable 
suffering’  itself.  Beyond  the  hermeneutic  circle  presented  in  this  research,  this 
study endows another circle for me, which is the process of identifying myself as 
the qualitative researcher, psychotherapist and both. To develop this thesis, I had to 
learn a way to acknowledge the ‘uncertainty’ of suffering and engage in a certain 
exploration of this uncertainty. Researching suffering, therefore, became a journey, 
in which I  can now fade the image of  a good therapist  who ‘lights through the 
darkness’, but also stays with the client and enables myself to be ‘the lamp which 
just  lights  up  my  next  step’.  I  understand  that,  in  this  journey,  I  am  not  only  
becoming a better researcher, but also honouring myself as a better therapist.
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